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ii. 
The Russian political parties commonly regarded by contemporaries 
as the 'moderates' (the Kadets, Oktobrists and Progressists) together 
comprised the fulcrum of the Fourth State Duma. By exploiting their 
pivotal position between the extremes of Right and Left, and drawing 
upon their exceptional professional experience and parliamentary 
expertise, the moderates in large measure determined the policies 
and actions of the Duma over the five years preceding the fall of 
tsardom. Despite the closeness of their basic interests in the face 
of estrangement from the nation, the hostility of the tsarist 
government and the developing revolutionary situation, party politics 
were never more vicious or obsessive. Over the period 1912-1917 the 
Kadet party led by Paul Milyukov cynically exploited the fortuitous 
collapse of its traditional Oktobrist rival and successfully resisted 
the challenge of the new Progressist group to emerge as the dominant 
authority within the Duma. However the Kadet parliamentary triumph 
proved hollow in the broader context. On being confronted by the 
mounting challenges of peacetime, wartime and finally revolution, 
the Duma moderates at each stage more clearly demonstrated their 
failings and limitations. The greater the crisis, the more selfish 
were their tactics ; the greater the danger, the closer their 
association with the tsarist establishment. On the collapse of 
teardom in February 1917, the Duna moderates received the legacy of 
power not through their proven abilities but from the total absence 
of effective competition. The fate of the Provisional Government, 
the moderates in power, was predetermined by their performance over 
the five years of the last State Dumm. 
iii" 
PRELIMINARIES 
No part of the material offered in this thesis has previously 
been submitted for a degree at Durham or any other university. 
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My acknowledgements must go to the supervisors of my research, 
Professor W. V. Wallace, now of the New University of Ulster, and 
Professor E. D. Chermensky of Moscow State University. My thanks are also 
owing to the British Council for making possible an academic year's 
study in the Soviet Union. 
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The transliteration system employed is that of The Slavonic and 
East European Review, with two exceptions : 
When the SEER system differs from that of a source, the SEER 
system is employed in the text and the original system reserved for 
quotations, references and the Bibliography ; 
The usage Nicholas and Alexandra is preferred to Nikolai and 
Aleksandra in referring to the Tsar and Taaritea, partly from deference 
to increasing popular usage, partly to differentiate them conveniently 
from other leading personages. 
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Unless specifically stated otherwise, all dates cited are Old Style. 
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Duma. Though only a record of official decisions and communications, not 
the minutes of ministerial discussions about the Dumas this file is 
fundamental to the topic, particularly since the 'Chancellery of the State 
Duma' (TaGIAL, f. 1278) unhappily provides no such complete and well-ordered 
document run from the Duma side. 
Personal Testimonies. These are scattered without readily discernible 
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been expected. Oktobrist records are generally the most ordered and 
businesslike but come to an abrupt stop in January 1914 (Oktobrgft Fraction : 
TsGAOR, f. 125)" Kadet records are the most irregular and evasive. 0nl the 
most formal occasions were completely minuted, for example the VI Kadet 
PartyCongress in February 1916 (Ts GAOR, f. 523, opis' 3, delo 5, pp. 1-147). All 
other meetings, even important party conferences, were either very 
indifferently recorded or indeed passed without written record : Kadet 
Fraction (TsGAOR, f. 125) and Kadet Party (TsGAOR, f, 523). Few Progressist 
records proved available, the Archive staff assuring me that the paucity of 
documentation did not even justify a seperate fond for the Progressist Party. 
Police Department Records. Where party documentation proved 
disappointing overall, the deficiency was amply compensated by the ordered 
and meticulous files of the tsarist Police Department (TsGAOR, f. 102). The 
police records provide a chronologically complete account of Duma activity 
frequently at variance to that offered by party sources. Chernov affected to 
find the police reports 'in general extremely one-sided' but they constitute 
a vital corrective to the bland propaganda of the political parties. (1) 
With its reporters legally entitled to attend all party gatherings, its 
undercover agents infiltrated into all parties, with the backing of a 
nationwide organisation and the ample funds of the Ministry of Interior, the 
Police Department performed the function of political intelligence bureau 
vii. 
very competently. With the confidentiality of their opinions and identities 
guaranteed, the police informants covering the Duma moderates appear to have 
been both sober and shrewd, free from the sensationalism of the agents 
covering the revolutionary and proletarian movements, who were tempted to 
maintain a note of emergency to justify their continued employment. 
The political judgement of the Police Department was reflected in the 
balance of its parliamentary coverage : dividing its attention equally 
between the Kadets and Oktobrists until earl9 1914, the Department thereafter 
concentrated on the Kadets, allowing the Oktobrists and Progressists 
together to lapse into a subsidiary interest. The most valuable police files 
proved to be the 'General Duma reports' (TsGAOR, f. 102, delo 307/A) submitted 
by the Department's regular team of lobby correspondents, and the 'Party 
reports' (TsGAOR, f. 102, delo 27) submitted by the individual undercover 
agents within each party. The latter file was further divided b9 province 
and major town : the most useful for the topic were predicatably the 
Petersburg (delo 27/57) and Moscow (delo 27/46) divisions. 
While each of the four categories of archival source suffers serious 
limitations and even distortions, the weakness of one source was usually 
compensated by the strengths of another. Though individually suspect, the 
composite effect of these sources, especially when integrated with the very 
considerable volume of published material, was to provide a rounded and 
balanced coverage of the politics of the Duma moderate parties from 1912 
to 1917. 
1 CHERNOV 448. 
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1. 
CHAPTER ONE : INTRODUCTION 
1. The emergence of the 'Moderates' 
The most persistent feature of the Russian political tradition in the 
nineteenth century was the concept of inescapable confrontation between 
the forces of Taerdom and Revolution, which could only be resolved by the 
complete victory of the one and the utter liquidation of the other. The 
very first years of the twentieth century however seemed to admit a new 
and promising political option. The most permanent impact of the train of 
events which came to be dubbed the 1905 Revolution was made by the Tsar 
Nicholas II's manifesto of 17 October which promised Russia for the first 
time a representative national assembly with full legislative authority. 
A constitutional 'Third Course' emerged to challenge and (many hoped) to 
supersede the sterile and wasteful earlier pattern of political development. 
The month of October 1905 witnessed not only the concession of the 
October Manifesto but the formal establishment of the Conetitntioaal- 
Democratic (or Kadet) Party and the Union of 17 October (common known as 
the Oktobrists). 1 Although the positions and programmes of the two parties 
were very different at their foundations in the heightened revolutionary 
atmosphere of late 1905, the parliamentary experience of the next five 
years was to have the effect of drawing theKadets and Oktobriete 
significantly closer together. The most potent factor influencing their 
changing political positions was. the recovery of the tsarist government 
from the tre. a of 1905,, expr. sing_ itself in the first instance in. 4 
campaign to minimise the coneessiele extracted under revolutionary duress 
and subsequently in an offensive against the most permanent of the 
1 E. E. Chermenalq PaskWis, i Tsar en v Pervo4 s off' `irfo , 1Moscvx 1970, pp. 158-17k & 197-201 ; G. Aronson, Rosi aakannne 8syol tai i, 
New York 1962, p. 163. 
2. 
products of the October Manifesto, the State Duma. 
While 1905 appeared to offer real hope to reformers, the future 
pattern of Russian political life was effectively decided in the contests 
of the next year. Political initiative started to flow back to the govern- 
-meat from the very first days of 1906. The new Fundamental Laws published 
in April constituted a catalogue of legalistic devices by which Duma 
authority and initiative were to be proscribed, a transparent attempt to 
revert as closely to the pre-revolutionary situation as the circumstances 
of 1906 and the Imperial promise would permit. 
2 This first unequivocal 
indication of the government's future technique of keeping to the letter 
of the October Manifesto while cynically disregarding its spirit was 
confirmed by the short career of the first Duma : the sangunely-labelled 
'Duma of the People's Hopes' was suffered to run a more seventy-two days 
before an im-passe in its relations with the government occasioned 
summary dissolution. 
3 
As the numerically dominant 'fraction' in the First Duma, the Kadets 
bore the prime responsibility for conducting the defensive campaign to 
safeguard the gains of 1905.4 Their only recourse was to attempt to rally 
all available areas of support against the government revue he but none 
proved capable of stemming the deterioration in the position of the Duna. 
The possibility of harnessing sympathetic foreign resources to the Duma 
cause recommended itself but the enormous loan from Western Europe secured 
by the tsarist government in April 1906 both provided the Tsar with 
2 B. Dmytrlehyn(Ed. ), Inverial Rassia_ source book 1700-1917, New York 
1967 9 pp "317-324 ; also L. Schul ts, ' C stitutienal Law is Russia' in Russia Entere theTwentieth Ceaturx Ed. G. Katkov, London 1971 pp. 44-7. 
3 V. A. Maklakov, T i1t_ t', l iama U. P. 1964, p. 14. 
4 Party groupings within the Duna were termed 'fractions' ; 179 of the 
total 478 First Duna deputies were Eadets : P. N. Miliukov 9 Political Memoirs 1 05-1 1 , Ed. A. P. fieadel, Michigan U. P. 1967 
(cited bester as 
UROV), Ip. 96 ; 'also A. Tyrkoba-liilliame, 'The Cadet Party's Re,,. T ew,,, vol. 12. no. 3", 1953 p 179. -ý .. 
3" 
interim financial independence of the Duma and demonstrated convincingly 
that international politics and high finance took instant priority over 
the most sincere French and British concern for Russian constitutionalism. 
5 
Talk of the formation of a coalition cabinet drawing upon both government 
and Duma personnel briefly raised hopes in May and June of 1906 but the 
intractability of the Kadet leader Pavel Milyukov (still determined to 
adhere to the principles of 1905 in greatly reduced circumstances) and the 
accelerating self-assurance of the government combined to bring the 
tentative negotiations to naught. 
6 
The final Kadet failure was the most traumatic of all. The classic 
resource available to the Duma was the active support of the nation ; the 
critical force which had sedured the 1905 victory could always be summoned 
to defend its gains. But the political weapon brandished so confidently by 
the first Duma leaders to browbeat the government proved by mid 1906 to be 
nothing but ineffectual bluff. The truth of the Duma's loss of contact 
with the nation and inability to command nationwide revolution at a 
moment's notice could not have been displayed more cruelly. The Vyborg 
Appeal calling for a mass demonstration of national solidarity with its 
representatives in the Duma echoed hollowly in the ears of its embarrassed 
authors, a political fiasco from which the morale of the Kadöta was never 
completely to recover. 
7 From their experience of 1906, a premature teat of 
5 O. Crisp, 'The Russian Liberals and the 1906 Anglo-French Loan to Russia', 
w (cited hereafter as SER), ro1.39, no. S East &=9M A2 
93, June 19 1, pp. 97-511 ; also T. Riha, A Bussi European : Paul M li ov 
in Russian Politics, Notre Dame U. P. 19 9, pp. 1l 5. 
6 Maklakev, The First State Dusaspp. 18k'-20k ; LIUXOV 108-116 ; also 
R. L. Tuck, 'Panl Miliukov and the negotiations for a Drama Ministry 1906', 
Americas Slavic and t Euroue sa (cited hereafter as ASEER), 
vol. 10, no. 2,1951, PP. 117-129. 
r? Maklakov, The First Stet&D , pp 218-232 ; V. N. Kokoytsov, Ont Of _ ? eat 
: Mssmoirs, Ed. H. H. Fisher, Stanford U. P. 1935 (cited hereafter as 
KOKOVTSOV), p. 155 ; also P. Exticott, T)w se otnt tut o- 
DrtcP , t: apubliehed N. 1. _ 
theüis n o* 
19 , PP. 29 -307., 4 ,... 
If. 
their political skills, the Kadets emerged with nothing but an aura of 
ineffectual martyrdom. In immediate terms, the government's prosecution 
of the signatories of the Vyborg Appeal hit the ladet party very hard, 
contributing to its greatly reduced representation in subsequent Dumas ; 
in the long term, the lessons of 1906 were to remain with the ladets to 
the end of their political days. 
8 
To the Union of 17 October, whose more modest ambitions had hitherto 
attracted lese attention and less support than the ladets, the events of 
1906 confirmed its belief in the necessity of compromise and collaboration 
with the government. In an interview given to Novoe Vre a on 27 August 
1906, the Oktobrist loader Alekeandr Guchkov expressed his party's complete 
support for the actions of the government (headed since the previous 
month by Stolypin) and tacitly approved both the field courts-martial 
instituted as a counter-revolutionary measure and the controversial 
dissolution of the Duma. A small group on the Oktobrist Left wing led by 
Dmitrii Shipov declared itself unable to support Guchkov's policy of 
'blank cheque' support for the government and quit the Oktobrists to form 
the independent 'Party of Peaceful Renewal'. 
9 However the Aktobrist 
majority, seeing in the Duna dissolution and ladet failure the collapse 
of the only viable alternative, quickly reconciled itself to the political 
realism of the Guchkov line. 
10 
The year 1907 served only to emphasise the bleak facts of the previous 
year. The career of the Second Duna demonstrated the humiliating 
ineffectiveness of 'the People's Wrath' while the confident 
8 MILITJXOV 145 ; also Riha, A Russian Eire e, an, p. 134 aad L. Strakhovsky, 
'The Statesmanship of Peter o pia', E, v01.37, no. 89, p" 52. 
9 Chermeaaky, Burz u is i Taa , pp"330-334 and G. A. Sosking, Q. veraaeat 
and Duna in Rm%wi& 19 0 . -1 1 ,, aapnblished Ph. D. thesis, Caabridge 1970, 
pp-38-9. 
10 )ULIULOV 139 & 158 3: £, F F*reaslq, The g orlS rs London 1966 
(sited hersatt. r as KERERM)#p. 95 ; Chera reeky, urn uasia i Tsarist, 
pp"334-5. 
5" 
unscrupulousness of the government over the Shornikova episode augured 
grimly for the future of Russian constitutionalism. The government was now 
sufficiently assured of its powers to effect the crucial counter- 
revolution : the new electoral laws of 3 June 1907 smashed for all time 
the representative rationale of the State Duma. In 1905 optimists had 
projected a government reformed by the Duma ; in 1907 the Duma was reformed 
to suit the government. 
11 The tsarist system proved prepared to tolerate 
the tame Third Duma which opened in November 1907. With the revolutionary 
situation calmed and the extreme elements which had been so in evidence in 
the Second Duma filtered from the Third, even the Tsar was prepared to 
admit privately to Stolypin that 'this Duma cannot be reproached with an 
attempt to seize power and there is no need at all to quarrel with it'. As 
a harmless sop to Russian society and convenient window-dressing to West 
European allies, the Third Duma encountered a significant measure of 
toleration by the government, which found it more expedient to maintain 
the Duma than to provoke opposition by an unnecessary dissolution* 12 
Within the Third Duma, the three basic political courses were 
represented very differently : the Right-wing groups were present in 
considerable strength, resting content with their self-appointed role of 
watchdog of the autocracy ; the revolutionary Left was almost entirely 
excluded by the slanted June electoral laws ; the remaining political 
groups in the middle position found themselves in a particularly exposed 
and vulnerable situation. The first Kadet reaction, as voiced for example 
by Mikhail Chelnokov, was of total despair : 
Duma affairs are no cause for rejoicing : just sitting here we are betraying Russia and ourselves ; we are gradually getting lost is trifles, losing our perspective, forgetting everything, learning 
nothing and little by lttle changing into bureaucrats ... we are insulated from real life here We are losing contact with the people, 
11 MILIUKOV 158-9 ;N . P. Yeroshkia! or Goeudarstvennikh Uchrezhdo-AiL Dorevolvutsionn` osaii, Moeoow 19 , pp. 270-1. 
12 B. Pares, The Fall of the Russian Monarc New York 1939, republished in 
Vintage Books 19 1 cited hereafter as PARES), p. 109 ; EESTNSKY 103. 
6. 
getting accustomed to living only in our imaginations, not having the 
opportunity to see or speak to our electorates. It is simply a wasfng- 
away of brains and the exercise cannot continue much longer. (13) 
Borae high by the flood of 1905, the Kadets now found themselves stranded 
and helpless, left high and dry by the rapid ebb of revolution. Morally 
bound by the now acutely embarrassing party programme which was largely 
the product of the heady revolutionary optimism of 1905, the Kadets were 
confronted by the stark political lessons of 1906 and 1907.14 
Rather than martyr Russian democracy gloriously but uselessly, 
moderate apologists for the Third Duma were to find comfort in the 
historical patterns of Western Europe, which offered proof of successful 
constitutional development born of equally unpromising early circum- 
-stances. 
15 Isolated from external resource and patently at the mercy of 
the government, the Third Duma learned to pocket its pride and husband its 
all too meagre internal resources. With survival as first priority, careful 
self-interest replaced strident declarations of principle as the dominant 
feature. Some years later Milyukov was to remark of the Third Duma :` 
The "heroic" age of its life was really at an end. Thenceforward the 
Duma was to live in obscurity. After a few months of meteoric 
splendour, there followed long years of a very modest existence... 
The Duma with its changed composition tried to adapt itself to its 
political environment. The new majority renounced bold schemes for 
the general reform of Russia and devoted themselves to the rather 
ungrateful task of self-preservation. (16) 
Political sights were lowered to cover at most the implementation of the 
October Manifesto. While the reforming groups for shame retained the 
political programmes of the revolutionary period, their morale and tactics 
13 M. V. Chelnokov to Countess Uvarova, 29 October 1907 quoted in Istoria 
, 1965: 2, p. 213. 
14 MILIUKOV 164 ; also F. J. Piotrow, Pau1 Mi14nkov and the Constituti 
Democratic Partv, unpublished D. Phil. thesis, Oxford 19619p. 239. 
15 M. Baring, TheMains ri s of Ru si , London 1914, pp. 126-7 ; Times, 22 April 1911(New Style , Sf ; PARES 117. 
16 P. Milyukov, 'The Representative System in Russia' in Russian Realities 
and Problema, Ed. J. D. Duff, Canbridge 1917, p"27" 
', 
7. 
were determined by the hard facts of the post-revolutionary period. 
The Oktobrist fraction enjoyed the same moral and numerical 
preponderance in the Third Duma that the Kadets had so briefly experienced 
in the First. 
17 But, warned by the ladet experience and the continuing 
government recovery, the Oktobrists deliberatel* set out to establish 
permanent collaboration with the government, which Soviet historians have 
dubbed the '3rd June System'. 18 Within weeks of the convening of the Third 
Duma there emerged a political understanding between Guchkov and Stolypin 
which effectively converted the Oktobrists into what rivals in their 
outrage termed the 'government party'. 
19 Meanwhile the Kadets, setting 
aside the aura of martydom left over from the First Duna, soon pursued a 
more realistic policy line and adjusted to the reduced circumstances of the 
Third Duna. Despite the extravagant despair of some of his lieutenants, 
Milyukov affected to view the future with equanimity : 
I had no doubts of course that there was a place for the ladet fraction 
even in the "Lords" and "Lackeys" Dnma of Juno 3rd ... In this respect I was the least implacable of all our "leaders". I always believed 
that the very idea of popular representation, even though distofted, 
carried within itself the germ of future internal development. (20) 
The Kadets almost embarrassingly quickly settled for the r8le of 'opposition 
to the Oktobrist 'establishment' ; on one unguarded occasion Milyukov was 
even to refer to himself as belonging 'to His Majesty's Opposition and not 
to the opposition to His Majesty'. 
21 
The political moderates emerged more and more clearly as they reconcil- 
17 G. A. Hoskings'StolTýin and the Octobrist Party', Sý, vol. 37, no. 108 
(January 1969), p. 1t2. 
18 For example, A. Ya. Avrekh, Tsarisa i Tret'esunakasa Sisteaa, lloscox 1966 & 
V. S. Dyakin, Ru B uaz a Tsari mv od pervoy mirovo voi , Leningrad 19 7, Chapter I: Tsarina i burzhuazia v tret'eyunskoy 
monarkhii. 
19 Milyukov, 'The Representative System', p. 31. 
20 MILIUKOV 164-5 ; also Pietrow, bnl Mi11ºukov, PP. 239-242. 
21 For Milrukov's Leaden Mansion Bonne speech, see Tim, 3 J111y 19®9('/s), 
14e ; for Russian coment, aee Rossig, 21 June 1909 and Gales " 
23 June 1909. 
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-ed themselves to the limited horizons of the Third Duma. The differences 
in party programme, social composition and party legend mattered less and 
less as time went by. The political harassment of the Ktdets had 
effectively broken their revolutionary spirit and diluted the principles 
for which they had stood so bravely in 1906 ; by the middle years of the 
Third Duma the Kadets had moved perceptibly towards the Oktobrist position. 
The differences between the Kadets and the Oktobriets started to become lese 
fundamental than their similarities. Lenin remarked that just as the 
Oktobrists were the 'government party', the Kadets were only the 'tolerated 
opposition' and their basic positions differed very little. Further to this 
he contended that the 0ktobriks and Kadets were but variants of the same 
phenomenon : 
The Oktobrist is a ladet who applies his bourgeois theories to 
practical life. The ladet is an Oktobrist whi in his hours of leisure, 
when he is not plundering the workers and peasants, dreams of an ideal 
bourgeois society. The Oktobrist will learn a little more about 
parliamentary manners and the political humbug of playing at democracy 
; the ladet will learn a little more about the business of bourgeois 
intrigue ; but they will merge, they will merge inevitably and 
infallibly. (22) 
While Lenin certainly overstated his case in 1908, his fundamental point 
was more premature than inaccurate. With time the differences in the 
moderate Duma camp receded still further and the 'moderates' emerged einer 
more clearly as a universally recognised political grouping. 
The 'principle' of society collaboration with the government was 
applauded in the prestigious and influential collection of essays entitled 
Vekhi which appeared in 1909. Vekhi welcomed the intelligentsia's break 
from exclusive commitment to the nineteenth-century concept of Revolution 
and its new emphasis on cooperation between society and the tsarist 
establishment. Mi. lyvkov affected to disagree with Vskh # and ßcst notably 
22 Quoted in J. V. Stalia(Ed. ), Th Ht of the Civil War is the USSR, 
London 1937, rol. I, p. 14 also Lenin, Collactad ýTo$ Fou h Edition, 
London 1963, vol. 1 81PP: 49-52. 
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with the opinions of Peter Struve, but the conduct of the Badet party after 
1908 was largely consistent with the principles of Vekhi. 
23 Lenin was later 
to remark that the VVeekki opinions were 'the clear, distinctly expressed 
views, not of an individual, but of a class, for as a matter of fact, the 
entire mass of the Octobrist and Cadet bourgeoisie in Russia during 1907- 
1914 subscribed to them'. 
24 Although the publication of Vekhi occasioned a 
political furore by pointing the contrast between the revolutionary policies 
of 1905 and the compromising tactics of 1909, it was intended to lend 
retrospective approval to the Oktobrist experiment in collaboration and, 
most particularly, the Kadet volte-face in relations with the government. 
Ironically, it was in the year of VVeekhhii's publication that the 
principle of constructive collabogEtion began its process of decomposition. 
Notwithstanding the stress laid by Soviet historians on the mutual benefits 
of the '3rd June System', the Guchkov-Stolypin compact was always essential 
precarious. The Oktobrist policy towards the government, though starting 
out with better prospects, was in the long term no more successful than the 
earlier Kadet policy. If the Oktobrist failure was less dramatic than the 
ladet, its agony was the more protracted. The privileged position of the 
Oktobrist fraction surviived intact for a more eighteen months over late 
1907 - early 1909. By mid 1909, irritated by Guchkov's stubbornly independe 
and occasionally unnecessarily provocative line, Stolypin had begun to 
search for a more subservient Duma ally, shifting inevitably towards the 
Right wing until he settled tentatively on the Nationalists. 
25 The camp- 
followers of the Right attracted to the Oktobrist banner by its privileged 
position started to desert almost at once : Oktobrism began to lose 
23 N. P. Poltoratzky, 'The "Vokhi" Dispute and the Significance of "Vekhi", 
Canadian Slavonic Paners, vol. 9, no. 1(Spring 1967), pp. 86-106. 
24 Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 20, p. 129 (original underlining). 
25 Padenie Tsarrskoao Rs hiaa : Report of the Special Investigation 
Commission of the Prei i©nal Government, Ed. P. E. Shchegolev 7 vole, 
Moscow 1924-7 (cited hereafter as PADSNIE), vol. vi, pp. 301-2(testimony of 
Milyukov) ; also Hosking, 'Stolypin and the Oktobrist Party'9pp"144030 
and 133-4. 
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membership to both Right and Left from the very first sign of rift with the 
government in spring 1909. 
The secession of the 'Gololobov group' began a steady drain to the 
developing Nationalist fraction to the Right of the Oktobrists. 
26 
With the 
closing of the gap between the Kadets (who were drifting to the Right) and 
the Oktobrists (who were moving further Left), the earlier and neglected 
Party of Peaceful Renewal received a dramatic stimulus to its development. 
Coupled with the tactical advantage of its position between the Kadets and 
Oktobrists was the increasing support and patronage of, in particular, 
Moscow industrialist circles. With the rapid development of the industrialij 
and commercial classes came a growing ambition for political participation 
which was earliest and most forcibly expressed by the Moscow group led by 
Pavel Ryabuahinsky. Following the foundation of a newspaper in 1909 to 
publicise the industrial interest (iTtro Roseii), Ryabushinsky promoted the 
most promising parliamentary fraction of the Third Duma as the future voice 
of the industrialist interest. After years in the doldrums, the Party of 
Peaceful Renwwal entered a period, of spectacular development over the last 
two years of the Third Duma. 
27 
The declining '3rd June System' was conclusively and irreversibly 
dissolved in the course of 1911. The Western Zematvos crisis of March-April 
1911 demonstrated both* the flimsy constitutionalism of even the relatively 
moderate Stolypin and the vulnerability of the State Duma to growing . 
government and court hostility. In the last resort the Duna was more than 
ever at the mercy of the government, its own resources and authority almost 
r. , 
26 Hoekiag, 'Stolypin and the Octebrist Party', pp. 142-3 & 150-3 ; MILIUKOY 159 & 220 ; V. Y. Laverychev, 'Lenin o klassakh i partiakh mezhdu dvumya 
burzhuazno-demokraticheskimi revolyntsiami' in V. I. Lenin i intoria 
klassov i uoliticheskikh ßartii v Roesii, Ed. M. P. Kim, Moscow 1970, pp. 166-7 
27 Laverychev, 'Lenin o klassakh', pp. 167-8,197 & 202 ; Avrekh, Tsarin i Tret'eyunekaya Sistema, p. 158 and 'Leneki Rasstrel i Krimis Tret'e3unekey Sistemy', ýVo rosi Ist_rii, 1964: 2, p. 158 ; MILIUKOV 160 ; Lenim, Co lta sd W_ ks, vol. 18, pp. 8.1-2 ; Hosking, Goyernment and. Dnma, pp"275-7. 
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negligible both in the constitutional and power-political contexts. Shocked 
by thes dramatic esposfi of their isolation and impotence, the Duma moderates 
rounded upon Stolypin as the perpetrator of their humiliation. 
28 Just as 
the Vyborg Appeal had spotlighted the bankruptcy of Kadet policy towards the 
government, the Western Zemstvos crisis now spotlighted the bankruptcy of 
Oktobrist policy and of the '3rd June System'. 
However the Duma still needed the goodwill of Stolypin. 
29 The Western 
Zemstvos crisis had at the outset been a product of Stolypin's difficulty 
in maintaining a moderate constitutional course in an increasingly 
reactionary milieu. The understandable but unfortunate antagonism of the 
Duma moderates resulting from the crisis only further weakened St©lypin's 
position and had he not been assassinated in September 1911 he would almost 
certainly have been replaced in office. 
30 An it was, the death of Stolypin 
profoundly affected the moderate cause within both government and Duma : the 
only conceivably effective barrier to the influx of reaction into the ruling 
establishment was removed ; the Duma lost the only ally of sufficient 
stature to cocoon the legislative institutions against the increasingly 
reactionary climate of court and bureaucratic Russia ; and any close 
relationship between a moderate Duma fraction and the government in the 
style of the '3rd June System' was now completely out of the question. 
After September 1911, government and Duna alike underwent a period of 
anxiety and protracted erisis. 
31 Within the structure of government, the 
death of Stolypin left a political void which it would hardly be an 
exaggeration to say remained the fundamental preoccupation of the Tsar and 
28 Hosking, Government and Duma, pp. 187-202 ; P_ E, vi, 301(Milyukov) ; E. D. Chermensky, B ' Kl ov i Partii v Chetvertoy Gosudarstvenno 
Dume 1912-1917 jut., unpublished Doctoral thesis, Moscow 1947 (cited 
hereafter as CHERMENSKY), pp. 30-2. 
29 A. Levin, 'Peter Stolypin :a political appraisal', Journal of Modern His t , December 1965, p. 445 ; Hosking, Governmeat and Duma, pp. 203.7. 
30 Erass iArkhiv, 105 vols, Noseow 1922-41 (cited hereafter as i&), -vel ! pp " 189.190 ; MILIUKOY 226. & 228-230 ;P , vii, 7(Shimgarev) .. 
31 Milyuk®v, ' 'hs -Represa*t*ºtilre System' , p"33 ;R ha, A_Russian Enropea*, p. 190. 
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his ministers until the February Revolution itself. Within the Third Duma, 
fears of an unconstitutional outrage against the legislative institutions 
were matched by growing apprehension about the next constitutional hazard : 
the elections to the Fourth Duma. 
2. The election camuai= to the Fourth Duma 
The Fourth Duma elections scheduled for autumn 1912 confronted the 
Dum4oderate fractions with two distinct causes for concern. Both 
fundamental relationships - with the government and with the nation - 
presented apparently insuperable problems. As regards the government, Vyborg 
had proved the failure of a candid opposition policy and the Western 
Zemstvoa crisis the failure of a collaborative policy. The apparent 
impossibility of maintaining either principal political course confronted 
the moderate fractions with the unenviable task of concocting a third course 
which was both tolerable to the government and consistent with party 
programmes. The relationship with the government was of more than academid 
interest since the attitude of the government was expected to be a major 
factor in the Fourth Duma elections. Although such a drift seemed to invite 
election disaster, the Third Duma moderates found themselves drawn into an 
oppositional stance by circumstances. All prospect of a return to 
collaboration with the government had gone ; Stolypin's death ushered in a 
resurgence of reactionary influence ; and even the maintenance of the Duna 
as a legislative institution was considered in question. 
32 The recent 
elimination of the constructive' alternative left the Doma moderates with 
little option but opposition to the government, 
The relationship of the Duma moderates with the electorate was ae lese 
fraught for they were well aware that their position in the country was 
32 M. V. R©dzya lco, 'ßosaäarstveri& a Da i Fsvrral 1917 god e, BIýr" tai L. ax 
in Fevral'ska a ýsfol tta aý d. 3. ý. el+ekasyer, isaco 19269pp. 3-4. 
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considerably weaker than on the occasion of the last election. The menace 
of a government with whom they could foresee no amicable relationship and 
the realisation of their estrangement from the nation made the prospect of 
the Fourth Duma elections daunting in the extreme. One effect was to draw 
the Duma moderates closer together to preserve the reputation of the Duma 
as a representative institution, for it was upon the 'democratic principle' 
that the Duma's legality, resource and resilience were believed to depend. 
Almost every fraction of any sizeable representation in the Third Duma 
tacitly accepted this line and through all the polemics of the election 
period no moderate fraction was to accuse another of being unrepresentative 
or out of touch with the nation. Once an attack on these lines was launched, 
the charge would inevitably rebound not only upon the head of the accuser 
but upon all moderate fractions. The subsequent revelations might well 
further alienate the Duma from the nation, ruin the Duma in the eyes of 
Western Europe (whose sympathies had been cultivated by the moderates since 
the inception of the Duma) and provoke a government coup against the 
legislative institutions. 33 The self-interest of the Duma deputies demanded 
a conspiracy of silence which was especially marked at the time of Duna 
elections but was maintained without serious breach throughout the Third 
and Fourth Dumas. 
The Kadet fraction had most to gain and most to lone from the approach- 
-ing elections. As the principal party of opposition to the Oktobrist 
hegemony of the Third Duna, the Kadete had high hopes that the collapse of 
the '3rd June System' would be reflected in poor Okt©brist returns at the 
polls, thereby offering the Kadets a greatly enhanced role in the Fourth 
Duma. 34 However in no other fraction was the contrast so stark between, 
prestige and public image on the one hand, and national support and party 
33 CHERMENSKT 3& 41. 
34 Tsentral'n3ri Gosudarstvs_nnvi Arkhiv Qktyabrakoy 8evolyutsii (Central 
State Archive of the October Revolution, at Moscow ; cited hereafter aus 
TsGAOR), fond 579(Milyuker foad), opis_ iii, delo 61, st. 3. 
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organisation on the other. Obsessively aware of their critical weakness in 
the country at large, the Kadets initiated their preparations for the Fourth 
Duma exceptional]' early. In mid 1910, a clear two years before the elections, 
the Moscow Kadet Central Committee voiced its apprehension about the future 
in a five-page initial report. After a lengthy description of the ailing 
Kadet provinc. organisation on the occasion of the last elections in 
1907, the report glumly concluded : 
Over the last three years our party organisation has suffered even more 
: administrative and judicial persecution, the absence of contacts 
between deputies and their electors, the unaccustomedness of society to 
continuous political activity and many other reasons have led to the 
still greater disarrangement of the local organisations. (35) 
The Kadet party was heading for disaster in the elections unless measures 
other than the traditional appeal to the electorate were launched. The 
report recommended an electoral bloc with the Party of Peaceful Renewal : 
This group shoult be compelled to operate hand in hand with the Party 
of Popular Freedom for such an electoral alliance has become both 
essential and inescapable ... the mutual nature of our electoral 
interests and the reciprocal aspect of the establishment of joint 
electoral organisations at the local level must be stressed to 
demonstrate that, owing to the temporariness of the arrangement, there 
is no danger to the party. (36) 
The ensuing debate confirmed the basic findings of the report and authorised 
a detailed province-by-province survey of electoral characteristics which 
was presented at the ladet 1911 Spring conference. 
37 
The Autumn conference in the same year endorsed the tactic of electoral 
alliance without being specific about the partners in the arrangement : 
35 TsGAOR, f. 579(Milyukov), iii, 61,1-5 (quotation p. 3) ; hereafter the 
annotation of archival material will be standartised thus : (1) Archive 
collection(by abbreviation), (2) Fond number(and deaignation), (3) Opis' 
number(in Roman numerals), (4) Delo number(in Arabic numerals), (5) 
stranitsa nuftber(s). 
36 The Kadets used the name 'Party of Popular Freedom' in preference to"-- 
'Constitutional-Democratic Party' increasingly after 1907. quotation : 
ibid, p. 4" 
37 31-page survey : TeßAOR, f. 125(Kadet Fraction), ii, 10,5-36 ; the Peters- 
-burg Town Committee had drawn up its list of local election candidates 
by late 1910 (Kolyubakin to Kadet Central Committee, 2 December 1910) : 
TsGAOR, f. 125(Sadet Fractioa)yii, 9,1. 
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In such cases where independent party activity in elections is 
impossible because of local circumstances, the local organs of the 
Kadet party may enter into agreement with other groups of'independent 
society elements, with the exception of anti-constitutional and 
nationalistic elements, and form joint electoral committees. (38) 
By mid January 1912 the Moscow Badet leaders, trying to retain their 
election initiative within the party, were agitating strongly for a full 
congress to unite the neglected provincial members behind the Kadet leader- 
-ship, to determine the party electoral campaign and to publicise the party 
to the country. 
39 However Milyukov and the senior Central Committee in St. 
Petersburg declined to attempt to solve one problem by posing a greater. 
The relationship of the Kadet leadership to the Kadet party was a close 
parallel to that of the Duma and the country :a party congress was as 
revealing about the former relationship as was a general election about 
the latter. A Kadet congresss was a hazard to be avoided at any time ; 
especially was it to be averted in 1912 when any party crisis would react 
unfavourably upon the voting to the Fourth Duma. 
° 
The Moscow and Petersburg Central Committees and the membership of the 
Kadet fraction were agreed that hopes for improving their position in the 
Fourth Duma rested upon an electoral bloc. The crucial question was with 
whom to ally. The obvious candidate in all respects was the Party of 
Peaceful Renewal, which in April 1912 renamed itself the Progressist 
party., 
41 
Two features recommended the Progressists as the ideal electoral 
partner : their growing popularity and financial backing by the Moscow 
industrialist group made them tipped as the fraction most likely to succeed 
; and their patent inexperience and naiven (for they were only in the 
process of emerging as a major parliamentary fraction). 
42 
Milyukov could 
38 Clause II of Report 2 of Kadet conferemce, 20-1 November 1911 : TsG OR, 
f. 102 (Police D' artment : cited hereafter as POLICE), xiii, 27-1912,9. 
39 Moscow Police report of 27 January 1912 : POLICE, xiii, 27/46,1-2. 
40 See VI Kadet Party Congreea, l8-21 February 1916 : Chapter Five, 2. 
41 Laverychev, Lenin o klaaaaach, p. 168. 
42 Ibid, pp. 167-8 & 197-8 ; also Ti_mee, 23 September 1912(n/8), 3f. 
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feel confident that the Kadet party would attract to itself much of the 
popularity enjoyed by the Progressists while exploiting Progressist 
diffidence to force Kadet policy on the joint electoral bloc. 
should the electoral bloc spread wider ? Or in more precise tactical 
terms, was the electoral alliance with the Progressists sufficient to 
guarantee Badet success in the elections ? Fedor Rodichev, the leader of the 
Left-wing Kadets, and the Moscow Central Committee favoured extending the 
bloc to the Left. 
43 
Milyukov, Vasilii Maklakov, the Right-wing Kadets and 
the Petersburg Central Committee favoured extending the bloc further Right 
to the Oktobrists. Chelnokov, the chairman of the Badet election committee, 
supported the Milyukov line : 
An upsurge in the mood of society like that of 1905 has not occurred 
and may never occur .. * conservative groups and parties have 
significantly gained strength and organised. Thesed conditions dictate 
above all else the permissibility of any kind of compromise with Right 
groups up to and including the Right-wing Oktobrists, just so long as 
the electoral slogans do not contradict the basic principles of the 
Kadet programme. (44) 
As an exponent of the Right-wing ladet position, Milyukov feared that the 
growing unpopularity of the government in the country and the natural 
desire to adopt a brave posture before the electorate could well prompt a 
general ladet shift towards the Left. 
Milyukov however was set on acquiring a share in government patronage. 
While the Oktobrists had become completely disenchanted with the Stolypin 
government after March 1911, their ostensible successors the Nationalists 
had by no means revived the '3rd June System', indeed in Decemeber 1911 the 
Nationalists pointedly refused any association with the government of 
Stolypin's successor Kokovtsov. 
45 
It was also evident that whatever the 
ambitions of Guchkov for the greater independence of the Oktobriat Union, 
43 TaGAOR, f. 125(Kadet P'raction), ii, 10 ; POLICE, xiii, 27/46(Moscow), 1 
TaGAOR, f. 6/x, 9,124 quoted in CEERMENSKY 36; 
44 POS, xiii, 27/57(Petereburg)yi4-15. 
45 KOKOVTSOV 285-9 ; also P. N Ki,, l tikov, 4sapomixania 1V_59-1917-,, New York 
1955-6, vol. II, p. 158. 
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the Oktobrist majority desired a return to the '3rd June System'. In these 
circumstances it was likely that the Oktobrists would still enjoy a large 
measure of government patronage at the Fourth Duma elections. The intense 
enmity of Milyukov and Guchkov rendered impossible a formal alliance with 
the main body of the Duma Oktobrists but the emerging Oktobrist Left wing 
appeared both amenable to Kadet overtures and sufficient to attract a 
significant proportion of government patronage to the 'bloc'. Milyukov's 
policy of expediency was clear : alliance with the Progressists to share 
their popularity and alliance with the Left-wing Oktobrists to share their 
government patronage. 
46 
There were at base just two means to success in the 
Duma elections : extensive support in the country and government patronage. 
The Kadets personally enjoyed neither but by adroit electoral alliance 
could enjoy the benefits of both. 
The Kadet Central Committeee meeting of 12-14 March 1912 dutifully 
endorsed the Milyukov stratagem of an electoral bloc towards the Right, 
albeit with tactical reservations : 
At the same time we must treat the bloc with particular care and not 
allow the concept to take root in the mass of the electorate. We must 
emphasise to the masses on every suitable occasion that the bloc is 
something temporary, a mask. (47) 
Within the ladet leadership, self-confidence bred optimism. I. V. Gessen 
sanguinely conjectured that the ladet fraction in the new Duma might muster 
one hundred deputies. 
48 
However at this point the ever watchful and weil- 
informed Police Department intervened to torpedo the ladet scheme. The bloc 
had been elaborated by the Kadet leadership on the understanding that it 
would be tactfully revealed to the provincial Kadets when all top-level 
negotiations with the Progressist and Left Oktobrist executives were 
complete. In late March the Ministry of Interior (hereafter MVD) authorised 
46 cHER NSKT 58. 
47 PO_ CE, aiii, 27/57(Petereburg), 12. 
48 Speech of 10 March 1912 : PO_, xiii, 27/57(Petersburg), 1-2. 
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the publication of full details of the electoral bloc as collected by the 
Okhrana in the semi-official government press organ Rossia. 
49 
The furore 
engendered by this well-timed disclosure almost aborted the bloc, as 
indicated by a triumphant report of the Moscow Okhrana chief, Zanyazin : 
The article in the government organ Rossia revealing the Kadet plans to 
shelter under the flag of the non-party Progreseists and thereby "slip 
by" at the elections has produced a powerful impression in Kadet 
circles ... and elicited the greatest embarrassment and discontent. 
The opinion is expressed that thanks to this premature leak, the whole 
thought-out plan can be considered exploded. (50) 
The chorus of complaint from the provincial Xadets released by this scandal 
stemmed from a number of causes. At a time when the Kadets in the provinces 
were well to the Left of the Duma Kadeta, approximating to a Trudovik and 
even Menshevik position, the proposal to ally with the Oktobriets provoked 
almost unanimous condemnation. 
51 The idea of hanging on to the coat-tails 
of the more popular Progreesists to gain votes delivered a profound shock 
to the amour-propre of the older-generation Kadets who could not reconcile 
themselves to the exigencies of the political situation. 
52 
Finally the 
provincial Kadets were exasperated that they had been simply left out of 
all election plans : the Badet electorate and provincial organisation 
which constituted the foundation of the party and its moral authority to 
participate is the Duma had been casually ignored by the Kadet executive 
in a manner which the provinces were bound to resent. 
53 
At almost precisely this juncture, when the Rossia scandal was compell- 
ing the Kadet leadership to reconsider the range and direction of the 
projected bloc, the arguments of the provincial Kadets and Moscow Central 
Committee for alliance to the Left were dramatically reinforced. On 4 April 
49 Moscow report of 5 April 1912 : POLIýCE, xiii, 27/46,10. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Petersburg report of 14 April 1912 : POCB,, xiii, 27/57,4" 
52 Moscow report of 5 April 1912 : P©LCE, xiii, 27/46,10. 
53 Petersburg report of 14 April 1912 s POý, xiii, 27/57,4" ;: 
;ý 
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a police regiment shot down some two hundred and seventy men, women and 
children protesting about living conditions on the remote Lena goldfields. 
54 
Alexander Kerensky was to set the significance of the shootings very high 
'just as the insane slaughter of the workmen on the 9th January brought 
about the Revolution of 1905, now the Lena Massacre of the 4th April 1912 
was the signal for a new burst of public activity and revolutionary 
agitation! 
55 Like Bloody Sunday, the Lena Massacre achieved its immediate 
object only at the cost of inflaming all sectors of public opinion against 
the government. The effect of the massacre upon fellow workers in Petersburg 
and Moscow was predictable in impact but almost unprecedented in scale : 
The Lena Massacre had been the signal for a new workers' movement. One 
felt that a new wave of opposition and revolutionary energy was rising 
throughout the land ... The wave of political strikes started with 
700,000 workers immediately after the Lena Massacre. (56) 
Josef Stalin in one of his earliest articles for Zvezda exulted that 'the 
Lena shooting has broken the ice of silence - and the river of the people's 
movement has begun to flow'. 
57 The Duma moderates spoke out indignantly 
in Duma sitting and at a ladet meeting on 16 April Milyukov 'considered it 
essential to pacify society by a promise from the Duna tribune to 
investigate the Lena incident and punish all the guilty'. 
58 .. 
While the protests of the Duma moderates were sincere enough, the Lena 
Massacre could not have come at a worse time for ladet electoral plans. At 
the critical juncture when Milyukov was attempting to show the desirability 
of alliance to the Right, the mood of the country swung violently to the 
Left. The current political mood proved irresistible. The Okhrana reported 
54 KERENSKY 81-3 ;A Short History of the USSB, Moscow 1965, vol. I, p. 294. 
55 A. F. Kereasky, The Cruc fixioa of 1 ba rtz, Lomdoa 1934, pp. 123-4 ; also 
Avrekh, 'Lensky Ranstrol', P. 749 re the same comparison is made. 
56 Kerensky, The Crucifizion, pp. 161 & 165- 
57 J. V. Stalin, 'The Ice Has Broken', Zvezda, no. 32,19 April 1912 quoted in 
J. Stalin, Wo, vol. II(1907-1913) n 1953, p. 245. 
58 Duna sitting of 9 April 1912 : Steno raficheokie Otch of Gosudaretvenia- 
-oy Dvsº, sozyv III, sessia V, saseia 99, at. 1658-1714 ; Petersburg 
Kadet Town Cemmittee, 16 April 1912 : Pp, LI 
I 
ü, 27/57,8" 
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that at a top-secret meeting between the Kadet fraction and the Moscow and 
Petersburg Central Committees on 10 May, 'it was decided to arrange in the 
most immediate future a joint meeting of the leaders of the Kadet and Left 
parties to consider the question of how to respond to the approaching 
revolution, which the Kadet leaders unanimously consider premature'. 
59 
Kadet alarm, so evident from the use of the word 'revolution' in a formal 
motion, turned the emphasis of the electoral bloc from the Right to the Left. 
A hurriedly-convened Kadet conference of 12-14 May came up with the 
following revised formula for membership of the bloc : 
1. Agreements with groups further Right than the Union of October must 
be considered inadmissible ... 2. Agreements with the Union of 17 October generally to be considered 
undesirable and harmful, although in certain circumstances 
permissible with the agreement of the Central Committee. In 
particular, the support of Oktobrist candidates like Guchkov is 
inadmissible ... $3. Agreements with the Progressists, the Party of Peaceful Renewal, to 
be considered compulsory ... 4. Blocs with Left parties bath desirable and essential. (60) 
The radical shift was clear : despite Milyukov and the Kadet leadership's 
predilections, the Lena Massacre capped the Rossia scandal to force the 
Ladet electoral bloc to the Left. The whole episode of the electoral bloc 
proved both the hyper-sensitivity of the Ladet leadership over the election 
period (contrasting so starkly with its high-handedness at all other times) 
and the vulnerability of the Duma moderates to the crucial external forces 
which remained totally outside their control. 
The electoral strategy of the Progressists was less sophisticated than 
the Kadet. the pro-election period was dominated by the energy of the Moscow 
industrialist group led by Ryabushinsky and its ambition to convert the 
modest and lack-lustre Party of Peaceful Renewal into a powerful Duma agent. 
Over late 1911 Ryabushineky welcomed the initial tentative Kadet suggestions 
of an electoral bloc and through early 1912 worked hard to ensure that the 
59 Petersburg report of 13 May 1912 : POLICE, xiii, 27/57,25" 
60 Petersburg report, of 14 May 1912 POLICE, xiii, 27/57,26 ; also Moscow 
report of 13 duly 1912': POL-ICE, xiii, 27 6,24-6. 
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bloc was between political equals. A Moscow Progressist Bureau was formally 
established on 17 March 1912, employing the namt 'Progressists' in prefer- 
ence to the 'Party of Peaceful Renewal' for the first time. In its 4 April 
issue of Utro Rossii, the Moscow Bureau both declared the principle that 
'it is high time that the met hart class should step into the political 
arena' and officially and rather self-consciously announced its metamorphosis 
into the Progressist Party. 
61 
In the course of the next month a Petersburg 
Progressist Bureau was established and definite electoral alliances between 
the Progressists and Kadets of both capitals agreed. 
62 
However despite their remarkable organisational growth in the pre- 
election period, the Progressists were still unable to treat with the Kadets 
on equal terms. Notwithstanding their undoubted energy and promise, the new 
Progressists were thoroughly dominated by their senior partner in the 
electoral bloc. 'Gromoboi', the leader writer for Golos Moskvy, commented 
perceptively in mid 1912 that the Progressists 'could become the Left centre 
and not just Milyukov's marionettes' but at present were able to comprehend 
only their own weaknesses. 
63 
Not without rough justice, Stalin 
sarcastically remarked 'Oh, don't think that the Progressists are Kadets 
No, they are not Kadeta at all ; they will only vote for the Kadet 
candidates, they are only the non-party servants of the Kadets'. 
64 
The 
Progreasiats passed the period of the electoral bloc in the belief that they 
benefited from the association far more than the Kadets. In fact the reverse 
was true. The Kadets allied with the Progressists because the bloc combined 
maximum electoral advantage and the company of an easily-manipulated 
61 V. Ya. Laverychev, Po Tu Storonu $arrikad, Moscow 1967 (cited hereafter as 
LAVERYCHEV), pp. 89-90 ; Hosking, Government and Dunma, pp. 275-8. 
62 Golos Moskv , 29 April 1912 and 7tro Ro_eei, 1 May 1912 ; also 
LAVERYCHEV 90 and C SKY 58. 
63 'Before the Elections', artiole by 'Gromobei' : Ts GAOR, f. 555(Guchkov), i, 
515,1-3 (quotation p. 3. ) 
64 'How They are Preparing for the Elections ', Zvezda, no. 32,19 April 19.12 
quoted in Stalin, Wor , vol. II(1907-1913), p. 248. 
- 
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political satellite with. minimal risk to their own freedom of action. The 
new Progressist party was unscrupulously used by the Kadet leadership to 
advance its own interests in the all-important elections. 
The Oktobrists were confronted with a dual crisis over the election 
period. The bankruptcy of the '3rd June System', on which the Oktobrists 
had placed all their political capital, left the fraction with distressingly 
little to bring to its electorate. The universal dissatisfaction with the 
record of the Third Duma naturally - if a little unjustly - concentrated on 
the fraction which had more than any other determined the character of the 
Third Duma. 
65 
Although aware of the general hostility, the Oktobrist 
fraction launched no special efforts to improve its public image. It was 
agreed that legislation was to be stepped up and continued until the vey7 
end of the Third Duma session in the hope that each bill that completed the 
legislative process would boost the credit of the Oktobrists and safeguard 
their vote at the polls. 
66 
A confident front was maintained towards the 
general public, as for example in interviews given to Russkoe Slove : 
We can expect a small shift to the Left in the Fourth Duma and the 
Opposition will grow numerically by 8-10 percent but this increase will 
be at the expense of the Right ... It may be that we will concede a few 
seats to the Progressists but again we are confident that the loss will 
be at the expense of the Right wing. (67) 
Throughout the election period, Oktobriet activity hardly merited the term 
'campaign', ostensibly resting content with completing legislative business 
and retaining a lefty sang-froid in the face of universal criticism. 
But immediately behind the public image of quiet confidence the 
Oktobrists were in a chronically fragmented condition. From the first 
moment of Stolypin's withdrawal of favour, the Oktobriste had experienced a 
65 Times, 23 September 1912(n/a), 3f ; Ta_, f. 579(Mil3ukov), iii, 61,3-4. 
66 Oktobrist Central Committee, 3 March 1912 : Tsentral'n i Goaudaratvenn 
Iatoricheakii Arkhiv v Leniagade (Ceatral State Historical Archive at 
Leningrad ; cited hereaffter as TsGIAL), f. 666(giyuzhev), f, 8,142, ; also . T8 GAOR, f. 115(Oktobriat Fractioa)9i, 29,3" 
67 Rusakoe Sl ovo, 25 March 1912 ; also quoted in Ta_ 4L, f. 669(LLyuzhov), i, 
8,174. 
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draining of membership both to iRight and Left. The Western Zemstvos crisis 
only exacerbated the growing problem of unity. In the summer of 1911 the 
fraction majority still hoped for a revival of the '3rd June System', 
closely associating with the recently-favoured Nationalists in the hope of 
sharing their patronage and privilege. 
68 
However with the return of Guchkov 
to the leadership of the Oktobrists in November 1911 (following his 
flamboyant renunciation of politics over the Western Zemetvos crisis), the 
official party line resumed its basic trend away from association with the 
government towards a more oppositional stance. 
69 
Over the winter 1911-1912 
a steady polarisation of Oktobrist opinion raised the spectre of a 
fundamental split in both fraction and Union. With each passing month the 
dichotomy in the fraction was revealed more clearly, culminating in the 
voting over the military budget in mid May 1912 : 
After the voting against the ship-building programme, the leaders of 
Oktobrism can count on the sympathy of the Opposition but the rank-and- 
file Oktobrists on the sympathy of the government parties. The 
Oktobrists themselves admit their lack of unity on fpndamental issues 
;;, they call themselves a "coalition medley". The sole logical raison 
d'etre of this coalition is personal politics ... the centre of the 
coalition was and remains Guchkov. (70) 
This frank comment by Busakoo S1e_o demonstrated that on the election eve 
the Okt®briet fraction was more divided than ever before. 
Rusekee Slovo also made plain that the responsibility for maintaining 
or disrupting the Oktobriet 'coalition medley' was Guchkov's. Guchkov 
found himself trapped by the timing of the Fourth Duma elections : the point 
for the grand debate on the future of Oktobrisa coincided with the prelude 
to the new Duna. In fear of a , split which would ruin the Oktobrist Union at 
the polls, Guchkov was compelled very much against his own nature to impose 
a year's moratorium on the discussion of fundamental policy.? The tensions 
68 TsGAOR, f. 115(Oktobrist Fractios), ii, 2,3 and f. 579(Milyukov), iii, 61,4. 
69 Hosking, Goverameat and Dana, pp. 190-1 ; J. F. Hutchiason, The Octebristl in 
Russian Politics 1905-1917, unpublished Ph. D thesie, Loadoa 19 , p. 19_. _ 
70 Ra, cakes S1ove, 1 June 1912 ; also T*GIAL, f. 669(Klyuzhev), i, 10,56 and 
'Chronicle', Rassia Re fiew, vol. i, no., q, 912, p. 159. 
71 TsGAOR, f. 555(Guahkov), i, 515,2-3. 
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evoked by this artificial stifling of party debate emerged clearly but on 
this occasion Guchkov proved the quality of responsibility which had always 
been so conspicuously lacking in his leadership in the past. Guchkov's 
speeches for the period demonstrate a diplomacy and tact rarely found in 
either his actions or published utterances. Even at the traditional Oktobrist 
banquet on 7 June Guchkov's self-restraint produeed only the most diluted 
version of his real views : 'Guchkov invited the fraction to look not to the 
past but to the future and wished the Fourth Duma greater success and 
greater results than those accomplished by the Third Duma'. 
72 
Given the stark necessity of judicious inaction, various features of 
the Oktobrist position may have persuaded Guchksv that a 'soft-sell' approach 
to the elections was not necessarily so unfortunate. The Oktobrist 
electorate, fundamentally the landed interest of central European Russia, 
was proverbially loyal and stable and unlikely to be radically affected by 
either the propaganda campaigns of rival parties or the recent Leftward 
movement in the country as a whole. 
73 On the government side, the well- 
known political affiliations of the now premier Kokovtsov furnished Guehkov 
with hope that, in despair of the undisciplined Nationalists bequeathed by 
Stolypin, government patronage would be exercised in favour of its former 
favourite and aily. 
71 Thus temporarily to suspend his own ambition to cove 
towards opposition offered Guchkov two advantages in the election period , 
a reasonably united Oktobrist party and the prospect of government patron- 
-age. With such results anticipated from a policy of inaction, it was both 
unnecessary and dangerous to mount a full Oktobrist election campaign. 
Through all their election preparations, the Duma moderates were 
resigned to the fact that government pressure would play at least a critical 
and very possibly a crucial Ale. However while the government was equally 
convinced of the fact,, its electoral, policies were hardly lees factional, 
_ 
72 Ts_, Z. 669(Klyuzhev ; cited hereafter as KLYUZHEV), i, 10,71. 
73 Milyukov, 'The Representative STstem''p. 39 ; TaGAOR, f. 115(Oktobriat 
Fraction), ii, 2,11. 
74 CHERMENSKTT 50. 
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than those of the Duma parties. The assassination of Stolypin in September 
1911 had effected a profound upset in the balance of power within the 
government. Stolypin had occupied the offices of Council Chairman and 
Minister of Interior, the two most powerful government agencies, as well as 
fulfilling many of the functions of Foreign Minister (after the disgrace of 
Izvoleky over the Bosnian crisis). 
75 Moreover Stolypin always insisted that 
collective decisions be made within the Council of Ministers, which would 
then be communicated to the Tsar by the Chairman alone, completely replacing 
the traditional system of private reports submitted by each minister 
individually to the Tsar. 76 The office of super-minister was now dismantled 
and its constituent functions allocated to three separate individuals : 
Kokovtsov added the Chairmanship to his current folio of the Finace Ministry, 
Makarov was appointed Minister of Interior and Sazonov was for the first 
time allowed full responsibility as Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
7' 
September 1911 represented an attempt by the Tear to take back the 
power and authority which had necessarily or accidentally devolved upon 
Stolypin. Nicholas and Alexandra hoped to exploit the fortuitous removal of 
Stolypin to place obstacles to the emergence of any similar 'Grand Vizier' 
who (they believed) might again detract from the authority and prestige 
which must be the Tsar's alone. The prominent Oktobrist Sergei Shidlovsky 
saw September 1911 as a turning-point : 
The government as something united and corporate ceased to exist... 
From the time of Stolypin's death, the Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers in practice ceased to be the head of the government, and we 
heard corroborated rumours that the Tsar considered this particular 
office completely unnecessary, sayng that each minister should report 
to him on the affairs of his own ministry and nobody and nothing else 
was needed. (78) 
75 I. V. Beetuzhev, 'Russian Foreign Policy, February-June 1914', Journal of 
Contemporary Hitory, vol. I, no. 3(1966), pp. 104-5. 
76 Hoaking, Government and Duma, pp. 5-7. 
77 MILIÜICOV 230-1 ; HA, vol. 74, pp. 190-1 ; S. I. Shidl©vsky, Vospominasia 1861- 
1922,2 vols, Berlin 1923, I. pp"198-9 ; Bestuzhev, 'RussianForeign Policy', 
pp . 104-5 . 
78 Shidlovaky, Voepominanip, I, 198-9. 
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On appointing Kokovtsov Chairman, Nicholas pointedly remarked 'Please don't 
follow the example of Pyotr Arkad'evich LStolypin - R. P. 
3 he somehow 
always tried to screen me off - it was him all the time, and because of 
him I became invisible'. 79 At her first audience with Kokovtsov, the 
Empress too made plain her dislike foh the man whom she believed had 
overshadowed the Tsar : 
You must not try to follow blindly the work of your predecessor. Remain 
yourself ; do not look for support in political parties ; they are of 
so little consequence in Russia. Find your support in the confidence of 
the Tsar - the Lord will help you. I am sure that Stolypin died to make 
room for you and this is all for the good of Russia. (80) 
In practice it became apparent at an early stage that the Tsar was not so 
much retrieving delegated power as redistibuting that power amongst a 
number of ministers instead of allowing its concentration in the person of 
a super-minister. The seporation of the Chairmanship and the MVD proved 
crucial to the ministerial power balance. Under Stolypin the moral authority 
of the Chairmanship and the executive authority of the MVD had complemented 
each other perfectly ; the forcible separation of these functions almost 
immediately spawned bitter rivalries. Within months the authority of the 
Chairmanship suffered a drastic decline, prompting a challenge from the 
increasingly ambitious MVD. 
As the first major issue confronting the post-Stolypin government, the 
Fourth Duma elections became a trial o strength between the Chairmanship and 
the NVD. Kekovtsov, accustomed to serving under a Chairman whose personal 
and political dominance over his ministerial colleagues had been almost 
unshakable, assumed (like Guchkov) that government policy towards the Duna 
would new be hie prerogative alone. A moderate is the manner of Stol'Jpin by 
political persuasion, Kokovtsev's attitude to the Duma was tolerant and 
benign. 
81 Over the first months of 1912 Kokovteov performed the thaakless 
79 Ibid, p. 198. 
80 KOXOVTSOV 283 ; ale* )II UIOV 232- 
81 KOKOVTSOV 323-4. fl 
L 
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task of peacemaking between the Tsar and the Duma over the growing rumours 
about the influence of Rasputin. 
82 
In June 1912 Kokovtsov went so far as to 
threaten resignation in order to persuade a reluctant Nicholas formally to 
thank the Third Duma for its endeavours and thereby set the seal of imperial 
approval on the Duma. 
83 
Kokovtson went further than support for the Duma as an institution by 
promoting the fortunes of the Duma party which he found most sympathetic. 
In autumn 1911 Kokovtsov argued that on grounds of both political 
desirability and financial stringency he intended radisally to cut back 
government subsidisation of the Right. When in February 1912 Markov Two and 
Purishkevich, the leaders of the Right fraction, presented bills for 
960,000 roubles as election expenses, Kokovtsov flatly refused to pay. He 
relented only when Makarov argued that to bankrupt the Right so near electio 
-time was tantamount to promoting a swamping of the Fourth Duma by the 
Opposition, 
84 
In March Hokovtsov attempted to lend the advantage to the 
Oktobrists by acts of cordiality to the Third Duna which won the grudging 
approval of even the Times correspondent in Petersburg : 
The Premier finds the practice of returning bills which have not been 
sanctioned before dissolution unnecessary. Moreover, the closing 
session will be prolonged until July, the General Election taking place 
in the autumn. Many highly useful measures will thus be expedited and 
deputies will not come before their constituents empty-handed. (85) 
This decision, dove-tailing so neatly with declared Oktobrq4t policy, 
provided additional grounds for believing that government patronage in the 
elections would be exercised in favour of the Oktobrists. 
Makarov however quickly dissolved the bond of trust that had made him 
Kokovtsov's nominee for the MYD in September 1911.86 His actions as 
82 KOKOVTSOV 290-304 ; MILIUKOV 234-5 ; M. V. Rodzyanko, Krushenie Imperii, 
Leningrad 1927 (cited hereafter as RODZYANKO), pp. 36-59" 
83 KOKOVTSOV 304 & 318 ; MILIUKOY 237 ; RODZYaaKO 59-60. 
84 KOKOVTSOV 324,328 & 338 ; MILIUKOV 279-280. 
85 Times, 21 March 1912(m/"), 5a ; also &ODZYAASO 60. 
86 KOKOVTSOV 277 ; -MILIVSOX 231 " Interesaayn nakhodka : del* Kokovtsov*' , Voprosi Istorii, 1964: 2, p. 98. 
28. 
Minister of Interior contrived to upset all concerned. The Emperor and 
Empress were irritated by Makarov's inability to suppress the attacks upon 
Rasputin published over the months of December 1911 and January 1912.87 
Makarov's mishandling of the Rasputin affair only sharpened his determinat- 
-ion to perform well in the matter of the Duma elections. On 12 January 
1912 Makarov issued a secret circular to provincial governors requesting 
their estimates of the future election results. 
88 
The replies suggested 
that while the Kadets were likely substantially to increase their 
representation, the Right wing was disappointingly weak and government 
patronage was essential to its strong representation. 
89 
Makarov concluded 
from these rather alarmist individual assessments that all government 
pressure must be exerted in favour of the Duma Rights and Nationalists. At 
first all proceeded smoothly for Makarov's schemes : his minor victory in 
persuading Kokovtsov to foot the Right bill for election expenses in 
February was matched by successful disruption of the opposition parties 
(of which the Rossia disclosure was the most striking). 
However immediately following the MVD's most dramatic coup, Makarov 
found himself under extreme pressure as a result of the Lena Massacre 
episode. Not only was Makarov technically responsible for the police actions 
in the first instance but he attempted to shrug off protests in the Duma 
chamber with the callous remark 'So it was, so it will be'. 
90 The subsequent 
furore compelled Kokovtsov to intervene to save Makarov and to appoint a 
government commission of enquiry in an attempt to mollify public 
indignation. 91 The Lena Massacre had even greater impact upon government 
policy than upon the Kadet electoral campaign in that it polarised opinion 
87 KOKOVTSOV 290-5 ; MILIUKOV 234. 
88 TsGAOR, f. 6/c, 247,1 quoted in CHE SKY 44. 
89 POLICE, 27-1912,35-69. quoted in C SKY 44. 
90 11 April 1912 : Steno rafichiskje `Ot of G. bn, sorsyy 111, E a Y`, 
zasedania 102, st, 1953. ; Vlad Cdr Gurke, Featuaýsa and Figures cat' the Fau 
Gv rnmeat and Oniaiom in the Rei` of Nichol X, Ed. H. H. Figher, Londol 
1, p"520. 
91 KOXoVTSOV 308-9 ; KERENSKT 82. 
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within the Council of Ministers. To Kokovtsov, the episode proved the need 
for a moderate centre in the new Duma which would reflect the mood of the 
country and avoid the blatant provocation of a Duma whose representation was 
clearly 'stacked'. But to Makarov, still bruised from his encounter with 
outraged public opinion, it proved the necessity of an obedient Right- 
dominated Duma with which the government could associate with harmony. 
92 
The Lena Massacre affair both highlighted and accentuated the dichotomy 
within the Council of Ministers. By late spring 1912 the split in the 
Council was overt and the stronger group emerging. Kokovtoov's moderate 
course was opposed by a majority of the ministers, thereby rendering his 
position most awkward and false : 
Discussions in the Council always made me unhappy. They demonstrated my 
isolation and helplessness. By public opinion I was regarded as the 
head of the government and responsible for its policies ; actually my 
power to formulate and direct such policies was undermined by a split 
within the Council. Moreover my opponents in the government had the 
support of the Tear. (93) 
In practice Makarov pursued the electoral policy of his own choice, confident 
that while actual political resource backed his own policy, the reeponsibil- 
-ity and unpopularity of that policy would fall upon 8okovtsov. Kokovtsov's 
frankly ephemeral authority could not match the executive day-to-day 
direction of the electoral operation by Makarov. 
94 
Acting on Makarov's instructions, Sabler the Procurator of the Holy 
Synod issued in May a secret circular mobilizing the clergy for the 
elections. 
95 Kharuzin was commissioned to arrange the details of the 
election-fixing, performing the same service for Makarov that Kryzhanovsky 
had performed for Stolypin in the elections to the Third Duma. The 
96 
92 SOKOVTSOV 323-5 ; 'Interesnaya nakhodka', pp. 98-9. 
93 KOKOVTSOV 349 ; 'Interesaaya nakhodka', p. 100. 
94 'Intereanaya nakhodka', pp. 99-101 ; P. G. Kurlov, Konets Tsarisma, Moscow 
1923"PP"170-1 ; PADFNIE, vi, 303(Milyuk®v). 
95 E. D. Chermensky, 'Vybory v IV Gosudaretvennuyu Dumu', Vo rosa Istorii, 1947: 4, p. 23 ; Kurlov, Konets Taarisma, p. 171 ; PADENIE, vi: 302 Milyukoo . 
96 KOKOVTSOV 324 ; MILIUKOV 280 ; 'Interesnaya nakhodka', pp. 102-4. 
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Police Department embarked upon a campaign of harassment of opposition 
parties, most effectively in the provinces but with greater circumspection 
in the capitals too. A correspondence between the Police Director Beletsky 
and the Petersburg Town Governor Bendorf illuminates the nature of the police 
campaign. Bendorf's report on the Kadet conference of 12-14 May was met by 
Beletsky's acid enquiry '®a what grounds this meeting was permitted by the 
police, since it contravenes the law of 4 March 1906 ? '. 
97 Bendorf explain- 
-ed that 'similar meetings have been held periodically throughout the period 
of the activities of the Third Duma, at the beginning and end of its sessions 
without the permission of the authorities, as they have no public 
character'. 
98 Bendorf's two grounds of 'non-public character' and 'precedent' 
were considered by Beletsky who (after consultation with Makarov) replied 
that henceforward the practice must be changed and the law of 1906 strictly 
enforced. 
99 Punctilious application of the law, in declaring both public 
meetings and private party assemblies subject to police permission and 
supervision, virtually liquidated electoral campaigning. The choice for the 
Duna parties was either deliberate illegality or near-impotence. By the eve 
of the elections, the Police Department had effectively reduced the campaigns 
of all the moderate parties to the level of frustrated legality. Even the 
tactical dexterity of the Kadets gained them little when confronted by 
police harassment which limited their activities to newspaper editorials and 
posted party propaganda. 
By July and Augu. t of 1912 the moderate fractions were well aware that 
their political futures lay out of their hands. The absence of a public 
forum (since the dissolution of the Third Duna on 9 June) and the pitiably 
proscribed sphere of operations left by police harassment threw the moderates 
upon the moray of the country and the. govoranent. Different estimates of the 
97 Beletaky to Bendorf, undated : PO LICE, xiii, 27/5?, 29 ; the law of 4 
March 1906 prohibited public aoeeciatione. 
98 Bendorf to Beleteky, 27 June 1912 : POLICE, xiii, 27/57,33" 
99 Beletsky to Bendorf, 8 July 1912 : ibid, p. 34. 
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relative importance of these two critical external forces produced widely 
varying forecasts of the complexion of the new Duma. At a secret meeting of 
the Kadet Central Committee in Moscow 15-17 August 'many of the committee 
members, on the basis of facts from both official and party sources, declare 
that the Duma will be greatly further Left ... and that elections within the 
zemstvo organisations indicate the sympathy of the local people for the 
progressive tendency'. 
100 Milyukov however laid greater stress upon 
government pressure and saw little cause for optimism : 
When at the end of November 1911 - R. P. 
) 
,I asserted in fraction 
meetings that in the summer would come the maximum offensive of the 
reactionaries against all that is honourable and legal in Russia, many 
of my colleagues considered me a gloomy prophet, but unfortunately facts 
have surpassed the most gloomy expectations ... Without doubt, the Fourth Duma will be an exact copy of its predecessor, only its centre 
will shift from the Oktobrists to the Nationalists. (101) 
With this fatalistic jeremiad Milyukov opted out of the campaign altogether 
by spending the remaining time before the elections on a working holiday in 
the Balkans. 102 As on a number of subsequent occasions Milyukov, apparently 
in the belief that his presence or absence would have negligible influence 
on political developments, simply quit the field. But Milyukov's action only 
symbolised the resignation with which all the moderate parties came to face 
the elections. 
103 Realizing that, both on account of government action and 
their own inadequacies, their varied campaign activities had been of only 
marginal influence, the Duma moderates had now no choice but to await the 
verdict in the greater contest between the voice of the Russian electorate 
and the artifice of the MVD electoral machine. 
100 POLICE, xiii, 27-1912,22. 
101 Ibid, 23-4. 
102 MILIUKOV 247.9. 
103 cs rtSKI 49-50. 
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CHAPTER TWO : THE FOURTH DUMA 
1. The Elections 
The electoral system established by the laws of 3 June 1907 was of a 
complexity which almost beggars description and defies any attempt at an 
adequate brief survey. 
1 The suffrage arrangement, described by Paul Gronsky 
as 'one of the most complicated that ever existed', was devised in order to 
lend the electoral authorities maximum practical discretion : neither 
universal, equal nor direct (since the concession of these principles might 
well benefit the opposition), the voting system did boast the secrecy of the 
ballot (since it offered a constitutional cloak for the operations of the 
electoral authorities). 
2 The electorate was summarily divided into four 
electoral curiae : the landowners, the town-dwellers (sub-divided into two 
groups), the peasants and the proletariat. The introduction of this 
artificial distinction by class was designed to fragment the opposition on 
the principle of 'divide and rule' and to enhance the control exercised by 
the election organisers. The process of election typically consisted of 
three seperate and consecutive stages : election to the local assembly, 
election to the provincial electoral assembly and finally election to the 
State Duma. Each assembly was elected solely to determine the composition 
of the subsequent higher assembly. Such a contrived three-layer sequence 
naturally multiplied the opportunities for government pressure, enabling 
the local authorities to screen and sift the candidates for election to the 
Duma. 
3 The more 'reliable' the curia, the more straightforward was its 
1 Attempts at brief surveys include P. Gronsky, War and the Russian G4overn- 
ment, Yale U. P. 1929, pp. 12-16, Milyukov, 'The Representative System', pp. 
35 Viand Yeroshkin, Istoria Gosudarstveanikh üchrezhdenii, p. 271 and diagram 
8; the only full descriptions of the 1912 elections are Cheermeusky, 
'Vybory v chetvertuyu gosudarstvenauyu Dumu', Vo rosi Iattorii, 1947: k, pp 
21-40 and CHERNENSKY 67-129. 
2 Grousky, War and the Russian Government, pp. 12-13. 
3 Ibid, pp. 13-15 ; Milyskov, 'Te RopresmitAtiye System''pp"35-8 ; CRERMENSK! 
67 & 74-129. 
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electoral machinery: the major landowners curia featured only the final two 
electoral stages. The more 'suspect' the curia, the more complex and protract- 
ed was the machinery : the peasant and proletariat curiae featured at least 
three electoral stages. The basic principle was that 'the more democratic the 
voter, the more stages have to be passed'. 
4 
At the most critical electoral stage - the provincial assembly which 
elected the deputies to the Duma - the 'direct' Russian electorate constitut- 
-ed only a tiny proportion of either the total population of the Russian 
Empire (about 150 million in 1912) or the'nominal' electorate. 
5 The total 
'direct' electorate amounted to just 5,252 individuals, who were arbitrarily 
distributed between the curiae in the following proportions :6 
Landowner 2,594 electors = 49.4 % of 'direct' electorate 
Town (1) 788 = 15 
Town (2) 590 = 11.2 
Peasant 1,168 = 22.2 
Proletariat 112 = 2.1 
The enormity of this travesty of national representation was graphically 
demonstrated by Milyukov : 
The number of electors givem to the various constituencies varies in 
opposite proportion to the number of the population. Thus for instance 
one fifth of a million of landed gentry have the right to choose 2,594 
electors, one-half million of wealthy citizens choose 788 electors, 
eight millions of the middle class choose only 590 electors, twelve 
million of working-men choose 112 electors, seventy million peasants 
choose 1168. It works out at one elector for every 230 of the landed 
gentry, for every thousand wealthy citizens, for every fifteen thousand 
middle-class citizens, for every sixty thousand peasants, and for every 
125,000 working-men. (7) 
The whole electoral system was heavily weighted in favour of the class 
considered to be politically most 'reliable', against the classes which had 
proved their 'unreliability' in 1905, and was so constructed as to offer the 
4 Milyukov, 'The Representative Syrsten', p. 37. 
5 Estimated population of the Russian Empire in 1913 was 155.4 million.: Cambridge Economic History of EuroDe, Cambridge U. P. 1966, vol. I, p. 63. 
6 Milyukov, 'The Representative System', pp. 35-6 ; also E. A. Goldenweiser, 'The 
Russian Duma', Political Science terl , vol. 29, September 1914, p. 417 and CHERMENSKT 67. , 
7 Milyukov, 'The Repreteitative Syetam', pP"35-6. 
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MVD every possible opportunity to determine the composition of the Duma. 
General elections were as unfamiliar to the tsarist government as to 
the political parties but on each occasion the MVD improved past techniques 
of electoral falsification and added to its already impressive repertoire. 
The blatantly illegal and the quasi-legal devices of the MVD to secure an 
amenable Fourth Duma surpassed all its previous efforts. Again it is 
Milyukov who offers the best brief description of the various means employed: 
What a campaign this was I Everyone who was the least bit suspect 
politically was unceremoniously eliminated from participation in the 
elections. Whole categories of people were deprived of their electoral 
rights or the possibility of participating in the elections. Undesirable 
elections were annulled. Pre-election meetings were not permitted and 
it was forbidden even to speak, write of print the names of undesirable 
parties. The electoral congresses were divided into arbitrary groups in 
order to create an artificial majority. (8) 
In the provinces, out of the eye of the national and world press, electoral 
abuse reached a new peak. 
9 
While the MVD was constrained to be a little 
more circumspect in the capital cities, its efforts there were hardly less 
decisive. In his description of the electoral campaign in the St Petersburg 
Workers Curia, the Bolshevik Badayev covered a catalogue of devices by which 
the MVD suborned the elections. Only workers at factories employing more than 
fifty men possessed the vote even at the lowest level. Only workers employed 
continuously for six months before the elections enjoyed the vote, thereby 
eliminating the substantial casual and seasonal labour force as well as 
offering the police the opportunity to exclude known trouble-makers by 
securing their dismissal on the eve of the elections. The suffrage which in 
theory extended to all householders ever 25 was in practice restricted to 
those paying house-tax. The election dates were kept secret until the last 
possible moment in the hope of gaining a snap-vote victory over the Left 
parties. Elections were deliberately timed to coincide with three-day 
factory holidays when a considerable proportion of the proletariat-might be 
8 MILIUSOV 280. 
9 See for example the experience of Boris A. Engelhardt in Mogilev province 
: Ruk®isnii 0td l Biblioteki imeni V. I. Leaina (Lenin Library Manuscript 
Department , f. 29 , OP 305-6 cited hereafter as ENGEZt'RMT), zii pp. 301- 311 ; also Chermensky, 'Vybery', PP"34.7. 
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expected to be away from the capital. Complaints about illegalities and 
irregularities were invariably 'mislaid' by the bureaucracy until after the 
elections, by which time even the mist persevering complainant conceded the 
pointlessness of further protest. 
10 Complaints about electoral malfeasance 
flooded into both the MVD and the offices of leading politicians, offering 
abundant proof offhe determination of the government to fabricate a national 
assembly convenient to itself. 
11 
The fortunes of the moderate parties in the Fourth Duma were by now in 
the hands of the government and (more tenuously) the country. While the 
moderates were unhappy and ill-at-ease with both the relationships crucial 
to their future, the Kadets and Oktobrists differed in theirelative import- 
-ance which they ascribed to the two factors. The Oktobrists placed the 
greater part of their hopes upon government patronage and by implication 
downgraded the role of their electorate. 
12 The Kadets woke up to the 
unpalatable fact that their only hope of avoiding annihilation by the MrVD 
now lay with a substantial measure of popular support. Uneasily conscious of 
the fickleness of the electorate, fear dominated the Kadete as the elections 
commenced. In the month following the Lena Massacre, the Kadets had been 
anxious that the Leftward shift in the political climate might benefit the 
Extreme Left parties at the expense of the mederates. 
13 By the election eve, 
this anxiety had been replaced by the fear that apathy on the part of an 
electorate disappointed by the perfor ce of the Third Duma might allow the 
MVD complete control over the composition of the Fourth Duma. A police agent 
attending a Kadet meeting in July commented on this growing belief : 
In Moscow Kadet circles, news of the most complete apathy on the part 
of the electors towards the elections is making a dispiriting impress-- 
-ion. The Xadet coat" asserts =4. that there is mass dissatisfaction 
10 A. Badayev, Ths Bolshey_ in the ; T§g ist Duma, London 1930, pp. 6-23 Baia. 
11 See local Badet complaints sent to'Milyukov : T8GAOR, f. 579(Milyuhov), i, 
dela 49(Orlov)151(Yareislavll)957(Tambev)959(0deeaa and 209(Voronezh) 
also Ro_ h', 11 sad 13 Oot"btr : 1912. 
12 CHEl ENSKY 49-50,, - 
13 Petersburg reports of 13 & 14 May 1912 : POLICE, züi, 27/57,25 & 26. 
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in the provinces and that this will find an outlet at the el`ctions. 
Indifference pervades the small electors i. e. the element on which the 
Kadets especially rely. (14) 
The first stage of the elections was marked by extreme tension on the part 
of the candidates and relative indifference on the part of the electorate, 
who on the basis of past experience were not sanguine about the prospects 
for the new Duma. Stanley Washburn, the resident Times correspondent in St 
Petersburg, confirmed this impression of universal insouciance, explaining 
that 'everyone knows now about how much - or rather how little - the 
legislature can expect to do ; the public has realised that it is not going 
to find in the fourth Duma what have been vaguely called "the fresh forces 
of Russial". 
15 
As if to confirm the moderates' worst fears, a last-minute 
conference of provincial governors called by the MVD in early September 
heavily underlined the necessity of throwing the full weight of government 
patronage behind the Right wing. 
16 
The initial elections at the local level were set in motion with the 
formal publication of the lists of registered voters on 8 September. 
'? 
Contemporary opinion of the electoral expectations of the moderate parties 
furnished Washburn with the material for his Times article 'Prospects of the 
Parties'. In the Oktobrists he found little to praise and legitimate cause 
for profound dissatisfaction : 
The party whose fate will be watched with the greatest interest ... will have to suffer for any disappointment with the achievement of the third 
Duma ... They will carry the main responsibility for the acquiescence of 
the Duma in the shelving or curtailing of all sorts of needed reforms. 
The Progressists were dismissed almost as a make-weight in the electoral 
'progressive bloc' organised by the 8adets : 
One can hardly speak of a party. They represent an attitude of mind ... In the fourth Duma, they are almost certain to be stronger. There is 
being organised a Progressive Block which will bring them into touch 
14 Moscow report of 5 July 1912 : POLICE, xiii, 27/46,18. 
15 Times, 23 September 1912(n/s), 3f. 
16 MILIUKOV 280 ; XOKOVTSOV 336-7. 
17 Times, 23 September 1912(n/s), 3f. 
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with Left Octobrists and Right Cadets ; it aims not at a programme, but 
at a platform ; and leaving a maximum of independence to individuals, 
it will probably unite some of the best voices in Russia in favour of 
what would most generally appeal to all. 
Washburn reserved his guarded approval for the Kadets, for although 'they can 
hardly gain much on their present 50 seats ... they will be a strong, resolute 
and capable element in the cause of progress in the fourth Duma'. 
18 
The results of the primary elections released in mid September appeared 
to dash any residual moderate hopes. The mobilisation of the clergy ordered 
by Sabler exceeded the most optimistic Right expectations to the extent of 
actually embarrassing the government. 'In forty-nine provinces, out of 8,764 
representatives, 7142 were clergymen' : some 80% of the first-stage electors 
to the Duma were priests. 
19 Although the current results constituted only 
the first stage of the electoral process, the prospect of a clerical-dominat- 
-ed Duma was no less alarming to the government than to the moderate parties. 
It was waggishly rumoured in political circles that Kokovtsov had been given 
the choice of dissolving the 'Popes House' or surrendering the premiership 
to the Procurator of the Holy Synod. 
20 Overwhelmed by the unexpected 
volume of clerical representation, the MVD hurriedly issued instructions to 
filter off a sizeable proportion of its own supporters : 
Thanks to the skilful pressure of the Home Office and the Holy Synod, 
the clerical majority secured at the primaries refrained from delegating 
a large majority of priests to the provincial electoral colleges and in 
most cases obediently voted the list of lay electors endorsed by the 
local authorities ... the clerical deputies are now expected to number 60 instead of over 200. (21) 
Having averted at the second electoral stage the clerical Duma threatened by 
the first stage, the MMVD had now to decide just how Rightist the Duma should 
be in order to act accordingly at the third and crucial electoral stage. 
While a substantial body of Right opinion saw no dilemma but that of 
'packing' the Duma with the maximum representation of the Right, some leaders 
18 All three quotations : Tim mea, 23 September 1912(n/s), 3f. 
19 MILIUKOV 280. 
20 Timmee, 4 October 1912(b/s), 3c, 
21 Tim eng 16 October 1912(s/s), 3d ; also MILIUKOV 280. 
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were not anxious to see a blatantly packed Rightist Duma. As early as 1 
September, Purishkevich, the leader of the Extreme Right in the Third Duma 
(and sAequently in the Fourth too), rather unexpectedly indicated the 
dangers of a provocatively gerrymandered Duma : 
I fear that by this election campaign we are entering upon the path of 
creating a government Duma, that could reduce it to the same address as 
the chancellery of the Minister of Interior. In such an eventuality the 
people will be disillusioned of the independence of the State Duma ... 
and in the idea of popular representation, which will give a push to 
the growth and success of revolutionary tendencies in the Empire. (22) 
Purishkevich here introduced the concept of the Duma as a political safety- 
-valve, ajline which subsequently enjoyed considerable currency amongst the 
moderate Right. In early October, the moderate Right groups reacted to the 
prospect of losing out to the Extreme Right by similarly warning that such 
a falsification of public sentiment is calculated to revive the unrest of 
1905'. 23 The precise influence of these warnings upon government policy is 
difficult to assess. However it is unlikely that the MVD responded in any 
significant measure to the charge that its policy was embarrassing the 
government by its success, especially when the electoral operation was 
already two-thirds completed. 
Party electioneering had its last proscribed opportunity over the two 
weeks between 2 October (when the elections to the provincial assemblies 
were completed) and 18 October (when the election of the deputies to the 
Duma by the provincial assemblies commenced). 
24 The Kadet party gamely 
attempted a last campaign although it must have realised that the contest was 
essentially over. A Kadet Address to the Moscow electorate published on 10 
October avoided the question of political principle almost entirely by 
concentrating a withering fire upon the Oktobrist Union : 
For five years the Oktobrists and their Right allies have directed the 
activities of the State Duma - now is your opportunity to deliver your 
judgement decisively and firmly on their activities ... In judging 
22 Quoted in Rech, I September 1912. 
23 Times, 18 October 1912(n/e), 5c. 
24 Times, 16 October 1912(m/e), 5d and 2 November 1912(a/e), 5f. 
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their legislative programme, they displayed their total readiness to t 
any measures to proscribe and emasculate essential reform and devoted 
themselves to the interests of the privileged classes alone. (25) 
The Kadet Address had little of any constructive import with which to close 
its condemnation : did the electorate want a continuation of Oktobrist rule 
or 'do you want the Duma to declare loudly and insistently the necessity of 
another path for Russia, which alone can bring our country liberty, order, 
prosperity and strength ? '. 
26 Even allowing for the fact that it was 
specifically aimed at the Moscow electorate as part of a Kadet campaign to 
storm the Oktobrist citadel, this Address was typical of the tone of the fine] 
Kadet effort. With little real alternative to offer to the discredited 
Oktobrist line, the Kadets still set out to capitalise on the disgrace of 
their rival by enthusiastically leading the universal chorus of condemnation. 
The Oktobrist Union by contrast failed even to mount an Address and 
passed the election period without a campaign worthy of the name, actions 
variously interpreted as indolence or guilt. Chermensky has suggested that 
'the Central Committee of the Oktobrists decided to refrain from publishing 
an electoral declaration and even from orgaiiaing election meetings for wider 
sections of the electorate ... because they placed all their hopes on 
government "patronage1'11e2? Whilst not attempting to deny the validity of 
this interpretation, the chronic internal condition of the Oktobrist Union 
must also have played a considerable part. Even amongst the Oktobrists who 
agreed with the basic policy of Guchkov, the element of risk (not to mention 
wounded amour-propre) involved in total reliance upon the government prompted 
some criticism. In a letter to the Oktobrist Central Committee in August, 
N. S. Avdakov expressed deep misgivings : 
It is essential to make clear whether the Union of 17 October even 
exists. If it does, then we must organise its activities quickly and 
25 POý, xiii, 2? /46(Moscow), 29. 
26 Ibid. 
27 CHER SKY 49-50. 
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energetically. Otherwise, we must acknowledge that the Union of 17 
October will not exist much longer. (28) 
Yet despite the sense of foreboding with which the Oktobrists put all their 
electoral eggs in the government basket, the past record of the Oktobrists 
in the Third Duma and the fragmented state of the Union effectively preclud- 
ed any alternative electoral policy. 
The MVD seems to have passed the final electoral fortnight with a 
similar fatalism, but one born of supreme confidence. When the Moscow Town 
Governor suggested to the Police Director that the Department of Posts might 
confiscate the Kadet election addresses cuarently in the mail, Beletsky was 
in no hurry to reply that 'in my opinion, confiscation of the addresses ..., 
being as they are only the usual pre-election bulletins, would only aggravate 
the situation and serve no real purpose'. 
29 Beletsky's reasons for inaction 
are unproved. Practical grounds may have dictated his decision : by the time 
that the confiscation proposal appeared for consideration, most of the 
mailed addresses had already been delivered. It is also possible that 
Beletsky did not consider the rewards sufficient to justify the operation : 
why make martyrs of the Kadets unnecessarily ? Most probably however, the 
dramatic success of MVD manipulatioa of the first two electoral stages 
engendered a confidence that the composition of the Duna was by now 
predetermined, rendering superfluous party campaigning and last-minute MVD 
action alike. 
From 18 October the provincial electoral assemblies were authorised to 
select their deputies to the Furth Duma ; the third and final stage of the 
protracted '3rd June' electoral process was smoothly and speedily executed. 
With the first sitting of the new Doma scheduled for 15 November, the releasel 
of the final electoral returns an 28 October allowed the politically-aware 
a brief fortnight to attempt to project the composition of the Duma which 
28 Letter of 1? August 1912 : TsGAOR, f. 160(Oktebriat Union), I, 76,27 quoted 
in CNSBZ 49. 
29 Bendorf to Beletsky, 13 October 1912 : POLICE, xiii, 27/46(Moecow), 30 
Beletaky to Bendorf, 17 October 1912 : ib_id, 31. 
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the MVD-manipulated elections had presented Russia for the next five years30 
2. The Composition of the new Duma 
It would be unrealistic to assume that any parliamentary institution 
can maintain itself totally without change but although the five-year 
duration of the Duma naturally involved alterations in composition, prompted 
by factors ranging from party crises to the resignations or deaths of 
individual deputies, the fundamental pattern of the Fourth Duma remained that 
determined by the elections of September-October 1912. The present section 
attempts to establish a profile of the Fourth Duma by considering its 
composition under eight headings : party affiliation, electoral demography, 
nationality, religion, occupation and class, education, age and parliament- 
-ary experience. 
31 
Party affiliation. The effect of the 1912 elections may be judged most conven- 
-iently by comparing the official Duna statistics on fraction membership for 
the last session of the Third Duma and the first session of the Fourth : 
32 
Fraction 
Rights 
Nationalists 
Centre 
Oktobrists 
Progressists 
Kadets 
Third Duma: Fourth Duma: + or - 
eeesis V sessia I 
51 64 + 13 
91 88 t 
+ 30 
- 33 
130 99 - 31 
36 47 + 11 
53 57 +4 
30 Times, 2 November 1912(n/s), 5f. 
31 Comparisons with the Third Duna on some of the eight headings may be 
drawn frem C. Jay ¢5mith Jr, 'The Rassian Third State Duna : an analytical 
profile', - Ritesian Review, vol. 17, no. 3, July 1958, pp. 201-210. 
32 Spisoki chlenev Gosudaretvenaoy Duw . bartvinvm 
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Nationalities 27 21 -6 
Trudoviks 11 10 -1 
Social Democrats 13 14 +1 
Unaffiliated 23 4 - 19 
It must be noted immediately that the party representation which emerged 
from the Duma elections was by no means sacrosanct. Party affiliation was 
the most transient aspect of the Fourth Duna, the most sensitive barometer 
of the mood of the Duma and its response to major political and national 
issues. Each Duma session brought changes in the relative numerical strength 
of the major fractions which adjusted the initial election distribution. The 
influx of a considerable body of now deputies into the Fourth Duma also 
meant that precise fraction affiliation remained unfinalized until well 
into the 1912-13 session. 
Yet despite these caveats, the fact remains that the 1912 elections 
dictated party distribution to an extent unmatched by all other influences 
combined. The most striking lesson eP the elections was that the two princip. 4 j 
-al electoral factors had effectively cancelled each other out. Government 
patronage, though perhaps a little disappointing, had proved its strength in 
boosting the representation of the Right wing by 43 seats (from 142 to 185). 
However the opposition movement in the country at large had managed to 
penetrate the 3/rd June electoral system to inch up the representation of 
the Left wing by 9 seats (from 140 to 149). 
33 The government had cause for 
bath self-congratulation and anxiety. While the representation of the Right 
had been substantially augmented, Ma influence in the elections had been 
decisive rather than overwhelming. The popular opposition movement, which 
showed every sign of developing further, moaned powerful. eneugh, to threaten 
even the M,,, ý central of the electoral process. The martyr to the increased.,., l 
representation of bette Left and Right wings was the Oktebrist fraction in 
the axis pesitien in the Thama ; the overall effect of the 1912 elections 
33 'Right wing' : Rights(64) Aati4i&liets(88) and Centre(33) ; 'Loft wing': 
SDs(14), Trnderiks(10), Natienalities(9), Sadets(57) & Progreasists(47). 
43" 
upon the Duma was to strengthen the political extremes of Right and Left at 
the expense off-the 6entre. The axis position which had in the Third Duma 
raised the possibility of a constructive relationship with the government 
was now seriously undermined. Perhaps the greatest misfortune of the 1912 
elections was that neither electoral force had defeated the other : each had 
triumphed in its own sphere, leaving the political centre without the 
support of either. 
Electoral Demography. Even over the relatively brief existence of the Duma, 
the various regions of the Russian Empire had developed distinct political 
allegiances. The decision of both the MYD and the more organised Duma 
fractions to institute detailed surveys upon which to base their election 
activities demonstrated that the complex pattern of electoral demggraphy 
was readily appreciated. 
34 
The overall voting patters was well-established. The extreme eastern 
areas of the Russian Empire, particularly Siberia and Trans--Baikal., were 
invariably Left in sympathy, providing much of the support for the Extreme 
Left fractions in the Fourth Duna. This arose partly from the regular 
presence of politisal exiles banished from European Russia (whose energies 
in exile were employed converting the local population) but principally from 
the radical leanings of a vigorous frontier society. 
35 The extreme western 
areas of the Russian Empire were just as reliably Right in sympathy. The 
fi 
high proportion of Jewish, Polish and Baltic minorities had prompted the 
government to institute a rigorous system of repression designed to ensure 
the primacy of the Russian tongue and way of life. As a result, the privilog. - 
-ed class which on joyed . 
Tama franchise was composed of Russifiers passion- 
ately convinced of the need to defend the Russian cause against the ambitions 
34 MVD : survey of January 1912 (POS, 247,1 quoted in CHERMENSKY Mots ets : 31-Page survey of early 1911(TsGAOR, f. 125, ii, 10,5-36) and 77- 
page survey of early 1912(P LLICE, xiii, 27. - 9 , 35-112). 
35 Ni yukev, 'The Representative System''p"39 ; C. day Smith, 'The Russian , 
Third State qua'#Ap "9 
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of subject minorities. 
36 Between the Right stronghold of the West and the 
Left stronghold of the East lay the heartland of European Russia. Much of 
the Ukraine, part of the Volga lands and the territory between the capitals 
were dominated by the landowning influence, which meant, translated into 
political terms, by Oktobrism. A section striking westward towards Moscow 
from the Far East illustrated growing support for the moderate line over the 
Extreme Left : Far East and Trans-Baikal(Menshevik), Siberia and Trans-Ural 
(Trudovik), Volga valley(Kadet and Progressist) and Kazan'(Oktobrist). 37 A 
comparable section striking eastward towards Moscow from the Baltic again 
demonstrated growing support for the moderate line, but this time over the 
Right : Vil'na(Extreme Right), White Russia(Nationalist) and Tver and the 
Moscow environs(Oktobriet). 
38 The East represented the political Left, the 
West represented the Right, and central Russia the moderate positi©n. 
Onto this broad chart of correlation between geographical region and 
political complexi©n must be superimposed the allegiance of the urban 
communities. Electorally-speaking, there were only seven urban centres : 
St Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, Odessa, Riga, Warsaw and Lodz. These cities 
enjoyed the privilege of electing directly to the Duma from the initial 
electoral stage, which out down MVD opportunities for interference and 
greatly increased the chances for the selection of moderate deputies. 
39 The 
36 Milyukov, i bid, p. 39 ; C. Jay Smith, ibid, pp. 207-9. 
37 Mensheviks A. I. Ryslev(Amur constituency) and I. N. Man'kov(Irkutak) ;a 
Trudoviks V. M. Vershinin(Tomsk) & V. I. Dzubinsky, M. S. R, gsev and A. S. 
Sukhanov(all Tobol'sk) ; Sadets V. I. Almazev(Saratov), N. A. Gladysh(Samaraa 
and M. S. Adzhemov, M. S. Voronkov, A. A. Nazarev, V. A. Kharmolev and F. V. CUrach- 
-ukin(all Don Cossacks) ; Progressiste V. V. Klenov, A. M. Maslennyakov and N. N. L'vov(all Saratev) and A. I. Nevikov, V. S. Obodovsky and A. P. Sidorov(all 
Samara) ; Oktobrists I. A. Bazhanov, P. F. Bychkov and I. V. Godnev(all Kazan') . 
Siiaok chlenov Gosudarstveaaov Dater ve izbiratle'avim okruRam in 
Appendices to St enograficheskie Otchyoty, soZyy IV, sessia I, st_ 9-18. 
38 Rights G"G. Zaayalevsky and V. P. Yuz'vyuk(both Vilna) ; Nationalists F. I. Ol'khovaky, P. M. Shmyakov and A I. Mukhin(all Vitebsk) ; Oktobrists M. I. Aref'ev, V. I. Voresov, A. P. Srasarov, A. A. Lodyzhenaky and N. M. Shubinskoy (all Tver) and A. Z. Taatsov, A. G. Lelyukhin and V. S. Fil'gin(ali Smolensk). Ibid, 9-18. 
39 The electoral allocation of beats was respectively 6,4,2,2,2,2, and I: ibid, 10,12,13,14,15,16 & 17 ; also Milyukov, 'The Representative System', 
p. 38 and Gronsky, Tht War and the Russian Govern$ent, pp"15-16. 
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Kadets did particularly well in the capitals, storming the Oktobrist bastion 
of Moscow to take all four seats, and only conceding two seats out of six in s 
St Petersburg. 
4o 
The location of the remaining five cities along the 
western periphery of the Empire, together with the greater freedom of operat- 
-ion allowed the MND outside the capitals, greatly reduced the chances of 
similarly sweeping victories for the moderates but even so, the Kadets and 
Progressists jointly managed to secure Riga and Lodz. 
41 
Warsaw proved the 
eifception to all rules, returning a Menshevik and a deputy to the Polish 
Kole ; Kiev saw the joint victory of the Kadets and Natkonalists ; Odessa, 
perhaps the most cosmopolitan of all the cities, returned two deputies for 
the Right. 
42 
Parallel to the'cities' were the 'industrial provinces', which 
were conceded separate Workers' Curiae on the strength of the size of the 
proletariat. In the six industrial provinces of St Petersburg, Moscow, 
Vladimir, Yekaterinoslav, Kestroma and Kharkov, the Bolsheviks swept the 
board. 
43 
The cities and industrial areas thus tended to constitute islands 
of the Left in the sea of moderate and extreme Rightism that was 
European Russia. 
Nationality. That the Fourth Duma was overwhelmingly Great Russian by nation-' 
-ality may be most readily gauged by considering the meagre exceptions. 
There existed three parliamentary groups which were specifically 'natioaality, 
fractions' : the Polish, the Lithuanian-cum-White Russian and the 
40 Moscow : V. A. Maklakov, N. M. Novikev, ILV. Chelnokov & N. N. Shchepkin(Kadets); 
Petersburg : P. H. Milyukov, F. I. Rodichev, A. I. Shingarev & L. A. Vblikhov 
(Kadets) and M. D. Kalugin & A. A. Varyshnikev(Progrossists). Source : 
ibidd, 13-14 & 15-16. 
41 Riga : S. P. Mansyrev(Kadet) and i. P. Zalit(Progressist) ; Lodz : M. K. 
Bomaah(Kadet). Ib a, 13 & 14. 
42 Warsaw : E. I. Y agello(Menshevik)asd S. N. Alskseyer(89lo) , Kiev S. A. Ivanov(Kadet) and V. Ya. Dencheako(Nati realist) ; Odessa : S. V. Levashev & 
Archpriest Anatolii(R ghte). II id, 10,12 & 17- 
43 Respectively A. S. Badayev, B. V. Malinovsky, F. I. Samoilov, G. I. Petrovsky, N. R. 
Shagev and M. ä. Muranov : i_bid, 9-18 ; also areasky, Ths War and the 
Russian Government, p. 15. 
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Mohammedan. Numbering respectively 7,6 and 6. all experienced a drop in 
representation as a result of the Fourth Duma elections. 
44 
Their numbers 
prevented their ever being more than spokesmen for their nationalities for 
(even combined) their Duna weight was negligible. By 1912 the members of the 
'nationality fractions' had resigned themselves to this proscribed role and 
become accustomed to standing outside Duma politics. Placed for convenience8s 
sake on the Left of the Duma spectrum, the 'nationality fractions' normally 
attended the Kadet fraction, whose self-chosen role as champion of subject 
nationalities was still uncompromiaed. As a political influence the 
'nationality fractions' could be almost entirely discounted. 
Not all nationalities deputies chose to stand aside from politics as 
members of the 'nationality fractions'. Many joined established 'political' 
fractions. As a natural consequence of the Russification policy, nationality 
deputies tended to give their allegiance to the Left wing. The three 
Georgians in the Fourth Duma exercised a proportionately immense influence 
over the Extreme Left, pre*iding the leadership of the Menshevik fraction 
(I. S. Chkheidze and 1. I. Chkhenkeli) and the secretaryship of the Trudovik 
fraction (V. L. Gelovani). 
45 
By contrast however, the two Armenians possessed 
negligible influence. 
46 
German influence was considerable and concentrated 
almost exclusively in the Oktobrist fraction :a self-sufficient group of 
seven Baltic Germana, four of them barons, constituted a formidable pressure 
44 Polish fraction membership dropped from 11 to 7, Lithuanian-cum-White 
Russian 7 to 6, Mohammedan 9 to 6; SpisokcjQenev Gosudarstvennoy Dumy 
Po partyihym cruirov . AM 
in Appendices to Steno raficheskie Otch et , sez III, eessia V, st. 19-24 and a®zyv IV, sessia I, et. 19-24. 
45 Unless stated to be otherwise, all the statistics in this section 'The 
Composition of the Now Duma' are from the official Duma records contain- 
-ed in the Appendices to the GogrujaEstvennaya Duma: Ste or icheskie 
Otc et (cited hereafter as GDSO under the heading of Ukaz atel' Indes). 
The most valuable sub-divisions are the S isok chlenev o izziratel'n 
ekru aa" pp " 19-18,. Stiis. k chlen v i)o t inym aruu»irovkam, pp " 19-2 , Lichav4 Alfab_zyi atý, pp. 57-22 k. For convenience, all will be 
cited hereafter as GDSa: UL*ZATBL'. 
46 M. I. Papadzhaaev. ( et) and A. B. Deayasovich(Centre) : GDSO: DKAZATEL' 164 & 96. 
ýý 
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group. 
47 
Deputies of Baltic nationality who chose to join an established 
fraction numbered five, three within the Progressist camp. 
48 
Polish deputies 
in the same position numbered only tw, testifying to the greater cohesion 
of the Kole. 
49 
Jews in the Fourth Duma numbered just three, all Kadets. 
50 
A single Swede, Dutchman and Greek completed the all too limited list of non- 
-Russian deputies in the Fourth Duma. 
51 
One complication in the abstraction of Duma nationality statistics 
remains the distinction between the Great Russians and Little Russians. The 
Left wing of the Nationalist fraction was very obviously Ukraine-based : of 
the total Nationalist membership of 88, tweleve were elected from the city or 
province of Kiev. 
52 However whilst acknowledging both the rapid development 
of Ukrainian nationalism over the period under discussion and the need for a 
measure of care in categorizing the Little Russian element, it is probably 
legitimate as well as convenient to make no distinction in the Duma context. 
Setting aside the Little Russians therefore, the total representation of 
non-Russian nationalities in the Fourth Duma reached just 44 deputies (19 in 
'nationality fractions' and 25 in 'political fractions'). The n"&-Russian 
deputies, a medley of widely-differing and frequently bitterly-bickering 
individuals, together constituted a bare 10% of the Fourth Duma total. 
53 It 
47 Oktobrist Germans : Baron A. F. Meyendorff, Baron O. M. Engel'hardt, Baron N. B. 
Wolf(all from Liflyand), Baron G. E. Felkerzam(Kurlyand) and G. A. Bergman, 
O. R. Brashche and K. Yu. Brevern(all from Estlyand) ; the only non-Okt©briat 
German was the Progressist I. I. Tsimmer(Don). GDSO: UKAZATEL' 146,220,82, 
203,70,73,73 & 208. 
48 Progressists : M. I. Grodzitsky(Orenburg), I. P. Zallit(Riga) and Ya. Yu. 
Goldman(Kurlyand) ; also the Kadet I. M. Ramot(Liflyaad) and the Trudovik 
F. O. Keinis(Kovne). GDSO: UKAZATEL' 93,106,90,175 & 116. 
49 R. V. Malinovsky(SD) and E. I. Yagello(SD). GDSO: UKAZATEL' 139 & 222. 
50 E. BGurevich(Kurlyand), N. M. Friedman(Kovne) and M. K. Bomash(Lodz). GDSO: 
UKAZATELI 94,206 & 72. 
51 Respectively V. K. Vinberg(Kadet), PP. Shreder(Progressist) and P. V. Sinadino 
(Centre). GDSO: UKAZATEL' 79,218 & 189. 
52 A. I. Savenko, V. Ya. Demchenko, G. A. Vishnevsky, N. N. Chikhachev, N. A. Zhilia, K. P 
Grigorovich-Barsky, P. F. Mershchy, M. Q. Mitrotsky, A. L. TregabovS. E. Steigorr ' 
P. T. Naseleako and K. E. Suvchinsky. GD UKpZATTEEL_ 183,95,81,211,105,: 91, '1. 
147,149,200,218,154 & 195. 
53 The official membership of the Fourth Duma was 442 : GDSO: UKAZAT$& 19-24" 
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is hardly necessary to underline that the 90% Russian dominance within the 
Fourth Duma reflected not the actual demographic balance within the Russian 
Empire but only the direction of the nationalities polity of the ttir*iet 
government. 
54 
Religion. The statistic" for the religious persuasions of the members of the 
Fourth Duma are especially revealing when contrasted with those of the First 
Duma (the closest to a genuine representative assembly that Russia was to 
achieve under the Tears) : 
55 
First Duma Fourth Duma 
Russian Orthodox 343 = 76.4% 387 = 88.1% 
Roman Catholic 63 = 14.1 20 = 4.6 
Lutheran 15 = 3.3 14 = 3.3 
Muslim 14 = 3.3 7 = 1.6 
Jewish 11 = 2.7 3 = 0.7 
Others 2= 0.2 8 = 1.8 
Two points are immediately apparent : the 'natural' hegemony of the Russian 
Orthedov faith was reinforced between 1906 and 19111 by government manipulat- 
-ion of the electoral system ; and the statistics for religion closely 
mirror those for nationality. To the government of Nicholas II, minority 
religions and nationalities were essentially manifestations of the same 
problem. Accordingly, just as the representation permitted the non-Russian 
nationalities in the Dumas dropped to a more 109% the representation of the 
non-Orthodox faiths was reduced to an almost identically low level. Examin- 
-ation of the Furth Duma membership on the basis of nationality and religion 
illuminates both the extent to which the State Duna had been forcibly 
incorporated into the overall imperial policy of the tsarist government and 
54 1897 Census : Great Russians 44.32% of total, Ukrainians 17.81%. In täer 
words, 55.7 % of the Empire was sen-Great Russian (R. Pipee, The Formast 
of the Soviet UnC Nationalism 11 -2 , Harvard U. P. r 19641p. 2). 
55 Geldenweiser, 'The Russian Duma', p. 419 ; Goldenweiser's statistics differ 
slightly from these in GDSO: UBAZATEL' but to no significant extent. 
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the desperate weakness of the Duma's claims to being a representative 
assembly by late 1912. 
Having established the identity of those elements largely excluded from 
the Fourth Duma, it is essential to consider more closely the composition of 
those elements which evaded or were allowed to pass the government filter. 
Occupation and Class. Eight broad catogories of occupation mad be abstracted 
from the Duma statistics available, represented in the Fourth Duma in the 
following proportions ; 
56 
Land Landowners 
Zemstvo personnel 
Intelligentsia 
Clergy 
Peasants57 
Civil servants 
Armed Forces 
Industrial/Commercial 
Industrial Proletariat 
63 = 15% 111 = 27% total 48 = 12% 
69 = 17% 
49 = 12% 
47 = 12% 
43 = 1oj% 
35 = 9% 
31 = 7 
12 = 3% 
397 = 98% of 41358 
The flavour of the Fourth Duma emerges at once. Though not dominated by 
landowners (for the landowner representation of 15% lay second to that of 
the intelligentsia), it was an assembly whose leading interest was land. The 
combined interests of the landowners and zemstvo personnel constituted a 
land interest which clearly outstripped its nearest rival (by 27% to 17%). 
The Fourth Duma was equally clearly dominated by traditional forces : the 
56 The basic source for this sub-section remains GDSO: UKAZATEL', en occasion 
supported by the most widely-employed Duna 'handbook' M. P. Boiovich(Ed. ), 
Chleny Gosudarstveaaoy Dua :. Nashi DeDutaty, St Petersburg 1913. 
57 While the electoral peasant curia officially returned 74 deputies, less 
than 50 were actually peasants, the balance being made up by small 
landowners : CHERMENSKY 122-3. 
58 Of the total 442 deputies, the nineteen in the 'nationality fractions' 
have been excluded on grounds of 'aea-politics', personal details proved 
insufficient on ten, and a final sixteen fell into none of the eight 
designated categories. These statistics therefore cover only 397 of the 
total 442 deputies. 
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land, priest, peasant, military and bureaucratic interests together command- 
ed 71% of total Duma membership while the more progressive elements (the 
intelligentsia, industrial and commercial capital, and the proletariat) held 
a weak numerical position. 
A great deal about fraction identity is revealed by comparing the 
distribution of categories of occupation fraction by fraction : 
Fraction Land Intell. Clergy Peasant Civil Milit Indust Prol. 
Owner Zemstv Serv. 
Right 13 1 5 22 14 6 2 2 0 
Nationalist 12 10 8 20 17 12 13 0 0 
Centre 7 3 0 2 3 9 8 1 0 
Oktobrist 30 22 13 0 3 11 3 9 0 
Progressist 1 3 14 5 3 0 5 13 2 
Badet 0 9 24 0 3 5 4 4 0 
Trudevik 0 0 4 0 3 0 0 2 0 
Menshevik 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 
Bolshevik 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 
63 48 69 49 47 43 35 31 12 
The forces of tradition obviously adhered to the Duma Right wing. Of the 
land interest in the Duma, only 12% (13 out of 111) were to the Left of the 
Oktobrist fraction. The Orthodox clergy were grouped overwhelmingly on the 
Right wing : al4but 7 (er 13% were affiliated to the Nationalist or Right 
fractions. The peasants were marginally more widely distributed, admitting 
the possibility of isolated groups on the Left wing, but even so the clear 
majority (65%) were again^the Nationalist and Right fractions. The civil 
servants too were a Right-wing phenomenon : all but 5 of the 43 were of an 
Oktobrist or further Right position. Finally for the Right came the military, 
only 9 (or 25%) of whom were further Left than the Oktobrist position. 
Despite untypical actions by exceptional individuals , the traditional slant 
of the landowners, clergy, peasants, civil servants, and soldiers was 
expressed in firm commitment to the Right-wing fractions. 
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The more progressive forces of sodiety were equally committed to the 
moderate and Left-wing fractions. The ranks of the intelligentsia, while 
quite widely spread, concentrated their numbers on the three moderate fract- 
-ions which together commanded 51 (or 73%) of intelligentsia repressstation. 
Of the total intelligentsia representation, 24 (or 34%) were Kadet, 14 (or 
20%) Progreasist and 13 (or 19%) Oktobrist. Industrial and commercial 
representation, whnlst comparatively slight, was also an essentially moderate] 
phenomenon : the Kadets, Progressiste and Oktobrists commanded 26 (or 80%) 
of its Duma strength. The industrial proletariat inevitably made a poor 
showing in the Duma membership : of a total of 12,6 were Bolsheviks, 4 
Mensheviks and two Pregressists. While the peasant in the Fourth Duma tended 
to be Right in his allegiance, the industrial worker was without exception 
committed to the Left. 
The above statistics for occupation and class are particularly valuable 
in establishing the flavour and balance of the Fourth Duma as a national 
assembly, illuminating the complex Duma fraction spectrum and providing a 
first insight into the distinctive identities of the leading fractions. 
Education. The education of the Duma deputies may be most conveniently 
discussed under six headings : university, technical, military, religious 
seminary, secondary level and primary level only. Statistics on this basis 
present the following profile of the Fourth Duma membership : 
59 
University 134 = 31% of total 
Secondary 57 =1 
Primary only 56 = 14% 
Military 46 = 11% 
Religious Seminary 46 = 11% 
Technical 38 = 9% 
37? = 90% 
59 Information on the education of deputies proved available and easily 
categirised on only 377 of the total 442, hence the figures differ 
slightly from these quoted in 'Occupation and Class'. 
I 
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The Fourth Duma featured a considerable measure of representation for each 
level and type of education : 31% had enjoyed a university education but 
28% had at most a secondary education ; the three principal types of vocation-al 
training had approximately equal representation ; university education, 
school education and vocational training were present in very comparable 
proportions. 
More informative of the bearing of education upon fraction identity are 
the more detailed statistics for the individual fractions : 
Fraction Univ. Tech. Milit. Seminary 2-ary 1-ary 
Right 10 7 5 22 7 14 
Nationalist 17 3 18 21 8 12 
Centre 9 4 9 3 2 5 
Oktobrist 45 6 12 0 15 8 
Progressist 15 9 0 0 10 4 
Kadet 34 7 1 0 8 3 
Trudovik 3 0 0 0 4 2 
Menshevik I 1 1 0 2 4 
Bolshevik 0 1 0 0 1 4 
A further breakdown of the university-education statistics is also revealing. 
More useful than the bare distribution of university graduates among fract- 
-ions is the proportion of each fraction with a university education : 
Kadet 34 university-educated of fraction of 57 = 65% of fraction 
Oktobrist 45 99 = 45% 
Progressist 15 47 = 33% 
Trudovik 3 9 = 33% 
Centre 9 33 = 27% 
Nationalist 17 88 = 19% 
Right 10 64 = 16% 
Menshevik 1 9 = 13% 
Bolshevik 0 6 = 0% 
An educational pattern emerges : if it is assumed, probably correctly, that 
a university education was. superior to th&t of the other five categories, 
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the best-educated were the moderate fractions (ranging from 65% to 33% 
graduate), the next best-educated were the Right wing (fanging from 30% to 
15% graduate), and the worst-educated were the Left wing (ranging from 13% 
to zero graduate). The universities of Moscow and St Petersburg commanded 
most allegiances : of the total 134 graduates, 54 had attended Moscow and 
40 St Petersburg, the remaining 40 being spread thinly over the less prestig- 
-ious provincial universities. 
6o 
Amongst the moderate fractions, which 
together commanded 94 of the 134 graduates, the same dominance was felt. 
Interestingly enough, whilst Moscow graduates swamped the Petersburg graduat-1 
-es in the moderate fractions, precisely the reverse was true amongst the 
Right-wing fractions, possibly indicating the different political atmosphereal 
prevailing at the 'government' University of St Petersburg and the 'society' 
University of Moscow. 
61 
Technical education echoed the pattern of university education : 22 
moderate deputies, 14 Right wing deputies and only 2 Left wing deputies had 
undergone technical training. While the Kaddts and Okt©brists headed the 
lists for university education, the Progressieta led for technical education. ] 
The distribution of deputies with primary education alone again corroborated 
the pattern, this time in negative : 
Bolshevik 4 Primary-educated only of fraction of 6 
Menshevik 4 
Right 14 
Trudovik 2 
Centre 5 
Nationalist 12 
Pr"gressist 4 
Oktobriat 8 
Kadet 3 
9= 
64 
66% fraction 
'+5% 
24% 
9= 22% 
33 = 15% 
88 -14% 
Z7 = 8.3% 
99 = 8% 
57 = 5% 
60 Moscow 54, St Petersburg 40, Kiea 119 Kazan' 6, Ne. oreeeiiek 6, Khar'ker 
5, Yuriev 5 and Tomsk 2. The universities of the remaining five are 
unspecified, very Possibly foreign. ¬EDSO: UKAZATEL' 57-224. 
61 Kadets : 17 Moscow graduates to 7 Petersburg ; Oktebriets : 17 to 12-; > 
Progressiets : 10 to 5 Rights 4 Petersburg to 2 Moscow ; Natioaaliats 
9 to 3. GDSO: UKAZATEL' 57-224. 
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The figures for primary education alone fall into the familiar grouping : 
the Left wing (over 25%), the Right wing (25-10%) and the moderates (less 
than 10%). Thus the figures for university, technical and primary education 
all postulate a fundamental tri-partite division of the Duma. 
Are. The average age of the Fourth Duma deputy on election was 44.2 years. 
Although the life expectancy in Russia in 1912 was still remäkably short, A 
the Fourth Duma average was still sufficient to refute any accusation that 
the Duma was an assembly of greybeards. 
62 
A further breakdown of the 
statistics fraction by fraction again proves rewarding. The age of the aver- 
-age deputy within each Duma fraction in November 1912 was as follows : 
Right 41 
Nationalist 46 
Centre 42 
Oktobrist 47 
Progressist 44 
Badet 48 
Trudovik 38 
Menshevik 34 
Bolshevik 33 
A pattern similar to that already remarked for education appears : the 
fractions with the eldest membership were the moderates (Kadets and ©ktebr- 
-fists generally im their late '40s), the next eldest the Right wing (Centre, 
Nationalists and Rights generally is their early '40s), and the youngest the 
Left wing (Bolsheviks, _Henshoviks and . 
Trudeviks in their 130s) . The youngest 
members of the Duna, and even apere se, their supporters outside the Duma, 
readily equated youth with the Left wing, a fairly justifiable conclusion in 
the circumstances. But mazy fell ist. the trap of equating old age with the 
Right wing which, as the Drama statistics demonstrate, was patently untrue. 
The membership of the '. *rth Dina , wee"is any case comparatively young ; but 
62 Expectation of Uf. at. birth i* European Russia, 1895 : 31(male), 33 33(female) ; 1926 : 4? (aale),, k7(fema], e). The Cambridge Econesic R1612" 
of Eurepee, vol. vi, p. 82. ,.. 
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even the oldest deputies the Fourth Duma had to offer were typically not 
reactionaries but moderates. 
A second pattern may be discerned by comparing the age of the fraction 
membership with the age of the fraction itself. The older fractions which 
had contrived a continuous Duma career since 1906 tended both to rely upon 
their veterans and to attract an older membership. The veteran Kadet and 
Oktobrist fractions enjoyed the oldest membership in the Fourth Duma (48 and 
47 respectively in 1912) while the recently-emerged Progressist fraction had 
an average age of 44, marginally but significantly lower. Similarly, the 
newly-created Centre fraction's average of 42 was appreciably lower than that 
of the neighbouring Oktobrist and Nationalist fractions (47 and 46 
respectively). 
The tentative conclusion may be drawn that the average age of the 
membership of a Duma fraction depended upon two factors : the position of the: 
fraction in the Duma spectrum and the age of the fraction itself. 
Parliamentary experience. The total number of Fourth Duma deputies with 
parliamentary experience was 123. The first conclusion is both glaring and 
crucial : since only 123 (or 29%) of the Fourth Duna membership had partic- 
ipated in one or more eälier Dumas, it followed that 71% had no parliament- 
-ary experience. The explanation for the low level of experience is probably 
two-fold. The victimization by the MVD of known 'trouble-makers' - the 
defeat of Guchkov in Moscow being the prime example - undoubtedly claimed a 
proportion of those Third Duna deputies who had wished to continue their 
parliamentary careers. 
63 
But more seriously to Duma morale, disillusionment 
on the part of some Third Duma deputies dissuaded them from standing for 
re-election in 1912.64 The large proportion of new deputies may be inter- 
preted not as a healthy symptom of a virile national legislature in the 
natural process of renewing itself but in part as a reflection of that 
63 MILIUKOV 282 ; JKLMMEV, i, 8,174.64 
ENGEL'HARDT, xi, 299-301 ; KLYUZHEV, i, 8,181. 
legislature's faltering belief in itself. 
56. 
A fraction by fraction survey of the Duma experience of the Fourth Duma 
membership reveals the following table : 
Right Nat. Cent. Okt. Prog. Kadet Trud. Men. Bel. 
1st Duma only 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
2nd Duma only 1 0 0 1 1 4 0 0 0 
3rd Duma only 11 16 5 31 4 12 2 1 0 
let & 2nd Dumas 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1st & 3rd Dumas 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
2nd & 3rd Dumas 3 3 2 7 1 7 1 0 0 
lst, 2nd & 3rd Dumas 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 
15 20 8 42 7 27 3 1 0 
To the Kadete belonged the claim of the longest experience of the Duma : 
three Kadets had sat in all four Duman (a record that no other fraction 
could approach) and a further seven had oat in all but the First Duma (a 
record that only the Oktobriste could equal and none could better) 065 
However the Oktebrist fraction enjoyed the strongest force of continuity 
from the Third Duna : 38 Oktebrist deputies from the Third Diana were re-elect 
-ed to the Fourth ; net surprisingly the Kadets followed next with 23 
deputies. 
The basic pattern which has become familiar under the headings of 
'iducation' and 'Age' emerges again on drawing up a table illustrating the 
degree of parliamentary experience within each fraction : 
Badet 27 with Duma experience in fraction of 57 = 48% of total 
Oktobriet 42 99 = 42% 
Trudevik 3 10 = 30% 
Centre 8 33 a 299 
65 'Three Ka: dets' : F. I. Rodichev, V. A. Bharmalev and K. L. Bardizh ; 'a further, 
seven' : M. S. Adzhemov, M. S. Vorrsksv, F. A. Yeremin, V. A. Maklakev, M. V. Chelaokrv 
and A. I. Shingarev ; 'the aktebrists could equal' : I. S. Klyuzhev, S. V. 
Lukashevich, L. Q. LyutaiR. It. Cpoohiliz, A. Z. Tantnw, K. N. Timirev and N. A 
Kho rakov. (DSO, ZATEL' 179,206: 67 ; 57,83,104,138,209,216 ; 119,134, 
137,162,196,199 & 2030 
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Nationalist 20 with Duma experience in fraction of 88 = 22% of total 
Right 15 64 = 21% 
Progressist 7 47 = 15% 
Menshevik 1 9= 12% 
Bolshevik 0 6= 0% 
The greatest parliamentary experience lay with the moderate fractions (ever 
30%), the lesser lay with the Right wing fractions (20-25%), and by far the 
least experienced was the Left wing (below 15%). 
The various statistics on the composition of the Fourth Duma start to 
lend some substance to the (at first sight) rather arbitrary bracketing of 
the Oktobrist, Kadet and Progressist fractions under a collective title. 
These three fractions featured certain fundamental similarities which simul- 
-taneously marked them off from all other fractions. Their central position 
around the fulcrum of the Duma offered each the possibility of a parliament- 
-ary eminence out of all proportion to fraction size or national support. All 
three were linked by their high recruitment from the intelligentsia : 51 of 
the 69 intelligentsia deputies in the Fourth Duma were ladet, Oktobrist or 
Progressist. Educationally the three fractions headed the Duma membership : 
94+ of the total 134 university graduates were Kadets, Oktobrists or 
Progressists. Over half of the deputies with Duma experience (69 out of 123) 
were Kadets or Oktobrists alone. Even the age pattern of the Duma placed the 
three fractions in the same camp. The composition of the Fourth Duma, 
subsequently corroborated by party activities throughout its duration, 
established not a straightforward distinction between 'Government' and 
'Opposition' but a tri-partite division with the central Badet-Oktobrist- 
Progressist group separating the extremes of Left and Right. Although the 
above parliamentary statistics cannot be either the sole or the definitive 
basis for judgement, and certainly cannot justify the term 'Moderates', they 
do provide reasonably satisfactory prima facie evidence for grouping the 
three fractions together. 
L 
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The Fourth Duma was a multi-party assembly with a spectrum of eight 
(and subsequently even more) parliamentary fractions, none of which even 
approached an absolute majority. The approximate balance of the Extreme Left 
and Right forces both lent the central Duma fractions enhanced authority and 
subjected them to exceptional political strain. The crucial importance of the 
moderate fractions in the Fourth Duma lay less in their not inconsiderable 
numerical strength - 203 deputies of the total 442 - than in the pivotal 
position. which opened to the Oktobriste, Kadets and Progressists the 
possibility of determining the overall character and policy of the Duma. The 
Contest between the three fractions for that elusive authority was a vital 
component in the history of the Duma over the last five years of tsar#st 
Russia. 
The Oktobrist fraction was the obvious front-runner in such a contest 
but suffered a crisis of policy and internal unity which threatened radically 
to weaken its bid for power. Like the other moderate fractions, the Oktebrist 
fraction was notable for the range of its social cospoaition: of the total 
Oktobriat membership of 99,52 represented the land interest, 13 the intoll- 
-igentaia, 11 the civil servants, 9 the industrial/commercial interest and 
3 each of the military and peasant interests. Of the eight categories of 
occupation only two (clergy and proletariat) were absent. Yet despite the 
comparatively wide range of representation, the political balance was 
decisively in favour of the land interest. 47% of the entire land interest 
in the Fourth Duna was concentrated in the Oktobriats (52 deputies out of 
111) ; within the fraction itself, the land interest commanded more deputies 
than all the other interests combined (52 out of 99). With such a heavy 
numerical preponderance, one could be pardoned for assuming that the land 
interest Was the sole director of Oktobrist policy. But while this was 
largely true for the Fourth Duma, it-had not always been the case. In the' 
early Third Drama, the fraction was led less by the land interest than the 9 
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commercial interest headed by Guchkov. The complicated machinery of the 
Union of 17 October, its committees without number and the complex relations 
of provincial organisation, Central Committee and Fraction Bureau encouraged 
the emergence of party bureaucrats. The land deputies with their f+rmal 
education, love of their country estates and traditional viewpoints had not 
the time, knowledge or inclination to become party operatives. The commercials 
class with its pragmatic background, acquaintance with business practice and 
firm grasp of finance and paperwork proved the recruiting-ground for the 
party organisation men. Partly from ambition, partly by default, both the 
fraction and the Union as a whole came to be dominated by the commercial 
interest, particularly the Moscow clique headed by Guchkov. 
66 
The succession of crises after 1909 served to estrange the Oktobrists 
from the government, fragment the diverse range of the Union and undermine 
the 'unnatural' commercial leadership of the fraction. The emergence of the 
Pregressists filtered off a significant proportion of the 'commercial 
Oktobrints' to leave the land interest numerically even more preponderant. 
The results of the Duna elections confronted the Union with the crisis of itsl 
relations with the government. To have its numbers slashed from 130 to 99 
was disaster enough but the realisation that the government upon which it 
had relied so heavily for election success had chosen to abandon it delivered] 
a stunning blow to Oktobrist morale. In the words of the unsympathetic 
Milyukov , 
The Oktebrists, the former centre, were particularly badly hit, suffer- 
ing the double effect of government action and society indignation 
against them for their conduct in the Third Duna ... The Oktobriets 
entered the Fourth Duma not only without direct government support but 
even against the wishes of the government. They were thus freed from 
the obligation which constrained S. I. Shidlevsky to say in the Third 
Duma that the Oktebriets, regardless of the terms, would be "always 
with the government" '. (67) 
66 Hutchinson, The Octobriste, p. 374 ; LAVERYCHEV 59 ; MAKIN 30-2. 
67 'Taktiki Frakteii v evyazi s ebahchim politicheskim polozheniem', a 
regular section of the annual Cadet publication Otchyet ® Deyatel'noety 
Fraktsii Narodnoy Sv*bods, published ever the Fourth Duma period i* three 
successive instalments : Seaei 1(1912-3), Seasia 11(1913-4) and Vo 
Vremya Vý(covering up `to tember 1915). Cited hereafter as TAM M. 
This quotation : TAXTIKI, 1912-3, p. 6. 
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To top this catalogue of catastrophe, the guiding spirit of Oktobrism Guchkov I 
was defeated at the Moscow polls, succumbing to a joint campaign of MVD 
victimisation and Kadet incitement of popular dissatisfaction with the Third 
Duma. 
68 
Although Guchkov was later elected to the State Council, his forcib 
exclusion from the Duma and Oktebrist fraction exacerbated the developments 
already in motion. Still further advantage was offered the land interest to 
remove the last vestiges of commercial direction (now numbering just 9 
deputies out of 99) and convert the Oktobrist fraction into essentially a 
pressure group for the landed interest. The removal of Guchkov from direct 
control of the fraction also permitted the free development of all the 
divisive elements against which Guchkov had been vainly fighting in the 
latter half of the Third Duma. 
Yet despite Oktobriet difficulties, there seemed little reason why the 
Oktobrist fraction should net play a major role in the Fourth Duna. The 
fraction was still the largest in the Duma with 99 deputies, almost a quarterl 
of the total membership. Its provincial organisation had proved resilient 
under considerable pressure from both MVD and rival electioneering. It enjoy-1 
-ed a length of Duma experience second only to the Kadet and by far the 
strongest force of continuity from the Third Dumas Assuming that the problem 
of internal unity could be overcome, the Fourth Diana prospects for the 
Oktobriet fraction though less glittering than in autumn 1907 still seemed 
excellent. Although the Oktebrists could not hope for a revival of their 
hegemony of the early Third Duna, they still had a clear advantage over theirl 
rivals for parliamentary authority. 
The Pregreesist fraction, the youngest and smallest of the moderate 
fractions, was in many respects the most intriguing. The initial period of 
Progressist development was stunted by two fundamental weaknesses. The 
fraction was essentially a parliamentary creation owing little to broad- 
68 MILTUKOV 292 s ütr® Rann4 i_ 2n nM-d%1, ß.. i ai -, . wr orrw,. "r _0 . i. -, I. -- -------- - --- ZLUU JMJCIV J. 091 / t. 
61. 
support in the country ; unlike other fractions, the Progressists were not 
the parliamentary representatives of a national party, though attempts were 
made to sponsor such a party from Moscow and St Petersburg. The Pirogressist 
leader wee Buryshkin was to admit in exile that 'outside the walls of the 
Duma, the Progressist party virtually did not exist'. 
69 
The second weakness 
was their low parliamentary experiences only seven of the fraction's 47 
deputies had served in earlier Dumas, a figure of 15% compared with the Duma 
average of 29%. Progressist inexperience was all the more glaring in the 
central moderate position between the Kadets and Oktobrists, the two most 
experienced fractions in the Duma (48% and 42% respectively). The explanation 
for the low experience level is two-fold. The Progresaist fraction was 
essentially a recent Duma phenomenon, emerging distinctively only on. the eve 
of the 1912 elections and f$ghting a general election for the first time. 
The Progressist fraction also served the same function for the new deputies 
of the Left as did the Centre fraction for those of the Right : new deputies 
attached themselves to the Progressists to allow themselves the freedom of 
considered choice before committing themselves to the closer discipline of 
an established fraction. As also in the case of the Centre fraction, these 
deputies often came to value their independence too highly to surrender it 
and were content to allow a temporary sojourn with the Progressist fraction 
to become permanent residence. 
7° Thus the Pregressist fraction emerged and 
expanded rapidly in the course of 1912 but necessarily featured a very low 
level of deputies with parliamentary experience. 
However the fraction was not without its advantages. In social compes- 
-ition it was the most well-balanced fraction in the Duna : 14 intelligentsia) 
deputies, 13 industrial/commercial, 5 soldiers, 5 priests, 4 landed interest, 1 
3 peasants and 2 industrial workers. Oathe eight categories of occupation 
69 P. A. Buryehkin, Mo. kva Kuveche+ska4a, New York 1954, p. 284 ; also DYAKIN 35" 
70 Official Fourth Duna liste, eeasja I, : 'full' Progressist members 32, 
'associate' members a further 15 GDSO: UXAZATEL' 23) ; also ENGEL'HARDT, 
xii, 317-8 & 321. 
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employed in these statistics, the Pregresaists could claim representation 
from all but the civil servants. The fraction was led numerically by not one 
interest but two : the intelligentsia and the industrial/commercial interest. 
It could also claim to be the best-qualified spokesman for industry : 13 of 
the total 31 deputies representin# the industrial interest were Progressists 
(with the Oktobrpists coming next with 9) and two of the twelve proletarian 
deputies (all the others being concentrated in the Social Democratic fraction 
). The close support of the Moscow clique of Ryabushinsky had certain 
undeniable advantages. Industrialist backing lent the Progressist fraction a 
financial security which the Oktebrists could envy and was beyond the wildest 
optimism of the Kadets. The Moscow industrialists were prepared to underwrite 
the regular losses incurred by Utro Rossii and the Progressist fraction 
throughout the Fourth Duma period in order to maintain a spokesman for 
industry at the level of educated opinion and the national representative 
assembly. 
71 There is also little doubt that the energy and raw drive of 
emergent Russian industry communicated themselves to the Progressist fraction 
to effect the accelerating self-assurance and initiative which became 
increasingly apparent after the 1912 elections. Although the Progressist 
fraction could never really claim the support of a national organisation or 
party, the resources and determination of its industrialist backers appeared 
more than sufficient to sponsor a political challenge to the Duma authority 
of its prestigious rivals. 
The Badet tugctien enjoyed a respect that not even a Right-wing newcomer 
to the Duma like Engelhardt could deny : 
Into Kadet ranks enter in the main the representatives of the free 
professions ... By educational standards it [the Kadet fraction Z R. P. 
) 
certainly takes first place in the Duma : significantly more than half 
of its members have enjoyed higher education. It possesses the most 
71 S. P. Maneyrev, 'Hoi Pospoaimania' in F ra 'aaaR v®1 utsia, Ed. S. A.. _" Alekseyev, Mosc. w 1926, p. 258 ; als® LAVERTCHEV 66 & 97. 
63. 
comprehensive political programme and is the spokesman for the hopes 
and ambitions of the Russian bourgeoisie and liberal nobility. (72) 
There was certainly much to admire in the Badet fraction. It provided a safe 
refuge for a significant number of nationality deputies and spoke out boldly 
against the government policy of Russification. 
73 It was the most experienc- 
ed and best educated of all Duma fractions. Although the fraction enjoyed 
the reputation of spokesman for the intelligentsia, it could not be dismiss- 
ed as a mere pressure-group for the liberal professions. A common feature 
of all three moderate fractions was the relatively wide-ranging nature of 
their recruitment and composition. In each case, while the predominance of 
the industrial, intelligentsia or land interest was irrefutable, few 
occupations or interests were entirely unrepresented. Of the 57 Kadet 
deputies, 24 (some 40%) represented the liberal professions, 9 the land 
interest, 5 the bureaucratic, 4 the industrial/commercial, a futher 4 the 
military and 3 the peasant. Of the eight categories of occupation, all but 
two (priests and industrial workers) possessed some measure of representat- 
-ion. Contributory factors to the social balance of the fraction included 
its central position, which encouraged the meeting of representatives of 
most political persuasions and class backgrounds, and the long-established 
nature of the fraction. The moderate fractions as a whole approximated most 
closely to the concept of a parliamentary 'party', the two political wings 
(especially the Extreme Left) approaching the more limited composition and 
aims associated with the term 'pressure group'. 
However the Kadet fraction was not without its problems. While the 
fraction was comparatively healthy in its parliamentary milieu, the Kadet 
party as a national organisation was declining at a disastrous rate, to the 
extent that by aid 1913 sae of its own leaders was to term it 'a head without 
72 ENGEL'HARDP, xii, 317 & 322. 
73 Nationality deputies in the Sad"t fraction included V. K. Vinberg(Swede), 
E. B. Gurevich(Jew), M. I. Papadzhanov(Armenian), I. M. Ramot(Eet©nian), N. M. 
Frieda={Jew) and M. H. Boaaah(Jew) : ßDSO: UKAZATEL' 79,94,16+, 275,206 & 
72. 
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a body'. 
74 Financial troubles dogged the Kadets throughout their political 
career, the result of dwindling national membership and also the reason for 
the failure of the Kadet Central Committee to remedy the decline. The 1912 
elections posed the Kadets a nightmare on both financial and membership 
grounds. The elections could reveal to every impertinent eye the extent of 
the Kadet collapse in the provinces ; only adroit alliance and the fortuit- 
ous Leftward shift of the national mood in 1912 averted the anticipated 
expose. The elections dealt the Kadet party a financial, and indirectly a 
membership blow. All available financial resources were utilised in the 
Kadet electoral campaign, leaving very little in reserve. At the first 
meeting of the new Kadet fraction on 8 November 1912, it was announced that 
the Central Committee could only afford to pay 10% of election expenses 
incurred by local Kadet branches. 75 Since the costs involved were often vey 
high, the weight of the remaining 90% of expenses frequently bankrupted the 
local Kadet organs. 
76 The 1912 elections both pauperised the Kadet party 
and provided a dramatic stimulus to the already disastrous collapse of its 
provincial organisation. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the 1912 
elections weakened the Kadets so badly that they could not weather another 
general election. 
The Kadet situation, though superficially healthy - Duma representation 
rose from 53 to 57 as a result of the elections - was in reality desperate. 
Given that the party must crash at the next elections, the fraction had the 
five years of the Fourth Duna to attempt to avert catastrophe and save both 
itself and the party from the political graveyard. The Kadets' only 
immediate hope was to press the tactics that had saved them at the recent 
74 Ariadna Tyrkova at Badet Central Committee meeting on 14 May 1913 : 
TaGAOR, f. 6/c., 15,10 quoted in CHERMENSKY 171 ; also DYAKIN 39 and Riha, 
A Russian European, pp. 195-8. 
75 POLICE, xiii, 27/57(Moscow), 42 ; also TaGAOR, f. 523(Kadet Party), iii, 9,6 
and f. 125(8adet Fraction), i, 12,5-6. 
76 For example, the Kadet campaig*n Moscow cost 24,500Orubles, in Kiev 
18,000 and in Riga 22,500 : POLS, _, xiii, 27/57(Moscew), 42. 
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elections : to employ their parliamentary expertise to maximum effect and to 
continue to work for the downfall of the Oktobrist hegemony of the Duma. 
The effect of the 1912 elections was to throw open the political 
situation in the Duma. The rivalry of the three moderate fractions was 
never so keen and so bitter. But though their parliamentary ambitions were 
similar, the three fractions viewed the Fourth Duma very differently : to 
the Progressists it was their first chance, to the Oktobrists their second, 
and to the Kadets their last chance. 
CHAPTER THREE : THE FOURTH DUNA IN PEACETIME 
1. The Oktobrist Crash (November 1912 - December 1913) 
66. 
When the Fourth Duma opened on 15 November 1912 it was apparent that 
the mood of the country was not only hostile to the government but profoundly 
dissatisfied with the Duma itself. Stanley Washburn claimed that, 
Unprejudiced observers in all the provinces report that the Opposition 
spirit (and by "opposition" in this sense is meant dissatisfaction with 
the delay in reforms as distinct from a desire to be identified with 
the parties who sit on the Left) pervades all classes of the 
community. (1) 
The 'delay in reforms' was interpreted as partly the design of the governmentl 
but partly the fault of the compromising Third Duma. Milyukov noted a 
universal impatience with the minutiae of the legislative process : 
Russian society felt the need of stronger excitement than the everyday 
routine work of the Duma, which was apparently condemned to sterility... 
The public was not the least interested in the question of how to handle 
the legislative rubbish left ever as a legacy of the Third Duma. (2) 
The 1912 elections brought home to the moderate fractions the breakdown in 
their relations with the government and the country. Though the moderates 
were never prepared to admit their isolation in public, their private 
meetings proved that they realised that the distance between the Duma 
fractions and their extra-Duma support was widening. While deficiencies in 
party organisation and membership could be covered in part by accusations 
against the MVD for perverting the representative principle, all the moderatel 
fractions were most grateful for a convenient scapegoat. 
If the management of the Duma elections was any basis for judgement, 
the government had now embarked upon 4pelicy of open hostility towards the 
State Duma ; in auch circumstances the isolation of the Duma moderates from 
the country increased their vulnerability to government attack. If, as 
seemed likely, the coming sessions of the Fourth Drina were 'to witness-a- 
1 Article 'Meeting of the Fourth Dumm', Times, 29 November 1912(n/s),? f. 
2 MILIUKOV 284-5 ; A. A. Kizevetter, Na Rubezhe Dvukh Stoletii, Prague 1929, 
P-515. 
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power struggle between government and Duma, the individual fractions must 
rally all possible support for their defence. As the government position 
showed every sign of moving steadily to the Right, the Duma moderates had 
little choice but to attempt closer links with the country. 
Fearing a rancour on the part of the Duma over the elections which 
might sabotage relations permanently and strengthen Rightist demands to 
reduce the powers of the Duma, Kokovtsev secured the approval of the Emperor 
for the removal of Makarov as Minister of Interior, adroitly delaying the 
announcement until the day before the first Duma sitting for maximum effect. 
Kokovtsov hoped that the dismissal of Makarov would both express a measure 
of government apology and remove the most obvious stumbling-block to future 
relations between government and Duma. 
3 However, as R. dzyanko was to 
remark, the first weeks of the now Duna were remarkable as much for parliam- 
-entary disorder and fraction strife as for the expected attacks on the 
government : 
The mood of all parties from the Oktobrists Leftwards was exceptionally 
heightened, one could even say bitter towards the government, but the 
internal dissension in the Duma was such that the State Duma was not in 
a position to elect a vice-president for over a month because there was 
no agreement on candidates. If it is added that the rumours of an 
imminent coup to reduce the Duma from a legislative to a consultative 
role, and of the possibility of its dissolution in the light of its 
inability to reach agreements between parties even in the election of 
the presidium, spread wider and wider, it may be seen how the direct 
danger to the authority of the representative assembly grew for us into 
a very real threat. (4) 
The early sittings of the first Duma session graphically demonstrated that 
the elections had not only secured a parliamentary majority openly 
dissatisfied with the government but in 'disestablishing' the Oktobrists had 
terminated the past balance and relative stability of the Duma. 
The Kadet fraction was the quickest to exploit the discomfiture of the 
Oktobrists to attempt to improve its relationship with the country. Follow _ 
-ing the ceremonial opening of the Fourth Dams, and the election of the Duna 
3 KOKOVTSOV 326-7 ; Times, 28 November 1912(n/s), 5c. 
4 Rodzyanke, 'Gosu4arstveanaya Duma'9pp. 3-4. 
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presidium (which will be discussed below), the first major item on the agenda 
was the submission of legislative proposals for consideration by Duma open 
sitting, the first opportunity for ambitious fractions to play to the gallery. 
The Kadets swept the board with seven eye-catching bills : proposals for 
freedom of the press, freedom of conscience, freedom of the individual, 
freedom of assembly, freedom of unions, equality of all citizens before the 
law and universal suffrage. 
5 Soviet commentators have condemned this 
programme as transparently dishonest : there was not the slightest likelihood 
of any of the Kadet bills becoming law and the Kadets were cynically 
'window-dressing' to draw support to the ladet flag. 
6 
In his later years 
Milyukov strenuously denied the charge : 'we decided that the time was 
appropriate for introducing as part sf the Duma legislation the Kadet project) 
for civil liberties which bore the "stamp" of October 17 ... introducing them 
was not a more demonstration'. 
7 Milyukov asserted that the most effective 
means of reviving the confidenece of the Russian people in the Duma was a 
challenge to the government to fulfil the seven-year-old promise contained 
in Clause One of the October Manifesto 't" grant the population the inviel- 
-able foundations of civil freedom based on the principles of genuine 
personal inviolability, freedom of conscience, speech, assembly and assoc- 
-iation'. 
8 
This greater Duma need accounted for the Kadet fraction's insist- 
-once on the immediate implementation of the October Manifesto. 
9 Milyakev 
5 For the original texts of the bills, see TsGAOR, f. 579(Miiyukev), ddela 44, 
417,418 & 419. Hereafter the annotation of Duma Stenographic Records will 
be standardised thus : (1) GDSO (Gosudaretvenn a Duma : Steno aficheakie 
Otc of ), (2) Se ssia (sessiea number in Roman numerals, (3) Zaser a 
sitting) number in Arabic numerals, and (4) Stolbets (column) number 
also in Arabic numerals. Ualeea specifically stated, all references will 
relate to the Fourth Duma (Ghetvertyi sozy ). The Kadet bills' reference 
is therefore t_, I, 6,154-5. 
6 CHERI 'NSKY 140 & 185 ;A Short History of the USSR, vol. I, p. 297. 
7 NILIUKOV 286. 
8 Dmytryshyn, ImDerial Russia :a source book 1700-1917, p. 314. 
9 Speech by Milyuk®v, 13 December 1912 : GDSO, I, 11,601-2 ; also MILIUK09 286. 
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emitted to point out that in this particular instance what was good for the 
Duma was even better for the Kadet fraction : the Kadets would take the 
credit for the Duma's return to fundamental reform. 
The Kadets were net the only party represented in the Fourth Duma to 
include the October Manifesto in their party programme : from the Oktobrists 
through to the Extreme Left, Clause One of the October Manifesto appeared 
consistently. 
10 While five fractions paid lip-service to the October 
Manifesto in December 1912, only the Kadets actually made any attempt to 
secure its implementation. The explanation lay partly in the superior expert- 
-ise of the Kadet fraction and partly in the reduced circumstances of its 
rivals. Neither SDs nor Trudovike, seperately or together, could muster the 
thirtisignatures necessary to initiate Duma legislation. 
11 The Progressists 
were still bound to the Kadets by the electoral 'progressive bloc' and 
overawed by their prestigious partner. 
12 The Badet fraction's chief rival 
for the legislative limelight was of course the Oktobrist fraction, temperar- 
-ily stunned by its loss of government patronage, its reduced representation 
and the defeat of Guchkov at Moscow. As a result, the Oktobrists were far 
slower off the mark than usual, letting slip the initiative to the Kadets. 
Of the nine bills submitted to the Fourth Duma an fraction initiative 
en 3 and 5 December 1912, seven were Kadet. 
13 The Kadet deputies had hetd 
meetings to discuss their plans for the Duma well before the start of the 
session and were organised for action before most rival fraction memberships 
had even arrived in St Petersburg. 
14 The Kadets were able to arrange their 
legisla ive proposals well in advance of their rivals because 'our jurists 
10 V. Ivanivich, Ro s' eP tii So ii L' , St Petersburg 1906, PP. 5-6 (SD Programme , 1-15 Badet Programme ; S' zd Pro ressistov 11 12 i 13 
neyabrya 1912 Soda, St Petersburg 1913, pp. 22-3 Progressist Programme ; 
TaGA R, f. 579, I, 387,1-8(Oktobriat Programme of 1907). 
11 14 SDa and 10 Trudoviks : GDSO UL ZATEL' 24. 
12 ENGEL'HARDT, xii, 326. 
13 C DSO, i, 6,154 5 °and 1117,251- 
14 Report on Badet meeting. of 8& 13 November 1912 : POLICE, xiii, 27/57, 41-2. 
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had prepared excellent texts, which were supposed to have been introduced 
into the Second Duma, and these texts had been printed'. 
15 By early prepar- 
ation and taking quick advantage of the temporary disorientation of its 
main rival, the Kadet fraction burst out of the eclipse it had suffered 
during the Third Duma. To this end almost any publicity was good publicity. 
The Kadets followed up their legislative coup by introducing a formula to 
conclude the Duma debate on the government Declaration on 15 December which 
demanded not only the implementation of the October Manifesto but a democrat- 
-ic electoral law, the reform of the State Council and a government in which 
the country had confidence. Such a radical formula was inevitably rejected 
by the full Duma vote but the publicity gained for the Kadets as proponents 
of fundamental reform was ample compensation. 
16 
The Oktobriste were compelled to rest content with the single and much 
less eye-catching bill for universal primary education. 
17 
When the Kadet 
proposals were later examined in open sitting and parliamentary commission, 
the Oktobrists had little alternative but to support their I{adet rivals in 
demanding the implementation of the Manifesto which furnished their name. 
The legislative bills advanced in December 1912 were an opportunity not only 
for attracting popular support to the now Duma but for one-upmanship between 
the more ambitious fractions. On this occasion the Kadets proved most 
successful, thereby drawing the fire of rival fractions furious at being 
outmanoeuvred and piqued that the Kadets should take the credit for putting 
the current combative spirit of the Duna into print. 
The intricacies of the legiolatiye process were by no means the only 
endeavours to involve the Nana moderates in early 1913. All Kadeta were 
aware that legislative bills alone could not draw the Duma closer to the 
country for any extended period and the initial impact made by the Kadet 
15 MILIUKOV 286. 
16 ODSO, 1,14,894-8. 
17 GDSO, 2,7,251 Cutting of 5 December 1912). 
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programme must be followed by convincing party action. 
18 
Despite a strong 
body of more conservative opinion among the Kadets, the Left wing led by 
Rodichev took the initiative within the fraction in early January 1913. 
Rodichev demanded an immediate shift towards stronger opposition and the 
summoning of a party congress to improve liaison between the provincial 
organisation and the ladet executive organs. The attendant police reporter 
made the following remarks : 
The question of the necessity of calling a par*y congress has arisen 
amongst the Kadets, either a congress or maybe a conference ... necess- 
itated by the used to consider a whole list of questions determining 
the future line of policy of the Kadet fraction in the State Duma ... [for] the supporters of the so-called "Left movement" headed by F. I. 
Rodichev hold that the party has settled too complacently for the role 
of "His Majesty's Opposition" and must adopt a sharper line towards the 
government or lose the sympathy of the liberal circles of society. (19) 
At a Kadet conference to debate the shift to the Left held 31 January -3 
February 1913, two lines of policy were agreed :a move for greater unity of 
action within the Duna (which meant reviving the electoral 'progressive bloc' 
and a reform programme radical enough to win converts and complement the 
seven Kadet legislative bills. Resolution 2. of the conference stated : 
The effective strengthening of the State Duma as both legislative and 
political force can be achieved only by the implementation of three 
basic conditions : democratization of the electoral law, fundamental 
reform of the State Council and-responsible ministries. (20) 
This programme was clearly more radical than that offered by the Kadets to 
the Duma ea, 15 December 1912 : within two months the term 'government im 
which the people have confidence' had become 'responsible ministries'. A 
further Badet conference with the participation of provincial delegates held 
20-24 Bebrnary 'possessing the authority and importance of a party congress' 
formally ratified the policy of the Left Kadets. 
21 
The Left Kadete took action precipitately : in open sitting of the Dana 
on 8 February, Rodichey attacked both government repression and Duma weakness 
18 Report of 4 February 1913 : POý:, xix, 27s7" 
19 Report of 5 January 1913 : POLICE xiii, 27-1912917. 
20 Report of 4 February 1913 : P0 ISS xix, 27,10 ; also TsGAOR, f. 579(MiIYuk- 
. fi TI `, 19'2=3, P . -ot), I, 372,1 and 
21 Undated report : POtICE, aix, 27,13. 
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, concluding a fighting speech on the freedom of the individual with the 
provocative phrase 'there will be no freedom without force$. 
22 The violence 
of Rodichev's expression thoroughly alarmed fractions to the Right of the 
Kadets and, as further reports corroborated this initial impression of a new 
Kadet policy, the opposition of the Right Wing mounted. On 12 March the Duma 
Press commission rejected the Kadet Press bill ; the next day the Kadet 
Electoral bill was defeated in open Duma vote 206-126 ; and again on 13 
March the Duma rejected by 142 votes to 92 a Kadet proposal to establish a 
Civil Liberties commission. 
23 Even the Oktobriste, who had suffered most 
from electoral abuse, turned against the Kadets in the vote over the Elect- 
-oral bill. 
24 By shifting Left so dramatically, the Kadets antagonised the 
fractions to the Right and provoked a reaction which could condemn them to 
perpetual minority opposition. 
Equally significantly, the Kadet Right wing rebelled in protest against 
the new official policy. The Right Kadets emerged rapidly to challenge the 
take-over effected by their Left Kadet colleagues. At an early January meet- 
ing, the police reporter was content to mention the group only in passing j 
'as for the so-called Right current in the party (the leader of which is 
V. A. Maklakov), it is differentiated only by its being rather less obsequious 
to the Jews, Finns and Poles than the mass of the party'. 
25 
By late February 
the same reporter was remarking that 'a group of Maklbkovites has been form- 
-ad which demands from the party a more flexible and compromising policy'. 
26 
Maklakov certainly opposed the current Kadet policy, though ostensibly on 
practical grounds rather than on principle. Engelhardt quotes his saying, 
I am a Kadet but I do not recognise two points of the Kadet programme - 
direct elections and responsible ministries. I do not reject theme 
points but I do not see any likelihood of their implementatio-a under 
existing circumstances. (27) 
22 GDSO, I, 21,1507-1516 (quotation at. 1514). 
23 Teý, f. 1278(Duma Chancellery), I, 2431,4 ; GDS0, I, 28,2167-2222. 
24 MILIUKOV 286. 
25 Report of 5 January 1913 : P0 LICE, xiii, 27-1912,17. 
26 Report on Badet ceaierence, 20-4 February 1913 : POLICE, xix, 27,13. 
27 ENGEL'HARRT, xii, 325.4 
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On 12 March Maklakov scandalised the Kadets when, as the Kadet delegate to 
the Duma Press commission, he voted against his own party's bill. 
28 Later 
the same day Ma4lakov organised his group of Right Kadets to demand from the 
fraction a 'working programme' of reforms as opposed to 'chimeric demonstrat- 
-ions'. The issue was postponed until the Kadet Central Committee meeting of 
15 March when, in the words of the ever-present police reporter, 
Twelve individuals - all personal friends of Maklakov - made a formal 
protest against the line of Milyukov. The Kadet fraction was occupying 
itself with fruitless projects, which were condemned to failure and 
were positively harmful at the present time when the internal situation 
of Russia demanded from the Opposition a closer relationship with the 
government. (29) 
The rebellion of twelve deputies (of a Kadet fraction total of 57), headed 
by the very able and immensely respected Maklakov, was a most effective 
challenge to the Leftward shift. It did not appear as if the Kadet fraction 
could long encompass both a Rodichev and a Maklakov. 
Despite the hopes entertained by Redichew and Milyukov for winning 
greater support in the country, it did not seem that the Kadet move to the 
Left was practical Duma politics. The policy had precipitated an internal 
fraction split and threatened to throw the Oktobrists into the arms of the 
Duma Right. At just this juncture a new development not only cancelled the 
Kadet shift Left but actually reversed it. The policy of the Okt®brist 
leadership to move into opposition to the government (suspended ever the 
election period) was resumed in spring 1913, inviting a political response 
from the Kadets. While the Kadet majority, headed of course by the Right 
wing of Vasilii Maklakov, was more than sympathetic to some form of collab- 
-oration with the Oktobrists, the Left wing was antagonistic. At first 
Milyukov managed to restrain the fraction from pursuing any line by stress- 
ing rumours of Oktobrist disagreement. A police report of 22 May made the 
following general remarks on the Kadet mood : 
There has been a protracted meeting of the Kadets on the Oktobriet 
issue. The Kadets are treating the facts very carefully, ascertaining 
all the available information and have stated that a real split in 
28 Tsý, f. 1278(Duma Chancellery), I, 2431,4. 
29 POLICE, xix, 27,25-6. 
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occurring in Oktobrist ranks. Shingarev has summed up the position in 
the phrase "there is no Oktobrist fraction". Yet everybody claims that 
the rumour that the Left Oktobrists will cross over to the Progressists 
or form their own party is quite premature. (30) 
Milyukov attempted to divert the attention of the fraction from developments 
on the Right wing by emphasising the decision taken earlier in the year to 
shift towards the Left : 
Reaffirming the decision taken by the meeting of 2-3 February 1913, the 
meeting of 25-6 May recognises the following as the immediate tasks of 
the fraction in the State Duma : 
1. The uniting of the greatest possible section of the State Duma for 
the purpose of strengthening its oppositional mood. 
2. More systematic exploitation of the budgetary rights of the State 
Duma for the purpose of parliamentary struggle. (31) 
Only the prorogation of the Duma on 25 June and the subsequent mass exodus 
to the country saved the Kadet Left policy from defeat. 
When the Kadet deputies returned for the start of the new Duma session 
on 15 October, the attitude of the fraction majority towards the Left policy 
had hardened into complete rejection. The debate was conducted in Moscow 
5-6 October on the occasion of the jubilee of Russkie Vedomosty, when just 
two items were placed on the agenda for discussion : 'the mood in the 
provinces' and 'on a bloc with the Oktobriots'. The feeling of the meeting 
on the first item was that although, as the Left Badet Nekrasov reported, 
there was a definite Leftward movement of the popular mood, 'it was noted 
that society was not at the same time inclined to demand or support extreme 
measures but there exists a hope that a compromise may be worked out, into 
which the government could outer'. 
32 Having qualified its forebodings about 
the mood of the people (and thereby implicitly denied the necessity for a 
Left policy), the majority opted for alliance with the Oktobrists: 
The majority present at the meeting was for agreement with the Oktobrista 
and the leader of the party Milyukov was left in an insignificant 
minority on the question. Milyukov was categorically against such an 
agreement. Chelaekev, Sishkin and others recognised the desirability of 
an agreement, stating that if the Kadete did not enter into a bloc with 
30 POICE, 307-1913.96. 
31 TsGAOR, f. 523(Kadet Party)4ii, 17,13(meeting of 26 May 1913). 
32 POOLICE, xix, 27,60 and xiv, 147-1913,5-6. 
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the Oktobrista, they were playing into the hands of the Right groups .. Despite the protests of Milyukov, it was decided to initiate negotiat- 
ions with the Oktobrists. (33) 
By autumn 1913 not only had the Kadet fraction cancelled its initial Left- 
-ward policy but had committed itself in principle to a giant parliamentary 
bloc to the Right. The Kadet majority had decided that closer identification 
with extra-parliamentary support, though desirable, must taks second 
priority to the exigencies of parliamentary politics. The Kadet bills of 
December 1912 and the radical programme of February 1913 were allowed to 
lapse ; they had proved impractical Duma politics. 
The problems of the Progressist fraction over this period lay less in 
political tactics than parliamentary self-confidence. The original Progress- 
-ist fraction programme for the Fourth Duma drawn up in late October 1912 
was a blend of Oktobrist and Kadet points, clearly delineating the position 
of the Progressists in the Duma spectrum. The first six points were : 
1. Concern for the internal unity and external might of Russia. 
2. Decisive and persistent struggle for the implementation of the 
principles of the conservative-monarchist system introduced by the 
Manifesto of 17 October. 
3. The protection of the rights and aspirations of lawful institutions. 
4. The elimination of the arbitrariness of administrative power and the 
establishment of a system of legality in the life of the country. 
5. The implementation of freedom of conscience ... 6. The elimination of infringements upon national peculiarities, cultur- 
-al independence and the naive tongues and religions of national- 
-itiea within the Empire. (34) 
In October 1912 the Progressist fraction was in the process of transition 
from the Oktebrist position (whence the fraction had originated) to the 
Kadet position (which it would soon reach and subsequently pass). 
However the First Progreseiet Congress of-11-13 November 1912 baldly 
declared the need for the withholding of credits from the government as an 
instrument of political coercion and the obligation to pursue fundamental 
reform even at the risk of Duma dissolution : 
Progresaists should cherish and defend the rights, dignity and import- 
-ance !f the State Duma as an institution ... but there is no necessity to cherish the Fourth Duma. We should net thoughtlessly provdke its 
33 Ibid, pp. 61 and 6-7 respectively. 
34 P0,274,2,3 ; als. Lesia, C. liected__Worka, v®1.18, pp. 441-3. 
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dissolution but nor should we be afraid of it, and circumstances may 
arise when it will be necessary consciously to reckon with dissolution 
and even hasten it, if that lies in our power. (35) 
Although a proportion of the ostensible extremism of the congress must be 
attributed to its timing (c(Oducted in the shadow of the perverted elections) 
and an eagerness to posture heroically on the eve of its debut as a power in 
the Dumas the change in stress between the October fraction programme and 
the November congress resolutions testified to the energy of the new 
Progressist movement. Much of this vigour stemmed directly from industrial- 
-ist support : speaking of the growing power of industry in a speech in 
September 1912, Ryabushinaky stipulated 'we must not be silent, we must 
demand, threaten - not beg as we hale done up to now - and compel the 
government to take account of us'. 
36 
The early actions of the Pr"greseist fraction were however more in 
tune with the moderate points of the October fraction programme than the 
bombast of the industrialist-dominated November congress. On 14 November the 
Progressists arranged a meeting of all Left and moderate fractions to discuss 
joint policy over the elections to the Duma presidium. 
37 On 5 December they 
made their first incursion into legislation by submitting a proposal for the 
introduction of universal primary education designed to undercut the Oktobr- 
-ist bill tabled the same day. 
38 In the debate that followed Kokovtsov's 
Declaration for the government, a Progressist formula demanding co-operation 
between government and Duma to implement the October Manifeste was adopted 
by the Duma in the face of rival formulae advanced by the Nationalists, 
Kadets and Trudoviks. 
39 On 28 February 1913 the Progressists on their own 
initiative drafted a bill to replace the existing State Council by a body 
entirely elected from the country, 
40 
35 S'ezd P'roaressietov. 11.12 & 13 norabrya 1912 Qeda, p. 6. 
36 POLICE , 27/46(Moeoow), B, 32 quoted in LAVTRYCHEV 92. 
37 SLY UZHEV, i, 11,47. 
38 GDSO, I, 7,251 ; TeGAOR, f. 579(Milyukov), 414(Oktobrist bill) and 416 
Progressist bill). 
39 CDS4"I, 4k, 894-8(sitting of 15 December 1912). 
40 T OR, f. 826(Dzh o; 5ky), I, 212,5. 
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The Progressists expended a great deal of thought in the spring and 
summer of 1913 considering their position as a 'bridge' between the Kadets 
and Oktobrists. With the Leftward movement of the Kadets halted and the 
Oktobrist fraction showing positive indications of moving Leftward into 
opposition (considered below), the Progressist fraction was excellently 
placed to promote a giant moderate bloc in the Duma. However the task was a 
premature test of Progressist initiative and put serious pressure on the 
discipline of the fraction. A police report for 22 May noted that while 'the 
Progressists view developments more optimistically than the Kadets and 
strongly hope that the Oktebrists will attach themselves to them', they did 
nothing to facilitate agreement and readily subscribed to the current Kadet 
policy of 'wait and see'. 
41 
At the Second Progressist Party Congress on 
5-6 October 1913, there was a clear split between those who possessed the 
self-confidence to advocate an opposition bloc against the government and 
those who believed that to do so wkould be to fight above the Pregressist 
weight. The police reporter pointed out that many Progressists chose to fly 
in the face of the brave resolutions passed at the previous congress : 'the 
Progressist Right wing, fearing that the Kadets strengthened by the Oktobristi 
would eneter into direct conflict with the government instead of constructive 
legislative work, de not support a bloc'. The final Congress decision was to 
suspend judgement until the Kadet conference of late October and the 
Oktobrist Congress of early November. 
42 
Thus while the Pregressist fraction 
made tentative forays into independent action over the first year of the 
Fourth Duma, it was still infinitely more comfortable as an auxiliary of the 
Kadets. In late 1913 Progressist action was still contingent upon the 
decisions of the experienced Kadet and Oktobrist fractions. While the trend 
of Progressist development was becoming more committed, the fraction could 
not be termed a force for the moderates until it mustered the courage to 
emerge from under the Kadet wing and accept the responsibilities and 
41 Poý, 307-1913,96 ; also Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 19, p. 238 and 
LAVERYCHEV 99. 
42 POLICE, xix, 27,61 and aiv, 147-1913,7. 
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hazards of political independence. 
Relations between the Duma and the government over the first six months 
of the Fourth Duma were far less hostile than the mood of the first sittings 
might have led one to expect. The Declaration delivered by Kokovtsov on 5 
December avoided controversial issues, advanced a vague programme of minor 
reforms and closed with a homily on the advantages of Duma good behaviour. 
43 
Despite their militant mood, the moderates found the Declaration disappoint- 
-ingly unprovocative and quickly settled down to the time-consuming but 
unavoidable procedures which started every new Duma. 
44 
The operation of 
parliamentary otdely to check the right of each deputy to represent his 
constituency occupied the first two months of the session. 
45 
At the same 
time elections were conducted to membership of the Duma commissions ; 
including special bodies set up to meet exceptional needs, thirty-two 
commissions involving 858 places were 'up for auction'. 
46 
The elections to 
commission memberships, always a lengthy process, on this occasion spilled 
over into the 1913 Winter Session. 
47 
Duma open sittings became rare as the 
bulk of fraction manoeuvre and bargaining was translated into the lobbies 
and committee-rooms. The formalities, etdely enquiries and commission elect- 
-ions finally gave place to preliminary readings of government and Duna- 
initiated bills in early 1913.48 Even now there was no clamour for the 
immediate implementation of major government reforms ; if government legisl- 
ation were delayed, all the better for Duma-initiated legislation which 
would now take pride of place on the Duma agenda. Such was the glamour of 
43 GDSO, I, 7: 260-281 ; KOKOVTSOV 351-2. 
44 Milyukov in Rech', 8 December 1912 ; Purishkevich on 7 December 1912 : 
GDS0, I, 8,290. 
45 GDSO: UKAZATEL' 25-30. 
46 Ibid, 31-47 ; Obzor Devatel'nosty Kommissii i Otdelov, sozyv IV, sessia I, 
St Petersburg 1913 ; Diagram 9 in Yereshkin. 
47 The last two 'standing commission' memberships were announced on 11 May 
1913 : GDSO, I, 43,1050. 
48 First discussion of legislative bills in open Duma sitting, 8 February 
1913, : GDSO, I, 21. 
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the Kadet civil liberties bills that the moderates had little patience for 
petty legisla*ion of the kind that had constipated the Third Duma. With so 
much necessary Duma business to occupy its attention and interest, the Duma 
hardly raised its eyes to consider its relations with the government until 
spring 1913.49 
The government too did its best to conduct its affairs with minimum 
recourse to the Duma. After his Declaration on 5 December, Kokovtsov withdrew 
to concentrate all his attention upon the administration of the state. While 
this apparent repudiation of close liaison with the Duma has been interpreted 
by some commentators as deliberate ostracism, it is probable that the 
premier's coolness towards the Duma contained as much embarrassment as 
hostility. 50 The first session of the new Duma found Kokovtsov in an 
unenviable position. He had been instructed by the Empress at his first 
audience 'do not look for support in political parties ... find your support 
in the confidence of the Tsar'. 
51 Xokovtsev attempted to make this policy 
work despite his own sympathy for the Oktobrtist viewpoint and in his memoirs 
claimed that his policy of disassociation from the Duma was the only practic- 
-al one in the light of the fraction power struggle : 
I tried to steer a straight course. I solicited favour from no-one, 
shunned all intrigue and bided my time till the Duma made some order 
out of its party chaos. This, I believe, was the wise course to follow, 
for there was no-one in the Duma upon whom to rely ; all the groups 
sought power, influence and government support ; but none had any 
definite policy. (52) 
Kokovtsov was also acutely embarrassed by MVD policy in the Duma elections. 
Although Kokovtsov had opposed Makarov's patronage of the Right, his dismiss- 
-al of Makarov now made of the premier the only target for Duma anger over 
MVD electoral abuse. Although he may never have visualised his position in 
such terms, Kokovtsov effectively had a choice : either to disclaim reapons- 
-ibility for government electoral policy and cast the blame on to the MQD, 
49 Hutchinsen, Ths Octebrieta, p. 208. 
50 Ibid, pp. 208-9 ; R. B. McKeaa, $nasia on the eve of the Great War, p. 32. 
51 KOKOVTSOV 283 ; MILIUKov 232. 
52 KOKOVTSOV 351. 
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which would involve admitting his own defeat at the hands of Makarov ; or to 
accept the blame for the MVD's actions, present a front of cabinet solidarity 
to the Duma and, at the cost of alienating large sections of moderate opinion 
retain prestige as leader of the government. Kokovtsov's self-esteem would 
not permit him to sacrifice the respect in which he believed he was univers- 
-ally held. By tacitly accepting the burden of MVD misdemeanours he created 
for himself an impossible relationship with the Duma. The entire Duma Left 
held him responsible for the perversion of the elections ; most painfully, 
the Oktobrists whom he had always favoured as the natural Duma ally of the 
government now berated him mercilessly for 'his' electoral policy. 
53 
A succession of incidents exacerbated the existing tensions between 
government and Duma. At the Romanov tercentenary celebrations in February 
1913, Duma representation was so proscribed as to constitute ( in the view 
of the Duma President Redzyanko) an unequivocal slight to the national 
assembly. The offence was taken all the more to heart because Rodzyanke had 
only recently gone to considerable trouble and not a little unpopularity in 
the Duma to accommodate the wishes of the Tear regarding the suppression of 
gossip about Rasputin. Snubbed both at the ceremonial service in the Kazan, 
Cathedral and the reception at the Winter Palace, Rodzyanko staged a public 
scene forcibly to extract from court protocol the prominence which he believ- 
ed the Duma deserved* 
54 A man quite as sensitive on matters of amour propre 
as Kokovtsov, Rodzyanko was furious that his services to the Emperor be 
repaid so churlishly. The whole unfortunate episode irritated the Duma, 
alienated Rodzyanko, again embarrassed Kokovtsev and exasperated Nicholas 
(who throughout the proceedings had envisaged the tercentenary more as a 
family than a state occasion). 
55 
Soon afterwards the Duma became alarmed by disclosures about the Right 
53 KOXOVTSOV 351 ; Vladimir Gurko, Features and Figures of the Past, (cited 
hereafter as GURKO), p. 527. 
54 Roma = 65-6 & 69 ; gI, YUZHu, xii, 143 & 147. 
55 MP report on the episode : Tom, f. 826(Dzhunkovsky), I, 212,1-3 ; also 
xoxovTSOV 36o-1. 
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wing. It had been assumed that the very presence of a fraction within 
the 
Duma by now indicated a strong measure of support for that institution. This 
preconception was badly jolted in Duma open sitting on 1 March when the 
Right leader Purishkevich pointedly declared that 'the sooner the Duma is 
dissolved the better'. 
56 Rumours of a Rightist plot, an intrigue between 
court circles and the Duma Right fraction, circulated freely. 
57 The Kadet 
fraction embarked upon some political espionage and triumphantly produced 
the agenda of an extraordinary meeting of the combined Right and Nationalist 
fractions held on 3 March. The first three items on the agenda scandalised 
the entire Duma : 
1. The necessity of the dissolution of the Fourth State Duna. 
2. The necessity of changing the law for elections to the State Duma. 
3. The necessity of changing the Duna practice of arriving at decisions 
by majority vote. (58) 
The crisis was not in fach as serious as the Duma moderates feared. The 
debate on the first item at the 3 March meeting revealed that only the 
compilers of the agenda, the ruling clique of the Right fraction headed by 
Purishkevich and Markov Two actually supported the dissolution of the Fourth 
Duna. Not oaly was the entire Nationalist fraction opposed to dissolution, 
even the rank-and-file of the Right fraction rebelled against their leaders. 
The priests and peasants who constituted such a high proportion of the Right 
and Nationalist fractions, though of tenacious Right persuasions, stubbornly 
supported the existence of the Duma as a talking-shop for the people and 
seriously considered withdrawing from their fractions. The Nationalist 
leadership issued an immediate disavowal of the Right leaders' proposals and 
an unqualified declaration Of support for the Fourth Duma. Even the Right 
leadership could not contemplate the defection of a full half of its fraction 
membership and was forced to retract. The only direct casualty of the affair 
was Meshkovsky, the secretary of the Right fraction, who was compelled to 
56 `, 1,25,1880-4 (quotation at. 1884). 
57 , 307A-1913,49 ; BLYÜZKE9, xii, 17-18. 
58 Gales Mos ,6 Harck 1913 ; JILYUZHEVixii, 35- 
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resign for his carelessness with party decuments. 
59 
The 'Rightist Plot' both encouraged the Leftward movement of the Duma 
moderates and sharpened the quarrel with the government. The moderate 
fractions drew together in disassociation from the policies of the Extreme 
Right. As Vladimir Lvov, the leader of the Centre fraction, was reported as 
saying, 'when the issue concerns defending the national representation from 
threatened attack, all party differences are sunk ; conservatives and 
liberals unite in the defence of the State Duma'. The Kadets and Progressists 
met to discuss the common danger and tentative feelers were extended to the 
Oktobrists. 
6o 
The Leftward movement in the Kadet fraction received a strong 
fillip and Left Kadets spoke out bravely against the suspected machinations 
of the government. It was universally believed that the Right leaders could 
not seriously have debated an issue as fundamental as Duma dissolution 
without the whisper of support from the highest places. Rodzyanko's postscript 
to the whole affair was that 'an the government side, the desire if not the 
actual determination ... to kill the Duma was clear'. 
61 
Relations between 
the Duna and government deteriorated into open hostility. 
The State Budget for 1913-14, debated by the Duna from 10 May to 15 
June 1913, proved to be a battleground between government and Duma. Criticism 
of the Budget started as always with the MVD estimates, which were finally 
despatched with an elaborate warning formulated by the Oktobrists as to the 
danger of equating firm government with police rule. 
62 
Unfortunately the 
Budget examination was also employed by the Duma, by now spoiling for a row 
with the government, deliberately to bait Kokovtsov. In his dual capacity as 
Finance Minister and Council Chairman, Kokovtsov was forced to abandon his 
adopted aloofness and appear before the Dama for the first time since 
59 Beck',? March 1913 ; KLYUZSEV, xii, 35 & 180-1. 
60 Rsch' , ibid ; KLYUZHEV, ib d, 181. 
61 RODSYANK© 76. 
62 Sitting of 21 May 1913 : GDSO, I, 52,1939-1947 ; also TAKTIKI, 1912-3,17 
and Kizevetter, Nu buhe Dar k St©letii, p. 516. 
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December 1912 to defend his Budget. 
63 
The Duma unrestrainedly levelled at 
his head all the pent-up criticism and suspicion which had been mounting 
over the previous five months. The Budget commission president Alekseyenko 
challenged Kokovtsov : 'we have given you good finances, now you give us 
good government' ; Vasilii Maklakov regretted the passing of Stolypin's 
administration and the deterioration of government to a 'caricature' of its 
former self* 
64 
Leading Duma moderates joined in fierce denunciation of 
Kokovtsov's record as head of the government. Kokovtsov's irritation at 
being subjected to this almost gratuitous barrage of criticism mounted 
rapidly. 
The crisis came over the sphere in which Kokovtsov was most personally 
involved and therefore most sensitive, the Ministry of Finance. Mention has 
already been made of Kokovtsev's attempts to cut back subsidization of the 
Right, +ampaign which he postponed for electoral reasons. In January 1913 
Kokovtsov returned to the attack and pruned the generous 'Special Fund' 
subsidies to the Right* 
65 
The Right fraction's antipathy towards Kokovtsov 
was consequently at its height in spring 1913. Towards the end of the Budget 
debates on 27 May, Markov Two followed a stinging attack on Kokovtsov's 
'mishandling' of the state finances by interrupting a Finance Ministry 
statement with the provocative phrase 'You are not to steal'. 
66 
Markev's 
motivation for this outrageous accusation is not entirely clear. Possibly 
the phrase slipped out in the heat of the moment. A more sinister interpret- 
-ation would suggest that there was no attack more likely irremediably to 
wreck relations between government and Duna. At the Council of Ministers' 
meeting which immediately followed Markov's 'accusation', Nikolai Maklakov 
(Minister of Interior) and Shcheglovitov (Minister of Justice) preached the 
63 GDSO, I, 42,910-950. 
64 GDS0, i, 42,910 (10 Ma3r 1913) and 55,117(27 May 1913)- 
65 BURRO 527-8 ; A. L.. Sidorov, 'Delo Kokovtsova', Vopr©si Isto_rii, 1964 : 2, 
pp. 107-8. 
66 GDs0, i, 55,66 ; also TAKTIKI, 1912-3, p. 20 and KOKOVTSOV 365. 
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complete closure of the Duma. 
67 
It is possible that the Right leaders in the 
Duma were in collusion with the reactionary elements in the government and 
that Markov's remark was deliberate provocation designed both to provide the 
excuse for the dissolution of the Fourth Duma and to effect the downfall of 
the moderate administration of Kokovts©v. 
68 
The majority of the Council of Ministers, while opposed to Duma dieaol- 
-ution, agreed with Kokovteov that such a charge brought in open sitting 
could not pass unnoticed. Kokovtsov demanded a corporate Duma apology. The 
Duma Council of Elders however, realising the enormous implications of such 
an apology, refused. Once the Duma admitted responsibility for the speeches 
of its deputies, a single unscrupulous individual had the power to ruin the 
Duma. One provocative speech by a Markov or Purishkevich could taint the 
entire Duma and render it subject to immediate dissolution as a seditious 
assembly. Fo* the Duma leaders to have accepted the principle of responeib- 
-ility would have placed the future of the Duma in the hands of those bent 
upon its destruction. 
69= 
Kokovtsov, temporarily blind to all considerations 
but his offended honour, answered the Duma refusal with a 'Ministerial 
Boycott'. 
Announced to the Duma on 31 May, the 'Boycott' was in force for the 
next five months. 
70 Ministers refused to attend the Duma or co-operate in 
the legislative process. It quickly became apparent that the normal business 
of the Duma could not operate : legislation ground to a halt, Duma questions 
and interpellations remained unanswered and the ministers worried how the 
'Boycott' would affect the as yet incomplete Budget examination. 
71 The 
67 KOKOVTSOV 366 ; KLYUZHEP, xiii, 23. 
68 Shcheglovitov had been implicated in the Shornikova Plot which provided 
the pretext for the dissolution of the Second Duma : PADENIE, ii, 346-8 
(Shcheglovitev) ; also Mcgeaa, Raseia en the eve of the Great War, p. 36. 
69 RODZYANKO 78 ; IOXOVTSOV 366 ; PADENIE,, vi, 133-4(Volkonsky) ; Hosking however condemns the Duma for its 'touchiness' and 'petulance' : Hocking, 
Government and Duma, pp. 288-9. 
70 KLYIIZHEVxiii, 27. 
71 Ibid, 22 ; Rech', 5 June 1913 ; GUREO 528 ; RODZYANKO 78-9. 
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psychological impact of the 'Boycott' upon the Duma and society was enormous 
and yet its precise effect upon Duma activity and government business was 
probably slighter than at first appears. Afer making allowance for the three 
and one half month summer recess, the 'Boycott' was operative over only he 
final three weeks of the first session (8-25 June) and the initial two weeks 
of the second session (15 October-1 November). Even so the blame must lie 
with Kokovtsov for taking offence too easily, demanding a corporate apology 
which in its own interests the Duma could not provide, and persisting in the 
'Boycott' long after its ineffectiveness was proved. Kokovtsov considered a 
duel with Markov beneath his dignity but did not scruple to cripple legislat- 
-ion and penalise both Duma and government over a personal slight. 
72 
Kokovtsov'4onduct of the affair was not only unstatesmanlike but politically 
dangerous for in allowing personal pride and the passion of the moment to 
cloud his judgement, he exposed his administration to effective undermining 
by the reactionary wing of the Council of Ministers. 
By mid 1913 the administration Of Kokovteov was weakening fast. Kokovta- ; 
4L 
-ov had exasperated the Empress by refusing to suppress press reports about 
Rasputin in early 1912.73 He had annoyed the Emperor by insisting upon the 
same authority as Stolypin within the Council of Ministers when a more astute 
politician would have realised Nicholas's intense dislike of Stolypin and the 
'Grand Vizier' status that his memory evoked. 
7' In a milieu increasingly 
sympathetic to traditional reaction and police rule, the only possible 
recommendation for moderate government was a high measure of success and 
political calm. Far from achieving rapport with the State Duma, Kokovtsov's 
administration had precipitated the greatest crisis in relations between 
The Beilis trial brought Duma condemnation and international censure 
of the Kokevtaov administration to a head. The details of how a peer Jew, 
Duma and government since the Western Zematvee furore. 
72 GM MO 528. 
73 $OKOVTSOV 306 ; MILIUKOV 283. 
74 Shidlovaky, Voopoxinania, vol. I, p. 198. 
. 41 
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Mendel Beilis was accused in Kiev of the ritual murder of a Christian child 
are sufficiently well-known to render superfluous any brief account here. 
75 
Public involvement in the case was great, as Milyukov recalled : 
The high point of public indignation was reached when .. * for thirty- 
five days, with the encouragement or the direct assistance of the 
authorities, there unfolded in Kiev a vile picture of perjury, bribed 
experts and obliging efforts on the part of the procurator to wring a 
verdict of "guilty" from the specially-selected, semi-literate peasant 
jurors. (76) 
During the trial itself, which ran from mid-September until 28 October 1913 
(when the defendant was found 'not guilty'), public opinion ran so high that 
police action was allowed full rein. Milyukov calculated that 'during the 
Beilis trial, 102 penalties were meted out to the press, including the arrest 
of six editors ; 120 professional and cultural-educational societies were 
either closed or declared illegal'. 
77 The police follow-up to the trial, 
which included the prosecution of twenty-five prominent Petersburg barristers 
?8 
continued until the very outbreak of war. 
The Beilis affair had three quite distinct effects upon the Russian 
political situation. Educated society was roused against the government as 
never before : just as the Lena Massacre had incited the workers, the Beilis 
affair inflamed the liberal elements. The trial backfired on the reactionar- 
ies : far from rallying the forces of the Right, the publicity and unfavour- 
able verdict split the Right camp dangerously, dividing the Extreme Rights 
from the moderate Rights. The Beilis case was a repetition of the 'Rightist 
Plot' episode on a national stage, isolating the extreme reactionaries and 
compelling moderate Rightist leaders like V. V. Shul'gin to disassociate them- 
-selves entirely from them. 
79 Finally, despite the fact that Kokovtaev was 
75 The most recent studies : Maurice Samuel, Blood Accueatien: the Strange 
History of the Be lis Case, London 1967 and Hans Regger, 'The Beilia Case : 
Anti-Semitism and Politics in the Reign of Nicholas I11, ASEERsvol. 25, ns 
4, December 1966, pp. 615-629. 
76 MILIUKOV 285 ; also Baring, Th e Mainsprings of Ruaaia, pp. 281-2. 
77 Ibid ; also Baring, p. 141. 
78 HEREASBI 85-6. 
79 Sydney Harcave, Years of the Gelden Co kere The Last 8emamov Tsare-1$' 
1917, Londoa 196$+p 1. : y< 
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at this time on extended semi-official visits to Paris and Berlin, the Beilis 
affair with its detailed coverage by national and world press further 
discredited the Kokovtsov adzi. nistration. 
80 
Although the trial was a symptom 
not of his own policies but those of his reactionary colleagues Maklakov and 
Shcheglovitov, Kokovtsov was again compelled to accept the responsibility 
and blame as titular head of the government. 
Kokovtsov spent seven weeks away from Russia in Western Europe, provid- 
-ing ample opportunity for the Extreme Right within the Council of Ministers 
to undermine his administration. Although there is no incontrovertible 
evidence that the Beilis trial was timed to coincide with Kokovtaov's 
absence, the trial proved the opening round in a Rightist campaign. Even 
before the Beilis verdict was reached, the reactionary ministers were 
contemplating their next move. The first to attempt to advance his career was 
Nikolai Maklaksv. On 14 October, the day before the opening of the new Duma 
session, Maklakov submitted to Nicholas a proposal for the dissolution of 
the Duma : 
The Duma is sharply raising the temperature of society. Unless this is 
met Vg immediate measures and strong action from Your government, the 
complete disruption of all our lives is unavoidable ... Two measures are 
essential : the dissolution of the Duma and the immediate declaration 
in the capital of a state of "Special Protection". (81) 
Nicholas's reply to Maklakov on 18 October was distinctly approving 
I have read your letter and find myself sympathetic to its content ... I consider it both essential and beneficial that My long-held opinions 
concerning changes in the Fundamental Laws pertaining to the State Duna 
be considered in the Council of Ministers. (82) 
The Council however rejected Maklakov's scheme. A majority of the 
Council, even without Kokovtsov to rally the moderates, still valued the 
Duma as a representative and legislative institution, while one cannot 
exclude the possibility that many ministers preferred a moderate Chairman to 
the ebullient 'Nicholas III' as pace-setter in the Council. 
83 
M*klakev_, 
80 KOKOVTSOV 378-393. 
81 V. P. Semennikev(Ed. ), Monarkhia Pored Krusheniem, Moecew 1927 (cited here-, 
-after as MPB)9p. 93" 
82 MPK 92 ; for both letters, see also PADENIE, v, 193-6(Maklakev). 
83 Maklakev'a nickname : KLTUZHEV, xii, 199. 
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ruefully reported the verdict to Nicholas on 22 October, including the 
pointed snub 'the Council has decided that as a general rule Duma matters 
remain outside the competence of the Ministry of Interior and fall within 
the jurisdiction of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers alone'. 
84 
Maklakov's attempt at a constitutional coup had been frustrated not only by 
the antipathy of the Council of Ministers towards the scheme but its defence 
of the prerogatives of the Chairman even in his absence. On the other hand, 
while Maklakov had suffered defeat on this occasion, there was no doubt that 
he had won the Tsar's favour and therefore his chances of eventual success 
were high. 
Shcheglovitov, a much more flexible and cunning politician, exploited 
Maklhkov's failure to mount his own political coup. Maklakov's deputy-minist- 
-er Beletsky was in no doubt of Shcheglevitov's manipulation of his chief : 
Maklakov acted under the hypnosis of Shcheglovitev and very much follow- 
-ed Ivan Grigorovich in his policies. Maklakov was still young but Ivan 
Grigorovicb, a personality with a good brain and strong politics, had 
long ago learned how to operate. N. A. Maklakov found in Ivan Grigorovich 
a leader, and Ivan Grigorovich made quite a lot of use of him. (85) 
The Council rejection which meant temporary disgrace for Maklakov left 
Shcheglovitov unscathed. Shcheglovitov set out to promote his own candidacy 
for leader of the government, but not by a frontal assault on the State 
Duma ; he could inflict greater damage on the Kokovtsov administration by 
raising the 'Boycott' in Kokovtsov's absence. 
The second session of the Fourth Duma had opened on 15 October with the 
'Boycott' still in force. However individual ministers immediately began to 
compromise the principle of boycott. From the very start of the session, 
while not personally attending Dama sittings and commissions, ministers sent 
representatives is collect and relay information on major topics of common 
interest. 
86 
This minor fissure in the boycott rapidly widened to become a 
84 MPK 94-5 ;T GIAL, f. 1276(Council of Minietera), ii, 158,19. 
85 PADENIE, iii, 368(Beletaky) ; Roggor, 'The Beilis Cause', pp. 621 & 624-7- 
86 No minister attexied the Doma 15 October-1 November 1913 but three vice- 
ministers did : GDSO, II, st©. 42-3(Finance), 298-300(Justice) and 339 O. 
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sizeable breach. Grigorovich, Minister for the Navy, was most anxious that 
Admiralty credits held up by the 'Boycott' be passed by the new session and, 
counting on the Tsar's concern for Russia's military performance and sympathy 
for any action calculated to diminish the authority of the Council Chairman, 
made a successful appeal for permission to appear before the Duma. Other 
ministers followed Grigorovich's example, each pleading 'special contingencyö 
and 'essential credits', until it became general practice within the Council 
of Ministers to bypass the 'Boycott' by appealling over the head of the 
absent Kokovtsov direct to the Tsar. 
87 
With the 'Boycott' dissolved in all but name, Shcheglovitov set out to 
usurp Kokovtsov's authority over Duma affairs for his own advancement. In 
the last days of October Shcheglovitov approached Rodzyanka with a formula 
for settlement : in exchange for a directive by Rodzyanko to the Duma forbid- 
-ding any recurrence of the Markov accusation, the government was prepared 
to raise the 'Ministerial Boycott'st once. 
88 
Rodzyanko was only too willing, 
especially since the rumours that Shcheglovitov was shortly to succeed 
Eokovtaov as Council Chairman were becoming increasingly authoritative. 
8 
The Duma was quite prepared to forgive provided the initiative for the 
settlement came from the government side. Markov Two, disconcerted that the 
'Boycott' should be ended by his own here within the government, was prevail- 
ed upon to issue a statement bordering upon an apology, and both sides 
declared that honour was satisfied. On 1 November 1913 the 'Boycott' was 
ended. 
90 Shcheglevitev was content that while Maklakov may have impressed 
the Tsar by his enthueiasn for autocracy, his own reputation had been greatly 
enhanced by the apparent ease with which he restored rapport between 
government and Dama. 
Kokovtoov returned to St Petersburg from Berlin on 8 November and 
87 RoDZYANxv 86-9 ; GU© 528. 
88 KOXOVTSOV 395-6 ; also Hosking, Government and Duma, p. 291. 
89 KOKOVTSOV 396 footnote. 
90 GDSO, II, 8,540-1 ; Times, 15 November 1913(n/s), 13i. 
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interviewed each minister to determine the developments during his seven- 
week absence. 
91 He realised at once that the Right wing of the Council had 
taken advantage of his absence and even though two of their projects (the 
Beilis trial and Maklakov's attempted coup) had not brought the Right the 
rewards anticipated, they had served to discredit his administration in the 
eyes of the Duma, the nation and indeed the world. He also realised that his 
personal position as Council Chairman had been under severe pressure and 
while it had withstood the assault of the Maklakov proposal, it had suffered 
definite reverses in the compromising and subsequently the raising of the 
'Ministerial Boycott'. 92 He now possessed just one advantage over his 
ministerial opponents : because the 'Boycott' had been raised without his 
participation, he was fortuitously out of an awkward political impasse and 
benefited from renewed relations with the Duma without the humiliation of a 
personal surrender. The sole course of action now open to Kokovtsov was to 
gamble all his remaining and fast-dwindling political capital upon an 
alliance with the Duma. Kokovtsov's only hope both for the survival of his 
moderate administration and arguably the very existence of the State Duma 
was to recreate the stable relationship that Stolypin had engineered with 
the Oktobrists in the early Third Dumm. 
To this end Kokovtsov announced in mid November a new era of cooperation 
between government and Duma and, most significantly, intimated the need for 
close relations between his administration and suitable Duma fractions. 
93 
The effect of Kokovtsov's coy advances upon the Duma was prodigious. The 
first fortnight of the session had been gloomy and pessimistic, with rumours 
of the Maklakov proposal reducing Duma deputies to near despair. Many 
moderate deputies were so convinced of dissolution that they anticipated the 
event by retiring to their constituencies, as Utro Ro_ deplored : 
91 KOKOVTSOV 395-6. 
92 Ibid. 
93 R ae a, 12 November 1913 ; ENGE'H4RDT, xii, 320. 
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Whispers and rumours of the imminent dissolution of the Fourth Duma 
have been circulating. Boredom 'is reigned in the State Duma, a feature 
in large part explained by the small numbers attending the open sittings 
of the Duma. A good half of the deputies have been absent without 
permission. ( 
Utre Rossii was concerned lest absenteeism admit the possibility of a Right 
'proceduzal majority' since, 
On the list of Duma absentees, the Kadets, Progressists and Oktobrists 
take first plate. The most conscientious in discharging their respons- 
-ibilities are the peasants and priests and, generally speaking, the 
whole Right wing of the Doma. (94). 
Kokovtsov's overtures to the Duma raised the modere fractions from their 
malaise and boosted the morale of the entire assembly. The jeremiads of the 
Right press were gradually stilled as the prospect of Duma dissolution 
faded. To the Left wing, Kokovtsov's attiude meant at least the continued 
existence of the Duma ; to the Right-wing fractions was opened up the 
glittering prospect of close alliance with the government. 
The impact of the government's projected rapprochement upon the 
Oktobrists can only be fully appreciated by taking the narrative through 
from the first days of the Fourth Duna. Despite the psychological and 
numerical damage inflicted by the 1912 elections, the Oktobrist fraction was 
still the most important political unit in the early Fourth Duma. The numer- 
ical axis of the Duma passed just to the Right of the central Oktobrist 
position. The Oktobrist membership of 99, still the largest in the Duma, 
straddled the Duma axis, lending it the weight to tilt the parliamentary 
balance either way. Excluding the Oktobrists, the Left totalled 149 and the 
Right 185. The affiliation of the Oktobrists was crucial : if they joined 
the Left, the result was a clear Left victory 248-185 ; if they joined the 
Right, the result was a crushing defeat for the Left 149-284 ; even if they 
abstained, the Right carried the vote 185-149.95 The Left moderates had to 
win Oktebriet support in order to stand any chance of influencing the 
policies of the Fourth Duma. The Oktobrist hegemony of the Third Duma seemed 
94 'Absenteeism in the Duma', II trs R. s ii, 27 November 1913,2. 
95 Figures calculated from GDS9: IIKAZATEL' 19". 24. 
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likely to be succeeded by hegemony of the Fourth Duma, albeit with less stress` 
on numerical weight and government patronage and more on strategic position. 
The first attitudes adopted by the Oktobrist fraction in the Fourth 
Duma were predictably anger towards the government and an accompanying 
hatred of all fractions to its Right. The Oktobrists negotiated an alliance 
with the Left to support the candidature of Rodzyanko for Duma President 
to prevent the election of a Nationalist leader. At the first vote Rodzyanko 
received 234 votes to the Nationalist Balashev's 147 (with the other 
candidates Volkonsky, Khomyakov and Purishkevich getting 10,1 and 1 
respectively) ; at the second and straight vote, Rodzyanko defeated Balashev 
by 251 voted to 150.96 Thus at the very first occasion for such a contest, 
the Left combined with the Oktobriats to overwhelm the Nationalists and 
Rights. In his post-election speech Rodz anko emphasised that this y parliam- 
-entary alliance was one of principle as well as fraction convenience 
I have always been and will continue to be a convinced supporter of 
that representative system on constitutional principles which Russia 
was granted by the Manifesto of 17 October 1905, the consolidation of 
which must remain and constitute the primary and unpostponable concern 
of the Russian representative assembly. (97) ?' 
The tone adopted by Rodzyanko voiced the antagonism felt by many Oktobriste 
towards the government and found particular expression in profound antipathy 
towards the Nationalist fraction. Lyuts, a very centre-line Oktobrist, 
considered that 'any combination with the Nationalists is absolutely 
impossible ; the Oktobrists will neither associate with the Right nor vote 
with the Right ; with the moderate. groups we can negotiate' . 
98 
The Oktobrists 
were very short with the emerging Left Nationalists who diffidently approach- 
-ed them ; finally the Left Nationalist leaders lost patience and quit in 
disgust, complaining that 'the Oktobriets always give us the cold shoulder 
and always answer "we are not yet organised and have yet to elect represent- 
-atives to initiate negotiations" +. 
99 
96 GDDSO, I, 1,5 &6(15 November 1912)... ° 
97 GDSO, I, 197 ; also Kizeretterý a,,. Rt beezheDISM Stoletii, p. 516. 
98 Interview in Vech_eraoe Vreem a recorded in KLYUZHEV, xi, 8. 
99 K+YUZHEV, ai, 44(Statement of Savenko, Chikhachev and Shull gin). 
93. 
However it would not be true to say that jealousy of the fraction which 
had usurped its place as darling of the government entirely clouded Oktobrist 
political judgement. The Oktobrists were for example prepared to negotiate 
with the Nationalists over the apportionment of the presidencies of Duma 
commissions in an attempt to retain as much as possible of their past 
hegemony of the Duma commission system. At a fraction meeting on 30 November 
1912 the Oktobrists agreed to surrender nine commission presidencies to the 
Nationalists (whilst retaining fifteen for themselves). A final quarrel over 
the presidency of the Education commission was reluctantly settled in the 
Nationalists' favour on 1 December. 
100 
Even when the emotions of the 
Oktobrists were unprecedentedly inflamed, the experience of the Third Duma 
would not allow them to forget their most precious interests. 
Throughout this period Guchkov, chafing at his exclusion from the Duma, 
made strenuous efforts to direct the fraction from outside. A Guchkov-inapir- 
-ed attempt by the Oktobrist Central Committee to reserve for itself a 
permanent seat on the Fraction Bureau was supported by the fraction Left 
wing but defeated in overall fraction vote on 16 January 1913.101 Accepting 
defeat and tacitly recognising its future exclusion from the seat of politics 
the Central Committee settled for a pathetic appeal to the fraction for 
constant liaison and passage of information. 
102 
For the rest of its exist- 
-ence the Oktobrist fraction operated increasingly remote from the Oktobrist 
Union outside the Duma and without the charismatic personality of Guchkov to 
inspire and direct its activities. With the repudiation of these past factors 
of discipline and cohesion, the unity problem of the Oktobrist fraction 
rapidly developed into a major crisis. 
On 22 January 1913 the Left-wing oktebrist Opochinin persuaded the 
100 TeGAOR, f. 115(Oktobrist Fraction), ii, k, 45-8(30 November 1912) & 54-5 1 December 1912). 
101 Ibid, 76-7(16 January 1913). 
102 Letter from Lindeman(Yice-President of Oktobrist Central Committee) to Antenov(President of Oktobriet Fraction Bureau), 24 January 1913 s TeGAOR, f. 115(Oktobriet Fractien), ii, 21,61. 
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fraction to authorise exploratory negotiations with fractions to the Left. 
1Ö3 
At the same time it was clear that the fraction as a whole preferred to bide 
its time rather than take precipitate action im favour of either wing. The 
Fraction Bureau elections on 5 February returned strictly centre-line 
Oktobrists while in the elections to the Fraction Presidency the centre-line 
niminee Antonov defeated his Left-wing challenger S. I. Shidlovsky by 50 votes 
to eight. 
104 Even so the exposure of the 'Rightist Plot' had the effect of 
stepping up Oktobrist approaches to the Left, and in the Duma Finance 
commission on 12 March the Oktobriste made their first direct move against 
the government when their representatives Savich and Bennigsen launched a 
strong attack on Kokovtsov. 
105 On 24 March Oktobrist and Progressist 
delegations met to work out a practical scheme to co-ordinate their Duma 
activities. 
106 
With the fraction moving towards definite commitment to the Left, the 
Oktebrist Right wing became restive. On 9 April the popular daily Russkoe 
Slev printed the rumour that the Right Oktobrists were about to be expelled 
from the fraction. A couple of individual desertions by Oktobriste received 
maximum publicity in the pree., particularly the defection of Baron 
Meyendorff in mid April. 
107 On 11 May Right-wing Oktobrists met the Centre 
leaders L'vev aad Krupenaky, thereby acutely embarrassing these Oktobriets 
attempting to cement agreement with the Progreasists. 
108 The MVD lobby 
correspondent made the following shrewd observations soon after : 
Everywhere one notices the restlessness of the Duma, the responsibility 
for which lies with the Oktebrists ... The fascinating thing about the 
relations between the Duma Oktebrists and the Oktobrists in the 
provinces is the real split that is emerging. This split may be 
103 TeGAOR, f. 115(Okt"briet Fraction), ii, 4,83-44. 
104 Ibid, 88. 
105 KLTUZHEV, xii, 186. 
106 TaGAOR, f. 115(Oktobrist Fraction), ii, 3,19-21. 
107 0" l. a M©skvs, k Mahr 1913 ; ? i*.., 19 May 1913 (n/a) , 5b . 
108 2s_ OR, f. 115(Oktsbriat Fracti9*), ii, 3,34. 
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observed in the Duma fraction, which is currently under the influence 
of the provincial Oktobrists ... The Oktobrists will soon leave the 
Chamber in the company not only of Progressists and Right Kadets - 
Maklakov's clique - but of Left Kadets, Trudoviks and Socialists ; or 
so you hear in the lobbies. Mind you, net all the Oktobrists will 
follow this course, only one section. (109) 
This observer was perceptive enough to detect the two issues which were to 
ruin the Oktobrist fraction : the split between the fraction wings, each 
pulling in opposite directions, and the split between the more conservative 
fraction and the more militant provincial Oktobrists. By the end of the 
first parliamentary session the Left Oktobrists, responding to the encourage- 
-meat of provincial Oktobrists, were seeking to dominate fraction policy and 
were demanding the immediate implementation of the October Manifesto, 
110 
The summer recess (26 June-14 October 1913) only partly interrupted the 
developments within the Oktobrist Union and Fraction. The parliamentary 
recess did not stem the rising mood of Russian society and public interest 
was caught by a spate of congresses held at Kiev, which served as a political 
focus while the Duma was out of session. As the correspondent of the semi- 
-official Rossia commented : 
At the Kiev congresses threre is a new spirit of drive and unanimity 
among the wide circles of Russian society, delegates of which have 
travelled from every corner of this great country ... The bolder, more 
lively interest of the most varied levels of society in social and 
political life really hits you in the eye. (111) 
At the Kiev Congress of Municipal Representatives in late September, Guchkov 
made his attitude as President of the Oktebrist Union clear, dismissing the 
anaemic petty reforming - the Oktebrist Fabianism - of the fraction, and 
asserting quite categorically that ' further delay in the execution of 
necessary reforms and further deviation from the principles proclaimed in 
the Manifesto of 17th October 1905 threatens the country with grave convula- 
-ions and ruinous consequences'. 
112 
Oktebriste outside the Duma warmly"supported Guchkbv and eagerly 
109 Report of 22 May 1913 : POL CE, 307-1913,96. 
110 For example, 0ktobrist fraction meeting 28 May 1913 : iYUZ13 v, xiii, 16. 
111 Roesia, 9 October 1913 also ti$eretter, Na bezhe, PP"517-8. 
112 Russian 8eview, vel. IIýn4. k(N. vember 1913), pp. 217-9 ; Revee Ore a, 1 
September r1913 ; also Hut'cbigsem, The Octebrists, pp. 215-7: 
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prepared for the Congress projected for 7-10 November, at which the future 
direction of Oktobrism was to be settled. 
113 A police report noted the 
enthusiasm of the Moscow Oktobrista for a Leftward move towards the Kadets 
and estimated that some thirty Oktobrist deputies were believed to support 
this course. 
114 On 20 October, the MVD lobby correspondent again came up 
with the kind of report that makes one qualify strictures about Okhrana 
ineptitude. The Oktobrist fraction was drifting Left through the influence 
of the country in general and the Oktebrist Union in particular but there was 
no conviction about the move within the fraction : 
It is clear to all those close to the ruling Oktobrist circles that a 
serious desire to move Left is totally lacking ... Guchkov, in pushing 
the party Left towards the Kadets, is executing an entirely personal 
manoeuvre, employing the mood of the moment to boost his sadly diminished 
popularity ... Antonov has stated with great conviction that the party 
majority stands on his policy and net on that of Guchkov ... In general 
it would be a mistake to speak of a genuine Leftward movement of the 1 
Oktobrist mass, but just the fear among Oktobrists of the possibility 
of new revolutionary agitation. (115) 
It was plain that the Oktobriet Congress was to be not just a gesture 
to satisfy the provinces but the actual arena for the thrashing-out of 
Oktobrist Policy- On 31 October a closed meeting of the Oktobrist Central 
Committee revealed that the two sides were almost equally divided. 
116 
Cnc 
now looked to the Congress both to reassert his personal predominance over 
the Oktobrist movement and to mandate the Oktobrist Fraction to move Left 
into opposition to the government. Moscow Oktobrists saw themselves as the 
spokesmen for the Oktobrist provinces, with a duty to insist upon their 
fraction demanding the promises of the October Manifesto and preferably 
forcibly excluding the Right-wingers of Shubinakoy altogether. 
117 Uninvolved 
parties looked forward eagerly to a political scrap to relieve the monotony 
of the current Duma session : 
113 Report of 8 October 1913: P'3' LICE, *iv, 1k? -1913,3-4, 
114 ib $, 16-18(12 October 1913) ; also N®ý_ i/re a, 13 October 1913. 
115 Ibtd, 20-22(20 October 1913). 
116 Gebe Meakv, 1 November 1g13 ; Ot h of TaZ S®n$a 17-eao oktTabrn 0 
výý eiýesýai fwwf4v 7 aaL. *raiaw r:. 4lýyRz 4aa. t. n. -.. _ wM. ý .. .ý 
-f eý 
11 ': See Moscow Oktebrist Y #. Shipex's interview in Utre Roasii, 6 November 
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Guchkov or Shubinskoy ? The conference must choose one or the other. If 
nothing comes of the present confrontation, them the moment for 
reconstruction and identification with society will be lost ... and the catastrophe of Oktobrism will be inevitable. The conferenece is the 
struggle of Oktobrist political courage, sincerity and valour with 
opportunism. Who will win ? (118) 
The Congress opened in St Petersburg on 7 November. The Okhrana attend- 
-ance figures are probably the most trustworthy : of the total 190 attending .1 
95 were fraction deputies, about 40 were Oktobrists from the capitals St 
Petersburg and Moscow (including the Oktobrist Central Committee) and some 
50 were delegates from the provinces. 
119 
An attempt to avoid the washing of 
any Oktobriste linen in public by restricting the admittance of press 
reporters to known sympathisers was moderately successful. The Okhrana 
reporter judged that 'the general composition of the congress features a 
preponderance of past and present Duma deputies, although on the other hand 
the predominance of provincial representatives over representatives of the 
capitals'. 
120 This balance predetermined the spirit and decisions of the 
Congress. The Left-inclined delegates from the provinces and capitals allied 
with the Left-inclined fraction minority to defeat the conservative fraction 
majority. The bulk of the agenda was given over to speechifying since the 
more delegates gave voice, the more democratic the Congress appeared to be. 
Decisions were arrived at by acclamation and nit vote. The events of the 
next month were to prove that some twenty-five deputies strongly supported 
the Guchkov line from the total fraction membership of ninety-nine. A 
conjectural vote in the Congress would have been 115 for Guchkov and seventy 
against (all but twenty-five of the Oktobriet Fraction). 
The highlight of the Congress was Guchkov's speech as President of the 
Central Committee. on 8 November, in which he declared, 
The ship of state has lest its course and is aimlessly tossing on the 
waves. Not only has the government failed to arouse sympathy and 
confidence, it is incapable of inspiring even fear ... It is natural in such circumstances that the government shoulf find itself solitary, 
118 Hirz hevis Vedomosty, 7 Nove*nber1913. 
119 Undated report on Oktebriat Congress ; POLICE, xiv, 147-1913,74. 
120 Ibid, 76 & 78 (quotation). 
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abandoned by all ... the sympathy and confidence which the government 
attracted in the time of Stolypin has receded in an instant from the 
government of his successors. The honeymoon is over ... Where is govern- 
-ment policy, or rather lack of policy, leading us ? Towards inevitable 
catastrophe. (121) 
Guchkov concluded that as the earlier contract between government and 
Oktebrism had seen dissolved by bad faith on the government's part, he could 
only declare it void from the Oktobrist side. Future Oktobrist policy must 
be to abandon subservience to the government and ally with the other 
oppositional parties within and outside the Duna : 
We must not leave to the professional opposition, to the radical and 
socialist parties, the monopSy of opposition to the government ... In 
so doing, we should foster the dangerous illusion that the government 
is combating only radical utopias and socialist experiments - whereas it is actually opposing the satisfaction of the most moderate and 
elementary demands of public opinion. (122) 
The Congress closed on 10 November with the passing of political resolutions, 
one of which (Point 5. ) was the decision that, 
The parliamentary fraction of the Oktobrist Union, as its organ, take 
upon itself direct conflict with the harmful and dangerous direction 
of the government, employing in full measure all legal means of 
parliamentary action. (123) 
The best that the fraction majority could secure as the fruits of a rear- 
-guard action was the acceptance of a proviso expressly forbidding the fract-1, 
-ion to sacrifice its identity in any form of multi-fraction bloc. 
124 
Opposition reactions were approving but disbelieving : the Kadet 
Shingarev doubted that 'in the Duma, Oktobrism will assume the Guchkov 
spirit' ; the Progressist Konovalev commented sourly 'a tragi-comedy : Guchkor 
is a general without an army'. 
125 
Doubts notwithstanding, the Kadets and 
Progressists could not let slip the opportunity of a moderate bloc against 
the government and, despite the misgivings of some (including Milyukev), 
121 Guchkov's own copy of the speech : TaGAOR, f. 555(Guchkov), i, 508,1-21 ; 
also Rech', 9 November 1913,4-6 ; English translation : Russian us Review, 
1914, no. l, pp. 141-158. 
122 Ts_ AOR, f . 555 (Guchkov) , i, 5o8., 15 & 17. 
123 TsGG OR, f . 555 (Guchkev) , i, 572,2 ; Otchvot TsL Sevuza 
--17-age oktvab=ya, pp "9-11 ; Rem c', 11 November -19'13. 
124 Taý, f. 555(Gachkov), i 572`, 2 (Point 7. ). 
125 Comments in regular column 'Pa'liamentary Notebook', Reechh: 10 Nevoaber 1913954, 
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agreed to initiate approaches to the Oktobrist fraction. 
126 
At precisely 
the same instant, Kokovtsov launched his capaign to attract the moderate 
Right to the side of the government. At no other time had the strain upon 
Oktobrist unity been greater : to both Left and Right wings of the Oktobrist 
fraction were extended the political prizes that they sought. Unfortunately 
for Oktobrist unity these same prizes were mutually exclusive : the Oktobrist 
response to the political overtures of the government and the opposition 
constituted the supreme crisis of Oktobrism both in the country and in the 
State Duma. 
The Oktobrist debate began at once. The Left Oktobriste argued that the 
Congress had mandated the fraction to move into opposition and that agreement 
with the Kadets and Progressists was implementation of that mandate. The 
fraction majority argued that not only had the Congress explicitly condemned 
entry into any multi-party bloc but that it was madness deliberately to 
sabotage a 'special relationship' with Kokovtoov by over-precipitate links 
with the 'professional Opposition'. 
127 On 20 November, twenty-two Left 
Oktobriats demanded the immediate implementation of Congress Resolution 5. 
Voting in the fraction resulted in a defeat for the demand by 42 votes to 25, 
while Bennigsen's compromise motion that the Congress Resolution would be 
effected 'as circumstances permitted' was carried by 41 votes to 18. At an 
extraordinary fraction meeting on 29 November, the Left Oktobrists again 
demanded that the fraction pass immediately and publicly into opposition, 
and again they were outvoted. 
128 The Left Oktobrists started to withdraw 
from the fraction in protest : by 2 December, eleven deputies had already 
resigned* 
129 
126 Utre Rsasii, 13 November 1913.3. 
127 RODZYANKO 84. 
128 The wording of the formula expressing the fraction's attitude to the 
Congress Resolution was vital. The Left verity stipulated 'direction' 
(rukovodstvovatsia), the majority only conceding 'drawing support' (pochervaut' uoddorsikic s Tsý R, f, 115(Oktobrist Fraction), i, 37,1 and 
Otchvot Tsä Sousa 17-o" o trabrva, pp. 11-12. 
129 Ibid, pp. 52-63. Dole 37 of the Oktobrist Fraction Fend is a complete 
collection of resignations over the period November 1913-January 1914. ' 
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Guchkov held to the course he had chosen to the bitter end, with no 
concessions to the political future of the Oktobriat fraction as in the 
previous year. He succeeded in bringing pressure to bear upon the fraction 
Bureau which on 2 December came down on the side of the Left Oktobrists : in 
other words, from that date the Left Oktobrist line was official Oktobriet 
fraction policy. Resignations from the Right-inclined remainder of the 
Oktebrista now started to pour into the Bureau office. 
130 In a last bid to 
prevent disintegration, Guchkov called a combined Fraction and Central 
Committee meeting on 6 December but his message brought no joy to the 
majority : the fraction was the organ of the Oktobrist Union and must there- 
-fore implement 8ä®luti©n 5. of the November Congress. 
131 The torrent of 
resignations became a flood. In the period between 2 December and the end 
of the month, the fraction Bureau received fifty resignations (and this on 
top of the eleven submitted before 2 December). 
132 Guchkev struck a brave 
attitude in the face of the complete disintegration of the fraction : 
This separation I find both natural and desirable ... In the period of 
collaboration between the government and the Oktobrist Union, certain 
elements were attracted because of the greater power they acquired ... It is perfectly natural that these elements should now fall away. (1330 
However Guchkov's glib talk of purging away the dross of the Oktobrista 
could net disguise the extent of the disaster for the 'time-servers' inherit- 
-ed from the Stolypin era constituted a full half of the fraction. 
The process of disintegration continued remorselessly throughout 
December 1913 and January 1914. Twenty Left Oktobrista, whom Klyuzhev hailed 
as the 'leaders of the Oktobrist rebirth', set up as an independent fraction 
(the so-called 'Novembrists') and were to remain so for the rest of the 
Fourth Duma. 
134 Some twenty-three centre-line Oktobrists met at Rodzyanko's 
130 26 reaignationa, 3-6 December 1913 : TsýAOR, f. 115, i, 37. 
131 Rech'97 December 1913 ; also Hosking, Government and Duma, p. 273. 
132 24 reaignationa, 7-31 December 1913' 'k , 
f. 113,4,37. 
133 Interview given to ß" sS arY917 December 1913. 
134 KLYUZHEV, xiii, 64., 
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on the evening of 6 December to form a new fraction, the 'Zemstvo-Oktobristsö 
135 
A further twenty-seven Oktobrists resigned without joining either new 
fraction and a final twenty-nine remained within the traditional fraction. 
However this Oktobrist 'rump' was further depleted over the course of 
January 1914 when twenty-five resigned : some joined the Zemstvo-Oktobrists, 
some associated with the Centre fraction, a number formed a so-called 
'independent group' while a few continued their Duma careers as independents. 1 
By late January 1914 just four deputies remained to represent the fraction 
which only two months before could muster ninety-nine. 
136 The process of 
destructive polarisation which had started withfhe defection of the 
Gololobov group (to the Right) in 1909-10 and continued with the emergence 
of the Progressists (to the Left) in 1911-12 had reached its dramatic 
climax. The career of the Oktobrist fraction demonstrated the intolerable 
strains of the central position, at one and the same time the most powerful 
and the most vulnerable in the Duma. In December 1913 the unity and integrity 
of the Oktobrista was irretrievably lost : the Oktobrist fraction in the 
Duma was ruined. 
2. The Defence of the Duna (January-June 1914) 
Kokevtaev probably realised that the collapse of his Duma favourite 
meant both the bankruptcy of his last bid to establish cordial relations 
with the Duma and the doom of his own administration. His powerlessness was 
brought home by the Tsar's refusal to dismiss the reactionary Minister of 
Education despite Kokovtsov's protestations that Kasse was the greatest 
single stumbling-block between government and Duma. 
137 
Makiakov, sensing 
both the decline of Kokevtssv's position and the strong candidacy of 
Shcheglovitov as new Council Chairman, attempted once again to advance dais 
135 Rueskie Vedomosty, 7 December 191393- 
136 TsGAOR, f. 115(Oktobrist Fraction), i, 37 ; see also TsGAOR, f. 826(Dsbumkov- 
-8ky , 1,210 and Guchkov's comments in Golds Samary, 17 December 1913« 
137 Report of 23 January 1914 : POLICE, xv, 27/57(Petersburg), 2-3. 
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"wn fortunes. Knowing the Tsar's antipathy for Moscow, Maklakov appointed 
the reactionary B. V. Stürmer to the vacant office of Mayor. 
138 
Toni issues 
were involved in the appointment : the traditional right of Moscow to. elect 
its own Mayor rather than submit to an imperial appointment and the legality 
of the Minister of Interior deliberately evading the constitutional approach 
to the Sovereign via the Council of Ministers. Kokovtsev realised that the 
Moscow appointment was a test-case in his power conflict with Maklakov. 
Should Maklakov prevail, then the Chairmanship of the Council of Ministers 
would become an empty authority which could always be circumvented by 
ministers close to the Tear. At a hastily-convened Council meeting, the 
ministers proved unanimous in their opposition to Maklakov. 
139 With the 
backing of the great majority of society and the overwhelming support of his 
ministerial colleagues, Kekovtsov was prepared to make Moscow a resignation 
issue. A painfully embarrassing confrontation with Nicholas at Livadia 
secured victory for Kokovtsov but although the immediate battle against the 
RYD had been won, the war to maintain moderate government in an increasingly 
reactionary milieu was already lost. Nicholas's distrust was aroused to an 
aprecedented level by Kokovtsov's insistence that the Council Chairmanship 
be confirmed in its traditional power and authority. 
1 
The strength of Kokovtsov's position in the government had always been 
his direction of state finances. Finance Minister with only six months' 
Z ak since February 1904, he was regarded by many experts, himself included,! 
BAs indispensable to the Russian economy. 
141 This reputation guaranteed his 
tenure an both Finance Minister and Council Chairman long after his failure 
in the latter office had been widely acknowledged. Since it was considered 
unthinkable to relieve Eokovtsov of one office without the other, Kokovts"T 
did not finally lose the Council Chairmanship until his direction of the 
fiance Ministry cane tinder fire 1h2 The spirit of penny-watching which 
138 1010VTSOV 395-6 ; also LLVZRTC8 96-7. 
139 KOKOYTSOY 396. 
"140 Ibid, 397-400. 
141 I, bid, 457-466. 
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had permitted the Russian economy to recover so rapidly from the war against 
the Japanese was out of place by late 1913 and Kokovtsov's critics argued 
that parsimony had become the end not the means of the Ministry of Finance. 
14 
The Balkan Ware and the distinct possibility of larger-scale war in the near 
future meant that financial stringency was net only unnecessary but militar- 
"-ily dangerous. A succession of rows with the War Minister Sukhomlinov 
attracted the attention of the Emperor, who unhesitatingly backed the plans 
144 fss an expanded military budget. Having created the prosperous state of 
Asian finances which made military involvement feasible, Kokovtsov now 
barred the way to the traditional pursuits demanded by Great Power status. 
Kokevtsov recjRved the long-expected rescript of dismissal on 29 
Jsauary 1914.145 His failings had been numerous and fundamental. Kokevtsov 
was an excellent Minister of Finance but a poor Chairman, an industrious and 
e"nscientious administrator but an execrable politician, 
146 He permitted 
the MVD to outflank his titular leadership, personally precipitated a five- 
-month contretemps with the Duma which was patently against the interests of 
both the Duma and his own administration, accepted responsibility for 
spheres over which his control was minimal and allowed his reactionary 
colleagues to make of him a society whipping-boy for their own activities. 
]Eokovtsev's failure as Council Chairman was attributable at base to a 
personality which could dominate and inspire a single government ministry 
but was unequal to the tactical demands of the highest minister ]. office. 
Ieicevtaov was also unfortunate in occupying, like the Oktobriste in the 
ptaa, the central position where; the"pelitical strains were most acute. 
£ ovtsov himself believed that the basic reason for his downfall was that 
'the liberals considered aye tee: cemeervative and the conservatives considered 
l 
14g KOBOVTSOV 409. 
143 Ibid, x+39 ; GU O 518-9 . &, 529, 
144 Ibid, 344-9 & 362-4 ; Vaeil iC rke, Menoriea and Imvreesiona of War asd Revolution in Ruesia 1914-191?, Lendes 191 , pp. rü-viii. 
14.5 KOKOVTSOV 419.420, # alas A UKOY 282.. 
146 Harcave, Yeare of the Geldau Ceekerel, P "392. 
fi 
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147 
ne too liberal'. While the Okt®brist crash was by no means the sole 
reason for Kokovtsov's fall, the occurrence of the latter close upon the 
keels of the former demonstrated the mutual inter-dependence of the moderate 
elements within government and Duma. 
Within the Duma, the Oktobrist crash effectively liquidated the Oktobr- 
-ist hegemony to which the Duma had become accustomed since 1907. All Duma 
fractions found the Oktobrist experience advantageous in some respect. On 
the Right wing the Nationalists, appalled by the prospect of the Oktobrist 
fraction tearing itself to pieces and aware of how easily they could share 
the fate of the Oktobrista, hurriedly sank their own differences and rallied 
their membership to retain a fundamental Nationalist identity. 
148 Fractions 
neighbouring on the Oktobrists benefited by the addition of ex-Oktebriat 
deputies : the Centre fraction recruited successfully from the Oktobrist 
Right wing and the Progres+sists anticipated close parliamentary alliance 
with the Left Oktobrists (a hope is large part realised after February 1914).; 
149 The collapse of the Duma centre could only strengthen both the Bight and 
Left wings of the Duma : even when fractions could net benfit directly from 
the 'aktobrist Partition' (like the Rights and SD. )j the absence of the e 
traditional Duma authority offered the possibility of a greatly-expanded 
voice and role in the future sessions of the Duma. 
The fortuitous collapse of the Oktobriete could not have come at a 
better moment for Milyukev and the Zadete. The Oktobriet crash opened up 
vistas of a oomplete Badet comeback after the party's eclipse since 1907. 
gis Duma Christmas recess (8 Deoeabei 1913-13 January 1914) was not wasted : 
the Badet Central Committee initiated a campaign to negotiate a coalition of 
all moderate parties at the provincial 3. evel. 
15o While the Kadets protested 
ta. advantages of greater unity amongst the moderates in the country, the 
oration smacked to a great extent :: *f- forcible merger, a callous expleitat- 
KOKOVTSOV 517. 
148 o yae Vre a, 10 December. 1913- I, XLYMIIEV ., 58. 
149 KLYUZHEP, xiii, 129. 
15+0 Report of 14 January 1914 s LICE, xY, 27-1914,9. 
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-ion of the Oktobrist crash. With the Oktobrist fraction in pieces and the 
vast majority of provincial Oktobrists adhering to the Left Oktobrist 
position, the Kadets were judging that provincial Oktobrism was territory 
ready for poaching and more sympathetic to the Kadet than to the Nationalist 
banner. An enquiry sponsored in late November 1913 by Rusekoe Slovo confirm- 
-ed that the Oktobrist following was still a prize worth the winning : while 
the Oktobrist Union was currently incapable of unified or coherent action, 
its membership was still relatively stable, the steady defection of provinc- 
-ial Nationalists into the Union compensating for its losses to other parti- 
-es. 
151 The sof surge political affiliation was moving from Right to Left, 
lending the advantage to the Kadets and offering proof that in the event of 
a merger with the Oktobrists, the Kadets would not be binding themselves to 
a moribund organisation. 
The political positions of the Kadet and Oktobrist organisations could 
hardly have been more contrasted. The Oktobrists were strong in the country 
and entirely disrupted in the Duma ; the Kadets were strong in the Duma but 
dangerously weak in the country. Milyukov would probably have preferred a 
weaker Oktobrist Union for he was well aware of the critical state of the 
Kadet provincial organisation. A Kadet Central Committee meeting of 14 May 
1913 had discussed the extent of the damage : by the estimation of the Moscow 
Kadets, only nine provincial organs were still in existence and Kadet 
committees operated in only ten towns. If the Kadet party was, in the words 
of a delegate, 'a head without a body' in May 1913, the subsequent seven 
months offered no evidence whatsoever of revival* 
152 
However Milyukov had no intention of surrendering one iota of the 
authority which he currently wielded over the Kadet party. If a merger with 
the Oktobrists would enhance that authority, Milyukov was the first to 
proclaim the merits of 'united opposition' ; but if the0ktobri8ta , appeared 
151 quoted in report of 29 December 1913 : POLICE, xix, 27,57. 
152 Tsý, f. 6/c, delo 15, PP. 10-17 (quotation from Ariadna Tyrkova p. I0) 
quoted in CHEF iSKY 171-5. 
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too powerful for the Kadets to dominate, Milyukov opposed such an 'elision 
of principle'. Throughout the summer of 1913, the bulk of the Kadet fraction 
had supported closer collaboration with the Oktobrists ; Milyukov opposed the 
move at every stage. 
153 
To Milyukov's delight, the Oktobrist crash opened 
up the prospect of a proportion of the Duma Oktobrists -a proportion large 
enough to be useful but small enough to offer no resistance to Kadet 
authority - being drawn into close association with the Kadets. 
154 
He also 
envisaged taking advantage of the furore within the Oktobrist Union to lend 
vital support to his own feeble provincial organisation. Ever astute to the 
tactics of power politics, Milynkov intended to exploit Oktobrist weakness 
for the greater good of the Kadets. 
In mid 1912 the Kadets had affected greater electoral stature by clamber- 
-ing upon the backs of the Progressists ; over the winter of 1913/1914 
Milyukov planned to resuscitate the dying Kadet provincial organisation by 
immediate transfusions of Oktobrist blood. A police report for January 1914 
estimated that some seven hundred Kadets and Oktobrists met throughout 
European Russia in the course of December and early January for the purpose 
of effecting closer union and a firmer line against the government. The police 
reporter was in little doubt of the success of the Kadet initiative 
All Kadet efforts have been directed to sow the greatest possible disc- 
ord between the society elements of the "moderate line" {ie. the 
provincial Oktobrists) and their delegates to the State Buma ... This "agitation" has succeeded brilliantly. The provincial Oktobrists have 
been propagandized in the sense desired by the Kadets. They hate the 
Shubinskoy group and incline towards the group led by Khomyakov and Shidlovsky ... Almost all the information on the activities of the Kadet 
emissaries sent into the provinces over the Christmas recess suggests 
that there was no real difficulty, just a succession of complete 
victories for Kadetism. (155) 
With the initial stage of the Kadet campaign well under way, Milyukov held 
out high hopes for a parallel improvement in Kadet fortunes within the Dumm. 
Within the government meanwhile, the dismissal of Kokovtoov heralded a 
153 Golos Mo_skvy, 12 November 1913,4 and 14 November 1913,2 ; also Recht 4 
December 1913,2 and POLICE, xiv, 27,60. 
154 Re, 8 December 1913,5 ; Birz hovie Vedomo, 30 November 1913,2. 
155 Report for 14 January 1914 : POLICEtxv927-1914t10. 
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shift towards the Right. Rumours of the impending fall of Kokovtsov suddenly 
made the moderates aware of his value :a police reporter wryly noted that 
'now that Kadet circles are convinced of the dismissal of Kokovtsov, it 
emerges that they warmly support the current premier'. 
156 
Milyukov saw in 
his dismissa*he removal of the last obstacle to the reaction that had been 
exerting increasing pressure on the Duma over the previous year : 
The political meaning of the change was not entirely clear ... one 
possibility was the cabinet breakdown - the complete absence of unity 
between the views of the Chairman and those of the reactionary members 
of the cabinet. Kokovtsov's fall must mean a fresh victory for reaction. 
Kokovtsov Sgs contained the full spate of reaction by moderates 
reasoned behaviour. (157) 
The spirit of foreboding that now dominated the moderate fractions was only 
partly relieved by conjecture as to the identity of Kokovtsov's successor. 
Witte had been advancing his own candidature over the last few months by 
playing the part of 'apostle of temperance' in the State Council debates on 
the Liquor Licensing bill, a cause which he knew to lie close to the heart 
of the Emperor. 
158 A police reporter summed up the opinion of the Petersburg!. 
moderates in the words 'Witte will be appointed unless the court party insi 
upon the appointment of Shcheglovitev'. 
159 Shcheglovitov, without question 
the darling of the Extreme Right inside and outside the Duma, universally 
regarded as the 'coming man' in the government, was the hot favourite to 
succeed Kokovtsov. 
160 The Duma moderates were left with the forlorn hope 
that another moderate in the style of Kokovtsov would succeed to the premier-] 
-ship. The correspondent of the Russian Review spoke for most of the Duma 
moderates in regretting, 'perhaps the ablest head in the babinet is Krivosheinl 
at the Ministry of Agriculture ... but as he is unlikely to be a candidate 
for the premiership, his ability leads rather to the prolongation of the 
156 Report of 20 January 1914 : POLICE, xv, 27-1914,16 ; also Times, 12 and 13 
February 1914(n/s), 8c and 5b respectievly. 
157 TAKTIKI, 1913-4,7. 
158 KoxovTSOV 407-412,422 & 444-5 ; GVRxo 530-1. 
159 Petersburg report of 23 January 1914 : POLICE, xv, 27/57,2. 
160 Sergei D. Saz. nov, Fateful Years_1909-1916, Loadon 1928, p. 280. 
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present indefinitypositionh. 
161 Even aside from his personal preference for 
the role of eminence rise, Krivoshein was currently convalescing from a 
serious illness in the Crimea and not at hand at the crucial moment to press 
his own candidature. 
162 
On 30 January 1914 Prince Goremykin was appointed as the new Chairman 
of the Council of Ministers. 
163 The shock in society at the nomination of 
this particular non-runner was profound : he was widely held to be (as in 
1906) the leader of a caretaker administration, which would shortly be 
succeeded by the strong Chairmanship of Shcheglovitov or Krivoshein. 
164 
Milyukov was convinced of this explanation : 
Decrepit not only in years but in his senile indifference to everything, 
Goremykin was not looking for power ... It was Krivoshein, a very 
intelligent man who understood the situation better than the majority 
of those around him, who dreamed up the idea of Goremykin ... While 
willing to direct events, Krivoshein did not want to bear the respons- 
-ibility and deliberately remained in the background. Goremykin suited 
him in that he was a vacuum, inert, and would not interfere in any 
plans. (165) 
There was a strong element of wishful thinking in Milyukov's argument : he 
hoped that the most moderate minister still in the cabinet would prove to be 
the power behind the throne of the reactionary Goremykin. 
The most satisfying interpretation of Goremykin's appointment must take 
into greater account the intentions of the Tsar. Milyukov's interpretation 
conspicuously ignored any part that Nicholas might play, an omission that 
set him off on the track of conspiracy and sesret influence. But when 
Nicholas dismissed Kokovtaov, the imperial rescript emphasised that, 
The experience of the last eight years has thoroughly convinced me that 
the union in one person of the posts of Chairman of the Council of 
161 Russian Review, vol. 3, no. 1 (February 1914), p. 171. 
162 Report for 4 February 1914 : POLICE, xv, 27-1914,19-20 ; Letter of Musin- 
Pushkin, 18 February 1914 : S9, vsl. 6l, pp. 132-3 ; KOKOVTSOV 438-9 ; 
GIIRKO 531. 
163 KOKOVTSOV 413 & 439 ; MILIDXov 284. 
164 Golos Moskvy, 1 February 1914 ; KLYUZHEV, xiii, 108 ; Rodzyanko, 'Gosudarst- 
-vennaya Duma', pp. 20-1. 
165 MILIUKOV 284 ; GURKO 531 ; KLYUZHET, xiii, 108 ; also Russian RelLow 
vol. 3, no. 2 (Maýf 1914)`, p. 1? 2. " 
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Ministers and Minister of Finance or Minister of Internal Affairs is 
incorrect and inconvenient in such a country as Russia. (166) 
The last thing that Nicholas wanted was a 'Grand Vizier', an all-powerful 
minister of the style of Witte or Stolypin. This determination automatically 
decided the candidature of Witte himself, Maklakov (who would have become 
both Chairman and MVD) and Shcheglovitov (who would have become both Chair- 
-man and Minister of Justice). The logical course open to Nicholas was the 
introduction of a complete outsiderwho could not combine the office of 
Chairman with any ministry brief already held in the cabinet. Goremykin was 
not appointed to lead a 'provisionalE administration, indeed his chairmanship] 
was not terminated until January 1916. Nicholas intended Goremykin as the 
unambitious leader of a cabinet in which individual ministers were so 
balanced. that no single minister could emerge to challenge the authority of 
the Tsar. The new balance in the cabinet was less the product of a power 
struggle between ministers than the deliberate creation of a Tear obsessively 
anxious to maintain the semblance of his own autocracy. 
167 
The reduced Chairmanship of Kokovtaev was accordingly succeeded by the 
even weaker Chairmanship of Goremykin. Duma society was hopeful that the 
debilitation of the Chairmanship would promote the increased authority of 
the moderate faction in the cabinet led by Krivoshein and Sazonov, and in 
certain restricted spheres, as for example their insistence on the retention 
of the Duma as a legislative assembly, the more liberal ministers were indeed 
able to hold their position. 
168 
But Nicholas's scheme to forestall the rise 
of a super-minister was frustrated by his over-estimation of the authority 
of the Chairman and under-estimation of the power of the MVD. By the January 
1914 'arrangement', Nicholas severed all links between. the Chairmanship and 
ministerial level. By so drastically pruning the effective authority of the 
Chairmanship, Nicholas both sponsored the inter-ministerial intrigues which 
166 KOKOVTSOV 418. 
167 Milyukov later conceded much of this : MILIUKOV 282-4 ; Nicholas even 
referred to his 'coup d'Stitt' of January 1914 : KA, vol. 47/48, p. 43. 
168 MILIUKOV 284. 
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were to weaken the government so disastrously in the war period and removed 
another obstacle to the rise of the ambitious MVD. As Kokovtsov remarked in 
his memoirs, 'Maklakov's main purpose was to undermine the position of the 
Chairman of the Council ... and find favour for himself before the Tear and 
the public'. 
169 Maklakov's early efforts at harassing the Duma had been 
almost entirely frustrated but the removal of K©kovtsov, his replacement by 
a reactionary and the further weakening of the Chairmanship not only lent 
Maklakov unprecedented freedom of action but provided a stimulus to MVD 
ambition. 
Maklakov took advantage of the slacker discipline exercised by 
Geremykin to promote a full-scale campaign against the Duma. A police report 
for 5 February noted that signs of strain between the Duma and the new 
administration were already manifesting themselves : 
Neither Goremykin nor Bark have informed Rodzyanko of their appointments 
nor have they paid him visits. Bark sent the Duma President his visiting 
card but the premier did not even do that. Rodzyanko is very touchy on 
matters of Duma prestige. Milyukov and Shingarev are trying to calm 
him down. (170) 
Whether accidental er calculated slight, the first trivial contacts between 
the Duma and the Goremykin administration augured the deterioration of 
relations which naturally accompanied the onslaught of the reactionary 
ministers against the State Dnma. In the words of Milyukov, with the appoint- 
-ment of Goremykin 'immediately began a campaign, and one after another 
followed a succession of attacks upon the most fundamental principles of our 
parliamentary activi»'. 
171 
The firnt move was simultaneously an encroachment upon Duma financial 
powere and a cor©11azp to the January 1914 'arrangement' of the government. 
On 11 February a radical change was announced in the powers of the Committee 
J Finances. This body, hitherto a humble bureaucratic organ convened to lend 
technical assistance to the Minister of Finance, became a permanent 
169 KOKOVTSOV 446. 
170 Petersburg report of 5 February 1914 : P0ý CE, xv, 27157,1914,8. 
171 PADENIE, ri, 305 & 359(Mi3. yuk v). 
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institution with greatly extended responsibilities and the right of direct 
approach to the Tsar. 
172 The new membership of this key financial body was 
determined by the Tsar alone. The Duma felt that its financial powers were 
being seriously infriged upon, though the L'Humaniti report on the subject 
may have been too sensational : 
The Committee is considered in the Russian parliamentary world, includ- 
ing the OktobxAst party, clear treason to the national representation... 
the right of parliament in financial matters, it is hardly necessary 
to underline, is completely annihilated. 
But while the new Committee diminished the financial rights of the Duma (and 
State Council), it equally significantly diminished the authority of the 
Ministry of Finance : 
The Committee's president will have the right of report, that is to say, 
the right to present the conclusions of the Committee en all financial 
matters direct to the Tsar. By the same token, the power of the Ministry 
of Finance is necessarily reduced and relegated to second place. (173) 
The initiative for the new Committee was not at first apparent. Neither Duma 
nor Finance Minister would of course abandon one iota of crucial financial 
power. Maklakev, currently wooing the new Minister of Finance Bark, would 
not be so crass as to sabotage the liaison by direct attack on his 
prerogatives. There is no evidence to suggest that Goremykin had even heard 
of the Committee of Finances, let alone entertained coherent designs for 
its future. 
By a process of elimination one arrives again at the obvious yet 
frequently overlooked seat of power, the Tsar. In his rescript of 29 January 
1914, Nicholas had criticised Kekevtaov not only as Council Chairman but as 
Minister of Finance : 'the depa*tment of finance can be managed only by 
somebody new ... it cannot continue any longer in this manner'. 
174 It 
appears that Nicholas was not content with the mere substitution of Bark for 
Kokovtaov. The obvious motivation for the promotion in the status of the 
172 Article 'La Douma perd sea derniers droits', L'HumanitS, 10 March 1914 
(n/a) as collected in the Foreign Press Fend of the MVD ; P0ICE, d le 
307A-1914,35. 
173 Both quotations, ibi , p. 35. 
174 KOKOVTSOV 418 ; MILIUKOY 283. 
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Committee of Finances was once again Nicholas's determination to prune the 
powers of the would-be overmighty minister and take more power to himself. 
Kokovtsov, partly by dint of ability, partly by the length of his tenure, 
had created of the Ministry of Finance a power stronghold of his own. This 
stronghold Nicholas intended to demolish both by expelling the present 
occupant and systematically breaching its walls. There was probably at least 
as much desire on the part of Nicholas to reduce the powers of the Ministry 
of Finance as to weaken the powers of the Duma. 
Goremykin's policy as regards the Duma has been described as 'a cat and 
mouse game'. 
175 This is to ascribe to Geremykin a cun4ing and a restraint 
of which he was incapable. Goremykin still lived in the world of autocracy 
and simply could not comprehend or - in his eyes - condone the political dev- 
-elopments of the last ten tears. One must not be too hard on Goremykin : he 
was already sixty-six in 1905 and it was toe much to expect him to serve his 
political apprenticeship when he was already past retiring age. 
176 An 
Council Chairman, Goremykin fought his own private battle to restore the 
only world he understood. He supported any move by fellow ministers to limit 
Duma authority and proved the ideal Chairman for Maklakov's campaign. 
177 He 
was not above a personal contribution to the campaign when the opportunity 
presented itself. On 7 March 1914, he answered Rodzyanke's complaint that 
Duma interpellations directed at the Council Chairman remained unanswered 
with the curt statement : 
The State Duma is only permitted to approach ministers with interpell- 
-ations because they are subordinated to the law of the Senate ... but 
the Chairman of the Council of Ministers does not stand subordinate to 
the Senate. (178) 
Goremykin judged that the Council Chairman was responsible to the Tsar alone, 
and need only reply to Duma communications if the Tsar so required. The issue 
had far-reaching implications : since theº only official liaison between Tsar 
175 CHERMENSKY 225. 
176 Shidlovskyr, Vospominania, vol. Il, p. 34. 
177 CHERMENSKY 223 ; also Sir George Buchanan, MZ Mission to Russia, 2 eels, 
London 1923 (cited hereafter as BUCHANAN), vol. I, p. 1 5. 
178 Ts AR, f. 4, i, 3,68 quoted in CHE14ENSKX 223. 
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and Duma was the Council Chairman, the absolute allegiance of that official 
to just one party necessarily meant the constitutional isolation of the 
other. 
179 Goremykin's stand on this principle of exclusive allegiance was 
legally incontestable, with no avenue of constitutional redress available 
to the Duma. 
Shortly afterwards the government launched its next sortie against the 
Duna, this time over the sensitive and constitutionally critical issue of 
parliamentary privilege. On 24 March the Menshevik leader Chkheidze made 
some hasty remarks in open Duma sitting to the effect that 'Russia's problems 
can only be solved under a republic'. 
180 The reactionary nespaper Grazhdanin 
immediately ran a campaign urging the prosecution of the Extreme Left fract- 
-ions for treason. On 29 March the Council of Ministers acquiesced : it was 
decided to prosecute Chkheidze under Clause 129 of the Penal Code for 
'incitement to rebellion'. 
181 The Council deliberately delayed publishing 
its decision until the day after the close of the Winter Session in the hope 
that the Duma Easter recess would both take the steam out of the Chkheidze 
affair and provide time to rush through the early stages of the prosecution 
to presnt the Duma with a fait accompli on its return. 
182 
As on so many 
other occasions, the government employed its control of the timing of the 
Duma sessions to lend itself the political advantage. 
Perhaps the most dangerous and potentially far-reaching attack by the 
government occurred early in the Spring Session. The uncompromising attitude 
of Sass® to the fundamental educational reforms put up by the Oktobrists in 
both Third and Fourth Dumas had united the Duma majority against all legisl- 
ation advanced by that minister. 
183 To escape from his predicament Kasse 
18p The official Duma record was censored by Rodzyanko : GDS0, II, 54,199 ; 
Article 'Le Gouvernement et la Douma', Journa]. de Gen ve, 6 May 1914(n/s), 
in MVD Foreign Press rend : P0ý, 307A-191 , 
55. 
180 POLICE, 307A-1914,55 ; also Ti mes, 9 May 1914(n/s), 7c. 
182 1914 Winter Session closed 28 March, Spring Session opened 15 April : GDSO, II, 57,41o and 58,417. 
183 MILIUXOV 205-7 ; Times, 20 June'1914(n/s), 7d. 
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came up with a remarkable tactical device. In Duma sitting, the Assistamt 
Minister of Education Taube dropped a constitutional bombshell : 
By the terms of Clause 57 of the Duma Regulations, the Duma does not 
possess the right to initiate legislative projects if the government 
has already indicated that legislation on the topis will be forthcoming 
from a government department. (184) 
In other words, the government had only to announce a legislative programme 
covering all principal fields of Duma interest and the Duma was powerless to 
advance its own bills. Once the announcement was made, the opportunities for 
obstruction and filibustering were endless : the government had only to adv- 
-ance a reactionary bill, see it buried in commission and finally rejected, 
then submit the same bill with negligible adjustments to minor sub-clauses. 
185 Taube's loaded interpretation of Clause 57 gave over complete practical 
control of legislation to the government. I&Courier EuropSene agreed that, 
The statement of Baron Taube demonstrates a new and most effective mode 
of attack upon the legislative powers of the Duma. .. You must realaise, 
as Professor Milyukov has pointed out, that Taube's interpretation 
amounts to a state revolution. Stage by stage, the government is trying 
to depress the Duna to the level of a purely consultative assembly. (186) 
Over the Winter and early Spring Sessions of 1914 the Duma was subjected to 
a barrage of attacks upon its constitutional and parliamentary rights to 
which self-preservation alone dictated a spirited response. 
At the same time as the G©remykin administration invited opposition 
from the Duma moderates, the situation in the country at large forced the 
moderates in the same direction. The oppositional need of society had 
-ad steadily since the Lena Massacre and by the winter of 1913/1914 was 
giving the moderate parties clear cause for concern. 
187 There appeared to 
be two distinct and superficially contradictory trends : an overall shift to 
the Left and a decline in the moderate position. Both trends were exemplified 
184 Article 'Ministare Geremykine at Douma', Le Courier Euro eene, 25 April 
1914(n/o) in MVD Foreign Press Fend : P0ý, 307A-191 ,4 51 ; also TsGAOR f. 826(Dzhunkovsky), 281,57. 
185 PADENIE, vi, 305(Milyukov) ; ale. Riha, A Russian Euronean, p. 209. 
186 P0ý, 307A-1914,52. 
187 Report of 11 February 1914 : POUCE, xv, 27-1914,30. 
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by the First Congress of Teachers, held 26-30 December 1913. The teaching 
profession was a traditional recruiting-ground for moderate, and particularly 
the Kadet, parties but a police reporter exploded any residual hopes that 
this might still be the case by late 1913. His report advanced the following 
tentative figures for the political affiliations of the Congress delegates : 
40% of the teachers were 'non-political'(unattached to any party) 
Of the remaining 60% : 10% Rights or Nationalists 
2% Oktobrists 
12% Kadet or Progressists 
20% We 
55% SRs or Trudoviks (188) 
If this situation reflected a traditional area of moderate support, the out- 
-look for the moderate parties on a national level was very gloomy indeed. 
Other evidence pointed the same lesson. The number of provincial newspapers 
with which the Kadet Press bureau had formal contacts fell from 26 in 1911 
to 16 in 1913 ; by January 1914 the bureau president Izgoyev was reporting 
that 'it can be confirmed that there is no Kadet press in Russia at present. 
189 The mounting evidence that significant and hitherto reliable sections 
of the populace were turning away from the moderate parties demonstrated the 
need for a renewed campaign of publicity-catching activities in the Duma. 
The moderates were compelled by the failure of their relationships both 
with the government and the country to adopt a more dynamic and oppositional 
policy line. Even at the moments of their worst relations with Kokovtsov, 
they had been constrained by the knowledge that their hostility could only 
benefit the reactionaries within the government. The one consolation about 
the dismissal of Kokovteov was that the moderates need now feel no eompuncti 
about launching an attack against the governemnt designed primarily to 
enhance their own reputation. The Duna Opposition was spoiling for a fight 
even before the government declared war. In the context of early 1914, each 
combatant was glad to see its opponent showing some spirit. Goremykin and 
Maklakov blatantly festered an atagsphere of antagonism in the hope that the 
188. Report of 3 January 1914 : PO 5 är, 27-1914,5. 
189 TsGAOR, f. 523(Badet Party), i, 31: a9-30,81-3 & 90(quotation). 
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Duma could be tempted into providing grounds for dissolution or, most 
conveniently, the reduction of the Duma to a consultative. assembly. The Duma 
Opposition led by the Kadets was thankful that the new administration's 
attacking line both united the Duma fractions as never before and provided 
a public arena in which the Duma leaders could posture heroically before a 
grateful and appreciative country. Behind the ostensible struggle for the 
survival of the Duma in early 1914 there was an element of charade : both 
government and Duma were attempting by passage of arms to draw their very 
different but equally fickle backers to a closer identification with the 
champion of their choice. 
An atmosphere of antagonism towards the government emerged amongst the 
Duma moderates from the very instant of Kokovtsov's dismissal. A mere five 
days after the fall of Kokovtsov a police reporter was already noting/that 
'the mood amongst the Opposition is hostile ; there is no hope of a "change 
for the better" ... in general the mood is very heightened and in moderate 
opposition circles the same spirit holds sway as in 1904'. 
190 Simultaneously 
a campaign for greater range and unity of the Opposition was under serious 
discission : 
The basic question of intra-Duma life is. the desire common to all 
fractions except the Social Democrats for the formation of a majority 
strong enough to affect the implementation of their decisions .. * and 
stimulate the interest of provincial society in the Duma. (191) 
The leaders of the Opposition initiative were predictably the Kadets, though 
Milyukov found the Kadet rank-and-file less receptive to the strategy of 
attack upon the government than to the policy of parlaimentary coalition to 
which they had been converted in the course of 1913. A Kadet Central 
Committee meeting on 17 February 1914 saw the Kadet Left wing, now led by 
Nikolai Nekrasov, again urging more fundamental policies to ensure Kadet 
leadership of Russian society. Nekraeov proposed net only that 'the Kadet 
Party should put an end to the tactics of passive defence and cross over to 
190 Report of 4 February 1914 : POL CE, xv, 27-1914,19-20. 
191 Report of 3 February 1914 : POý, 307A-1914,18. 
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the attack' but that Kadet influence shoult be extended into the Army officer 
corps and, even more urgently, 'we must not ignore the fact that the workers 
are in the highest degree an active force ... we allow the Social Democrats 
to monopolise this sphere far too readily'. 
192 
However the Kadet Right wing was still reluctant to explore unknown 
territory, particularly in the light of the eminently successful negotiations 
with the provincial Oktobrists which were turning the Kadet fraction towards 
the Right rather than the Extreme Left. The Rig %Ad! 
zgoyev 
considered that, 
The Kadet Party would not succeed 
the worker and peasant masses .. e 
of a complete united opposition a 
defend our own authority... It is 
leadin4r le in worker and peasant 
if it attempted to link itself with 
it is essential to abandon the idea 
ad rather present our own slogans and 
useless to hope that we can play the 
circles. (193) 
The Kadet majority also voiced its apprehension about any future power 
contest between government and Duma ; even Rodichev completely changed his 
tune from the brave notes of just a year before, advising the party that 
'at the moment we should be thinking in terms of tactics of defence rather 
than attack'. 
194 The bulk of the Central Committee, awed by the prospect of 
outright collision with the government, referred the whole issue of ICadet 
tactics to the imminent Party conference. 
The Kadet conference of 23-25 March was by far the most important event 
among the Kadets in the months preceding the outbreak of war. The first 
issue debated by the conference was Nekrasov's proposal to attempt to extend 
Badet influence to the workers. Milyukov glossed the issue by concluding 
that the unreliability of worker support precluded a Badet campaign of 
recruitment but that 'threre can be no doubt that in the current broad-based 
192 TsGAOR, f. 6/c, delo 31,104-5 quoted in CHERMENSKY 230 ; TaGAOR, f. 523(Badet 
Party , i, 31,1Ö cited in I. S. Rozental', 'Ruaeky liberalizm nakanune 
pervoy mirovoy voiny i tak ika Bol'shevikov', Istoria SSSR, 1971: 6, pp. 
58-9" The identical delo and pagination in the two archive references 
bear witness to the radical reorganisation of TaGAOR between the 
completion of the two secondary works (1947 and 971 respectively). 
193 Quoted in CKEMMSXY 231-2 and Rozental', p. 60 ; see also opinion-of 
Vasilii Mak]. akov in Rua e Vedomeety, 23 February 1914,3- 
194 T$GA0R, f. 6/c4- delo 31,107 quoted in CHERMENSBY 232 ; confirmed by 
Rozental', 'Rusakg liberalizm', pp. 59-60. 
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political movement amongst the mass of the workers, the existence of the 
State Duma plays a most powerful role'. 
195 The embarrassing subject of the 
Kadet organisation in the country surfaced briefly. The Central Committee 
blandly reported that 'the last election campaign showed that the repuatation 
of the party in the eyes of society opinion stands high and the election 
organisation of the party enjoyed great authority and influence'. 
196 The j, 
decline in provincial IKadet branches was glibly blamed on the familiar 
scapegoat, the MVD, and even here the official Kadet account took pains to 
assure the members that 'this does not mean that the party is ceasing to 
function in the provinces'. 
197 With long-neglected fundamental issues again 
shelved, the conference debated the more congenial topic of Kadet tactics 
vie-ä-vis the government of Goremykin and Maklikov. 
Party conferences in the period 1912-17 were invariably further Left 
than the Duma fractions which claimed to represent their views. The 
fundamental division between the Oktobrist Union and Fraction at the November 
1913 Congress had precipitated the ruin of the Fraction and left the Union 
without unified representation at Duma level. The Kadet fraction was 
fundamentally little happier in its relations with Kadets outside the Duma. 
The conference of March 1914 urged upon the 'defensive' fraction majority 
the need for open conflict with the government to unite both Duma opposition 
and the country behind the Badet. The conclusions from the debate on 
general Duma tactics included the following : 
Point 3. The implementation of the task demands the organisation of all 
opposition forces in the country and State Doma for political 
struggle. 
Point 4. The aim of the united efforts of the Opposition to be the 
isolation of the government. 
Point 5. The Fraction of People's Freedom to organise more frequent 
attacks from the floor of the Duma, more questions to ministers 
".. and advance legislative projects possessing the closest 
practical interest for the democratic strata of the 
p&I. ation. (198) 
195 Tß, 1913-4,10 ; for fuU covrage of Nekrasov"s proposals, aee 
Russakie Vedo , 27 March 191492-3. 
196 TAKTIKI, 1913-4,12 ; Rnakä e Ved omoaty, 27 March 1914,3. 
197 Ibid, 12. 
198 Ibid, 11. 
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The Conference resolution, destined to become the slogan of the Opposition 
over the next few months, was couched thus : 
As in 1905, change can only be achieved by the unified effort of all 
progressive forces of Russian society ... AS OUR IMMEDIATE TASK FOR ALL LEVELS OF SOCIETY, WE PROPOSE THE POLITICAL ISOLATION OF THE 
GOVER] RENT. (199) 
With the Duma Winter Session closing only three days later on 28 March, the 
Kadet fraction had no opportunity to implement the Conference resolutions 
immediately but prepared the onslaught mandated by the Conference for the 
Spring Session just three weeks away. 
The Progressist fraction for the first time played a major part in Duma 
affairs by its independent contribution to the raising of the political 
atmosphere of the 1914 Winter Session. The initial meeting of all Left and 
moderate fractions to consider the possibility of a unified front against the 
government on 27 January was sponsored by the Duma Progressists, with 
Aleksandr Konovalov in particular attempting to forge a united Opposition. 
But although the meeting came out in favour of the co-ordination of Oppositio 
activities and the creation of an inter-fraction bureau as the executive of 
the unified Opposition, the urge towards alliance could not override the 
jealousies of the constituent fractions : 'the participants at the meeting 
were sympathetic towards the idea of forming such a bureau but no definite 
commitment was undertaken'. 
200 
Despite the luke-warm success of this venture 
the Progressists were in no way downcast. By late February they were 
experiencing an upsurge of self-confidence, for the twenty-strong Left 
OktobrifliuRad attached itself to them-rather than to the Kadets. 201 Stung 
by the attacks of the Goremykin administration and flushed with new-found 
self-assurance, the Progressist fraction started to opt for open warfare. 
At first Progressist initiative was overdependent upon Badet support. 
O*. '! March 1914 the govern sat arranged a secret meeting between War Minister 
199 TXTISI, 1913-4,. 10 (capitals in the original). 
200 KLYUZREV, xiii, 106 ; Reime k', 4 Fabruary 1914 ; ala" LAVERYCHEV 101-2. 
201 KLIUZHEV, ziii 129. 
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Sukhomlinov and all fraction leaders (except the Extreme Left) to draw the 
Duma into close rapport with government policy over War Credits. 
202 
Sukhomlinov was clearly incompetent but the government stratagem of suberdin- 
-ating the Duma to its wishes by making it privy to state secrets proved to 
be effective. 
203 The strictures of Chkheidze were largely deserved : 
We are told that we were not invited because we are against militarism 
on principle. This is true, but there is another even better reason. 
We are nob disposed to play the part of government lackeys. (204) 
Milyukov'e lieutenant Andrei Shingarev and the Pregreeeist leader Ivan 
Yefremov tentatively suggested making the passing of the Credits contingent 
upon government concessions in legislation but were howled down by a majority 
dizzy with self-induced patriotism. When Milyukey offered no support for his 
hard line, Yefremov readily acceded to the majority viewpoint, 
205 
Like the Kadete, the Progressists too-entered the year 1914 with plans 
both to adopt a stronger line towards the government and to expand their 
support in society ; but unlike the Kadete it was decided to make serious 
efforts to create support amongst the Extreme Left. The decision was taken 
at a meeting in late February at abushineiq' ý$ a and initiated by Kanovalov 
early in March. 
206 
An 'Information Committee' to sponsor the growth of the 
Opposition outside the uma was established on 4 March - the exact equivalent 
to the Progresaist-inspired 'Inter-Fraction Bureau' within the Duna proposed 
at the meeting of 27 January. 
207 Though it is likely that the fraction 
leader Yefremov held. no high hopes for the 'Information Committee', the 
Moscow industrialist trio of Kenovalov, Rgabushinsky and Morozov lent the 
scheme their total support, even to the extent of entering into financial 
transactions with the Bolshevik Skvortsov-8tepanov. By late March a trial 
202 KLYIIZEEV, xiii, 142 ; KERENSK? 117 & 125-6 ; Timmes, 16 March 1914(n/* )98a, 
203 SE t8KY, 125-6 ; PAD Ervi, 359-36O(Mi1yvkov) and viit30(Shingarev) ;., 
204 L'Humanit6,13 April 1914(n/s) quoted in POOLLICE, 307A-1914,46. 
205 KLYUZHEV, xiii, 142 ; Report of 3J ebruary 1914 :P LPL E, 307A-1914,18 ; Lenin., Collec ted Works vel. 20, pp " 155-7. 
206 LAVERTCHEV 104 ; Rozental', 'Rusaky Liberalizm', p. 57. 
207 TsGAOR, f . 63,1913,47, k$, 62-4 cited in Honking, Goyeerrnmeent and Dun, Pp" N2-3o' 
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alliance had been agreed between Progressists and Mensheviks at both local 
and Duma levels, contributing to the still-growing se'-confidence of the 
Progressist fraction. 208 
A meeting on 8 April (during the Easter recess) found the Progressists 
adding independent action to initiative : the fraction advocated the employ- 
-ment of Budget control as a weapon against the governant 'not stopping 
short even at the cost of Duma dissolution'. 
209 The Peterburgeky Kurier 
noted the aggressive spirit of the Progressiste and published an interview 
with the fraction secretary Titov in which he stated that 'the province of 
politics is growing and expanding to include the passage of credits ; 
budgetary struggle is both necessary and unavoidable'. 
210 On the eve of the 
Duna Spring Session, the Kadets began to realise that the crash of the 
Oktobrist fraction had not eliminated their only rival for Duma leadership. 
A new power for the moderates was emerging to challenge Kadet hegemony of the; ' 
Opposition. The moderate fractions were new under pressure to shift to the 
Left by reason of government attack, society discontent and party politics. 
But precisely at this moment the government campaign was abruptly 
terminated. The virtually unanswerable government assaults on Duma rights ands 
privileges over the Winter Session were cleverly contrived but badly timed. 
The start of the Spring Session on 15 April, with the vital State Budget and 
War Credits awaiting examination, found the Duma united as never before and 
determined to attack. The danger to the government lay in the fact that not 
only was the 'prefessional opposition' Ito use Guchkov's phrase) in combative; l 
seed but the allegiance of the Right wing was seriously in doubt. As a result. $ 
stet only was the government campaign of harassment called off but attempts 
ade to seethe the fears of the Duma moderates whose votes were now crucial.. 
t#eregkin conceded a measure of contact with the Duna President and the Dana 
was given to understand that parliamentary privilege would be respected and 
208 LAV RYCHEY 105-6 ; Rezentael'OkIW sky liberalizm', PP"57-8 & 60-3. 
209 c SKY 239. 
210 Peterburßsks S uurrier, 13 April 1914 ; also KLYUZHEV, xiv, 8. 
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the 'Taube interpretation' of legislation shelved. 
211 The most obvious 
rationale for the Duma attack on the government was removed at a stroke. 
However the government quitting of the field had little effect upon the 
campaign of the Duma moderates. In part the explanation lies with the inflam- 
ed passions of the Duma majority : the deputies refused to abandon a contest 
for which the government was in large part responsible at the convenience of 
the government. The period of the Budget debate was the only point in the 
parliamentary calendar when the Duma had the political advantage and for the 
first time it appeared as if the Duma was incensed enough to refuse the 
government Budget. If the first of the reasons for the Duma campaign was now 
largely effaced, the remaining two were more potent than ever. The country 
showed every sign of supporting a Duma offensive, the provincial memberships 
of the Kadet and Oktobrist parties were encouraged by the campaign and the 
rapidly developing strike movement among the industrial proletariat was 
starting to revive memories of 1905. Perhaps even more significantly, the 
Kadet and Progressist fractions found themselves matched in a contest for 
the leadership of the Duma moderates, the Duma Opposition and, in its present 
outraged mood, of the Fourth Duma itself. 
The Progressists seized the initiative by organising the Doma defence 
of parliamentary privilege. At the second sitting of the Spring Session, 
Progressist agitation (supported by the entire Left and moderate camps) 
induced the Duma commission for Judicial Reform to appoint a special sub- 
committee to formulate a bill to guarantee parliamentary privilege ; as a 
gesture of goodwill towards the government, it was agreed to establish a 
Duma disciplinary court to punish the abuse of parliamentary free speech. 
212 
Agitated by its new rival's ploy, the Kadets attempted to cap the Progreesiet 
campaign by advocating blac$mail of the government to preserve Duma rights. 
A Kadet motion submitted to the Duna on 21 April stated : 
211 KLYIIZBEV, uiii, 144 ; also CH+TBKY 239- 
212 Time 892 1 14(n e) 9c B. McKean Ruseja an the eve of the Great 
war, pp. 14&-9 
123. 
We, the undersigned, demand that the State Duma desist from its 
examination of the bill concerning the state budget for 1914 until the 
legislative bill on the establishment of free speech for deputies, 
currently under consideration by the Judicial commission, is effected-213 
Though the KadetAana a slightly milder Progressist alternative were both 
rejected (by 164 to 80 and 157 to 99 respecjrively), the rival motions of 21 
April 1914 represented the high point of moderate opposition in the pre-war 
period and a first peak in the running battle between the Kadets and 
Progressists for Opposition leadership* 214 
However the Kadet tactic was itself capped by the actions of the Extreme 
Left. The Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and Trudovika decided to refuse the Budget 
until their demands were met, submitted the most radical motion of all 
(which was defeated by 140 votes to 76) and in a gesture of protest against 
the government brought the Duma proceedings of 22 April to a complete 
standstill. 
215 The moderates were net prepared to go so far, especially as 
the presence of Goremykin in the Duma that day raised some hopes of an 
improvement in relations. While the Kadets and Progressists judiciously 
abstained, the Oktobrists voted enthusiastically for the expulsion of the 
Extreme Left. Twenty-one of the twenty-four Extreme Left deputies were 
formally excluded from the next fifteen Duna sittings. 
216 
The moderates 
actively or tacitly accepted the necessity for a temporary purging of the 
Duma membership in the interests of retaining some measure of contact with 
the government. The moderate fractions were prepared to compete up to a 
certain point for party reasons but had no intention of forever destroying 
hopes of a revived rapport with the government. 
While the Duma moderates took care to disassociate themselves from the 
obstruction tactics of the Extreme heft, the response from the industrial 
proletariat was prompt and unequivocal : 80,000 Petersburg workers and 
25,000 Moscow workers came out on strike in sympathy with the suspended 
213 GDSO, II, 61,? k9" 
214 IIbid, 750-1. 
al 
215 GD9O, II, 62,785 .; also T . aee, 6 May 1914(8%), 7a. 
216 I. id, %8yä06 ; als© Piitrew, Paul Ni3jru oy, p0281. 
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Duna deputies. 217 The moderates were not a little alarmed that the Extreme 
Left coul& summon up such instant support and at the Kadet Central Committee 
meeting of 23 April Izgoyev frantically indicated the developing social 
forces outside the walls of the Duma : 
There is too little flexibility in Badet tactics ... For the party to 
concentrate solely on the Duma and completely ignore the country is 
dangerous. The country wants to do something but this Duma has given 
them nothing and consequently they are not interested in it. (218) 
The moderates came under considerable fire from their provincial memberships 
for their failure to support the suspended deputies. In a later debate 
Vasilii Maklakov rather plaintivelf related how he had been taken to task by 
his constituents and 'I, a Moscow deputy, had to make a trip to Moscow to 
give an explanation to my electorate why I had not voted against the exclus- 
-ion of the Bolsheviks'. 
219 
Just as the pressure on the aoderates from the 
government was removed, pressure from the country was increased. 
The Kadet response was to step up its campaign of opposition to the 
government, albeit never prejudicing residual hopes of an improved relation- 
-ship in the future. In practice, this took the form of concentrating fire 
upon pre-selected government targets, warning the government of the folly of 
its policies but avoiding giving offence to the liberal sector of the Council } 
of Ministers. On 28 April Milyukov attacked Rasputin by name in the debate 
on the budget of the Holy Synod, concluding that 'the fate of Russia ... is 
in the hands of this hermit ; first free the state from the captivity of 
upstarts, the hierarchy from the captivity of the state and the church from 
the captivity of the hierarchy, and only then speak of refor' 
220 on 2 ms. 
May Milyukov launched a personalattack uphn Nikolai Maklkakov for plotting } 
against the constitution, 'demonstrating that a whole series of his state- 
-meats coincided with the Bulygin Duma Act of August 6,1905, that is, with 
217 R'eAOR, f . 6/c , 18,3 cited in C NSKY 285-8. 
218 Quoted in CHERKENSK1 290 also TaGAOR, f. 523(Kadet Party), i, 31,172 
cited in Rozental', 'Rusaky liberalizä', p. 66. 
219 GDSO, ii, 81,501+(12 xv, 1: 414) ,:; TsGAOR, f. 63,1914, L, k9,66-7 cited in Rozental', ' Russkjr liberalila' , p. 66. 
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the decree on the legal-consultative Duma which preceded the October 
Manifesto,. 221 Kadet and Progressist deputies followed one another to the 
Duma tribune less to sever all contacts with the government than to jolt it 
into full realisation of the dangers into which it was leading both the Duma 
and itself. 
222 Milyukov argued that Maklakov's policy at the MVD was 
actually creating revolution : 'the government attacks revolution, not 
knowing that the reason for revolution is really its own polities'. 
223 The 
Progressist Mansyrev envisaged the government bringing down the Duma in its 
own fall : 'I do not see the means of fighting the present direction of 
police activity ... we are all trying by every means to prevent the pronunc- 
iation of the crucial word but that word must be uttered ; not here but 
there - on the streets'. 
224 Perhaps most significantly, the menace of 
revolution dominated the thinking of Vasilii Maklakov, most Right-wing of 
the Kadets : 
The country understands the impotence of our speeches and the hopeless- 
-ness of the "path of loyalty". The country instinctively falls into 
error and adopts the slogan "Abandon the path of loyalty, let force 
decide"... If the movement passes us, overtakes the Duma, not employing 
either us or legal means .., it is the beginning of the end ... There 
is only one way of averting a revolution - make it yourself ! To revive 
faith in the Duma as the symbol of peaceful development in Russia, the 
Duma must turn to opposition and even to extreme opposition. (225) 
Fear of revolution, the most extreme symptom of the breakdown of their 
relationship with the country, emerged in moderate ranks for the first time 
since 1905 in the Duma Spring Session of 1914. 
Progresaist activity over this period experienced a definite decline. 
The last Progressist success was seeing their motion to establish immunity 
for deputies from prosecution for speeches in the Duma adopted by an over- 
-whelming majority on 25 April. 
226 But having provoked the Kadets into 
221 GDSO, II, 72,1662-1678 ; quotation from MILIUKOV 287. 
222 See Mu$bin-Puehkin'e evaluation, 19 April 1914 : SA, vol. 61, p. 134. 
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strong action by their early initiative, the Progressists failed to maintain 
the challenge. The Progressist fraction could not summon up the necessary 
self-esteem to regard itself as a serious rival of the Kadets ; the Progress- 
-ist mentality was still that of the lieutenant and lagged behind the 
political röle of which the fraction was capable. Added to this problem of 
confidence was the ambiguous attitude of industry at the time. The VIII 
Congress of the Delegates of Industry and Commerce in early May 1914 advocat-! 
-ed two almost mutually-exclusive lines of policy. 
227 
The developing strike 
movement constrained the alarmed industrialists to demand sterner measures 
by the MVD to suppress the labour movement. At the same time the reactionary 
policies of the government were having adverse effects upon foreign invest- 
-ment and the Congress demanded the assumption of a more moderate line. 
228 
Implicit though unstated was the principle that the Duna could only influence; 
the government by preserving some sort of relationship with it, therefore 
policies of illegality and obstruction were undesirable. Though the Congress 
resolutions were little more than crude expressions of industrial self- 
interest, their contradictory nature flustered the Progressist fraction and 
contributed to its already ebbing self-confidence. Lastly, the Duma 
expulsions of 22 April effectively dissolved the Progressist alliaace with 
the Extreme Left by emphasising the difference in tactics between the Duna 
Left and the Duma moderates. The Progressist bloc with the Left failed its 
first test within the Duma, the repercussions of which were felt inside and 
outside the Tauride Palace. Outside the Duma, the Progressists were dicredit-. 
-ed and were forced to close down their 'Information Committee' ; inside the 
Duma, the collapse of their tentative parliamentary bloc capped the other 
factors in draining the Progressists of their political self-assurance. 
229 
Opposition initiative passed back from the Progressists to the Kadets. 
227 Times, 18 May 1914(n/a), 7c ; also CHEA4ENSKY 236. 
228 CHERMENSKY 238 ; Ruth A. Roosa, 'Russian Industrialists and "State 
Socialism" 1906-17', So viet Studies, vol. 23,3(January 1972), p. 413. 
229 LAVERYCHEV 106-7 ; R©zeatal', 'Russky liberalizm', pp. 61-4. 
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The Budget examination provided the great opportunity for the Duma 
moderates and Left to deliver a massive rebuke to the government by rejecting 
'! 
the estiAmates of those ministers whom they wished removed. In such a 
situation, the allegiance of the Duma axis - the Oktobrists - proved crucial 
to the government and Opposition alike. Since the cataclysm of the previous 
December, the Oktobrists had constituted an unreliable political quantity. 
The Zemstvo-Oktobrists grew from the original twenty-three to about sixty in E1 
the first days of the Winter Session, and conducted their first formal 
meeting on 18 January 1914.230 The next day the Oktohriat Union held a 
jubilee to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the 
zemstvo. A four hundred-strong gathering of Oktobrists unanimously elected 
e 
Guchkov as chairman of the festivities, who immediately took the carfully- 
prearranged opportunity to deliver a challenge to the government. Guchkov 
used the jubilee for in effect reconvening the Oktobrist Congress, his 
r 
principal aim being to convert the new Zemstvo-Oktobrist fraction to opposit- 
ion. Guchkov first flattered his predominantly landed audience : 'it scan 
be openly asserted that the October Manifesto and our national representative 
institution are the result not of strikes but the zemstvo movement -a 
victory for the zemstvo'. He concluded on a note of 'sweat and tears' : 'Our 
paths now lead us to violent struggle, inevitable sacrifice and suffering ; 
but they lead us at the same time to conquest and to victory'. 
231 
The support for Guchkov's oppositional views outside the Oktobrist 
fractions seemed as tumultuous as ever but the Zemstvo-Oktobrists were not 
won over to opposition. An intrigue to oust Rodzyanko (the Zemstvo-Oktobristl{ 
leader) from the Duma presidency and replace him with the Left Oktobrist 
Khomyakov foundered over Milyukov's reluctance to make an enemy of the 
Zemstvo-Oktobrist fraction. 232 At the Progressist-organised meeting of 27 
January, the Left Oktobrist group participated but the all-impo*tant Zemstvo- 
230 SL YUZEEV, aiii, 137 & 99. 
231 TsGAOR, f. 555(Guchkov), I, 509,1-3 (both quotations p. 2). 
232 Report of $0 January 1914 : PO I_ICE, xv, 27_1914,13-16. 
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Oktobrists held aloof. 
233 The Zemstvo-Oktobrist Varun-Sekret was quoted in 
interview as stating quite categorically that 'the Zemstvo-Oktobrists will 
never enter into any long-term agreement with the Opposition'. 
234 
But although the majority of the Zemstvo-Oktobrists was probably still 
opposed in principle to agreement with the 'Professional Opposition', fracti- 
-on unity was the most potent factor demanding an independent line of policy. 
Xlyuzhev, himself a Left Oktobrist%, remarked that 'the physiognomy of the 
"new group" of Zemstvo-Oktobrista is evident with startling clarity - it has 
no physiognomy , 
235 The Zemstvo-Oktobrists were very much 'those who were 
left', a conservative group huddling together for company, without the 
principles or initiative of either Left or Right Oktobrists. The real 
tragedy of the Zemstvo-Oktobrists was that the disintegration of December 
1913 had solved none of their problems : the Zemstvo-Oktobrist fraction was 
just like the pre-Congress Oktobrist fraction with smaller dimensions. In 
place of a ninety-nine strong Oktobrist fraction subject to split, there 
appeared in early 1914 a sixty-strong Zemstvo-Oktobrist fraction equally 
likely to disintegrate. 236 A police report for 3 February 1914 remarked 
upon precisely this feature : 
The composition of the present Zeno 
quantitively and not qualitatively. 
Left flank was Khomyakov and on the 
fraction, on the Left flank we have 
Bennigsen. (237) 
tvo-Oktobrist group has changed only 
In the previous fraction, on the 
Right, Shubineky. In the present 
Alekseyenko, and on the Right, 
Acutely aware of the predicament, the Zemstvo-Oktobrists studiously avoided 
moves either to Left or to Right in the interests of fraction unity, thus 
staving off further split but at the risk of becoming a political and 
parliamentary non-entity. 
Only non-party issues could tempt the Zemstvo-Oktobrists from their 
233Report of 3 February 1914 : POLICE, 307A-1914,18-19. 
234 Russkie Vedomoet9,29 January 1914. 
235 KLYUZ v, xiii, 137. 
236 Ibid, 139. 
237 ß, 307A-1914,19. 
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chosen isolation. The Budget of the hated Kasso was such an issue, and as 
early as February 1914 the Zemstvo-Oktobrists 'booked' a voting agreement 
with the Left Oktobrists (and implicitly with all the Duma Oppositio$) to 
oppose the Education Budget. 
238 Other issues on which the Zemstvo-Oktobrists, ' 
agreed to vott with the Opposition were the defence of parlaimentary privilege 
and the denial of the 'Taube interpretation' of legislation. 
239 Realising 111 
the danger of allowing the Zemstvo-Oktobrists to ally (however briefly) with 
the Opposition, the government set out to woo the Zemstvo-Oktobrists away 
from the Left. Its earliest move was to invite Alekseyenko, President of the 
Duma Budget commission and a leader of the Zemstvo-Oktobrists, onto the 
newly-constituted Committee of Finances. Alekseyenko attracted considerable 
criticism for allowing his membership to go through but argued that, as the 
sole Duma representative on the Committee, his increased authority and the 
information to which he would gain access had decided him to accept the 
government invitation. 
240 
With the opening of the Spring Session, the attitude of the Zematvo- 
Okjcpbrists became crucial. The government knew it could rely on the allegia- 
nce of the Right and Nationalist fractions, both too involved in internal 
disciplinary problems to pursue independent lines via-&-via the government 
241 
Together with the apparently docile Centre fraction, the government could 
drum up 185 votes to support its Budget and War Credits ; to guarantee 
success, it needed 219 votes (the total membership of the Duna at this time 
being 437 deputies). 
242 The government therefore required a further thirty- 
four votes, which could only be made available by the sixty-strong Zemstvo- 
Oktobrist fraction. 
238 Report of 10 February 1914 : POLICE, 307A-1914,20-1. 
239 KLYUZHEV, xiv, 34. 
240 POLICE, 307A-1914,35 & 23. 
241 Report on Nationalist and Right fractions : POLICE, 307a-1914,19 ; also 
report of 14 January 1914 : POLICE, xv, 27-191k,, 11. 
242 64 Rights, 88 Nationalists and 33 Centre : GDSO: UKAZATEL' 19-21 ; for 
the attitude of the Centre fraction, see KLYUZHEV, xiv, 25. 
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Having succeeded in committing the Left Oktobrists to membership of the 
Opposition since mid February, the Duma Left now tried hard to draw the 
Zemstvo-Oktobrists the same way. 
243 As President of the Oktobrist Union, 
Guchkov again tried to make the Zemstvo-Oktobrists obey the mandate of the 
November Congress by an interview in Peterburgsky Kurier : 
At the moment political conditions augur well for the concentration of 
progressive elements. The progressive elements of the country must 
exploit the opportunity otherwise - and I fear to say this - the chance 
for a peaceful solution to the present crisis will be completely lost... ) 
I consider that the constitutional parties must move over to decisive 
action : the refusal of Credits. (244) 
The appeals of the Opposition and their own party leader proved insufficient 
to overcome the conservatism and subservience of the Zemstvo-Oktobrists in 
the voting over the first major Budget item, the estimates of the MVD. At 
the final vote, the Zemstvo-Oktobrists supported the government and secured 
the passage of the MVD Budget by the slimmest possible margin : 186 votes to 
185.245 
The slenderness of government victory betrayed the uncertainty of the 
Right moderate fractions in their allegiance to the government. The Zemetvo- 
Oktobrists had only supported the government after long debate. The Centre 
fraction was equally unsure and Vladimir Lvov expressed his views of the 
MVD in strong language 
The Centre group believes that we are standing at a terrible crossroad. 
The Minister of Interior knows in advance that the road which he has 
chosen is that of non-consideration of the rights of the national 
representation. This road is dangerous, for the rvem- *411 not be 
guided by the forces of society, even the moderate elements, and 
consequently has no hope of support. (246) 
The MVD Budget had not been passed without being pointedly cut by the Duna, 
and accompanied bjý a formula condemning Nikolai Mak1hkov for 'creating 
dissatisfaction and the deepest discontent in wide and otherwise peaceful 
243 KLYUZHEV, xiii, 129. 
244 Peterburgeks Kurier, 12 April 1914. 
245 KLYÜZHEV, xiv, 23-5. 
246 Ibid, 25. 
1i. 
sectors of the population'. 
247 Encouraged by Zemstvo-Oktobrist va illation, 
Guchkov again appealed for Oktobrist commitment to opposition : 
We are now entering a period of parliamentary struggle by means of the 
Budget ... When the Commons - the Lower House in England - entered upon the path of budgetary struggle, they knew not into what extremes such a 
course would lead. They thought only of their duty. (248) 
The chances of persuading the Zemstvo-Oktobrists to join the Opposition 
seemed greatly improved after the MVD Budget vote. 
Excitement in the Duma grew intense with the very real possibility of a 
government defeat. A three-cornered verbal brawl between Milyukov, ICerensky 
and Purishkevich led to their expulsion from the Duma for one sitting on 
13 May. 
249 On 16 May commenced the debate in which the Zemstvo-Oktobrists 
were not only ready to vote with the Opposition but eager to lead the attack 
: the budget of the Ministry of Education. 
25° 
Their vote was decisive. In 
the absence of Kasen, the Duaa formally rejected the Education Budget, 
attaching the following Oktobrist formula of explanation : 
The Minister ... has not only failed to make any attempt immediately to 
implement vital reforms passed long ago by this assembly, he has even 
put obstacles in the path of the implementation of any reforms which 
have been advanced by the initiative of the Duma. (251) 
The significance of the action was immense. Although the rejection meant in 
practical terms only the repetition of the Education Budget passed the 
previous year and was therefore in no sense financially catastrophic, the 
moral blow administered by the Duna was prodigious. In the opinion of Hans 
Rogger, the government suffered a profound shock : 'the Opposition had 
succeeded for the first time in the history of the Duna in rejecting a 
specific portion of the Government Budget for the purpose of political 
protest'. 
252 
247 GDSO, II, 73,1710 (4 May 1914). 
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It is doubtful whether the Duma moderates seriously considered pressing 
their attack. The prime targets for Opposition abuse, the MVD, Justice and 
Education Ministries, had all been chastened by the Budget examination and 
neither Kadets, Progressists nor Oktobrists wished t+abotage relations 
between Duma and government permanently. In any case, the future close 
alliance of the moderates presupposed a degree of government flagrancy which 
the Goremykin administration was now careful to avoid. Even before the 
conclusion of the Budget examination on 10 June, the Opposition campaign was 
effectively over. Weeks before the end of the Spring Session, the exception- 
-ally warm and oppressive weather brought forward the traditional flight 
from the capitals into the countryside 0253 On 3 June, eleven days before 
the session formally closed, Klyuzhev remarked that, 
The deputies are disappearing. The scent of the countryside is pervading 
the Tauride Palace and nothing can prevent mass exodus ... With each 
day, the'Duma benches become more depleted. Some 128 deputies are 
already absent from the Duma. (254) 
ý:., 
The political effect of the 'flight to the country' was not only to reduce 
the atmosphere of the Duma but to weaken the Opposition. The Opposition 
needed all its manpower to mount any effectve challenge to Right dominance 
of the Duma, but absenteeism was notoriously more prvalent amongst the 
moderate deputies than amongst either Extreme Right or Left. 
255 The absent- 
-eeism experienced by the moderate fractions towards the end of the Spring 
session largely accounted for the easy passage of the War Credits through 
the Duma on 10 June. Though the leaders of the Kadet and Progressist fracti- 
-ons voted against the War Credits (supported by Guchkov from outside the 
Duma), their numerical strength was already lost. 
256 
The Tsar was reported as having expressed his gratitude ter the Duma for 
passing the War Credits but their passage owed as much to absenteeism amongst 
the moderates as to patriotism amongst the Right. The Badet and Progressist 
253 t riet Buchatran, PetroArAä. thCity of Trouble 1914 _1918, London 141! 
pp. 12-14. 
25 gzTUZHEV, xiv, 35 " 
253 Be* 'Absenteeism in the Dumm'; Utre Rem i, 27 November 1913,2. 
256 GDSO, TI, 1o6,883-8(10 dune "914) ; also CHE IENSKY 454. 
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leaders found one small consolation in the passing of the 'Godnev Amendment', 
a proposal submitted by the Left Oktobrist Godnev that unused sums of meney 
voted for specific purposes must be returned and not spekt at will. Sadly 
and inevitably, even this modest attempt to increase Duma budgetary powers 
was convincingly defeated in the State Council. 
257 Partly by choice and 
partly by necessity, the Opposition offensive petered out well before the 
close of the Spring Session. Despite actions which went further towards open 
hostility towards the government than ever before, the moderate leaderships 
faced the summer recess only too aware of the unsatisfactory and inconclusive 
nature of the confrontation. 
Once the Budget examination was complete (10 June) and the Duma session 
prorogued (14 dune), the government had no need to foster the friendship of 
even the Duma Rights. The Duma would not reconvene until October and present- 
ed no real threat until the next Budget in April 1915. Maklakov, new freed 
from dependence upon any section of the Duma and smarting at his treatment 
at the hands of the Opposition, returned to the attack, attempting a 
constitutional coup d_ fitat while the Duma was dispersed and powerless to 
defend itself. Encouraged by a conversation with the Emperor the previous 
day, Maklkkov submitted a proposal to the Council of Ministers on 18 June 
for reducing the Duma from a legislative to a consultative assembly. As 
Milyukov had contested in his Duma speech of 2 May, Maklakov now advanced 
the case for abandoning the October Manifesto and reverting to the Aukust 
258 
1905 Bulygin Duna. Perhaps rather surprisingly, the whole Council of 
Ministers united against the proposition ; Maklakov again found himself 
isolated and defeated within the Council. 
259 The Emperor readily agreed to 
drop the question for the time being, magnanimously declining the offer of 
resignation submitted by the bewildered and humiliated Makiakov, who for the 
2; 57 Article 'Le Conflit Budge'taire entre la Douma et is Conseil de L'Empire' 
in L'Humanite, 13 July 1914(n/e), in MVD Foreign Press Fond : POLICE, 307A-1 914,94 ; also PADENIE, vi, 306( sl ev) and McEean Russia on the 
eve of the Great Wa,, r, pp"166-8. 
258 GDSO, II, 72,1662-1678 ; MILIUKOV 287 ; PADENIE, vi, 306-7 & 358(Milr3kov). 
259 PADENIE, vi, 306-7 & 358(Milyukov) and ii, 435-7(Shcheglovitov). ' 
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second time had been manipulated into releasing and accepting the responsib- 
-ility for the Emperor's ballons d'essai. 
260 
The decision of the Council of Ministers, whilst essentially the same 
as that reached in October 1913, was probably fortified by two considerations 
not pertaining the previous year. The internal situation of Russia in mid 
1914 was troubled by a strike movement almost unparalleled in its history : 
over the first six months of 1914, some 1,449,000 strikers invaded the 
streets, more than the total striking fores for 1913 (itself a bad year for 
industrial unrest). 
261 In St Petersburg, the firing by the police upon a 
crowd of 12,000 Putilov strikers on 3 July converted an industrial episode 
into a social crisis. By its instinctive reliance upon police repression., 
the MVD provoked the industrial proletariat of both capitals into open 
rebellion* 
262 Soviet statistics estimate that the striking force in St 
Petersburg escalated from 7,000 on 1 July, through 90,000 on 4 July to an 
unprecedented 200,000 on 11 July. 
263 Pourtales, German Ambassador to St 
Petersburg, was rumoured to have despatched a coded cable to Berlin to the 
effect that Russia was in the throes of internal revolution and quite unable 
to conduct a war. 
264 The international climate also militated against the 
reduction or removal of the Duma. Three days before the Council of Ministers 
considered Maklakov's scheme, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated 
in Sarajevo. 
265 The fever of war was universal in Europe and the likelihood 
of Russian involvement was considered high. With such an internal and 
external situation, the government could not afford to alienate the Duma. 
The government proved unprepared deliberately to provoke public opinion and 
risk a repetition of 1905 at a time when the national legislative assembly 
260 PADENIE, ii, 437-8(Shcheglovitov) an4ii, 133(x. Maklakov). 
261 Istoria BPSS, Moscow 1965, vol. I, p. 142. 
262 A Short History of the USSR, MoscoW 1965, vol. I, p. 297. 
263 Istoria KPSS, vol. I, p. 157. 
264 KERENSKY 127-8 ; Felix ! UBUpcv, &gputin, London 1931+, p. 77. 
265 SERENSKY 119 ; PARES 180 ; Hoshing, Government and Duma, p. 295. 
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could be uniquely valuable in rallying the country against both foreign and 
domestic dangers. 
Early 1914 had seen a rapid escalation in the crisis of relations 
between government and Duma. Alarmed by their fading influence in a country 
which was shifting rapidly towards open opposition, antagonised by a 
succession of attacks by the Goremykin Administration and impelled by a 
growing competition for Duma leadership, the moderate fractions in the Duma 
adopted more radical means of struggle than ever before. Responding to a 
tentative Progressist challenge, the Kadets assumed the leadership of an 
Opposition which temporarily extended further towards the Right position 
than ever before to include the shattered but still powerful Oktobrists. 
The parliamentary contest having been cut short by the Duma summer recess, 
political initiative passed back to the government, finding its most 
reactionary manifestation in the intrigues of Maklakov. However the 
constitutional position of the State Duma was 'frozen', partly by the 
indulgence of the majority of ministers, partly by the exceptional internal 
and external stresses of Russia in July 1914. 
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CHAPTER FOUR : THE FIRST YEAR OF WAR 
1. 'The Sacred Union'(Julg 1914-Januars 1915) 
On the evening of 19 July 1914 Germany formally declared war on Russia. 
1 
Great play was made at the time of the emotional reception accorded by 
Russian society to the outbreak of war. 
2 With the passage of time more 
critical judgements have made themselves heard, as for example the opinion 
of Vladimir Gurko : 
It cannot be said that the war was popular with the peasants. They 
experienced no patriotic exultation. The war aroused among them a 
muffled, submissive, sullen discontent ... 
[but] Although the war excit- 
ed neither patriotjim nor indignation among the peasant and factory 
workers, it deeply stirred the patriotic sentiments of the educated 
classes. (3) 
Hans Rogger claims to detect a large measure of police organisation about the. 
'war enthusiasm' of the proletariat in July 1914 and even the French 
Ambassador Paleologue had his doubts about the genuine spotaneity of the 
populace's welcome for the war. 
4 
But whether the more emotional manifestat- 
-ions sprang from the hysteria of the moment or were stage-managed by the 
police, the fact remains that the outbreak of war entirely dissolved the 
current crisis of relations between government and country. A strike of 
27,000 Petersburg workers on the day that war was declared represented the 
culminating-point of the 1914 strike movement and the collapse of labour 
agitation until the summer of 1915.5 The war permitted the tsarist government' 
a full year's respite not only from proletarian unrest but from opposition 
from the Duma. 
7 Journal Intime de Nicolas Itz1914-18, paris 1934, Entries for 19 & 20 July 
19T BUCHANAN, I, 205 & 211-2 ; PARES 186-7. 
2 RODZYANKO 95 ; Shidloveky, Voeponmimi ania, II, 14-15 ; A. T. Vasiliev, The Ochrana 
, London 1930, PP"31-2 ; A. A. Oznsbiahis, Voev®minaaia chleaa IV-oar 
Gosudaretveanoy Duay, Paris 1927, pp. 205-6. 
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There had been no war during the eight years of the Duma's career and 
the present hostilities raised for the first time the question of the role 
of the Duma in wartime. Although the Duma moderates had voted against the 
so-called 'War Credits' on 10 June, six weeks before the outbreak of war, 
even the government was prepared to acknowledge that the action had been a 
political demonstration, in no way casting aspersions on the patriotism of 
the Duma as a whole. As early as December 1912 the Duma moderates d promis- 
ed the government a 'blank cheque' in the event of war : 
Maklakoff, Constitutional Democrat, said that his party, although the 
political opponents of the Government, would in the event of war forget their enmities, mindful only of the fact that the Government was defend- 
-ing the interests of Russia. The representative of the Progressists 
spoke in a similar sense. (6) 
The Council of Ministers was sufficiently sure of the patriotism of the Duma 
to reach unanimous agreement on the propaganda value of a Duma sitting. 
Trepov, Governor-General of Kiev, had suggested this to Goremykin on the 
very eve of war : 
It would be useful from all points of view to call the State Duma, if 
only for a single day, in order to underline the complete solidarity of 
all levels of the populace at this moment of crisis, and their prepared- 
-noes to serve the Throne and the country with all their strength. (7) 
The Council recommendation was fully approved by Nicholas, who personally 
welcomed the opportunity 'to be at one with my people' : on 20 July, a one- 
day 'historic setting' of the State Duma was announced for the twenty-sixth. 
8 
However the granting of this exceptional situating did not resolve or 
even touch the question of the rights of the Duma in wartime. On 24 July (on 
the eve of the Duma sitting) it was learned from Rodzyanko that the govern- 
-meat was unlikely to recall the Duma until November 1915.9 The Duma leaders 
of most party persuasions were angry that Rodzyanko should be so intoxicated 
Kurlov, Konets Tsarisma, p. 208 ; SERENSKT 128 
6 Tiaea, 21 December 1912(n/go)95b and . 
5c. 
7 Letter dated 14 July 1914 T$GIAL, f. 1276(Coancil of Ministers) , x, 7,1. 8 TaGIAL, f. 1276(Council of Minister+s), a, 7,2 ; QDSO, II, -, page 3 and column 1 sitting of 26 July 191k). 
9 TACTIKI, War period, p. 10 ; PADENIE, vi9307(Mi. lyukvv). 
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by the patriotic euphoria of the moment as to forget his responsibilities as 
Duma President. 1° The government motion to shelve the Duma for sixteen 
months was not only an insult to the national representation but, in that thej 
Duma had to be convened to pass the State Budget, a direct violation of the 
Fundamental Laws. 
11 Rech' inveighed agiinst government obtuseness in reject- 
-ing close identification of the state and people at a time of national 
crisis. The Duma Council of Elders sent a collective rebuke to Goremykin, 
who declined either to answer or receive a Duma deputation. 
12 Snubbed by 
official channels of communication, the Duma leaders resorted to more 
indirect petition : 
The deputies with surprising unanimity condemned the decision of the 
government as unrepresentative of the mood of the Duma and country. A 
deputation of seven (Milyukov, Konovalov, Alekseyenko, Varun-Sekret, 
Antonov, Shein and Khvostov) visited Krivoshein. (13) 
Krivoshein, already sympathetic to the Duma and antagonistic to the reaction- 
-ary primacy of Goremykin and Maklakov, readily agreed that an earlier 
convocation than November 1915 was necessary to preserve the present 
salutq'y atmosphere of cooperation and goodwill. 
Krivoshein put the Duma point of view to the Council of Ministers, 
including the desire of the majority of members to continue Duma sessions in 
14 
wartime exactly as in peacetime. Goremykin reported the gist to Nicholas :' 
After the congregation of a considerable number of Duma deputies, there 
has grown up a unanimous desire to approximate to the customary duration 
of a Duma session, following the current recess in its activities. The 
most prominent representatives of all political persuasions in the 
Duma speak this way. (15) 
At the Council meeting of 25 July, a compromise solution was reached between 
the reactionary wing (led by Goremykin and Maklakov), who disapproved of any 
10 Rech', 24 July 1914,1 ; P. L. Bark, 'Voepominania', Vosrozhdenie, April 1965, 
p. 
11 Rech', 24 July 1914,1 ; PADENIE, vi, 307-8(Milynkov). 
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Duma session in wartime beyond the purely ceremonial, and the liberal wing 
(led by Krivoshein and Sazonov), who envisaged a Duma role in wartime closely 
resembling that of peacetime. According to the official Kadet account, 
As a result of these negotiations, the time question has been resolved - 
not as favourably as that pressed for by the deputation i. e. 15the 
October 1914 - but all the same much earlier than that originally 
envisaged by the Government. The new date - "not later than" February 
1st 1915. (16) 
The compromise date naturally carried a safety clause for the Ministers' 
Council : the new date was set 'always permitting, if circumstances show it 
to be inevitable, to postpone the Duma convening to a later date'. By the 
'agreement of 25 July', ratified by the Tsar the next day, the State Duma 
occupied a compromise position between full peacetime rights and the excess- 
-ively cramped function ascribed to it by the reactionary wing of the 
Council. 
17 The constitutional issue was not settled and future political 
advantage rested with the government. 
At the same time as a detente was being reached over the constitutional 
issue, the Duma fractions were discussing their attitudes to the was and the 
government. From 18 to 26 July the Duma Council of Elders met daily at 
Rodzyanko's office with a view to formulating a relationship with the govern- 
-meat to which it had so recently been violently opposed. From outside the 
Duma the press, organs of the moderate parties came out strongly in favour of 
a moratorium on differences with the government. The Oktobrist Golos Moskvy 
declared that 'the moment has come when all party differences, "questions of 
programme" and "class contradictions" must take second place ... there can 
only be one party in Russia at this juncture - the Russian'. The Progressist 
Utro Rossii agreed that 'there are in Russia neither Rights, Lefts, govern- 
-meat or society but only a united Russian nation'. 
18 Milyukov too envisaged 
a suspension of internal conflicts in the face of the common enemy : 
16 TAKTIKI, War period, p. 10 ; also PADENIE, vi, 308(Milyukov) and Rech', 
26 July 1914,3- 
17 TsG AL, f. 1276(Uouncil of Ministere), x, 7, pp. 4(quotation) and 9. 
18 Goloe Moskv9,18 July 1914 ; Utre R® asii, 20 July 1914. 
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At the moment that war was declared all these differences faded into 
the background before a general display of healthy patriotism .., the 
j 
explosions of nationalist sentiment that occurred simultaneously and 
everywhere identically. The French called it "union sacree", the 
sacred union. (19) 
More practically, the Kadet Central Committee published an appeal in Rech' 
on 20 July urging that, 
No matter what our attitude towards the government's domestic policy, 
our first duty is to preserve the unity and integrity of our country ... 
Let us postpone our domestic disputes ; let us not give our adversary 
even the slightaest chance of relying on the differences that divide 
us. (20) 
The same day a manifesto from the Tsar appeared to match the moderates' 
appeal, trusting that 'in this year of terrible trials, internal disagreeme- 
-nts be forgotten, the union of the Tsar with the people be strengthened and 
all Russia stand united to repel the enemy's criminal attack'. 
21 
But the Duma leaders were not unanimous in their adoption of this policy 
of 'sacred union'. Kerensky led an Extreme Left movement to exploit the war 
to force from the Tsar fundamental reforms in the spirit of the October 
Manifesto. A debate between Milyukov and Kerensky dominated the Council of 
Elders' meetings immediately prior to the Duma 'historic sitting'. In the 
vote of the Council of Elders, Kerensky claims to have enjoyed the support 
of the Progressists, Mansheviks, Trudoviks and even Left-wing Kadets. How- 
-ever Milyukov's proposal gained the support of all representatives 
to the 
Right of the Kadets and defeated the Kerensky motion. Kerensky did manage to 
persuade Rodzyanko to mention both the successful and defeated motions in 
his interview with the Tsar on the morning of 26 July, an undiplomatic 
concession on Rodzyanko'e part received most frostily by the Emperor. 
22 
The 'Historic' Duma sitting of 26 July passed off in the spirit of 
Milyukov's 'sacred union'. In his opening speech Rodzyanko asserted that 
#the war has suddenly put an end to all our domestic strife ; the Russian 
19 MILIUKOV 305 ; also CHERNOV 53-4. 
20 also in MILIUXOV 305- 
21 GDSO, II, -, 1 (sitting of 26 July 1914). 
22 SERENSKY 129-130 ; TAETIKI, W'är psriod, p. 5. 
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people has not known such a wave of patriotism since 18121.23 Goremykin, 
Sazonov and Bark made confident speeches calculated both to inspire the 
members of the Duma and impress the Allied ambassadors who were present. 
24 
Spokesmen for the national minorities rose to vow allegiance to the Russian 
cause, followed by a succession of representatives of the leading Duma 
fractions. 25 Milyukov for the Kadets announced : 
We are fighting for the liberation of the Motherland from foreign 
invasion ... We arte united in this struggle. We set no conditions and 
we exact nothing. On the scales of war, we simply place our firm will 
for victory. 
Even so, Milyukov made it clear that the armistice between the Kadets and 
the government was only temporary : 'the fraction is by no means changing its 
attitude towards questions of internal affairs byt only postponing the 
parliamentary struggle until the time when the general and national danger 
is past. ' 
26 
Kerenskg resigned himself to the prevailing spirit of 'sacred 
union' while making his own reservations perfectly plain : 
Peasants, workers and all of you who desire the happiness and well-being 
of the country, steel yourselves for the great trials ahead of us, 
gather your strength and, having defended your country, you will 
free it. (27) 
Only the Bolshevik fraction braved the inflamed patriotism of the Duma but 
even its actions were 'couched in cautious termas much was left unsaid' and 
the fraction opted to abstain from voting on the War Credits rather than 
opposing them. 
28 The 'Historic' sitting fulfilled its government purpose of 
demonstrating solidarity between country and state before both national and 
international audiences. The government had successfully averted any move by 
the Duma Opposition to make political capital out of the war situation and 
secured a virtual 'blank c$eque' from the Duma Rights and moderates. 
23 GDSO, II, -, 6 ; also PALEOLOGUE, I, %6. 
24 Ibid, ools 7-8,8-12 & 12-17 ; also PALBOLOGUE, I, 68-70. 
25 Ibid, cols 18-29 ; Y. V. Shul'gin, Dni, Belgrade 1925(cited hereafter as 
SHUL'GIN), p. 60. 
26 GDSO, II, -, 24 
& 23 ; also in SKY 133 and TA TIEI, War period, P: ý,..: 
27 Ibid, 19 ; also KERENSKT 132-3- 
28 N. ärupskaya, Memories of Lenin, Panther History, London 1970, p. 246. 
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The government initiated a series of measures in the spirit of the 
'sacred union'. On 3 August, the Commander-in-Chief, the Grand Duke Nikolai 
published a manifesto on Polish autonomy, a concession calculated to secure 
the allegiance of the population of the inevitable battlefield. On 18 August, 
St Petersburg was renamed Petrograd as part of a campaign to eradicate 
German influence from Russian public life. 
29 Apparently in the conviction 
that patriotism was as heady an intoxicant as vodka and that the two were 
readily interchangeable, the Russian Empire introduced Prohibition from 23 
August. 3° The government was even prepared to tolerate the emergence of 
society organisations which might sublimate the political drive of the 
educated classes. Russian society organised itself for the war effort with 
an enthusiasm which even Paleologue, snug in the French Embassy, could admire= 
All the social organisations are equipping themselves for war. An usual 
the signal is given by Moscow, the true centre of national life and the 
place where the spirit of enterprise is more developed than anywhere 
else. The idea behind the movement is to go the help of the Government 
in the fulfillment of the complex tasks which the bureaucracy, idle, 
corrupt and blind to the needs of the people, is incapable of performing 
for itself. (31) 
The Union of Zemstvos, which had provided excellent support during the 
Japaneas War, received Imperial permission for a renewal of its activities on 
12 August ;a similar organisation, the Union of-Towns sprang into existence 
32' at the same time, claiming recognition from the government a few days later 
It was for the most part thropgh the agency of the Zemstvo and Town Unions 
that Russian educated society satisfied its desire to serve the war effort 
and to play its part in the leacred union' of state and country considered 
so essential to victory. 
However within weeks of the 'Historic' Duma sitting, the greater part of 
the spirit of 'sacred union' had evaporated. The actions of the government, 
29 Leto is' Voin za Pol aa, JaAuary 1915, p. 1 ; fLYUZHEV, xv, 69 ; PALLOLOGUE, 1984 & 108. 
30 PARES 219 ; Tiý, mes, 21 and 26 October 1914(n/s), 8e and 10a respectivelj'; KOXOVTSOV 422 ; M. Miller, The Ec©nö ü. e Devel©bment of Russia 19© 1917, London 1926, pp. 123 & 284. 
31 PALYOIAGUE, I, 76-7. 
32 MILIUKOV 313-5 ; KLYÜZ t, r, 69 ; ietýpis', P. 1. 
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some the result of wartime necessity, others the manifestation of distrust 
of Russian society, became increasingly distasteful to the moderates and put 
aJ 
strain on the 'sacred union'. The powers of the government were increased 
from the very first days of the war. The 'agreement of 25 July' amounted to 
a declaration that the wartime g-overnment would be operating for the most 
part without the State Duma. Although the Duma was not rejected outright as 
a wartime phenomenon, its uses were closely proscribed and its meetings were 
to be rare and selective. By the same token, legislation through the normal 
Duma and State Council channels was automatically impossible and the govern- 
-ment assumed the entire responsibility for legislation 
(as permitted by 
Clause 87 of the Fundamental Laws). 
33 The authority of the government was 
also increased by extended powers devolved from the Tsar. In late July 
Nicholas still envisaged assuming personal command of the Russian army. 
34 
By an imperial rescript of 24 July the Council of Ministers was authorised 
to assume extra powers while the Tsar was at the Stayka, the Army Headquarters 
in the Field. In effect, Nicholas was establishing a regency council with 
all civil powers for the duration of his military leadership. As it turned 
out, the Council of Ministers prevailed upom Nicholas to appoint Grand Duke 
Nikolai as Commander-in-Chief but the rescript of 24 July was not rescinded 
and the ministers entered autumn 1914 with greater and more independent 
power than ever before. 
35 
The Duma moderates might well have accepted the greatly enhanced powers 
of the government as justified by war necessity had not various ministers 
employed them to repress society and launch attacks on the constitutional 
position of the recessed Duma. With the experience of the 1914 Budget fracas 
still very much in mind, the government seriously considered the liquidation 
of the Duma's financial rights. In mid August a proposal was put up to the 
33 pADFME, iii, 311-2(Goremykin) ; during the premiership of Goremykin(Janua- 
-ry 1914-January 1916), Clause 87 was employed 384 times : ibid, p. 310. 
34 Sazonov, Fateful Yeýýaurs, p. 291 ; Jo -al Inti e de Nicolas II, entry for 19 
July 1914 ; BUCHANAN, I, 216 ; PALEOLOGUE, I, 5 and 11,58 ; PADENIE, vii, 
118(Rodzyanko). 
35 PADENIE, iii, 302-4(Goremykin)'; also PARES 219. 
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Council of Ministers that for the duration of the war taxes should be raised 
by decree. 
36 The furore caused by rumours of this motion rocked the confid- 
ence of the Duma moderates in the 'sacred union' and a declaration of 
protest drawn up by the Progressists and Moscow Kadets even reached the pages 
of the national press. The certainty of almost united Duma opposition 
persuaded the Council to withdraw the motion ; the whole question of the 
Duma's budgetary rights was discreetly allowed to drop. 
37 
Inevitably it was Maklakov at the MVD who led the campaign to reduce 
the position of the Duma and contain the activities of educated society. 
Censorship and the prohibition of public meetings proved effective weapons 
for Maklakov's purpose. War censorship had been introduced on 20 July, the 
day that Russia declared war, and was increasingly rigorously enforced in 
the course of autumn 1914. By mid September the newspapers Zavety and Rusekoel 
Boga tstvo had suffered complete closure and Den' and Rusekie Vedomoety were 
flailing under the weight of MVD fines. 
38 In November Rodzyanko approached 
Maklakov with a request to permit a congress of public organisations 
(for 
which he had already secured the approval of the Grand Duke Nikolai). 
Maklakov peevishly retorted : 
I cannot give you permission for convening auch a congress ; it would 
be an undesirable and universal demonstration to the effect that there 
exist disorders in supplying the army. Besides, I do not wish to give 
permission since under the guise of delivering boots, you will make 
revolution. (39) 
Maklakov's statement highlighted the MVD's fear of Russian society, its 
preoccupation with the prestige of the government and its determination 
(while tacitly' accepting the indispensable-aid that society had to offer) 
to disclaim any such formal obligation as the mach-vaunted 'sacred union'. 
Maklakov's major offensive was launched at the Duna itself. Parliament- 
-ary privilege had been successfully defended by the Duma in the Spring 
36 ENGEL'HARDT, xii, 329 ; also GHERMENSK! 477. 
37 Utro 8o seii and Busslee Vedomoat.,, y, 29 August 1914 ; also Moscow report of 29 august 1914 : ý, xv, 27/4 b, 1914,11-12. 
38 Moscow report of 23 September 1914,: POLICE lxv, 27/46b. 1914,15. 
39 RODZYANKO 144-6 ; also Redayanke 'Goeudarstvennaya Duma', p. 10. 
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Session ; in early November Maklakov returned to the attack. The Bolshevik 
fraction's attitude to the war was dictated by Lenin in Switzerland, who from 
the security of that neutral state demanded forthright opposition to the 
'imperialist war' by the workers' representatives. 
4o 
The five deputies of 
the Bolshevik fraction attended an illegal conference to discuss wartime 
tactics from 2-4 November, only to be arrested on the last day on a charge of 
treason. 
41 
The motives of Maklakov for this action are open to a variety of 
interpretations. The most obvious is that the government was simpiy. ncarcer- 
-ating elements suspected of treason of'of 'spreading alarm and despondency'. 
Maklakov's pre-arrest report to the Tsar leaves this impression : 
The members of the Bolshevik fraction are preparing to call a conference' 
with the participation of exiled Social Democrats for the purpose of 
drawing up the tactical means of propagandising the idea of the 
immediate dissolution of the war and the overthrow of the monarchical 
form of government in Russia. 
Badayev, the Bolshevik fraction leader, substantially agreed : 
The Okhranka was prepared for our conference ... the tsarist government 
had long been searching for a pretext to liquidate the Bolshevik 
fraction of the State Duma ... because the Duma Bolshevik fraction was 
the mouthpiece of the revolutionary movement and the organisational 
centre of the mass of workers. (42) 
But it is also possible that Maklakov was indulging a personal vendetta 
against the Duma as revenge after his earlier defeat on the very same 
principle of parliamentary- privilege. It may also be that Maklakov expected 
the reaction from Duma society to be sufficiently ill-advised an to provide 
grounds for the dissolution of the Duma in its absence. Provocation was the 
lýüiD's most recently developed and therefore favourite device. The MVD4 
provoked 'Shornikova Plot' had provided the pretext for the dissolution of 
the Second Duma, and Maklakov may have hoped that the 'Bolshevik Plot' of 
November 1914 would serve the same purpose for the Fourth Duma. 
Whatever Maklakov's motivation for the arrests, the reaction from 
society was surprisingly mild. Even the most partisan Soviet accounts cannot 
40 A Short History of the USSR, T, 319 ; Krupskaya, Mem mories, pp. 246-252. 
41 'The Arrest of the Five Bolshevik Deputies', KA, vol. 64, pp. 31-2 & 35-9 
also Badayev, The Bolsheeike, pp. 213-7. 
42 KA, vol. 64, pp"31(Maklakov) & 31-2(Badayev). 
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muster a 'workers' response' to the Bolshevik arrests so it may be safely 
assumed that there was none. 
3 The Duma deputies' enthusiasm for the war 
almost entirely smpthered their disapproval at the unconstitutional action 
of the government. Even Kerensky readily postponed the reckoning until 
after the war : 
The living forces of Russoan society do not attack or oppose Maklakov. 
For the time being our path runs parallel with that of the government. 
But we expect much more from victory in the war of liberty than the 
government ... You understand that after the war Maklakov will be brou- 
ght to account. In the meantime we will be silent and rest content. (44)'1. 
Rodzyanko sent Goremykin a formal letter of protest on 30 November but was 
to make no attempt to raise the issue as a Duma question or interpeliation: 
5 
Far from protesting against the arrests, the Kadets completely disavowed the 
Bolsheviks, intimating that such 'traitors' deserved all they got : 'the 
whole population from top to bottom stands for the war ; defeatists are not 
an influential group and may be punished with impunity'. 
46 
If Maklakov had 
hoped for an outburst on a scale which could justify the dissolution of the 
Duma, he was disappointed. Though the government continued to press for the 
harshest brand of justice for the Bolshevik deputies, and only the intransig- 
once of the Grand Duke Nikolai prevented the case from being transferred to 
a military court carrying the death penalty, the whole 'Bolshevik Deputies' 
affair fell rather flat, lending little credit or advantage to any of the 
parties involved. 
' 
Soon after the arrests Maklakov decided to take action against the 
public organisations. At the Council of Ministers' meeting on 18 November, 
Maklakov demanded that the Unions of Zemstvos and Towns be strictly confined 
to medical and sanitary duties, and requested authorisation that the MVD be 
43 A Short History of the USSR, 2,319 ; CBEI1ENSKY 472-3 ; Badayev, The 
Bolsheviks, pp. 214-221 ; I. Tseret. eli, Va"oainania o Russkov Revoh*utsü, 
Paris 193/4, vol. I, p. 10. 
44 Police report of 8 November 1914: POLICE, xv, 27/57,1914,28. 
45 EA, vol. 64, pp. 46-9 ; Badayev, The Bolsheyiks, pp. 220-1 ; RODZYANKO 107. 
46 Rech', 6 November 1911 ; also Lenin, Collected Worke, vol. 21, p. 172. 
47 E , vol. 64, pp. 5O-1 ; CHER sKY 473. 
147. 
empowered to intervene at any level of the Unions. At the subsequent Council 
meeting on 25 November, Maklakov received his authorisation. 
48 
The power 
was now his to take direct action both against the expanding sphere of 
influenece of the Unions and against Kadet dominance of the Union of Towns. 
A police report for 30 November provided precise information on the extent 
to which the Union of Towns was Kadet-controlled : the Union President 
Chelnokov was a Kadet and of the twenty-two-strong Executive Committee of the, 
Union, sixteen were Kadets and two were Kadet sympathisers. 
49 
From late 
November Maklakov attempted to reduce the influence of the Unions but was 
effectively stymied by the shortcomings of the bureaucratic and military 
machines, which made the increasing support of the Unions vital to the war 
effort. Maklakov also attempted to reduce Kadet contrthl of the Union of 
Towns but Kadet concentration at the administrative and executive levels 
made it hazardous to remove their personnel without a public furore, apart 
from the military danger of weakening such an indispensable war organisation. 
On both scores the Unions received a1 Cge measure of support from the militar 
authorities, who in their own interests protected the Unions from the 
attempted incursions of the civil government. 
50 
Meanwhile the first three months of war had convinced Garemykin of the 
political and military necessity of secret government. At the Council meeting 
of 9 November, Goremykin secured approval in principle for the secrecy of 
Council proceedings, a decision within its jurisdiction under the terms of 
the Rescript of 24 July. 
51 On 18 November Goremykin wrote to Sukhomlinov 
confirming that henceforth the activities of the Council were to come under 
the heading of 'classified information' and that the Ministry of War was to 
assume responsibility for the censorship in the war zone. A similar directive 
48 TsGIAL, f. 1274,547-1914,10-11(18 iovember) & 14-20(25 November) ; also Ts GIAL, f. 1282(MVD Chancellery), I, 73?, 76-92 cited in MAKIN 68. 
49 Po=CE, xv, 27/46b, 1914,37" 
50 Riha, A Russian European, pp. 22O1 ;. PADENIE, v, 204(N. Maklakov). 
51 PADENIE, iii, 320(G*remykin) . 
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to Maklakov on 4 December stipulated that in future 'the press can publish 
no information about the activities of the Council of Ministers except that 
released through the [official-B. P. ] information bureau'. 
52 By this scheme 
Goremykin intended, in the words of the President of the Provisional Govern- 
ment Investigation Commission, that 'you and your group of ministers 
should retain power and that your activities should be secret and suffer no 
criticism'. Despite Goremykin's ostensible victory, secret government was 
however imperfectly implemented : Sukhomlinov and Maklakov argued between 
themselves and their Chairman about the responsibilities of censorship 
administration and the unofficial 'grapevine' by which Duma society learned 
of the activities of the Council of Ministers suffered little effective 
diminution of its powers. 
53 
. 
As the government started to employ its exceptional powers to undermine 
the position of the State Duma, the elation of the 'Historic' Duma sitting 
disappeared, to be replaced by mounting gloom amongst the moderate deputies 
and a growing awareness that their leaders had let slip the supreme moment 
for negotiation with the government. A police report for 4 November describ- 
ed the fall in enthusiasm after late July : 
The aggregate of relevant factors has completely changed the mood of 
those Kadet groups who initially hoped that the "Historic" sitting of 
the State Duma would open a new page in the history of relations between 
state and society. Complete disillusionment and growing irritation are 
emerging in speeches along the lines that some=protest or, other must be 
launched against the present tactiss of the government. 
Only the patent futility of such a gesture had prevented the Kadets from 
employing the good offices of Rodzyanko to present a petition to the Tsar : 
Some (Kadets - R. P. 
] consider such an address completely useless from 
the point of view of results, others categorisally stand out against it, 
holding it to be the greatest tactlessness publicly to announce the 
dissatisfaction of society at this time. (54) 
A succession of Badet meetings to discuss a deputation to the Tsar revealed 
that the rift between the Left äadete and the party majority was deepening. 
52 PADENIE, iii, 324-1 & 32k(GoreWkin) 
53 r. 322(quotation) and 324(argunente). 
34 POLICS, xv, 27-191+, 53.4 & 3.5a. 
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The Left Kadets already disavowed the 'sacred union' and demanded pressure is 
on the government for the immediate recall of the Duma, while the centre and 
Right Kadets opposed a deputation as drawing domestic and foreign attention 
to society discontent. At the Kadet Central Committee meeting of 19 August, 
the whole proposition of deputations and addresses was defeated and the hope 
expressed that discreet and clandestine pressure upon the government might 
55 
secure a wartime Duma without the necessity for recourse to an open campaign. 
On 22 August a police report noted that although the State Duma had been 
out of session for almost four weeks, the Tauride Palace was still the 
congregating place for a large proportion of Duma deputies. Thefstensible 
pretext for this activity was the sittings of the Duma Aid Committee, an 
independent organisation for war work employing some 3,000 nurses financed 
by public and Duma subscription, which from the very start performed the 
function of a Duma information centre. By late August the Okhrana was report- Jj 
-ing that the Aid Committee sittings were being employed for political 
discussion. 
56 The explanation of the phenomenon owed much to the Tsar him- 
-self. A decision of the Emperor, relayed from Sukhomlinov to Goremykin on 
28 July, stipulated that 'members of the State Duma who enlist in the ranks 
of the army in time of war are not permitted to resign their offices as Duma 
deputies', a ruling which became common knowledge on its communication to 
Rodzyanko on 2 August. 
57 The decision, motivated peesumably by a desire to 
quarantine the potentially disruptive Duma membership from the army in the 
field, had the effect of barring the Duma deputies from all activities 
except service in the public organisations and in the Duma itself. A 
significant proportion of Duma deputies took up positions at the administrat- 
-ive level of the Zemstvo and Town Unions but a large number found them- 
-selves barred from any activity except that of the Duma itself and 
55 TaGAOR, f. 6/c, 31,183-4 & 188 quoted in CHFRMENSSY 478-480 ; also TeUAOR, 
f 523,1,32,3-12(Mi utea of badet Central Committee meejýinge of - 
August 1914) quoted in MAKIN 64. 
56 POLICE, 307A-1914t 109... 114 :V -a1 *6 Re cam, 2 August 1914. 
37 TsGIAL, f. 1276(Co*ncil oS nisters), x, 7,9 & 10. 
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consequently set themselves with a will to founding a Duma substitute. By 
attempting to head off one problem before it started, the Tsar only contrib- 
uted to an illegal crypto-Duma which naturally promoted the only activities 
to which it was allowed recourse. 
By late August 1914 the 'unofficial Duma' was considering the rumours 
that the last redoubt of the Duma, Budget examination, was under discussion 
in the Council of Ministers. The threat alarmed the Kadets in particular : 
The Kadets spiritedly debated the question of the necessity of the 
recall of the State Duma to discuss taxation matters ... They say that 
the government wants to dismiss the Duma and "go it alone" ever the 
introduction of new taxes. 
The Moscow Kadets demanded that Rodzyanko and the Duma presidium resign in 
protest unless the Duma was either in session or definitely promised by 15 
September. 
58 The nerve of the Kadet fraction, which more than any other had 
put its signature to the 'sacred union', was under great strain by the 
autumn of 1914, inducing Maklakov to issue a secret MVD circular ordering 
the utmost vigilance in respect to the oppositional parties and 'in 
patticular, hiding under the flag of the "Constitutional-Democratic Party". 
the Left wing of the Opposition, with its republican leanings'. 
59 The Kadet 
party became the primary target for Okhraiia surveillance. 
Both Kadet and MVD attention over the course of September and October 
concentrated on the Union of Towns. The First Congress of the Union on 12-14 
September aroused Maklakov's suspicions from the first : through Goremykin 
he secured the Tsar's approval for pre-publication censorship to prevent the 
Congress speeches and resolutions from appearing in the press. 
60 
Irritated 
by the government's victimisation, the concluding speech of the Congress by 
the President of the Moscow Municipal Duma, Astrov, betrayed a distinctly 
'political' note : 'the war ... will give us the opportunity not oni9 to 
defeat our external enemies, but the selutioa to the more complex problems 
58 Report of 29 August 1914 :P , xv, 2? Ik6b, 11 ; also Utro Rossii, 29 
August 1914. 
. 59 MVD circular of 2 Septeaber 1914 : POLICE, xv, 27-1914,87. 
60 PADENIE, iii, 325( oremykia). 
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of internal construction and renovation'. 
61 
At the same time the Kadets 
were recovering from their fit of nerves and, inspired by Milyukov, were 
making strenuous efforts to broaden the basis of their support. 
62 
The Kadetsl 
mounted a campaign to wrest the leadership of the Union waway from the 
Oktobrists, who had sponsored the emergence of the organisation only a month 
before. At the First Congress, the Kadets successfully toppled the Oktobrist 
Bryansky as Head of the Union and got Chelnokov elected as his successor. 
63 
Following this coup, a flurry of Kadet meetings took place in early October 
at which Milyukov declared that 'the present time is the most effective for 
the rebirth of all-powerful public organisations under the flag of, and on 
the grounds of philanthropy and aid to war victims'. 
64 
Maklakov's surveillance over the Kadets and the Unions of Towns and It 
Zemstvos was increased. On 14 October an MVD secret circular was issued 
requiring provincial governors to present reports on the activities of local 
Kadets. 
65 
But while it transpired that the provinces could still be safely 
ignored as a political factor, events in the capitals demanded the MVD'a 
constant attention. A police report for 18 October regretted that, 
The Tauride Palace is becoming more and more the centre for the exchange 
of all kinds of news. Life beats more strongly here, the "monies" of 
the Duma members are constantly changing hands ... the frustrated are 
seeking here, at the centre, the solution or explanation of those 
issues and doubts which are arising in the provinces. (66) 
On the next dal Maklakov received a report that Chelnokov, the new Kadet 
Head of the Union of Towns, was on a tour of the major provincial towns 
drumming up support for both the Town Union and the Kadet party. 
67 
The 
Union of Towns, far from remaining non-political, appeared to be the front 
61 Report of 30 September 1914 : POLICE, xv, 27-1914,34. 
62 Reporte of 22 and 24 September 1914 : POLICE, xv, 27/46b, 16-22. 
63 Moscow report of 17 September 1914 : -"POLICE, xv, 27/46b, 13-4 ; also Petrograd report of 30 September 1914: POLICE, xv, 27-1914,34 and ßße Moskvy, 17 and 21 September 1914. 
64 Report of 10 October 1914 : PO_, xv, 27-1914,40. 
6 PO LICE, xv, 27-1914,41. 
66 Po_, 307A-1914,117. 
67 Moscow report of 19 Octeber 4914 : POLKK /k6b, 23. 
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for the creation of a nationwide revitalised Kadet movement. Throughout the 
late autumn of 1914 continued a clandestine manoeuvring for position on the 
part of both government and major Opposition groups, a silent war of which 
few signs ever escaped to penetrate the public image of 'sacred union' 
maintained by both sides. 
Since the 'Historic' Duma sitting, political initiative and advantage 
had rested with the government ; with the munitions crisis of late 1914 the 
advantage tipped towards leading society groups, In wartime, the civil 
government was ultimaty dependent upon Russia's military performance. 
Thoroughly imbued with the concept of the short Bismarckian war, few combat- 
-ants were entirely free from a munitions shortage by December 1914, but 
Russian lack of foresight was crowned by incomprehensible stupidity on the 
part of the War Ministry. As early as mid August Rodzyanko, acting on rumours 
reaching Shingarev, enquired of Sukhomlinov about munitions shortages bgt 
received bland assurances of sufficiency. 
68 
When in mid September Joffre, 
the French Commander, enquired about Russia's munitions needs, Sukhom inov 
assured Paliologue that no shortage was likely in the foreseeable future. As 
late as November, an agitated Paleologae was still getting no satisfaction 
from the War Ministry : 
I am getting reports from many quarters that the Russian army is running 
short of ammunition and rifles. I have been to General Sukhomlinov ... but he kept answering "Don't worry, I've prepared for everything", and 
has produced for me the most comforting figures. (69) 
The whole sorry business was revealed to the Allied ambassadors in early 
01 December : Pale ologue heard from the Grand Duke Nikolai himself that military 
operations were having to be curtailed from lack of ammunition ; Buchanan 
received the information independently from the Chief of the British Military 
Mission at the Stavka shortly afterwards. 
70 Confronted by incontrovertible 
evidence, Belyayev (Chief of Staff to the War Minister) admitted the exist- 
68 PADENIE, vii, 23(Shingarev). 
69 PALEOLOGUE, I, 212 & 11,21 ; also Sazoaov, Fatsfnl Years s PP "286- , BUCHANAN, I, 219 and QU0 549 
70 PALEOLOGUE, I, 221_; Joha ia*bAxy-Williams , The Emperor Nicholas II as I Knew Him, London 1922, pp. 19-20. 
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-ence of a dangerous munitions shortage in confidence to Paleologue and 
Buchanan on 5 December. 
71 
The munitions crisis had three distinct political effects on the 
Russian government. The first was acute embarrassment before its war allies, 
rising to terror that the crisis might permanently damage Allied military 
cooperation. Paleologue and Buchanan complained loudly, first to Sazonov and 
on 6 December to Goremykin, accusing Sukhomlinov not only of inefficiency 
and lack of foresight but deliberate deception in his relations with Russia's 
Allies. 72 With its war effort increasingly dependent on imported materials f 
(particularly from France anf Great Britain), the Rip-ssian government could 
not afford to endanger it* relationship with its Allies. Stemming from this 
embarrassment and the grave military situation which occasioned it was a 
perceptible decline in the self-confidence of the government. The third 
consequence was an awareness at the highest government level that to make 
good the munitions shortage, the Goremykin Administration must establish an 
immediate constructive rapport with Russian society. Within six months of thee 
outbreak of war, the Russian vernment was compelled to a gýe PPeal to the 
wealth and talents of society to survive a military crisis of its own making. 
From the moment that the munitions crisis was officially (but not publicly) 
recognised in early December, concessions on the part of the government 
towards Russian society were inescapable. In sordid practical terms, the 
government needed the active cooperation of industry as a crucial component 
in recovery in time for the 1915 campaign, and a meeting of the State Duma 
to authorise the substantial extra sums necessary to remedy the immediate 
military crisis. 
The Council of Ministers approached the Duma leaders from mid December 
Xtha view to contracting a mutually-satisfactory political bargain. The 
extent to which the government-recognised the Kadetaas leaders of.. the; Duma 
may be gauged by the fact that tbe"initial fegotiatione were with the badete 
71 PALEOLOGUE, I, 222 ; BUCHARAN41,219 
72 PALEOIAGUE919223-4 BUCEANAN, I, 219. 
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alone. In return for agreement to the Military Budget and a demonstration 
of unity with the government, Krivoshein (the Council negotiator) offered 
the Duma three concessions :a government declaration of goodwill towards 
society, a short Duma session early in the New Year, and a promise that the 
1915 Budget would be submitted to the Duma without recourse to Clause 87 of 
the Fundamental Laws. 73 In relation to the government's needs, Kriveshein's 
terms were laughable ; it can only be conjectured that Krivoshein did not 
expect the terms to be accepted, only to provide a basis for bargaining. In 
offering the Duma nothing but a brief session during which its every action 
and utterance was dictated by the government, the Goremykin Administration 
could only hope that the spirit of 'sacred union' among the Duma leaders 
was sufficiently strong to gloss over political developments since the 
'Historic' Duma sitting. In this preposterous gamble the government proved 
completely successful. Despite its weak bargaining position, the government 
achieved its aims without fundamental concession : on 20 December Krivoshein 
74' 
secured the agreement of the Duma Council of Elders to the government terms. 
Although Milyukov led the movement within the Council of Elders to meet 
the terms, the Kadets were not all as intoxicated by the spirit of 'sacred 
union' as their leader. Indeed early in October the Moscow Kadets became so 
shrill in their abuse towarS& the MVD that the Petrograd Kadets, fearing a 
rift in the 'sacred union', ordered a halt to 'irresponsible' speeches 
At the meetings of the leaders of the Kadet Party, it was decided- 
temporarily to hold back from any criticism whatsoever and maintain a 
policy of restraint towards the government. (75) 
The ladet Central Committee meeting on 21 December reiterated this line 
If it is foreseeable that the Duua aittinga will be employed for a 
succession of oppositional appeches against the government, it would be 
better to oppose the recall of : the Duman with all our strength. 
However, accepting that it would be unpatriotic to refuse a Doma session 
offered by the government in its hour o need, the Central Committee agreed 
73 C `ISKY 484-5 and DY r 65 ('ne primary documents cited). 
74 C SKY 487 ; '3'GGAOR, f . 523, I, 32,105-121(Minuted of Kadet Central Coamittee meeting of 2t D. oe 1914) quoted in DYMCrN 65. 
75 Moscow report of 9 October 1914 : POLTCE, mr, 27/46b, 1914.22. 
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to ratify Milyukov's action of the previous day. 
76 Even so, the meeting 
failed to resolve the question of Kadet relations with the government and it 
was only of r considerable debate that a general meeting on I January 1915 
agreed to maintain the Milyukov policy line and not return to the opposition-' 
-al policy of pre-war politica. 
77 A police report for 3 January 1915 
observed that the Left wing of the Kadejr fraction was agitating for a full 
Kadet conference to settle the question of relations with the government. 
78 
Another report noted that the Left-wing Kadet minority was demanding that 
the Duma session be employed for raising such issues as the arrest of the 
Bolshevik deputies, government censorship and the legatlity of the extended 
use of Clause 87. However, although the Left wing gained a minor victory in 
establishing that Kadet deputies who tabled questions against the government 
would not be disciplined by the fraction, it was clear by early January 1915 
that the majority of the Kadet Central Committee and Fraction were for 
maintaining the polic9 of 'sacred union'. 
79 
There is little documentary evidence available to suggest that the 
Oktobrists or Progressists pursued any independent policy in the first six 
months of war. Corporate Oktobrist policy effectively ceased to exist as the ' 
fraction members dispersed to service in the public organisations (most 
notably the Russian Red Cross and the Union of Zemstvos). The Oktobrists 
started the war period with control over both the Union of Towns and Union 
of Zemstvos ; however the Union of Towns was lost to the Kadets as early as 
September 1914 and even the Union of Zematvos (to which most Oktobrists now 
attached themselves) came under increasing pressure from the Leftward move- 
-ment of public opinion. The financial and subscription difficulties of 
the Oktobrist Goloe MogIM, epitemieed the general Oktobrist decline : in 
December 1914, the editorial board of Golos Mcakv for the first time 
76 TsG OR, f. 6/c, 32,109-110 quoted in CAE +IENSK? 485. 
77 Moscow report of 10 January 1915: POLICE, xy, 27/k6, k6 
78 p0, 
-, 
ISCE, zur, 27/46b r44. _ 
79 Moscow report of 10 January 1915 POw LIICE, xy, 27/LI6,1F6 ; also TAKTIKI, War period, p. 11. 
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admitted non-Oktobrista (the Kadet Fallbark and the Progreseiet Rzhevsky). 
80 
The Oktobrist movement was still disintegrating and diffusing, the protracts 
and painful consequence of the Congress of November 1913. Amongst the 
Progressists, the fraction leadership was content to follow the Kadet line 
while the industrialists who had sponsored the career of the fraction in 
peacetime were now too preoccupied with their profits in supplying the war 
effort to have recourse to Duna politics. 
81 
The Okhrana concentrated its 
attention on the Kadets on the assumption that the leadership (if not the 
initiative) of any opposition against the gýovern96nt would come from this 
quarter. There are no grounds for believing that the Police Department was 
seriously in error in this assessment. 
On 11 January 1915 the Tsar agreed to convene a Duma session on the 
twenty-seventh. The next day he signed a ukaze for the prorogation of the 
Duma on 29 January until 1 November 1915.82 With the Duma unwittingly 
helpless in his grasp, Goremykin informed the delightged Rodzyanko that a 
Duma session had been granted, though with the warning that 'in view of the 
war situation, the duration of the imminent session will be of an altogether 
brief extent 
83 
The government had taken every precaution before permitting, 
a Duma session : it had secured the promise of the Duma leaders that there 
would be no departures from the government-decided programme ; it waited 
until the anticipated tro. ble maker, the Badet fraction, had made its 
harmlessness apparent ; and it released the news of a Duma session only after 
its three-day duration qGd already been decided and documented. 
With the preparations for the charade complete, the government could 
afford to appear generous. The Duma Budget commission held its preliminary 
meeting on 8 January, its subsequent Budget "Y*4nation commanding regular 
80 MA KIN 68-9. 
81 gNG , '$ARDT, viii, 598.. 9. 
82 TsGIAL, f. 1276(Council of Miniaters), x, 7, pp. 22,25 & 29-30 ; also PýMi, iii, '305(Goremyk¬n ) 
83 ThGIAL, f . 1276, x, 7,29- 0.. ;r. 
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and conscientious attendance from government officials. 
84 
The Budget 
commission meetings were conducted in the closest secrecy, which allowed the 
Duma representatives to be judiciously critical. The MVD came under fire for 
its activities but Maklakov was content to suffer criticism when there was 
little chance of it spreading beyond the forty-four members of the Budget 
Commission. 
85 
The government achieved a master-stroke of diplomacy by 
appointing Ignat'ev Minister of Education on 18 January. 
86 
Basso had died 
in November 1914 and the Education Ministry had remained vacant since that 
time. By appointing the liberal and popular Ignat'ev to the post, Goremykin 
left Duma society with the impression that some concrete advantage had been 
won from the government. The Rech' leader for 21 January 1915 enthused : 
The appointment of Count P. N. Ignat'ev as Minister of Education remains 
at the centre of public interest ... It would hardly be a mistake to 
state that up to this time no single appointment has aroused such 
general satisfaction and hope. 
As a final 'concession', G4oremykin permitted Rodzyanko to arrange a 
meeting of the entire Council of Ministers with the Dgma Defence commission 
on 25 January. The atmosphere of the meeting confirmed the earlier arrange- 
-went of 20 December 1914.8' Only the Kadet leaders introduced a note of 
discord : Milyukov and Shingarev attacked the wartime policy of'the MVD and 
'demanded the dismissal of Maklakov as the violater of the "sacred union"'. 
Maklakov contemptuosly dared the Sadets tb: break the 'sacred union' by 
attacking him publicly : 'Go there 
[to the Duma - R. P. 
] 
, the government 
does not fear criticism in public, we will answer you there'. Sukhomlinov 
too natuxrally came under attack, while Goremykin played the unaccustomed 
r8le of soothing and reassuring the Drama leaders . 
88 
The meeting of 25 
84 TsGIAL, f. 1276, x, 7,19 & 31 ; Russkie Vedomosty, 13 January 1915. 
85 TAKTIKI, War period, p. 12 ; PADENIE, vii, 21(Shingarev). 
86 Article 'What we expect front the new Minister', Birzhevie Vedomost , 10 January 1915 ; KLYUZHEV, xv, 66 & 72 PADENIE, iii, 317 Goremykin and 
vi, 309(Milyukov). 
87 Ts Gi , f. 1276, x, 7,36 ; TAKTI$I., War period, 12 ; PADENIE, vi, 309(Milyukov). 
88 MILIUXOV 309 ; TAKTIXI, War per iod, 13 ; PADENIE, vi, 309-311(Milyukov) and 
vii, 22 & 27(Shingarev), 
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January was an extension of the closed sessions of the Duma Budget commiss- 
ion : the government was prepared to face criticism and meet the - Opposition 
because of the circumscribed nature of the confrontation. For the price of 
private criticism from a sector of the Diana membership, the government 
gained the money essential to its military recovery and the placid Doma 
session vital to its political self-assurance. 
The spirit of 'sacred union' pervaded the Duma session of 27-29 
January 1915. As planned, a demohstration of unity between Duma and govern- 
-went was mounted by the representatives of all leading fractions and 
nationalities. The sentiments of Savenko, orator for the Nationalist fraction 
serve as a typical example : 'in time of war, there are no parties and no 
nationalities in Russia, but only a single, strong, terrible, granite Russian 
monolith'. Yefremov, orator of the Progresaist fraction, though subscribing 
to this view, permitted a suggestion of criticism to colour his speech 
'we, the representatives of the people, may not embark upon criticism of the 
activities of our government, even though it sometimes actually hinders the 
expression of the vibrant patriotism of the people'. 
89 
With the Bolsheviks 
forcibly excluded, it was left to Kerensky to declare against the Duma 
policy of non-criticism of the government : 
The country has been surprised and shocked by this terrible silence, 
by this absence of truth ever the last six months. It shguld know that 
there are people who understand and recognise that this silence 
cannot continue. (90). 
However Kerensky's attitude was overwhelmed by the isaietence of the Duna 
majority on continuing the Duma röle of July 191k. At the closed meeting of 
25 January even the Kadete (the most critical group represented) had been 
careful to point out that they were intent only on removing 'violaters of 
the sacred union' not dissolving the 'union' iteelf. 
91 On 28 January in 
Duma sitting, Milyukov spoke fdr the great majority of the Duma when he 
vowed 'just as then on 26 July ,. so today, in our appeal for unity, we are 
89 GDSO, III, 2,61(Savenks) &, 4(Year v). 
90 Ibid, 46 ; also Milyukov, 'Fevral'skie Dni', p. 162. 
91 TAKTIKI, War period, 12 ; also Utroo Rooeesii, 27 January 1915. 
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performing not a political gesture but our exacting civic obligation'. 
92 
On the second day of the session the Duma expressed its 'civic obligat- 
-ion' by passing the State Budget without opposition. 
93 On the third day 
Goremykin announced to Rodzyanko the decision made as long ago as 12 
January : the Duma was prorogued until November. 
94 The Duma had again 
played the role dictated by the government ahd had outlived its usefulness 
within three days. Duna apologists hesitantly advanced a claim that the 
January session represented a victory over the government but an awareness 
that the Duma had been cynically 'used' by the government for its own ends 
quickly took possession of public opinion. The official Kadet account 
published in September 1915 attempted to resolve the two interptetations : 
The January session of the State Duma particularly strengthened its 
authority and increased its importance ... but the general impression 
was that the session - by no fault of its own of course - did not fulfil] 
its function. There was strengthened not only the authority of the Duma 
but the conviction of the need for a long session. The period "no 
later than November" seemed too distant. (95) 
The patent weakness of the explanation betrayed the declining Kadet belief 
in the 'sacred union' after the Fama session of January 1915. 
The 'sacred union', a concept introduced and sustained by the Kadets 
and their fellow moderates, was treated by the government and particularly 
the MVD as a valuable Duma delusion 
Ach it could exploit. An Milyukov 
himself conceded later 'what was meant as a truce wad taken`to mean 
capitulation'. 
96 The concept had hardly been a practical policy even in the 
first heady days of war but the Duna moderates added unreasonable obstinacy 
to their earlier gullibility by refusing to learn the lessons of the first 
six months of wartime government and take political advantage of the 
munitions crisis. The 'sacred union' had ceased to exist at government level 
92 GDSO, III, 2,50 ; also TAKTIKI, War period, 12. 
93 GDSO, III, 2,154 ; MiLIUKOV 309" 
94 GGDSO, III, 3,281 ; Tsý, f. 1276(Coticii of Ministers), x, 7,40. 
95 TAKTIKI, war period, 13 ; also PADENIE, vi, 311(Milynkoe). 
96 TAKTIKI, 1916, p. 9 quoted in Iha, A ýUosi an European, p. 218. 
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as early as September ; by November, the Left Kadet Kolyubakin was already 
warning his party that the 'union' had disappeared at the common level : 
An enormous change in the mood of the country has taken place since the time of the "Historic" Duma sitting of 26 July ... The mood has 
collapsed and everywhere has been replaced by solossal disillusion- 
-ment. (97) 
By January 1915 the 'sacred union' existed only in the minds of the Duma 
Rights and moderates, but with a tenacity which persuaded the moderates to 
abandon the political instrument which had been employed with such success 
over the last weeks of peace. The Duma leadership chose to sacrifice its 
very real budgetary powers to a concept which was chimerically sanguine at 
the best of times and ludicrous in its untenability by the time of the 
Duma session of January 1915. 
2. 
_ 
'The Progressive Bloc' (February-August 1915) 
With the Duma safely prorogued until November, the government seemed 
set to revert to its policy of repression and harassment. The trial of the 
Bolshevik deputies, approved by the Emperor on 28 Decemr but prudently 
postponed until after the Duma session, eventually returned verdicts of 
guilty and imposed sentences of exile in Siberia upon the five defendants 
but aroused little interest still less outrage on the domestic scene. 
98 
When the Moscow Kadet Rusakie Vedomosty ran a survey through its readers on 
25 January on the effects of the war upon the peasant, Maklakov waited only 
for the Duma session to pass before ordering both 'the necessity of instit- 
-uting for the future stricter surveillance over the newspaper Ruaskie 
Vedomosty' and an all-round tightening-up of press control. 
99 
The one 
"ntb's imprisonment imposed on the Kadets Peter Struve and Vasilii Maklakov 
in March for their conduct during. tb , 
Beilis trial again seemed to point 
97 Ts GAOR, f. 6/c, 32,53 quoted in CBERMENSKY 480-1. 
98 K&, vol. 64, p . 51 ", Badayev The ]; ehe,,,, e__ k$, PP " 232-241. 
99 POI. lCE, xvi, 27/46, PP"3-L(articl+e): 5(Poliae report), 10(Maklakov's reply) & 12 general directive$12 Feber 1915). 
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the lesson that the moderates would be bearing the brunt of a renewed 
government offensive in the near future. 
100 
However by comparison with its pre-war activities and, even more 
pertinently, its operations during the first six months of war, the repress- 
-ion of the government in early 1915 was distinctly muted. Indeed from 
December 1914 onwards, the antagonistic front presented to the Duma and 
country by the Goremykin Administration progressively softened. The change 
in attitude was not surprisingly hardly a voluntary transformation of 
character but the result of increasing pressure exerted by the war effort. 
The minitions crisis judged so alarming in December 1914 had no actual 
military impact until the new campaign 'season' opened in Spring 1915, 
leaving the government several months in which to redevelop its military 
resources, dutifully financed by the Duma session of January 1915. However 
the events of Spring 1915 brought no comforst to either government or High 
Command. The breaking of the Myassoyedov scandal confirmed the public in its 
growing belief that Russian ill-success in the war owed more to treason than 
to German superiority in arme. 
101 The mysterious destruction by explosion 
of the Okta munitions factory, the largest in Russia, on 31 March did nothing 
to counter the universal sense of German conspiracij. 
1©2 When the campaign 
season reopened in March 1915, the munitions shortage still crippled the 
Russian war effort. 
103 
German units posted to stiffen Austrian resistance 
proved the vital ingredient which sent over the Austrian army from defence 
to attack : from late April 1915 the Austre-German offensive pushed back the 
Russian armies with ever-increasing speed. Over the summer of 1915 the 
Russian retreat from Galicia became a rout. 
104 
100 Ruaskie Vedoaosty, 15 March 1915. 
101 PALBOLOGUE, I-, 299-301 ; RODZYABSO 108 ; GM MO 549-550 ; SHtn'GIx 80 ; To IAL, f. 1276(Council of Ministers)'x, 7,42-"3. 
102 PALE UE, I, 329 ; Timesql May 1915(n/s) , 7b. 
103 MILIUKOV 311 ; Gurko, Me , PP-102-3 ; A. S. Lukomaky, Memoirs of the Asian Revolution, Loadom 1922, pp. 18-19. 
104 Gurka, Memo ies, pp. 107 & 11l ft ; Gilliard, Thirteen ! eare, p"134 B H. Bruce Lockhart, TheTwo 90 oln foas, Landon 19671p. 55. 
162. 
The intimate relationship between military success and government self- 
confidence has already been remarked. Each major military event produced a 
political backlash : victory brought renewed self-cofidence to the govern- 
ment to the exclusion of society forces ; but defeat sapped the morale of 
the government, forcing it to turn to society for moral and material support. 
The Duma session of January 1915 was the first major political result of 
military failure, although not on this occasion exploited by the Duma 
moderates. The military disaster of spring and summer 1915 occasioned a 
series of tactical opportunities which the moderates (at first reluctantly) 
utilised for their political advantage. The Left Nationalist leader Shul'gin 
held that the government had a moral account to settle with the nation : 
For this defeat the government had to pay. But what with ? With the 
only currency which was acceptable in payment - it had to settle its 
debt by the concession of power, however seemingly, however 
temporarily. (105) 
At the practical level, the government was compelled to make concessions in 
order to harness the country's energies and talents to the state apparatus ; 
at the public relations level, the government had little choice but to 
conciliate the country with political concessions, the only acceptable 
commodity which it had to offer in lieu of military victory. 
The 'Liberal Phase' which briefly held sway over summer 1915 was forced 
upon the Russian government by the anonymous pressures of the war and owed 
very little to Russian society and the State Duma. The process of 
'liberalisation' assumed three overlapping stages. The first was the gradual 
admission of non-government elements into the structure of the government. 
Initially the government attempted to meet all problems by drawing upon the 
resources and personnel of the government alone. The fuel crisis of early 
1915 was tackled in such a manner. The cheapness and ready availability of 
foreign coal in peacetime had stunted the exploitation of native fuel 
resources. With the coming of war and the remarkably effective German 
blockade, the Russian war effort was thrown back on dangerous overdependence 
169 SHUL'GIN 78-9. 
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upon its own poorly organised coalfields. The government's response was to 
establish the Fuel Committee on 31 March. 
106 
The fuel crisis was aggravated 
by the problem of transport : as a commodity vital to the war effort, coal 
took priority over foodstuffs on the railways, resulting in the spoiling of 
food, consequent food shortages in the larger cities and the injection of 
moral contoversy into the whole issue of fuel and food. The government's 
response was identical : the creation of the Provisions Committee on 
19 May. 107 
Both these new institutions were composed of government personnel 
alone, with no account taken of the merchants and industrialists whose 
cooperation and counsel were essential to the solution of the problems. 
However 19 May marked not only the setting-up of the Provisions Committee 
but a most significant breakthrough in society participation in government. 
Rodzyanko used his privileged access to the Emperor in the first five months 
of 1915 to preach the advantages of close collaboration between the Duma 
and the government. Claiming that the private meetings with government 
leaders in March 1914 and January 1915 had proved the value of cooperation 
and the trustworthiness of the Duma delegates, Rodzyanko advanced a scheme 
for the Duma and industry to aid the war effort through a commission 
attached to the Ministry of War. Despite Sukhomlinov's opposition, Nicholas 
on 13 May decided to adopt Rodzyanko's plan. 
1o8 
Dismayed that his incompet- 
-ence be exposed in future before strangers, Sukhomlinov fought an effective 
rearguard action : at the Council of Ministers' meeting of 23 May hh. won as 
assurance that the proceedings of the Duma Commission would be entirely 
secret and its accounts armour-clad, that is to say, neither subject to 
Duma approval nor included in the annual Budget statement. 
log 
Despite 
106 Letter of Nicholas II to Alexandra, 2 March 1915 : The Letters of the Tsar to the Tsaritsa 1 14-1 1 , Ed. C. E. Vulliamy, London 1929 cited hereafter as NICHOLAS , p. 31 ;SO. Zagorsky, The State Control of ln4ut in Russia during the , Yale U. P. 19281p. 38. 
107 Zagorsky, ibid, pp"83-4 ; MILIUXOV 312-3. 
108 RODZYANKO 113-6 ; TAKTIKI, War period, 16 ; Lukomak , Memo re, p-. 19 Times, 8June 1915(n/s), 8c. 
109 CHERMENSKY 492. 
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these limitations, Rodzyanko's delight was enormous for there was no denying 
the importance of his achievement : for the first time Duma and industry 
delegates were to be permanently attached to one of the most p erful 
government ministries and privy to all its actions. 
The Yeception of the Commission in Duma circles was very mixed, meeting 
violent opposition from the Kadets : 
The Right ... maintained a cautious silence, the Nationalists and 
Oktobrists welcomed my efforts but the Kadets, encouraged by their 
leader Milyukov, entirely unexpectedly ganged up against my undertaking, 
declaring that any contact and joint endeavour with the War Ministry of 
Sukhomlinov would be shameful for the Duma ... they, the Kadets, would 
not participate in the newly-formed Commission under any circum- 
-stances. (110) 
Milyukov was piqued that the first successful act of cooperation between 
Duma and government should be engineered by Rodzyanko, whom he held in very 
low esteem, and not himself. The Progressists followed the Kadet lead in 
rejecting participation in the new Commission, thereby leaving the Right to 
monopolise the Duma representations 
ill 
However Rodzyanko was as ambitious 
for the Oktobrists as for the Duma as a whole, and contrived to exclude 
representation from the Right of the Oktobrists. Partly from sour grapes on 
the side of his moderate rivals, partly from his own machinations, Rodzyanko 
finally headed a deputation of four Duma delegates to the Commission, all of 
-whom were fellow Oktobrists. 
112 At the very instant of a resounding victory 
for the Duma, party politics soured the achievement. 
The party political element persisted through the first meetings of the 
new Commission. The attention of the Duma was concentrated upon Rodsyanko's 
'pilot scheme' to ascertain whether this experiment in wartime collaboration 
would end in failure and the defiant ossification of a government which 
refused to mend its ways, or prove acceptable and engender a succession of 
similar opportunities for society participation. The first meeting of the 
Commission on 1 June calmed most government fears but at the cost of 
110 RODZYANKO 117 ; also report of 27 May 1915 : PE3ýr, 307d-1915,20. 
111 MILIIIKOV 316 ; see discu sinn in Kadet Central' Committee 10 June 191 ;_ 
TaGAOR, f . 523: i" 32,175 cited in DYAKIN 78 ; %the Kadet fraction agreed lw, 
principle to participate only on 11 June : tilyukov, Z, toria V 
Revolyutsii, Sofia 4921-4, vol. I, p. 25. 
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flagrantly ignoring old society loyalties and exacerbating the element of 
party political rivalry. The War Ministry was considering the nationalisat- 
ion of all war industry, a step naturally opposed by the industrialist 
lobby and publicised by the Progressist (and to a lesser extent the Kadet) 
fraction. Rodzyanko and his Zemstvo-Oktobrist colleagues on the Commission, 
partly because their predominantly landed fraction had nothing to lose from 
the nationalisation of industry, partly from a craven eagegness to avoid 
giving offence to the government on the first occasion, supported the as-yet 
tentative government move. 
113 By this action Rodzyanko alienated the power- 
-ful industrialist sector and supplied ammunition to those critics who 
accused him of employing his Duma office for party interests. At the same 
time however, he had discovered a way of promofing the greater power of both 
Duma and Oktobrists simultaneously. The Duma Oktobrists received the first 
fillip to their self-confidebce since the 1913 crash. The government was 
reassured of the feasibility of cooperation with society elements and 
conceded further experiments in collaboration. On 7 June a Commission for 
Munitions was established, admitting once again four delegates from the 
Duma. 114 From the two initial Commissions were to spring the five Special 
Councils which established permanent institutional collaboration between 
government and Duma created in August 1915. 
The second major aspect of 'liberalisation' was the substitution of 
more liberal ministers for the most hated reactionaries. The situp] 't and 
most dramatic gesture of concession to society, it was at the same time the 
one which could be reversed most speedily and with least harm to the 
structure of government. Sensing the direction of events, power groups 
within the government exerted pressure to exclude individual ministers. 
Sazonov, Krivoshein and Kharitonov, the liberal wing of the Council of 
112 Namely Savich, Protopopov, Dmitrgukov and Rodzyanko himself : KLYUZV, f 
xiv, 156 also Lenin Library Manuscript Department, f and 260(P. P. 
Ryabushinsky) iv, 10,5. 
113 TsGVIA(Tsentral'nyi Gosudaratvenni Voyenno-Istoricheakii Arkiv) f. 369,11 
174,98 quoted in CHERMENSKY 495 ; Zagoreky, St_, ýý 
trol, Pp 87'-A. 
114 Zagoraky, State Control, pp. 84-5 ; PALEOLOGIIE, I, 347" 
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Ministers, stepped up their campaign against the reactionary wing, agitating 
particularly for the removal of Sukhomlinov. With reportd of the Russian 
retreat becoming daily more alarming, with Rodzyanko joining his complaints 
to those of both cabinet and country, Sukhomlinov was in any case the 
obvious scapegoat : on 12 June he was dismissed as Minister of War and 
replaced by the popular and able General Polivanov. 
115 
Maklakov too fell from power at this time. The blocking of his personal 
ambition, his constant out-manoeuvrings by Shcheglovitov and the crushing 
weight of the MVD in wartime discouraged and frustrated Maklakov to the 
point of actual physical illness. Maklakov petioned Nicholas for dismissal 
in March, though playing his rearguard action against the Duma to the last : 
The State Duma and its President strive wherever possible to increase 
their own power and importance in the state and, by the same token, are 
endeavouring to diminish the powers of Your Imperial Majesty ... I have 
always pressed upon Your Majesty the necessity for diminishing the 
rights of the State Duma and reducing it to the level of a consultative 
institution. (116) 
On 4 June Maklakov's resignation was finally accepted, to be made public on 
the thirteenth. It is likely that the dismissal of Maklakov was effected 
more in sorrow than in anger, and there is no indication that Maklakov was 
in disgrace or considered unfit for the post of MVD. 
117 Unfortunately the 
popularity of his 'liberal' successor Prince Shcherbatov was matched by his 
incapacity as Minister, a fact hardly out of keeping with his only previous 
administrative experience as Director of the State Stud. 
118 
A second wave of dismissals was decided at a meeting of the Council of 
Ministers at the Stavka on 13 June, though only made official on the Tsar's 
return to the capital in early July. The two arch-reactionaries in the 
Council were removed : Sabler(Procurator of the Synod) was dismissed on 5 
115 Sazonov, Fateful Years, pp. 283-8 ; RODZYANKO 122-3 ; Lukomsky, Meaoý`, 
pp. 20-1 ; GURKO 551 ; Nicholas's letter of 12 June 1915 : NICHOLAS 57. 
116 Letter of Maklakov to Nicholas, 27 April 1915 : MPK 96 ; also quoted in 
RODZYANKO 121-2 ; also PALEOLOGUE, I, 308. 
117 See Nicholas's letter to Maklakov, 12 August 1915 MPK 97 ; also Tinme s, 
21 June 1915(n/e), 7f ; also DYA$IN 77. 
118 Kurlov, Konets Tsarisma, p. 177 ; Ozaobishia, Vospom3a*tfia, p. 211. 
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July, Shcheglovitov the following day. 119 Their successors were less 
popular and liberal than the earlier replacements but were welcomed 
nevertheless as symptoms of the trend away from reaction. Samarin, the new 
Procurator, was Marshal of the Moscow nobility ; Aleksandr Khvostov, the ne' 
Minister of Justice, while a crony of Goremykin, had the reputation of bean, 
industrious and scrupulously honest. 
120 Milyukov only regretted that 
Goremykin had not been removed with the rest of his reactionary clique : 
The retention of Goremykin continued to cast a special shadow on the 
Government. This man was an immoveable stone weighing down upon 
Government policy, and his person symbolised the absence of any 
substantial change in the direction of that policy. (121) 
Sazonov's group within the Council rested content with only Goremykin to 
tackle : 
Goremykin had the powerful protection of the Empress Alexandra 
Feodorovna and, un. r the circumstances, it would have been hard to 
obtain his dismissal. And besides, we thought that without Shcheglovito' 
who was the soul and brain of the reactionary party, and without his 
other'supporters, Goremykin's part in the Government would be 
insignificant. (122) 
By early July 1915 the only survivor of the reactionary wing of the Council 
as it had existed in early 1914 was the Council Chairman, whose influence, 
though considerable, was not expected long to resist the pressure of the 
influx of more liberal colleagues. 
With the arch-reactionaries removed from the Council of Ministers and 
society representatives consolidating a bridgehead on the periphery of 
government, only the Duma was needed to express the ambitions of Russian 
society. The last Duma session had been prorogued 'until not later than 
November 19151.123 Within weeks of this closure, individuals began campaig 
-ing for a much earlier recall. On 25 February Kereneky wrote to Rodzyanko 
k 
119 RODZYANKO 122 ; Rech', 6 July 1915,1. 
120 The full first name will-be used when referring to Khvoatova(as in the 
past with Maklakovs) to , avoid c©fusion : Aleksandr A. Khvostov(the 
Uncle), Minister of Justice July 1915-July 1916 and MVD July-September 
1916 ; Aleksei N. Khvostov(theNephew), Duma deputy and MVD September 
1915-March 1916. 
121 MILIUKOV 318. 
122 Sazonov, Fateful Years"PP"284(quotation) & 288-9. 
123 T, ý, f. 1276(Council Of Ministers), x, 7,40 ; GDSO, III, 3,281. 
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insisting that the only antidote to the insidious activities of the MVD was, 
is the first instance, the recall of the Duma : 
The authoritative intervention of Russian society is essential. The 
State Duma must do everything it can to protect the nation from this 
perfidious stab in the back. I beg you, as official President of the 
Duma, to insist on the immediate recall of the State Duma. (124) 
However the actual organisers of the emerging Duma agitation for a new 
session were the Progressists. As early as March the Progressist deputies 
still in Petrograd voted to initiate a campaign for a Duma session and issued; 
instructions recalling all fraction members to the capital. 
125 Yefremov 
approached Milyukov with a view to uniting with the Kadets in a propaganda 
campaign but encountered unexpected opposition : 
[The suggestion -q R. P. 
] met at first far from unanimous acceptance even 
amongst the Opposition fractions. Both Maklakov and Milyukov coldly 
retorted ... that a long session of the Duma in time of war was 
inappropriate, and to embark upon a session at such a time(March-April) 
was undesirable ... Milyukov declared himself to be against "switching 
horses in mid-jump". (126) 
Spring 1915 found the Kadet leadership unsure of its ground. In early April 
Milyukov embarked upon a lecture tour of the Volga towns only to discover 
that his policy of 'sacred union' was not tolerated bq audiences unanimously 
and openly hostile to the government. 
127 Disturbed by his findings, Milyukov` 
was the motive force behind a Kadet Central Committee circular issued on 
29 April requesting urgent information on the provincial Badet attitude to 
the war, the government and Kadet policy. 
128 
In early May Yefremov returned to the capital from witnessing the start 
of the retreat from Galicia, and at an extraordinary meeting of the Duma 
Council of Elders demanded the immediate recall of the Duma and a government 
124 Letter in Rodzyanko Fond : TsGAOR, f. 603, I, 70. 
125 It is now possible to compare the 'official' Kadet account of events 
(TAKTIKI, War period, pp. 13-40) with the 'official' Progressist account 
by Yefremov(two identical copies in the Archives : Ryabushineky Fond, 
Lenin Library Manuscript. Department, f. 260, delo 4/10, pp. 1-23 and Mi v 
Fond, TsGAOR, f. 579, delo 386, pp. 1-23). 
126 Since the two copies of the 'official' Progressist account are identical 
even to pagination, referenoee hereafter will for convenience quote only 
the Milyakov copy. This quotation : TBGAOR, f. 579,386,2. 
127 Report of 14 April 1915 : PO U21,27-191593-6. 
128 Report of 29 April 1915 : PO E, 27.. 1915,20b, 4. 
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responsible to the Duma. Yefremov's eye-witness reports not only confirmed 
the Progressists in their policy but converted the majority of Duma Kadets. 
129 Initiative was slipping away from Milyukov because of his insistence 
upon the by-now ridiculous 'sacred union'. While Milyukov hesitated, the 
Progressists were usurping Kadet leadership of the Opposition, the Oktobrists 
were enjoying a revival of fortunes initiated by Rodzyanko'e War Commission 
and the bulk of the Kadet fraction was cleaving dramatically towards the 
Progressist viewpoint. The Duma Committee for Aid became more and more the 
clandestine Duma, commanding regular attendance from all fraction leaders 
except the Extreme Right. 
130 By 29 May all Duma fraction leaders had agreed 
to the recall of their deputies in anticipation of an imminent Duma session. 
131 Milyukov however had not changed his attitude. A police report asserted 
that Milyukov's agreement to recall Kadet deputies was by reason of the 
pressure of Kadets already in Petrograd and not because Milyukov had been 
converted with the majority of his fraction to the desirability of a Duma 
session : 'Milyukov spoke out against such a recall, declaring it condemned 
to failure as a poor copy of the Vyborg meeting'p132 
If by mid May Milyukov was already at odds with the majority of the 
Kadet fraction, it was not until early June that he was compelled to yield. 
The Kadet Party Conference of 6-8 June was forced upon Milyukov by the 
possibility of widespread Kadet revolt against the atrophied 'Milyukov line'. 
133 The immediate impression from the conference minutes is of almost 
unanimous attack upon Milyukov's leadership. Milyukov had to explain away 
the policy of 'sacred union', now so patently futile that no Kadet could 
recall how he had ever been persuaded of its value. He had to suffer a 
129 Progressist account : Ts G AOR, f. 579,386,2-3 ; Milyukov ignored Yefremov's 
part entirely in his own account : PADENIE, vi, 312. 
130 Report of 27 May 1915 : POLICE, 307A-1915,19 ; PADENIE, vi , 312 
(Milyvkov) . 
131 PADENIE, vi, 312(Milyukov). 
132 Report of 4 June 1915 : POLICZ, 307A-1915,15. 
133 N. Lanin on the Badet Party Conference of June 1915 : KA, vol. 59, p. 110 ; 
on the provincial Kadet pressure fox' a conference, see DYAKIN 66-7. 
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tirade of abuse from the provincial delegates (spearheaded as usual by 
Moscow) while radical resolutions in the spirit of the Progressist demands 
were passed overwhelmingly, most notably, 
Resolution 5. It is deemed essential for the practical co-ordination 
of the resources of the country and their proper employ- 
-ment in the interests of the defence of the homeland : 
(a) To form a cabinet capable of directing the organisat- 
ion of the war home front and safeguarding the 
internal peace of the country and the close 
collaboration of state and society. 
(b) To recall the State Duma immediately. (134) 
In the debate over Kadet policy, criticism was widespread : the bulk of 
attack came from fourteen leading provincial delegates but five fraction 
deputies and three Central Committee members joined in the witch-hunt. The 
provincials fell intm three groups as to future policy : the largest 
demanded 'direct action' and a government responsible to the Duma ; the 
second group urged the immediate development of the ailing provincial 
organisation to revive a national Kadet movement ; and the mildest of 
Milqukov's provincial critics stipulated a Duma session to implement a 
programme of solid legislative work. 
135 
However Nilyukov managed to avert the greater danger posed by the 
conference. Not enjoying the status of a Party Congress, the conference had 
no formal authority over the Kadet executiove. 
136 Of the 60 delegates 
invited to the conference, 28 were Dua4leputiee, 5Central Committee members 
and 2$ provincial representatives ; as a numerical result, the representat- 
ion was weighted against the provincial delegates and a vote of 'no- 
confidence' in Milyukov required not only the unity of the 'provincials' but 
the defection of a significant proportion of the Buma fraction. 
137 All 
proceedings of the conference were conducted in closed session and the 
resolutions submitted to the conference were deliberately vague, bearing 
the nature of recommendations rather than directives. As a result of the 
134 Te R, f. 523(Kadet Party), ii, 39,1 ; also reports of 9 June 1915(, 
307A-1915,69) and 17 June 1915(POLICE, 27-1915,42-4). 
135 KA, vol. 59, pp. 111-145(Minutea of Conference). 
136 ibid, p. 145. 
137 Undated report on Kadet conference ; POLICE, 27.. 1915,36. 
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'arrangement' of the conference, Milyukov escaped with an inconclusive 
drubbing out of the public eye. His sole gain from the conference was the 
adoption of his formula demanding 'A Ministry of Public Confidence' over the 
provincials' slogan 'A Ministry Responsible to the Diamal. 
138 
But in spite 
of averting the greater danger which a Kadet congress or conference always 
presented, Milyukov was still forced to jettison the policy of 'sacred union' 
and join the Duma Opposition campaign for a new session, complete with a 
conference-approved slogan which demonstrably reversed previous Kadet 
wartime policy. 
139 
Milyukov was acutely aware that although remarkably little Kadet dirty 
washing had been exhibited in public, Duma circles appreciated that a revere- 
-al of Kadet policy had been effected by the party conference in defiance of 
his leadership. Milyukov could not purge his party, but he could silence his 
critics by improving the position of the party via-i-via other rivals for 
power. The obvious rival in June 1915 was the Progreesist party, with its 
successful record in uniting the Opposition. As Yefremov proudly recorded 
To the credit of the Progressists, it was by their initiative that the 
collecting together of the Opposition had taken place. Also, by the 
recommendation of the Progressists to all fractions to recall their 
members to Petrograd, there was engineered the greatest possible number 
of Duma deputies at the Council of Elders to demonstrate, the attitude 
of the Duma towards a renewed session. (140) 
Opportunities for Milyukov squashing his impudent rival were not long 
emerging. The first chance arose after 11 June when the Progressist Central 
Committee, encouraged by the success of Rodzyanko's Commission, published 
its plan for a supreme executive organ for defence, in which the government, 
Duma and industry would participate jointly and equally to co-ordinate the 
war effort. 
141 The ingenuous nature of the conception, the fundamental 
questions to which it offered no solution and the Progressists' complete 
commitment to the plan made it an obvious target for Kadet attack. A 
138 KA, vol. 59, pp"119p122. 
139 Undated report on Kadet conference : PQ LLICE, 27-1915,51. 
140 Progressist account : TaGAOR, f. 579,386,4. 
141 Ibid, 7-8 ; Report of 11 June 1915 POLICE, 307A-1915,73 first adte*oed 
in Utro Ro s ii, 26 tä-1915 ; also DYAEIN 7& 72-3. 
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preliminary skirmish on 12 June gave the Progressists grounds for hope that 
their plan would soon be adopted by the whole Opposition. 
142 
The showdown 
over the plan occurred at a meeting on 23 June : the Progressists, convinced 
in their own minds that their plan represented the solution to all Russia's 
problems, eagerly explained their 'Committee of State Defence'. 
143 
To explode this pipedream presented no great difficulties to the Kadet 
leaders.. Milyukov and Shingarev cogently argued that the Progressist plan, 
whilst of course desirable in the extreme, had no chance whatsoever of 
implementation. The gains which Russian society had secured so far (the 
War Commission and Munitions Commission) were not so much victories over the 
government as compromises made under war duress. The pattern for the future 
must be to advocate moves which the government would find easy to accept in 
a spirit of compromise, particularly institutional extensions of the existing 
state structure. The Kadets harboured no hopes for the creation of some 
chimeric super-society organ, but recommended the creation of four new 
government ministries, for Labour, Local Government, Supply and War Measures. 
For the Duma to introduce any element of competition was to sabotage its 
recommendations from their inception in the eyes of the government ; the 
stress must be on compromise and constructive participation, not on 
competition and inevitable exclusion. The Progressist plan was heavily 
defeated by the meeting, and so demoralising was the effect that the plan 
was abandoned as quickly by the Progressists as it had been rejected by the 
Opposition as a whole. 
144 Milyukov's first attack on his rival was 
conspicuously successful both in reviving Badet drooping fortunes and 
mocking Progressist claims to be the new leader of the Left. 
Negotiations were going on all this time for a Duma session. On 9 June 
the Duma Committee for Aid unanimous3. y commissioned Rodzyanko to approach 
Goremykin with a view to securing an earlier date than November 1915 ; the 
142 TsGAOR, f . 579,386,9 ; KLYUZHEV, xvi, 24 ; Ruses Yedmo sß, 13 June 1915 
143 Ts GAOR, f. 579,386,7-9. 
144 Ibid, 9 ; Kadet Central Co., *itteedecision to oppose Progressis't plan, 
1 June 1915: Tsý R, (. 579,695,1 cited in MAKIN 85. 
following day, the more official Council of Elders (albeit with only Kadets, 
Progressists, Oktobrists and Trudoviks represented) set Rodzyanko the same 
task. 
145 
At an interview on 11 June Goremykin, by now resigned to the 
necessity for ministerial changes, held out hope for an earlier session of 
the Duma but asked Rodzyanko for time to reconstitute the Council of 
Ministers. Certain ministers would have to be dismissed in order to make 
government-Duma relations practicable ; otherwise, as Goremykin said, 'at 
the first appearance of Maklakov, every fraction would attack him and willy- 
nilly I would have to prorogue the Duma'. 
146 At an extraordinary meeting 
of the Council of Elders to discuss this reply on the thirteenth, Yefremov 
and Milyukov clashed violently. Yefremov moved the necessity of bringing to 
bear 'direct pressure' on the government to force a favourable decision from 
the temporising Goremykin. Milyukov rounded on Yefremov in exasperation : 
I don't understand you Progressists. The government is coming to meet 
us. They have dismissed IULklakov and Sukhomlinov and given their 
promise of an early Duma recall... It's all printed in the newspapers. 
What more do you want ? (147) 
Milyukov proposed a 'cooling-off' period of at least a week to allow the 
government time to prove its good faith, a motion carried despite the 
opposition of the Progressists, Trudoviks and Mensheviks. 
148 
The very same day (13 June), the Council of Ministers' meeting at the 
Stavka heard Nicholas order not only the second batch of dismissals (as 
detailed above) but further concessions to society : 
It is essential to bring forward thcdate of the convening of the 
legislative organs in order to listen to the voice of the Russian 
people... I have decided that the renewal of the activities of the 
Duma and Council will be no later than August. (149) 
Goremykin set out to secure the best possible terms for the government 
having announced a forthcoming Duna session sine die on 16 June, he 
145 T+sGAOR, f. 579,386,3 &6; TAKTIKI, War period, 19 ; Reportd for 9 June 
1915_. ß, 307A-1915,62) and 11 June 1913(POLICE. 307A-1915,71). 
146 KLYUZREV, xvii, 167 8; also T. AKTIKI, War peri©d, 19, PADENIE, vi, 312-3 
(Milyukov) and POLICE, 307A-1915,73. 
147 Quoted in KLYUZHEV, xvi, 18. 
148 P0 E, 307A-1915,75-7 ; TeGAOR, f . 579,386,6-7 ; Utro, Ro eii, 14 & 17 June 1915 ; PADENIE, vi, 31VM+l cflv). 
149 RODZYANKO 123 ; TAK XKI, War period, 19. 
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attempted to impose conditions on the Duma leaders. 
150 Rodzyanko repeated 
the gist of Goremy)Sin's proposals to the Council of Elders on 20 June : the 
government declined to set an opening date until an agenda was agreed. 
Goremykin was trying to repeat the stratagem which had proved so successful 
in January 1915, of only permitting a session if the Duma was guarantedd 
placid. On 24 June a Duma deputation headed by Milyukov received the same 
'conditional' answer. 
151 However the political circumstances of late June 
1915 were very different from those only six months previous. Goremykin 
realised that he could not resist the persistent Duma campaign for very 
long. It was already ten days since the Emperor made his decision and 
Goremykin could not barter with the Duma any longer without both irritating 
and compromising the Emperor. On 27 June Goremykin abandoned his ineffectual 
bluff and set the Duma opening date for 19 July. 
152 
Early July witnessed a futher example of the divergence of the Kadets 
and Progressists. At the same 13 June meeting at the Stavka, Nicholas 
decided to accept the experimental Rodzyanko Commission : on 27 June an 
imperial ukaze converted the provisional 'Doma Commission to the War MinsstrI 
into the permanent 'Special Commission on Defenace'. 
153 Coming on the same 
day that the date of the Duma session was announced, the Special Commission 
caused considerable confusion amongst the Duma fractions. When in early July 
the individual fractions were invited to pint up representatives to the 
Special Commission, party reactions differed considerably. The Progressiets 
refused to submit a candidate on the grounds that the Commission was a front 
organisation from which Duma participation would gain merely a simulacrum of 
power in exchange for a major share of the blame for government shortcomings 
: 'such a framework, while laying upon the members of the legislative 
150 Utro Rosaii and Rech', 17 June 1915. 
151 TAKTIKI, War period, 20 ; Undated report : PO IcE, 307A-1915,79-80 ; 
TsGAOP, f. 579,386,7 ; MILIUKOV 317 ; Rech', 25 June 1915. 
152 TsGIAL, f. 1276(Council of Ministers), x, 7,64-5 ; TAKTIKI, War pericd, 20 ; 
9 July 1915 ; PADENIE, vi , 313(Milyukov) . 
153 ROAZYANKO 123. 
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chambers great moral responsibility and defending ministers from attack, 
gives the former no real power to influence the decisions of the government' 
154 To the chagrin of Milyukov, the Kadet fraction was by and large in 
sympathy with this attitude. The Kadet leader saw in the Special Commission 
a golden opportunity for collaboration between government and Duma which 
jejeune Progressist-inspired scruples must not be permitted to obstruct. 
Despairing of the 'negative' attitude of the Kadet deputies, Milyukov took 
the issue over the head of the fraction to the Central Committee where he 
could he sure that his own view would prevail. A Kadet delegate to the 
Special Commission was elected, but Milyukov's chicanery prompted a minor 
rebellion within the fraction : Nekrasov, the leader of the heft Kadets, 
resigned from the Central Committee in protest at Milyukov'd dictatorial 
manipulation of fraction affairs. 
155 The affair went no further at this 
time beyond proving to Milyukov that when setting out to oppose Progressist 
ventures, Kadet solidarity behind his leadership could not be automatically 
assumed. 
The period of summer 1915 has been represented as one of growing 
harmony and identity of interests in Duma political life, but while this 
judgement has some merit with regard to the month of August 1915, it does 
not hold true for the earlier months. Although the spring and summer of 1915 
ostensibly witnessed a growing spirit of alliance in the interests of 
exploiting the government's current 'liberal phase', Duma party politics 
operated as viciously as ever only just below the surface. The early 
initiative of Rodzyanko brought the aktobrists back into the political 
picture for the first time in almost eighteen months and aroused the Kadets 
and Progressists from the torpor of the 'sacred union' philosophy. As in 
1914, political initiative sprang from the Progressists in the campaign for 
a Duma session but again proved unable to resist the Kadet counter-attack.. 
At a time when one might have expected a sinking of party differences in the 
154 Progreesiet account .. 
T. AOR, f. 579,586,15" 
155 Pow, 27-1915,50 also B 'rzhev ,e Ved ,9 July 1915. 
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interests of the Duma and the war effort as a whole, fraction jealousies and 
party politics played as powerful a rile as ever. 
Perhaps the most important reason for the Progressists' renewed 
initiative in early 1915 was the agitation of their industrialist backers. 
Until that time Russian industry had been more than content to supply the 
war effort and cull increased profits from its ready patriotism. By spring 
1915 however the government, disturbed by rumours of exorbitant war profit- 
Bering and anxious to establish direct control over a sector so crucial to 
the war effort, was seriously considering the nationalisation of war industry, 
The industrial lobby awoke to the danger immediately and instituted two 
parallel operations to protect its position. The first was a public relations 
exercise to change the 'grasping' image of industrial capital. Government 
incompetence in the past was employed as an argument : every mistake and 
misdemeanour of the government was spotlighted to discredit the concept of 
nationalisation. At the same time the patriotism of industry was played up 
as an alternative to state nationalisation, the slogan the 'self-mobilisat- 
-ion' of industry was desperately publicised. Russian industry counted on 
enjoying greater freedom and independence as a reluctant volunteer than as 
a state conscript. 
156 
The second industrialist operation was to make its voice heard official- 
-ly by both government and country. For this industry needed the Progressists 
as its public spokesman and the State Duma as its public forum. The initiat- 
ive of Yefremov in campaigning for an earlier Duma session received growing 
support : Pavel Ryabushinsky demanded the recall of the Duma as early as 
April 1915. His lone voice made little impact until the IX Congress of 
Representatives of Trade and Industry on 26-28 May, when he secured formal 
Congress backing for his campaign. 
157 The same Congress created the third 
of the wartime public organisations, the War Industries Committee, which 
established local organs of industry designed to improve technical and 
156 Zagorsky, The State Contrc1, pp. 76-7,82 & 87-8 ; also DYAKIN 74. 
157 Progressiat account : , 1012 
ft, f. 579: 386,3 ; TAXTIKI, War period, 17 ;j 
Ti mes, 10 & 11 June 1915(n/8), 7b & 8d respectively ; GURKO 550. 
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administrative efficiency and synchronise the resources of Russian industry 
with the demands of the war effort. 
1,58 This new organisation, again 
fundamentally a response to the threat of nationalisation, was the institut- 
-ional manifestation of the slogan the 'self-mobilisation of industry'. The 
War Industries Committee, numbering seventy-three local organs within two 
months, drew together Russian industry into a permanent structure which 
annual congresses had never been able to provide. 
159 The speed of develop- 
ment of the War Industries Committee was evidence not only of patriotism 
and eagerness to serve but of a determination to protect the interests of 
the industrialist sector. 
However the cause of industry in the Duma was by no means an easy one. 
The Progressist fraction was not as effective (or as reliable) as its 
industrial backers could have wished. Added to this, the early initiatives 
of Rodzyanko were almost entirely at the expense of the industrialist sector. 
As has already been described, Rodzyanko was so eager to reassure the 
government that its concession of the Duma War Commission had been a sound 
move that on 1 June he publicly supported (and therefore encouraged) the 
government move towards nationalisation. This action in itself betrayed the 
changing nature of the Oktobrist fraction (which had the monopoly of 
representation on the Commission) : in its earlier career Oktobrism had been 
led by the industrialist sector headed by Guchkov. By 1915 the Zemstvo- 
Oktobrists were essentially a landed interest group prepared to attack 
industry in its own interests. In the ironic confrontation, Guchkov 
(President of the War Industries Committee and past leader of the Oktobrist 
fraction) faced Rodzyanko (President of the Duma and leader of the new 
exclusively-landed Zemstvo-Oktobriats). The industrialist camp was not 
unnaturally alienated not only from the government but from the Duma, which 
appeared to be lightly abandoning the principle of society private 
158 For Congress resolutions, see Novoe Vremya, 28 May 1915 ; also KLXUZ , xiv, 163 ; KERENSRY 136 ; DYAKIN 75-6. 
159 A. Shlyapni$ov, Kanun Semnadtsatogo Goda, Moscow 1922-3, PP"99-100 '.: CHERMENSKY 493 Zagor 3º, The State. Controi, p. 89. 
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enterprise to purchase dubious political advantage from the government : the 
Duma was staking money not its own to secure winnings it refused to share. 
Rodzyanko underlined this bad impression only weeks later. Not content 
with alienating industry as a whole, Rodzyanko contrived to estrange Moscow 
industrialists altogether. Over-anxious to preserve the prerogatives of his 
precious War Commission, Rodzyanko's conception of the infant War Industries 
Committee was very proscribed. A guest at the ceremonial opening of the 
Moscow War Industries Committee on 25 June, Rodzyanko blandly informed the 
astonished delegates that the local committees would serve only to distribite 
war orders, with the War Industries Central Committee acting as a clearing- 
house for government contracts. Ryabushinsky, the President of the Moscow 
War Industries Committee, flatly refused to accept this reduced definition 
of his duties and claimed full organisational and executive rights, not just 
the routine allocation of contracts. 
160 With his sights concentrated on 
collaboration with the government, Rodzyanko betrayed his chronic 
insensitivity to factors outside the sphere of the Desna and Zemstvo- 
Oktobrist fraction. 
A final row in the course of July 1915 delineated and institutionalised 
the gulf seperating the Duma and the industrialist camp. Following the 
creation of the Special Commission on Defence (out of Rodzyanko's War 
Commission), joint meetings of the Duma Finance and Army-Navy commissions 
recommended three new Special Commissions to cover the vexed questions of 
fuel, food and transport. 
161 The Right-wing fraction representatives, 
fearing an influx of Bolsheviks onto privileged government bodies, insisted 
that no delegates from industry were to be invited to serve on any Special 
Commission that might be created. The two Duma commissions, anxious to 
secure Duma solidarity in order to present a front of unanimity in 
negotiation with the government, agreed to the Right proposition. On 25-2? 
160 Moesow report of 28 dune 1915 : P0,343, I, 72 quoted in B. B. Grave, Burzhuazia nalcanuaý evr , 'e&ov Revolvutsii Moscow 1927 (cited 
161 Tom, !. X278, v, "5 'i8 `t, Bir r pý o minutes of Finance and Arq-Davy commissions, 23.. 30 itar 19153 cited in DYaXIN 90-1 ; aieo sue' G 67-73. 
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July the First Congress of the War Industries Committees met (symbolically 
enough) in Moscow, still seething over the recent decision, which was put 
down to the Durna jealously coveting its monopoly of political access to the 
government. The Congress, which had initially envisaged institutional 
contacts with the Duma, now publicly and dramatically abandoned the scheme. 
162 Estranged by what it regarded as a Duma snub, the Congress hmffily 
severed all contacts. The War Industries Committee would now be elected 
entirely by delegates of the provincial and local committees, admitting no 
Duma representatives at any level and appointing no delegates to the Duma. 
163 
A belated attempt to repair the damage and rebuild political bridges was 
made : the Progressist fraction, acting for its industrial patrons, forced a 
vote in the Duma on the representation of the War Indhstries Committees in 
the Special Commissions. The Progressist motion scraped through by 141 votes 
to 138, albeit with a Zemstvo-Oktobrist caveat stipulating that delegates 
were to be nominated by the War Industries Central Committee and not the 
local committees, in the hope that by this device 'irresponsible' Bolshevik 
elements would be excluded. 
164 By this time however, the damage to relations 
was already done and preserved for all time in the rapidly institutionalising 
structure of the War Industries Committees. 
All three major public organisations suffered similar alienation from 
the State Duma. In part this stemmed from the early reluctance of the 
Zemstvo and Town Unions to make themselves a target for MVD harassment or 
even closure by becoming too closely associated with the political activities 
of the Duma. Ignorance of political and parliamentary matters also dissuaded 
the Unions from involvement in what was traditionally within the jurisdiction 
of the Duma alone. However another element in the estrangement came from the 
Duma itself, with its jealousy of the growing power and labour force of the 
public organisations and its insistence on the Duma's monopoly of political 
162 CHERMENSKY 522 ; DYAKIN 91 & 94. 
163 Rech', 28 July 1915,4 ; Zagorsky, The State Control p*90* 
164 Progressiet account : TeGFAOR, f. 579,386,16 ; GDSO, IV, 4,300-2 t 324 
(sitting of 1 August 1915) ; also MAKIN 91. 
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initiative and access to the government. But despite the Duma, the public 
organisations were becoming such a power in the land that they implicitly 
at least represented a challenge to both government and Duma. A police 
report of 13 June regretted that with every move made by the Zemstvo and 
Town Unions, the technical expertise which had been the rationale for 
granting permission to these bodies was becoming subordinated to political 
discussion and manoeuvre. 
165 There was little doubt that while the public 
organisations were only gradually becoming 'political' and still readily 
deferred both to government and Duma, the traditional confrontation was now 
complicated by new society forces to which both parties felt antagonistic. 
The emergent forces of society were all the more alarming for having 
their geographical concentration in Moscow. Since the outbreak of war Moscow 
had experienced a rebirth, its strategic situation at the nodal point of the 
communications system of European Russia making it the natural headquraters 
for the Union of Zemstvos, Union of Towns, War Industries Committees and all 
the ancillary 'home-front' organisations. Until mid 1915, partly in 
sublimation of the political activities from which both government and Duma 
excluded it, Moscow threw all its abundant energies into the war effort 
alone. Afater mid 1915 Moscow developed a political voice of its own and the 
proven organisational capabilities and growing self-assurance of Moscow 
started to shift into the political arena. The failures and shortcomings of 
the government and Duma in Petrograd only encouraged Moscow society in its 
challenge for the leadership of the war effort. By contrast with the energy 
of Moscow, Petrograd was becoming increasingly introverted, swept by intrigue 
, rumour and waves of despair which enveloped 
Duma deputies and government 
ministers alike. The advance of the German and Austrial armies in the summer 
of 1915 threatened Moscow more than Petrograd but evoked in the former a 
spirit of stubborn resistance which only threww into greater relief the 
collapse of morale in the capital. Paläologue noted the disgust felt. by 
Moscow towards Petrograd in his diary entry for 29 June 1915 : 
165 P0ý LICE, 3k3, I, %2 quoted" in GRAVE 19-20. 
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The citizens of Moscow are utterly furious with high social and Court 
circles in Petrograd, whom they accuse of having completely lost touch 
with national feeling, hoping for a defeat, and preparing the way for 
a betrayal. (166) 
Stanley Washburn wrote from 'Moscow the Defiant' in very similar vein in 
late October : 
If the Germans ... would draw their conclusions from Moscow rather than 
Petrograd, it is safe to assert that there would be less optimism in 
Berlin. No matter how cheerful people feel at the front Petrograd always 
sees the dark side. It is difficult for any human being to stay there 
for two consecutive weeks and preserve any true perspective of Russia 
In Moscow one finds quite the reverse : Petrograd is filled with 
apprehensions, while Moscow is defiant. (167) 
As Moscow came to view itself more and more as the heart of the war effort, 
it began to see the Duma as the society hostage held by the government in its 
Petrograd stronghold, needing sturdy support in its relations with the 
government from the forces of Moscow. 
It was clear from the moment that the Duna session opened on 19 July 
that any residual hopes for a repetition of the tame Duma of January 1915 
were groundless. In an earlier conversation with Shul'gin, even Milyukov 
conceded the necessity of the Duma voicing the complaints of the populace : 
Above all else it is necessary to lend an outlet to this irritation. 
They expect the Duma to brand the culprits for the national eatast? orhe. 
If this safety-valve is not opened in the State Duma, the irritation 
will express itself in other ways. The Duma must sternly condemn the 
mistakes and perhaps even determine the punishment. (168) 
Stephen Graham made the same point in a Septemf, er issue of the Times : 
The failure of the Russian arms meant the rise, of the Duma. As long as 
the Russian army was winning victories and driving the Austrians back, 
the political conscience of the nation was at rest, but when the change 
in fortune came and the loss of great fortresses and cities, a thousand 
voices began to ask questions. The Duma became the voice of the people, 
proclaiming anxiety, pain, dread. In great stress better that the people 
have a voice, otherwise they may go mad. The Duma affords a great 
relief. (169) 
An o%burst of pent-up criticism of the government's conduct of the war 
166 PALEOLOGUE, II, 27 ; also BUCHANAN, I, 246 and Bruce Lockhart, Th T Two 
Revolutions, p. 54. 
167 Article 'Moscow the Defiant', Tiimmea, 3 November 1915(n/s), 9e ; also 
communication from Buchanan to Grey, 19 August 1915(n/s) quoted in Grey, 
Twenty-Five-Years 1892 -191166, London 1925, vol. II, pp. 211-2. 
168 SHUL'GIN 62. 
169 Article 'The Duma and the War', Times, 6 October 1915(n/a), 6a. 
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dominated the first few days of the session. On the very first day, 
Paleologue noted that the Duma opened 'in an atmosphere which is heated, 
heavy and full of the promise of storms ; men's faces seem charged with 
electricity ; the prevailing expression is anger or intense apprehension'. 
1? 0ý 
The sitting of 20 July held that the individuals responsible for the 
munitions shortage must be held liable legally as well as morally. 
171 The 
Duma pressed its point by passing a resolution demanding legal proceedings 
against Sukhomlinov, with the possibility of treason not ruled out. 
172 The 
antagonism of the Duma towards the government appeared to offer no poesibil- 
-ity of compromise or even the avoidance of immediate prorogation. 
Milyukov however set out to prevent the Duma committing itself to an 
heroic death. The official Kadet account oversimplified the process to the 
point of mendacity : 'from the first day of the session, the Fraction of the 
People's Freedom, better prepared than the rest,.. was the ideological leader 
of the Duma majority'. 
173 This record misleads on two counts. Milyukov 
experienced rather more difficulty weaning away the Kadets from continued 
antagonism to the government than the account suggests. As Rodzyanko observed: 
The Kadets and Lefts allied to introduce a whole list of comyßaints. The 
Oktobrists opposed this, saying it was not the time for recrimination 
but for organisation for practical work. Certain Kadets were preparing 
to bring up the question of a Responsible Minietry, and it was no small 
task to dissuade them. On almost all questions, Milyukov supported the 
Oktobriste against the Progressists. (174) 
Milyukov had also to fight off a serious Progressist challenge for 
Opposition leadership. The first pre-sessional meeting of the Progressist 
fraction took place on 9 July, that of the Kadets on the thirteenth, the 
175 
Oktobrists on the fifteenth and the Nationalists and Centre on the sixteenth. 
170 PAILEOLOGUE, II, 39. 
171 GDSO, IV, 2,189-190 ; RODZYANSO 126. 
172 PALEOLOGUE, II, 40 ; BUCHANAN, I, 247 ; Lukomsky, Memoirs, PP"30-33. 
173 TAKTIKI, War period, 24. 
174 RODZYANKO 126. 
175 Report of 19 July 1915 : P0LICE, 307A-1915, pp. 88,105,109 & 113-4 ; K$dat 
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The presence of all Progressist deputies in Petrograd a full ten days before 
the Duma opening was a considerable advantage in organising their activities 
for the session. At the Council of Elders' meeting of 17 July, Milyukov 
again explained the practical advantages of pressing for government commiss- 
-ions employing Duma representation and specialist advice ; as on 23 June, 
the Progressist 'Committee of State Defence' was heavily defeated in favour 
of the more modest Kadet proposition. 
176 Proviked by this unnecessary 
repetition of past defeat, the Progressists decided to test reaction to the 
slogan 'A Ministry Responsible to the Duma', which they intended putting up 
to the Duma. At a special meeting on 18 July of all moderate fractions 
except the Kadets (who were pointedly not invited), the Progressists moved 
their slogan for the first time. Predictably its tone was too extreme for 
the Nationalists who suggested the formula 'A Ministry enjoying the Confid- 
ence of the Nation' as an alternative. Apart from the Zemstvo-Oktobrists 
(who abstained) and the Nationalists (who naturally voted for their own 
formula), all those present supported the Progressist slogan. With the 
support of four-fifths of the votes cast, the Progressists confidently 
anticipated victory on the larger stage : 
This vote gave the Progreseists fraction the right to hope that the 
formula of Responsible Ministry would be accepted by the Duma. The 
fraction considered that this formula alone contained sufficient 
clarity and exactness, and that the formula for the Confidence of 
Society in essence said nothing at all. (177) 
On 19 July the Progressist and Nationalist formulae were advanced in 
open Duma sitting. To Progressist amazement, the Kadets supported the 
Nationalist slogan, prompting (to Progressist despair) the Zemstvo-Oktobriste 
to switch from abstention to support for the same slogan. 
178 
When the votes 
were counted, the Nationalist formula of 'A Ministry of Confidence' had a 
comfortable majority ; all the Progreasists' careful preparations and 
political reconnaissance had been brought to nought. 
179 
Milynkov could 
176 PO`, 307A-1915,118 ; TAKTIKIlWar period, 23. 
177 Progressist account : Ts GAOR, i. 579,386, i1-12. 
178 Ibid_, 13 ; a. DSO, IV, 1,72 & 90-1 & 2,189-1916 ; SHUL'GIN 63. 
179 , iv, 2,196ti91 Potea to 162). 
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defend his action by indicating the compromise slogan of the June Party 
Conference ; in fact the move was motivated by his vindictive jealousy of 
the challenging role played by the Progressists. 
18o Although by their 
voting pattern the Kadets had committed themselves to the moderate Right,, 
apparently vacating the leadership of the Left to the Progressists, Milyukov 
had demonstrated not only that the Progressists were no match for the Kadets 
in political manoeuvre but that the Kadet fraction represented the fulcrum 
of Duma politics. 
Milyukov's victory over the rival slogans lent the Kadets renewed moral 
authority within the Duma. Just as significantly, the defeat of the formula 
of 'Responsible Ministry' precipitated a split within the Progressist 
fraction :a Right-wing minority led by N. N. L'vov rebelled against the 
official fraction slogan in favour of 'A Ministry of Public Confidence', 
formally quitting the Progressiet fraction in the last days of July. 
181 The 
defection of the Lvov group not only considerably weakened Progressist 
hopes of again challenging the Kadets but added solid numerical advantage to 
Milyukov's moral victory. Soon afr the initial spate of denunciation, 
Kadet authority and policy came to dominate the Duma session. 
182 
The government had now to be reassured that the Duma was not merely a 
spiteful and capricious critic deserving no better than prompt prorogation 
but a constructive force for the greater coordination of the war effort. 
183 
At a Duma closed sitting to discuss the war on 28 July, Milyuleov (for the 
Opposition) and Savenko (for the moderate Right) warmly supported the 
endeavours of the new War Minister Polivanov, stressing that the Duma's 
quarrel lay only with corruption and incompetence not with the basic direct- 
-ion of the war effort. 
184 On the thirty-first the Duma Army-Navy commission 
180 Report of 17 August 1915 : POLICE, 307A-1915,145. 
181 Progressist account : TsGAOR, f. 579,386,13-14 ; Rech', 23 July 1915. 
182 The Kadets even managed to break the traditional Oktobrist hold over the 
Duma Army-Navy commission- Shingarev was elected Chairman (the first 
non-Oktobrist ever) : Utro Roshii 22 July 1915. 
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(now under Kadet chairmanship) decided to institute closed-session daily 
meetings, to which the War Minister had an open invitation and the rights 
of inspection and veto over the commission minutes. 
185 While insisting on 
its own close involvement with the minutiae of the war effort, the commiss- 
ion thereby supplied the initiative for frank confidential relations with 
the government. Milyukov hoped by this demonstration of rational and 
responsible behaviour to offset the bad impression left upon the government 
by the ferocious if well-deserved campaign of recrimination which had 
opened the session. 
However by the first week in August it was widely rumoured that those 
forces in government and court hostile to the Duma had made political 
capital out of its initial actions and had already secured agreement in 
principle to an early prorogation. 
186 On 5 August Goremykin confirmed the 
rumours by confiding to Rodzyanko that in his personal opinion the Duma 
would be prorogued in mid August. 
187 Duma attendance fell off sharply. A 
survey of absenteeism sponsored by Rech' and Utro Rossii found that 37 
Rights and Nationalists, 26 Centre and Oktobrists, 6 Opposition and 11 non- 
party deputies were absent by 6 August ; eighty deputies, one fifth of the 
total membership, had quit the Duma in the course of the survey week. The 
motive for the exodus was the universal belief in the imminent prorogation 
or even dissolution of the Duma, an opinion held most firmly by the Duma 
Right wing which was consequently most subject to dwindling numbers. 
188 
In alarm the Duma moderates met together in the Council of Elders on 
6 August to insist upon a lon5 Duma session, a motion endorsed by all 
fractions except the Extreme Right. 
189 For the first time almost the entire 
185 POLICE, 307A-1915,128-131 ; Rech!, 1 August 1915,4. 
186 Report of 5 August 1915 : POLICE, 307A-1915,134 ; Rech', 4 August 1915,5 ; 
PADENIE, vi, 315(Milyukov). 
187 P0ý, 307A-1915,134 ; TAKTISI, War period, 29. 
188 Rech' 4 August 1915,4 A. Grunt 'Pro ..: Yi , greesivttü Blok', Výo roe Ist Vif , 19rio. 3/k, p. 109 ; TA' IKI, War period, 29 ; Uta Rc ,., 6 August 191 
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189 Report of 6 August 1915 : POLICE, 307A-1915,135 ; TAKTIKI, W&r_, Pý Odt 
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Duma membership was unanimous upon a policy at variance with that of leading 
government circles. The political phenomenon which came to be called the 
'Progressive Bloc' was born at the meeting of 6 August, prompted by the 
threat of Duma prorogation. The only effective counter-measures to such a 
move within the Duma could come from the Right, which was unusually depleted 
by its over-precipitate acceptance of the fact of prorogation ; for once 
Duma absenteeism worked to the advanfage of the Opposition. 
If the Bloc was created by the Duma moderates, it owed its first 
initiative to the promise of ministerial support. The 'coming man' in the 
cabinet was generally acknowledged to be Krivoshein, a minister both able 
and sympathetic to the cause of the Duma. Observing the unprecedentedly 
united nature of the Duma, Krivoshein projected an alliance which would 
benefit both parties. Vladimir Gurko was in no doubt about Krivoshein's 
initiative : 
The power behind the formation of the Bloc was, I believe, Krivoshein, who 
was anxious to become head of the govern fint. He thought that if he could 
effect a union of the moderate Right elements, especially the Octobrists 
with whom he had long been sympathetically and closely connected, and 
those elements of the Opposition, which at the beginning of the war had 
declared themselves ready to support the government in the work of 
defence, he would have support in his campaign to become head of the 
government. Once he had achieved this goal he thought that such a bloc 
would continue to support him, and this would mean cooperation not 
friction between government and legislature. (190) 
A 'liberal conspiracy' between the Duma majority and Krivoshein was contract- 
-ed, lending the newly-formed Bloc the initial confidence to expand its 
scope and support. However, as Milyukov was quick to point out, the Bloc 
rapidly developed its own momentum, escaping from the limited function 
ascribed to it by Krivoshein and abandoning its original author en row ute. 
191 
While the motive factor in the emergence of the 'Progressive Bloc' was 
the contract with Krivoshein, it increasingly gave pride of place to the 
steadily expanding base of the Bloc. On 9 August, a meeting at Rodayanke's= 
established the principle of an inter-fraction Bloc. 
192 The participants, 
190 Gtr 555. & 571-2(quotation) ; also MAKIN 100-1. 
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inspired by Milyukov, were eager to retain the unanimity of attfude express- 
-ed at the meeting of 6 August and especially concerned to extend the bounds 
of the Bloc as far to the Right as possible. The Extreme Right fraction was 
clearly beyond the limits of practical possibility but the Nationalists were 
by no means as monolithic in their doctrines. On several occasions, the 
split between the Right-inclined Nationalists of Balashev and the Left- 
inclined Nationalists of Shul'gin had widened, only to be hastily patched. 
The issue of Bloc membership smashed Natiooäilist unity for all time : the 
Left group, hereafter known as the 'Progressive Nationalists', opted for 
membership of the Bloc, casting off all links with the Nationalist main 
193 body. At the opposite extreme of the Duma spectrum, the Mensheßiks and 
Trudoviks thmugh declining membership were demonstraby sympathetic, thereby 
delineating a Bloc which extended from almost the most extreme Left position 
as far as the Nationalist position. 
19k In the early stages the range of the 
Bloc was still comparatively meaningless since the only obligation of 
membership was agreement to joint agitation for the continuance of the 
current Duma session. At a later stage the adherence of the Progressive 
Nationalists was to complicate the drawing-up of a Bloc Programme but the 
propaganda value of a Nationalist group within the Bloc was always considered 
sufficiently high to compensate amply for any inconvenience. 
The second stage in the process of broadening the Bloc base was an 
approach to the State Council. To unite the progressive elements of both 
legislative chambers would immeasurably increase the prestige and bargaining 
power of the Bloc. On 10 August the leaders of the Bloc sounded representat- 
-ives of the Academic, Centre and Non-Party groups of the State Council. 
195 
Mutual sympathy was unmistakable, despite the State Council's impatience 
with the Duma concentration on political programmes : 
193 Undated report : P0ý E, 307A-1915,135 ; TAZTIKI, War period, 29-30 ; 
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The concept of a legislative programme as the sole basis for rapproche- 
-meat encountered quite energetic opposition ... The critics maintained 
that the mood was too nervous for calm legislative work, and it was 
vital to put the organisation of effective authority as the first 
priority. (196) 
Guarded agreement to a political entente centred on the concept of a 
defensive bloc to agitate against the prorogation of the Duma and State 
Council. A second meeting with the Council leaders on 12 August produced 
more tangible results : four delegates from each chamber were nominated to a 
commission to formulate a Bloc programme. 
197 The Bloc commission took just 
two meetings, on 14 and 15 August, to complete the programme, despite 
the fundamental disagreement of the Duma Progressive Nationalists and Council 
Academic Group with the amnesty and Jewish rights clauses advanced by the 
Bloc majority. However a spirit of fraternal compromise and the application 
of judicious phrasing (particularly over the Jewish clause) preserved the 
unprecedented front of unity between the Duma and State Council members. 
198 
The preface to the Bloc Programme demanded two basic conditions for 
the political future : 
1. The formation of a united government, composed of individuals who 
enjoy the confidence of the country and who have agreed with the 
legislative institutions upon the fulfillment, at the earliest 
possible time, of a definite programme. 
2. Decisive changes in the methods of administration employed so far, 
which have been based upon a distrust of public initiative. 
Eight measures were cited which required immediate attention, perhaps the 
most important of which were : 
No. 1. By means of imperial clemency, a termination of cases instituted 
on charges of purely political and religious transgressions ... 
No. 2. The return of those exiled by administrative decree for matters 
of a political and religious nature ... No. 3. The complete and decisive cessation of persecution on religious 
grounds, under any pretext whatsoever ... 
No. k. The immediate drafting and introduction into the legisl`tive 
institutions of a bill for the autonomy of the Kingdom of Poland. 
No. 5. The inauguration of a programme aimed at the abolition of 
restrictions upon the rights of Jews. 
196 KA, vol. 50/51, pP"123-4 ; also TAKTIKI, War period, 3ß and PADENIE, vi, 315 TMi 1yukov) . 
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A legislative programme of twelve less urgent measures, including the 
introduction of the volost' zemstvo and the confirmation of the laws of 
199 
prohibition, concluded the Bloc Programme. When the Programme was agreed 
on 15 August, the Bloc leaders could still claim almost complete unanimity 
between Duma and Council participants. 
Again the base of the Bloc was broadened but this töme at the initiative; 
of neither its ministerial patron, Duma founders nor Council collaborators. 
Moscow educated society, since mid July particularly anxious to develop its 
political voice, intervened unasked to organise more ýeneral support for the 
Bloc. In the official Kadet account Milyukov could not dispute the röle 
played by Moscow in the Bloc campaign : 'Time did no*wait ; in the country 
the mood of society was heightening and Moscow was the organ which gave this 
mood definite shape'. 
200 
In a later account, Milyukov attempted to share 
the honours between the twp capitals : 
The political mood which was aroused in the lifetime of the Bloc swung 
backwards and forwards from Petrograd to Moscow, and from Moscow to 
Petrograd .:. It is clear that this mood manifested itself in both 
Moscow and Petrograd and that the Progressive Bloc was the product of 
a joint agreement. (201) 
'Agreement' or no, the Moscow leaders flung themselves into a campaign of 
support with enthusiasm. News of a police massacre of strikers at Ivanovo- 
Voznesensk on 10 August revived the moral outrage of the Lena massacre and 
further encouraged the Moscow campaign. 
202 
On 13 August the Moscow 
industrialist and Progressist groups published their 'Defence Cabinet' in 
Utro Rossii : 
Chairman Rodzyanko 
Minister of Interior Guchkov 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Milyukov 
Minister of Finance Shingarev 
Minister of Trade and Industry Konovalov 
State Controller Yefremov 
Minister of Agriculture Krivoshein 
Minister of Education Ignat'ev 
Minister of War Polivanov (203) 
199 KA, vol. 50/51, P"133 ; Milyukov's own copy : Teý, f"579"deý 385- 
200 TAKTIKI, War period, 28. 
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Moscow's 'ideal' cabinet allowed the retention of three liberal ministers 
currently serving in the government (Krivoshein, Polivanov and Ignat'ev) 
and judiciously distributed the moderate party representation amongst the 
remaining ministerial posts : two Oktobrists (Rodzyanko and Guchkov), two 
Kadets (Milyukov and Shingarev) and two Progressists (Konovalov and Yefremov 
). Such a blatant example of skinning the bear $eforeit was caught thoroughly 
embarrassed the Blov leaders in Petrograd. 
The Moscow leaders maintained the pressure. On 16 August Konovalov and 
Ryabushinsky convened a meeting of the leaders of Moscow society 'for the 
vital organisation of special "coalition" committees, directed by a Moscow 
Central Coalition Committee, to sponsor widespread agitation for the purpose 
of backing the programme of the "Progressive Bloc" '. 
204 The Moscow Central 
Coalition Committee immediately became an arena for conflict between the 
Progressist and Kadet viewpoints. Konovalov and Ryabushinsky demanded a 
petition to the Emperor containing an ultimatum that either the Council of 
Ministers be entirely re-staffed by society representatives or society would 
withdraw all aid, material and moral, from the war effort. Vasilii Maklakov 
headed the Kadet response, indicating the advantages of compromise, the 
impossibility of employing ultimatum tactics in wartime and the feasability 
of a joint society and government 'Ministry of Confidence'. 
205 With the 
final decision deferred until the opinion of the Bloc leaders became known, 
the Committee temporarily settled for agreement on the necessity of closer 
links between the public organisations to enable a giant 'Congress of 
Society' to meet in the foreseeable future. 
206 Just as the Duma Bloc had 
quickly outrun the leadership of Krivoshein, Moscow was showing every sign 
of outrunning the Bloc leadership in Petrograd. 
In the capital the Bloc was entering its final stage. After 15 August 
the Bloc was confonted with the question of what to do with the completed 
203 Note Milyukov'8 attempt to play it down : Rech?, 15 August 1915,4. 
204 TAKTIKI, War period, 132 ; Rech', 17 August 1915,3- 
205 Moscow report of 17 August 1915 : P0 LICE, 343,4,28 cited in DTAK1NN10 
also CHERMENSKY 543-4. 
206 P0 E, ibid ; for a deliberately vague account, see Re_ ch!, 17_ 
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Programme : Shidlovsky opposed even attesting to approach Goremykin ; 
Yefremov demanded a Bloc delegation direct to the Emperor. Choosing to avoid 
the immediate responsibility, the Bloc decided to put the issue directly to 
the individual fractions, thereby gaining in democratic aura what would 
arguably be lost in the few days' delay required to arrange the fraction 
votes. 
207 Goremykin, alive at last to the danger, attempted to sink the 
scheme by enticing away the Right Wing and reducing the Bloc's allegiance to 
the familiar confines of the 'professional Opposition' : on 15 August he 
invited the Oktobrists and Nationalists to form a new Centre Right group in 
the Duma which would enjoy government patronage and privilege after the style 
of Stolypin and would create a firm stabilising bond between government and 
Duma in the future. 
2o8 The offer which had split the Oktobrists in 1913 
had never been as explicit as that moved by the reactionary Goremykin, but 
the Bloc Right Wing chose to prefer the earlier contract offered by the more 
Krivoshein trustworthy at the inception of the Bloc. The fact remained that 
within the Bloc, the fractions of the Right were still uneasy : at the Bloc 
meeting of 17 August the Left Nationalists continued to wrangle with the 
Kadets over the clause on Jewish rights, a contest in which Milyukov finally 
compromised to safeguard Bloc unity ; at the same meeting the Centre fraction 
stipulated that it could only sign the Bloc Programme as long as it bore no 
suggestion of ultimatum. 
209 But towards the government, the Bloc maintained 
a parade-ground discipline which not even Goremykin's admittedly tempting 
offer could disrupt. 
Also on 17 August the Council of Elders agreed to put to all fractions 
the proposal that after the passage of essential war projects a programme of 
more general legislative bills be placed upon the Duma agenda. 
210 Insofaras 
an official Duma organ, the Council of Elders, was proposing a political 
programme of legislation unconnected with the war, this decision demonetrate&, 
207 KA, vol. 50/51, p. 137 ; Progressist account : TaGAOR, f. 579,386,19 
208 Shidlovsky, Vos ominania, I1,37-k0 ; TAKTIKI, War period, 31 ; PADENIE, vit 
316(Milyukov ; Russ kie Vedomostv, 17 August 1915. 
209 V. N. L'vov's caveat : PA, vo1.50/51, pp. 120,138 & 144. 
210 Re_,,,,, ch', 18 August 1915,4o 
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the universal desire to operate as in peacetime and symbolised the growing 
closer identification of the Duma and Bloc. This identification was largely 
justified by the numerical allegiance of the Bloc : some 300 deputies of the 
Duma total of about 430 were affiliated to the Bloc. 
211 With 70% of the 
Duma within the Bloc, it was hardly surprising that by late August the terms 
'Duma' and 'Bloc' had become virtually interchangable both in the public 
and ministerial mind. 
While the Bloc was solving its problems by caution and compromise, 
developments in Moscow were moving ever faster. Dzhunkovsky, Director of the 
Police Department, noted on 17 August that another 'ideal cabinet' was being 
projected : 'the Moscow society organisations have come out unanimously in 
favour of a Society Ministry, the formation of which would be entrusted to 
Prince L'vov'. 212 The public organisations, still estranged from the Duma, 
were thinking in terms of snubbing both government and Duma personnel in 
favour of their own leaders. The rivalry between Progressists and Kadets in 
Moscow grew more intense, the former constantly attempting to expanflowheir 
industrial stronghold, and the latter desperately fending off bids for their. 
control of the official organs of Moscow civic life. In a closed session of 
the Mosco* Municipal Duma to debate Army supply on 18 August, the Progressist 
attempted to persuade this traditionally Kadet institution to switch 
allegiance from the ladet formula of 'A Ministry of Confidence' to their own 
formula of 'Responsible Ministry'. 
213 The Progressist bid, though defeated, 
was not wasted. The Moscow debate was the signal for civic institutions 
throughout the provinces to introduce political issues onto their agendas, 
discover their allegiances and determine their attitudes to the rapidly 
developing political crisis in Petrograd. Messages of support for the Bloc 
211 Progressive Nationaliste(about 20), Centre(33), various Oktebr#ste(99), 
Progreasists(47), Kadets(57), nationality fractions(21). Trudoviks(10) 
and Mensheviks(9) total 296 deputies : GDSO: UKAZATEL'19-24. 
212 Published in Utro Rossii, 14 August 1915 ; Police report : TaGAO , f. 
826 
(Dzhunkovsky), I, 212,5 quotation). 
213 Report of 19, August 1915 quoted in GRAVE 22-3 ; also litre Rosa i, 19 
August 1915 and MILIUKOV 323. 
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began to flow in a steadily increasing stream from every corner of the 
Empire. At a superficial level at least, the Bloc now had a claim to 
nationwide support. 
214 
On 19 August the Duma participants in the Bloc gave final agreement to 
the Programme. 
215 Rodzyanko attempted to secure for the Bloc the greatest 
possible numerical advantage by forbidding the prolonged absence of deputies 
from the Duma without prior permission fron the Duma Chanceilery. 
216 The 
Duma fractions within the Bloc, as decided at the meeting of 15 August, vented 
on what next to do and agreed that the Programme was not to be published. 
217 
The Centre and Progressive Nationalists had made it clear that they would 
not tolerate any suggestion of ultimatum ; publication would leave no room 
for manoeuvre ; and the Bloc must make it as easy as possible for the 
government to accept the Programme, a practical concession to government 
amour rý opre which public negotiation could only injure. It was decided to 
put the Programme to the cabinet corporately at an unofficial level, with no 
public limelight to stiffen government resistance or encourage Duma 
posturings. On 22 August the Bloc leaders privately signed the Programme, 
and two days later the Centre, Academic and Non-Party groups of the State 
Council pronounced their formal agreement and joined the Bloc. 
218 
That 
familiar 'political postman' Krupensky was commissioned to submit the 
Programme to the Council of Ministers. 
219 
A ceremonial signing of the 
Programme took place in Duma sitting on 25 August despite the agitation of 
the Extreme Right and Markov Two's furious denunciation of the 'treachery' 
of the Progressive Nationalists. 
220 
214 CAERMENSRY 549 ; Stalin(Ed. ), The History of the Civil War in Russia, I, 
8; Riha, A Russian European, p. 230. 
215 TAKTI1cI, War period, p. 32. 
216 Report of 21 August 1915 : POLICE, 307A-1915,149 ; Rech', 18 August 1915,4 
217 BA, vol. 50/51, P. 138. 
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At the last moment even the Moscow industrialist group preferred to 
rally to the Bloc Programme rather than continue to take issue over the 
relative merits of rival slogans. A War Industries Committees' conference 
called and dominated by Moscow (only thirty-four of the 100 delegates were 
from neither Moscow nor Petrograd) decided on 25 August to support the Bloc 
formula of 'A Ministry of Confidence'. 
221 After disputing throughout the 
period of the Bloc formation even the more radical elements of Moscow 
'society' were now prepared to settle for the Bloc compromise in order to 
present a unified front to the government. 
Unfortunately for the policy of 'an open treaty secretly arrived at', 
the Bloc Programme leaked into the Moscow press. The precise circumstances 
of the 'leak' remain obscure but suffice to say that the 26 August evening 
editions of the Moscow press had'a journalistic 'scoop' on their hands. 
222 
The very same evening, the Council of Ministers met to consider the 
confidential document it had received and commissioned Kharitonov to approachl 
the Bloc leaders with a view to establishing their precise demands. 
223 The 
Bloc leaders now found themselves in an awkward position : 
In view of the differences of opinion over the question of publishing 
the Bloc Programme, its printing in the Petrograd papers had been 
prevented. However it appeared in a somewhat garbled text in the Moscow 
papers on August 26. After this, further restraint was meaningless. On 
August 27 the Programme was released to the Petrograd papers, even 
though a group of Bloc adherents (as was announced subsequently by 
certain State Council members) did not approve of the step. (224) 
The deputation from the Council of Ministers (Kharitinov, Aleksandr Khvostov, ] 
Shcherbatov and Shakhovskoy) now found itself meeting the Bloc in very 
different circumstances than those originally envisaged by either side. 
225 
xharitonov, the ministerial spokesman, finally conceded that there appeared 
221 Report of 25 August 1915 quoted in GRAVE 24-6. 
222 TAKTIKI, War period, 36. 
223 bid, d ; GURKO 575-6 ; M. Cherniavsky(Ed. ), Prologue to Revolution, New 
Jersey 1967, pp. 180-208. An annotated English translation of the notes 
of Secretary A. N. Yakhontov of the meetings of the Council of Ministers, 
24 July-2 September 1915, originally published in ARR, vol. 18. 
224 TAKTIKI, War period, 36. 
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to be few real differences between the Bloc and the Ministers' Council but 
these were sufficiently fundamental to be outside their competence and must 
accordingly be submitted to the Emperor. 
226 Despite the unfortunate 
circumstances of the negotiations, the ministerial delegation reported back 
to the Council of Ministers on the twenty-eigth-th in a favourable light. 
The Council expressed its sympathy for the Bloc Programme but, as Kharitonov 
had warned, declared the agreement of the government to be within the 
province of the Tsar alone. 
227 
It is vital to the understanding of the political crisis of late August 
1915 to appreciate that the emergence of the Progressive Bloc was only one 
of two fundamental issues confronting the government at this time. While the 
month of August was for the Duma and the educated societies of Petrograd and 
Moscow the era of the Progressive Bloc, the attention of the Council of 
Ministers was concentrated very largely on an entirely different stream of 
events. The summer rout of the Russian forces had persuaded the Emperor that 
his duty lay with the army and he must assume the responsibility of 
Commander-in-Chief. On the personal level, Nicholas had been 
pUsuaded from 
taking the supreme step in 1904 and 1914, disappointments which had only 
confirmed the step in the Emperor's perverse mind. 
228 The fatalism to which 
Nicholas became increasingly subject may have engendered within his complex 
and elusive personality a desire to sacrifice himself for the good of his 
country ; in Vasilli Maklakov's succinct phrase, 'the Sovereign was not 
seeking laurels, he was offering himself as a redeeming sacrifice'. 
229 From 
as early as June 1915 the Empress conducted a campaign to blacken the 
reputation of the Grand Duke Nikolai, whom she accused of harbouring plans 
226 XL, vol. 50/51, pp. 145-9 ; MILYVSOV 330 ; Rech'928 August 1915,4. 
227 TAKTIKI, War period, 36 ; EATGEL'HARDT, viii, 616 ; PADENIE, vi, 317(Milyukov) 
Rech', 29 August 1915,6 ; Cherniavsky, Pologue, pp. 209.218. 
228 Sazonov, Fateful Years, p. 291 ; Nicolas II, Journal Intime, 20 September 
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229 Vasilii Maklakov, 'On the Fall of Tsardom', SEER, vol. 18, no. 52(July 1939), 
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to oust Nicholas from the throne and take power himself as Nicholas 111- 
230 
When the Court Minister Count Frederiks on one occasion attempted to defend 
the Grand Duke, Alexandra angrily replied : 
Would you prefer that he [Nicholas - R. P. 
) 
should go on giving up his 
power piecemeal to the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaievitch, who exacts it 
ubder the pretext that General Headquarters need it and that everything 
must be subordinated to the exigencies of war ? He has insisted that the 
Ministers go and work with him at Baranovichi, he encroaches on the 
Tsar's authority in every branch of the Administration ... The Emperor 
is dethroned "de facto" and I can see the time is coming when the Grand 
Duke will openly take his place. (231) 
Returning from a tour of inspection of the front on 29 June, Nicholas spent 
the next seven weeks at Tsarskoe Selo, where the continuous attendance and 
dominance of the Empress must have furnished a vital component in his 
decision. 
232 
However Nicholas's assumption of the supreme command was not merely a 
matter of personal ambitions and court intrigues. Since June 1915 Krivoshein 
(at that time in particularly high favour with the Emperor) had pleaded the 
necessity of both cooperation with Russian society and a centralised military 
dictatorship. In early July Krivoshein recommended the immediate removal of 
Goremykin and the establishment of a War Council headed by the War Minister 
Polivanov, with Krivoshein himself as vicegerent in charge of the civil 
administration'. 
233 Over the course of July the arguments in favour of a war 
dictator were dramatically reinforced by the deteriorating military 
situation. On 16 July Polivanov delivered his famous speech to the Council of 
Ministers 'the Fatherland is in danger', in which he described the disorgan- 
-isation at the Stavka, the defeatism in Petrograd and the chaos of the home 
front "231I The most controversial issue was the relationship between the 
civil government and the Stavka. As the German and Austrian armies advanced 
230 For example, Alexamdra'. s letters of 12,17,24 & 25 June 1915 : ALEXANDRA, 89,100-1,109 & 110 respectively ; ; 
BUCHANeN, I, 239 ; BODZYARKO 218. 
also PALEOI, OGtTE, I, 285-6 and 11,65 
231, Quoted in Countess Y4einmichel, Memoriea of a Shiuwrecked World, London 
1923, p"199" 
232 Bernard Pares' commentary in ALEWWRA, pp. xxviii-xxix. 
233 GURKO 555-6 ; SAVL'GIN 78-9. 
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steadily eastward, enveloping Warsaw on 24 July, Brest-Litovsk on 13 August 
and Vilna on 5 September, the war zone under the authority of the St a vka 
shifted closer to the heart of European Russia. 
235 After mid July the 
Russian retreat brought Petrograd within the war zone and the Council of 
Ministers felt its powers dwindling to a dangerously low level. If Petrograd 
was in the war zone, was the capital to be administered by the MVD for the 
civil authorities or the VI Army for the military authorities ? 
236 
Krivoshein insisted that the latest events made dual power quite 
impossible and authority must be vested in a single centralised body, 
preferably the War Council which he had been advocating. 
237 
Shcherbatov, 
the Minister of Interior, protested that neither the MVD not the Stavka 
could solve this particular riddle, which must be submitted to the Emperor 
directly for his decision. However Goremykin, while accepting the serious 
nature of the dilemma, pleaded that court politics favoured extreme caution 
with the backstairs campaign against the Grand Duke Nikolai at its height, 
the ministers must not allow their appeal to the Tsar to be exploited by the 
anti-Grand Duke caucus. In the interests of maintaining stable direction of 
the war effort, Goremykin secured the reluctant assent of the Council to the 
postponement of any appeal to the Emperor, 
238 
However the clash between the military and civil authorities grew worse. ' 
Time and again Goremykin had to step into heated Council debates and warn his i 
colleagues that their open criticism of the Stavka could only lead to the 
dismissal of the Grand Duke. 
239 Inevitably there came a point when, as 
Sazonov explained, the problem of divided authority was threatening to 
disintegrate the entire structure of government : 
235 PALEOLOGUE, II, 41,60 & 77 ; also W. S. Churchili, The Unknown War : The 
Fýaster{} Front 1914-1917, Loadon 1941, pp. 304-7. 
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Governmental power was divided between innumerable military and civil 
bodies and there was no-one to put an end to the anarchy which continued 
unchecked, exciting people's minds and shattering the very principle 
of authority. (240) 
Despite general solicitude for the Grand Duke, there was no alternative but 
to refer the problem to the Tsar, the supreme authority alone capable of 
creating a reformed hierarchy of power to fit the straitened military and 
political circumstances. It seems that the submission of this problem to the 
Tsar finally decided him to assume the office of Commander-in-Chief. 
The reaction to Nicholas's decision was everywhere hostile. A protracted 
Council meeting on 10 August devoted entirely to a discussion of the Tear's 
decision revealed that all the ministers except Goremykin were strongly 
opposed to the move, and even Goremykin later expressed his anxiety about the 
risk the Emperor was taking. 
241 The ministers feared two principal reper- 
-cussions. As Sazonov admitted to Paleologue, the dynastic risk was immense : 
Henceforth it is the Emperor who will be personally responsible for all 
the misfortunes with which we are threatened. If the inefficiency of one 
of our generals involves us in a disaster, it will not be merely a milit- 
-ary defeat but a political and social one at the same time. (242) 
The dangers inherent in the Emperor's personal identification with military 
eventuality was not the only problem to tax the apprehensive ministers. With 
Nicholas safely removed to the Stavka, the inevitable power vacuum in the 
capital could only be filled by one unwelcome personality. No minister of 
even the most dilueted liberal tendencies could welcome the entrance of the 
Empress onto the political stage. Sazonov even dared to himt at this reason 
for ministerial opposition to the Emperor's face, only to find the audience 
23 
abruptl9 terminated. 
The reaction of the Duma was equally disapproving, as Gurko described : 
The news created a tremendous sensation, especially among the members of 
the opposition. The Duma members present were all monarchists, opposed to 
and afraid of revolutionary movements during the war, and among them the 
240 Sazonov, Fateful Years, p. 290. 
241 Ibid, pp. 291-2 ; Cherniavsky, Pro o e, pp"91-5. 
242 PALEOLOGUE, II, 58 ; also BUCHAAN, I, 238 and Denikin, 'Fevral'skaya 
revolyutsia i armia', p. 190. 
243 Sazonov, Fateful Years p. 292 ; PADENIE, vü, 220(Shcherbatoi). 
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Tsar's decision aroused many fears. They regarded the Stavka ... as a 
sort of corrective to the extreme Right policies of the Tsar but they 
felt that under Nicholas II the Stavka would lose its corrective 
influence. Krupensky's news seemed to draw together all present despite 
their varying political opinions. (244) 
This Duma unanimity came as a significant fillip to the development (though 
not the programme) of the Progressive Bloc. RoAzyanko rather hysterically 
begged the Council of Ministers to petition Nicholas not to assume the 
military command, an attitude certainly backed by the Duma majority. 
245 
When 
the decision was publicly released on 14 August, the response from society was 
again unfavourable : 'the news has produced a deplorable impression ; it is 
objected that the Emperor has no strategic experience ; he will be directly 
responsible for defeats ; and lastly he has the "evil eye"'. 
246 
At just this 
moment the Duma Army-Navy commission presented its report on the war effort 
to the Emperor. After predictable complaints about the chaos caused by divid- 
ed power, the Duma commission recommended the resolution of the problem of 
authority by the appointment of a War Dictator. The intention of the commiss- 
-ion was in fact to promote the elevation of Polivanov to the supreme milit- 
-ary office but the report, couched in language intended to avoid offending 
imperial sensibilities, was apparently taken by the Emperor as Duma corrob- 
-oration of his decision. 
2l7 As on so many other occasions, mutual misunder- 
-standing served only to widen the gulf which seperated Duma and Tsar. 
The most determined effort to change the Emperor's mind came from the 
cabinet. At a meeting of the Council on 20 August the ministers individually 
pleaded with Nivholas not to take the fatal step but made no impression upon 
the now adamant Emperor. 
248 
In desperation Samarin organised the ministers 
to make a corporate 'resignation issue' of the decision. With the signature 
of all ministers except Goremykin (who refused to oppose an Imperial decision 
244 GURKO 573 ; also Buryshkin, Moskva Kupecheska-ya, p. 319. 
2k5 GURKO 568 ; Rodzyanko, 'Qosudarstvennaya Duma", p. 15. 
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however unwise) and Polivanov and Grigorovich (whose military oaths precluded 
such a declaration), a formal letter was sent to the Emperor concluding : 
We venture once more to tell you that to the best of our judgement your 
decision threatens with serious consequences Russia, your dynasty and 
your person. At the same meeting you could see for yourself the irrecon- 
cilable difference between our Chairman and us in our estimate of the 
situation in the coutry, and of the policy to be pursued by the Govern- 
-ment. Such a state of things is inadmissible at all times and at the 
present moment it is fatal. Under such conditions we do not believe we 
can be of real service to Your Majesty and to our country. (249) 
The letter was despatched on 22 August, -the same day on which Nicholas left 
for the Stavka to assume the office of Commander-in-Chief. 
250 
Although the submission of the Bloc Programme to the Council of Ministe 
coincided with this crisis of relations between the Council majority and the 
Tsar, the Bloc leaders had high hopes that the atmosphere of crisis would 
benefit the Bloc campaign and force from the reactionary establishment 
concessions unthinkable at any other time. On 28 August the atmosphere in 
Duma and society circles was confident and optimistic. 
251 It did not seem 
possible for the Bloc demands to be refused when so many weighty factors 
were in favour. The Duma was united as never before and enjoyed the support 
of a large sector of the State Council ; the Bloc demands were relatively 
mild, partly to accommodate the unprecedented number of differing particip- 
-ants, partly to make it as dignified as possible for the government to 
concede; Petrograd and Moscow society was organised to lend the most effect- 
-ive moral support to the Bloc ; with the exception of Goremykin alone, the 
entire Council of Ministers accepted the Bloc Programme and recommended 
compromise ; even the provinces had woken up to the significance of the 
political campaign being staged in the capitals. Pot participants and onlook- 
ers alike, it was difficult to imagine why or how the Progressive Bloc 
could fail. 
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CHAPTER FIVE : THE SECOND YEAR OF WAR 
1,. TheCollaDee of the Bloc (Sertember-Decomber 1915) 
On 29 August Goremykin not out for the Sta_ with a clear brief from 
the Council of Ministers to secure the sanction of the Emperor for compromise) 
with the Bloc. 
1 In the light of the favourable reception accorded the Bloc 
Prograume by the Council the previous day, the Bloc meeting of 29 August 
greeted his mission with confidence. 
2 Even so only the most sanguine 
adherents of the Bloc failed to consider the possibility of refusal. The 
Kadete took the line that in the unlikely event of the prorogation of the, 
Duma, the Bloc would appeal over the heads of the ministers directly to the 
Sover egn through the Duma presidium ; the Pregressists insisted that the 
Duna would disobey the command to disperse and appeal to the country for 
support. The Bloc leaders soon found theaselvea having to justify their 
3 
words for when Goremftin was received in audience by Nicholas on the 
thirtieth he pleaded not for negotation with the flloc but the immediate 
prorogation of the Doma. Nicholas's response was uncharacteristically prompt 
s Goremykin returned to Petrograd the next day with the Imperial anthorisat- 
-ion for prorogation in his pocket. 
By I September rumoursand counter-rumour. were rife and the threats 
of the Bloc leaders becoming more extreme. The Progreseists swore that in 
the event of prorogation they would recall their delegates from the newl - 
created Special ouncilS as i first step towards complete withdrawal from 
the war effort. The Kadets were equally explicit, threatening a total 
boycott of the wä aaleos their political demands were met. But although 
, vol. l8, pp. 119-124 3P , ri, 317(Milyukoy). 
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the gadets publicly identified with the Progressists in their attitude, the 
threats of the Bloc leaders proved to be the weakest kind of bluff. 
6 
On 2 
September Goremykin privately informed Rodzyanke that the Duma was to be 
prorogued the next day.? Nicholas had authorised 8oremykin to prorogue the 
Doma 'not later than 3 September', and when the apprehensive deputies 
assembled that morning in open sitting, they were net with a fait accompli 
to which they mounted no challenge or skew of resistance. In the watchful 
presence of officers of the geverhaent, Redzyanko meekly declared the Duma 
session prorogued. 
8 
Shocked into submission by the cool arbitrariness of this unexpected 
act, the fighting spirit of the Bloc leaders abruptly disappeared. At the 
Council of Elders' meeting earlier the sane morning of 3 September, the 
Bloc majority prevailed upon its more militant colleagues to abandon or at 
least postpone immediate action in the interests of maintaining Bloc unity. 
9 
The Kadet account attempted to play down the gravity of the situation and 
gloss ever the divisions within the Bloc : 
In the spirit of all the tactics of the Blocs it was unanimously 
decided to receive the break in activities with complete composure is 
order to set as example to the country ... By this decision was demonstrated the unity of the Bloc. (10) 
The Sadets were easily persuaded, only too aware that their earlier threats, 
now so patently ineffectual, were a political embarrassment ; even the Left 
Kadet leader Nekrasov conceded the necessity of 'operating only by parliam- 
-entary means'. A hastily-convened meeting of the Oktobriat Central Committee 
demanded that there be ne withdrawals from legislative or state institutions 
and urged the Bloc to 'maintain its role of an organisation bringing 
pacification to the country'. 
11 The Pregreasiete were considerably harder 
6 Taß, A, 0R, f. 579,386,23 (Progressist accoust). 
7 RODZYAMO 132 ; TsGI, AL. f. 1276(Council of Miaiaters), x, 4,99. 
8 RODZYA1 XO 133 ; 4DSO, IV, 16,1207-8 . 
9Tf. 579: 386,22-3 ; ßs17 & 18 September 1915(a, /a), 8e &;; 6d 
10 TAKTIK,, war period, 39" 
11 Ram e Yedýaaoa_ts, 4 &8 Septeab"r 1913 quoted in DYE 119. 
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to convince but acceded to the Bloc majority after a brief tussle with 
tbsir consciences. 
12 
Equally seriously, a depressed Bloc meeting on the evening of 3 
September decided that although the prorogation must be viewed as 'an 
uncharacteristis and transitory episode', the Bloc was still an extension of 
the Dua azd could not function iadepoadently of it. 
13 The Bloc which 
coamaaded the loyalties of over two-thirds of the Doma dissolved not because 
of government persecution or repression but from an internal crisis of 
confidence. The decision of the Tsar not only prorogued the Duna but, at one 
remove and with the tfeatist complicity of its members, had the effect of 
proroguing the Progressive Bloc. The Bloc went into voluntary liquidation 
atil the self-confidence of its members recovered from the brutal shock 
of the rejection of the Bloc campaign. 
The self-assurance of the Bloc, evaporating quite literally overnight, 
was replaced by an, attitude of abject servility toward the government. 
14 
When the goverueit curtly and without any evidence of enbarramoment infora- 
-ed the representatives of the recessed Dues that the 1916 Budget was ready 
for examination, the Dams delegates fastened to coaply. 
15 Commencing OR 
75 Ssptszber, the Dsaa Budget commission dutifully worked its inky thrrosgh 
the state estimates as tkosgk relations between government sad Duma had 
&over boon sore cordial. 
16 If there had esisted a spirit of resistance 
towards the govera tt, this wau the moasat for counter-attack. The Daaa 
leaders could claim that the arbitrary äad unwarranted closure of the 
session preveated coastractive collaboration with the government, opening up 
the exploitation of the current financial aced of the goverment to extract 
political coacessioae. Two factor. pr. te*ted auok a Dvua respoaae. In the 
12 Ts R, f . 579,386,23 ; RODZTi tO '132-3 ; TARTISI, liar period, 39-40. 
13 Mlvo1. $Oj51, pp"154-5 ; as st*te*sat : Bwas e Ysdoaao; t , 10 Septeaber 1915 ; 2AL? IYI, Tier period, 40. 
14 Stalin sra*d tie wkole B'oa aaapaige, 'a revolt om their knees' : Stalin (Sd. ), The Histori of the Cl nuts, I, 2`ýº 
1, TaGI ,f . 1276 
(Co*g 1 of ai&ters) *_, 4,102. 
16 Po Ga 3o7&. 1915,150. 
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first place, Goremjkii had taken steps against just such an eventuality (as 
will be described below) ; and perhaps most significantly, the complete and 
utter collapse of Du*a zorale precluded any possibility of organised 
oppoeitioa to the government. 
But while the Bloc s*rresdered without a semblance of resistance, its 
sympathisers within the Council of Ministers fought hard. On 2 September 
Goreapkin informed an astounded Council that the Tsar had decided against 
further negotiations with the Duna, which would be prorogued the next dam ; 
as to the collective letter of resignation submitted by the eight 'liberal' 
ministers, the Emperor was pleased to command all ministers to retain at 
their posts. 
'? With time to consider the enormity of the decision, the 
Conzcil mounted a full-scale protest at the meeting of 4 September. Goremykia 
was accused of acting directly contrary to the wishes of the Council eajority 
by delivering a report to tie Tsar which gave a false impression both of the 
good of the Dsaa and the recommendations of the Council . Goremykia argued 
is return that the Council Chairman alone constituted the official channel 
of com micatioa between the Duna and the Tsar, hence he was perfectly 
withia his rights to follow his owa advice to the *xclvAioa of fellow 
iiaisters. 
18 The meeting broke up in disorder, leaviag Goresykin deteraized 
to *soap* from tke present intolerable position : OR 14 September he travell- 
-4d to the Std to appeal to the Eaperor to decide between the Council 
majority azd its chair as. Nickolas promptly sum oaed all ministers concerned 
to a Council teeti*g At the Stxft& os 16 Septeaber, which was to be the 
'showdown' between Goremykii and his`oppoaeats. 
79 
Amte].? aware of their aadie*cr °ud that they were fighting for their 
political lives, the two sides attaeksd saoh other without aorof. 
20 
At first 
Nickolas may have hoped for ex aeeöii96datio* with tine liberal group : to 
17 Cheraiavmk7, Prm., 
ý 
1o 9PP"227 & -233 ; IXLXUKOV 331 ; SasoaoT, Fatetnl Year., 
18 Police report of 6 $eptesDeaýx1915 =; , #. 6,3 3,2,25557 gao1* GRAYS 43. 
19 G"atkoye o , Loadoz 1967(cite4t koreatter 
,A XAMV rp"152 ; <, " 9-90 ; GVM 379-580. 
. 205. 
quote Gorozykin, all of them got a good scolding from His Majesty the 
emperor for the August letter and for their behaviour during the August 
; crisis'. 
21 But Nicholas quickly perceived that there was no possibility of 
the two antagonistic groups continuing in the same cabinet : either 
Sksberbator and Saaarin would have to go, or Goremykin. There does not seen 
to have been any doubt in Nicholas's mind as to who should remain : 
From all corners of Russia come the warmest cosgratalatuons from my 
truly loyal subjects. It would be useful for you worthy ministers to 
spend some tine here at the front to refresh your minds. I hope that 
henceforth you will be unhesitatingly follow my orders as well as the 
instructions of Ivan Legginovieh, whom I intend to retain at the head 
of the Council of Ministers for a long time. (22) 
Is a letter to the Empress dated 17 September, Nicholas observed that 
'yesterday's sitting has clearly shown as that the Ministers do not wish to 
work with old Gore in spite of the stern words which I addressed to then , 
therefore on my return some changes must take place'. 
23 Nicholas's decision 
to purge the Council awaited only his return to Petrograd to be translated 
ist, ®-fact. The ministerial letter of 21 August had clearly identified the 
disruptive elements within the cabinet and, as Sasoaoe described, 
It decided the fate of the lliaisters who signed it : six of them, 
including myself, were gradually got rid of during the following year 
and only two, supposed to be less dangerous, remained in office till 
the downfall of the monarchy. (24) 
Within ten days of the 16 September meeting the two most committed advocates 
of collaboration with the INas Bloc had been summarily removed, clearing the 
way for the refurbished authority of Goresykin as Council Chairman and the 
dedicated reaction of the new occupant of the MVD. 
The third protagonist in the political crisis was the collection of 
public organisations centred on Moscow. While the Dunn prorogation elicited 
o disappost*ent a*dd' resignation in the Capital, in Moscow it generated a 
»r' . 
dyzuie respow. býai atslq ritt. ! unkest im exprese"g the 
AMqv*jl8vv*136 ; NILIUKOY 331 ; QUO 580-1. 
Cies iatt+ýkTrý 'ýl gF. 243 1,61M 599-580 ; NICHOLAS 90. 
22 l ! (. Sa ov Iz IItst'l. ýtsük ýý° ? .. , Rex York 1955, vo1. IX, 3P"306" 
NICHOLAS 91. 
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disillusionment of the higher society circles in Moscow when on 4 September 
he called for the withdrawal of all war aid to the government. 
25 To 
universal surprise the Moscow proletariat responded to the political crisis 
with enthusiasm : while Petrograd could muster only 2,500 strikers, 17,800 
came out in sympathy with the Duna in Moscow. 
26 A Soviet commentator claims 
that the official police figures are grossly misleading and suggests that the 
total striking force in the capitals may have touched 70,000.27 
Whatever the exact figures, this unforeseen mifestatioa of support 
from the urban proletariat alarmed the Duaa for, far from being cheered by 
the workers' response, the Bloc leaders dreaded the approach of a fresh 
revolutionary situation. lonovalov for the Progressists was apprehensive : 
It is essential immediately to take every measure to prevent the people 
from reaching that state of morale when it is so overwhelmed by despair 
that it appears there is only one course open - the path of force and 
every kind of excess. (28) 
Kerensky feared the government was attempting to provoke the Opposition into 
committing itself to premature revolution : 
To prevent the government seizing the opportunity to explain away its 
military failures and its growing repression, the Trudovik fraction 
mast maintain its tactics of restraint and appeal to the Workers not 
to strike ... the activities of the government must be viewed as 
provocation. (29) 
At a meeting on 5 September, the Drama Kadets regretted what they regarded as 
a potentially explosive situatioa. 
30 Geohkov too felt constrained to make 
the Oktobrist position clear : `we dpmaaded that the government eater into 
an agreeqieat with the demands of society not for revolution but to strengthen 
the government for the purpose of the defence of the homeland from revolution 
and anarchy' 
31 
25 Moscow police telegram of 4 September 1915: T sGAOR, f. 6,343: 25157 
quoted is GRAS-38. 
26 Moscow Polio* telegram of 5 September 1915 , f. 6,341,2 $O4 
quoted. in GRAVE 40. 
27 6 ,. 571. 
28 Mcscov Police report of 29 August 1915 : TsGAOR, f. 6,343,2.27553 quota 
in GRAVE 30 
29 Repot` of 4. September' 1915 : p0 I , z+ý3.3#5« º, 19'13,2 -6!. 
; 9- 
quoted 30 Moscow Police to . egram of 5 September 1915 ; Ann n , f. 6,3*1,22 is GRAv 4o ; Tam t. 52 32,196-2b2(a sa46 det Cemta 
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Believing that a policy of restraint was essential if revolution in 
Moscow was to be averted, the public orgaaisations followed the Bloc lead. 
At a giant meeting drawing attendance from all parties, public institutions 
and organisations on 5 September in Moscow, unmistakable antagonism tosards 
the government was muted by fear of the terrible consequences of forthright 
criticism. 
32 At anotheb open meeting the following day Chelaokov, while 
agreeing that the imminent congresses of the Zeastvo and Town Unions should 
formally consider demands for a renewed Dumm session and a Ministry of Public 
Confidence, insisted that the congresses must also publish an appeal for calm 
together with a petition to the Tsar to restore law and order in the 
capitals, 
33 
The Moscow congresses which net 7-9 September were the obvious rallying- 
point for political opposition to the government. Even the Empress was alive 
to the possibility of the congresses being a substitute for the recessed 
Dana : 
Now the ambers of the Duma want to most in Moscow to talk over every- 
-thing when their work here is closed - one ought energetically to 
forbid it, it will only bring great troubles. If they do that - one 
ought to say that the Dunn will not then be reopened till amok later - threaten then. (34) 
If the Bloc leaders were to make a gfiok recovery from the prorogation, it 
was to the congresses that they mast turn as the political and organisatioul 
heirs of the Dula. 
However from outside and from within the Congresses, the Bloc loaders 
continued to plead for palm. To the Moscow Kadets on 8 $epteaber Mily kov 
"tressed the virtues which he claimed to distinguish in the Progressive Bloat 
played down the 'temporary' interruption in the activities of the Duaa and 
meeting of 5 September 1915) quoted in DYAHIN 120. 
31 Moscow Police report of 8 September 1915 : TsGA©D, f. 6,3k3,2,25534 gm6t6d 
is GRAYS 50 . 
32 Moseox Police report of 6 Sept. aber 1915 : TsGAOR, t. 6,3k3,2,25557 quoted 
in GRAVE 40. 
33 uadatsd Mosgow PPoii. 9 report sT4., i, 6 ,, 343,2,26380 quotod -#, i GRLTE 48 ", Ck laiokor also sigaed auf appeaI for cal* as Heed of the Noaeow xwd$: LP- 
-al Dma t ßßt". %, 6 Sspboabor 1915 eitel is MAMM 120. 
34 AMexezdra to Nickolas, 2 Septeaber 1915: L RJ1 135 tal" 1 i. 
condemned the militant tendencies of the Progressists as criminally 
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irresponsible. 35 Keren. k7 too publicly reiterated his plea fOG restraint 036 
The efforts of the Duaa moderates proved largely successful : though the 
debates were storay, the official resolutions passed on the final day of the 
Congresses were relatively mild. The Kadet element within the Union of Towns 
prevailed over the Progressist minority and lent official support to the 
restrained criticisms put up by the joint Kadet and Left Oktobrist establish- 
-aent within the union of Zeastvos. 
37 
Public interest centred on the decision of the Congresses to cake a 
personal appeal to the Emperor through a deputation elested equally from the 
Zenstvo and Town IInioas. 
38 Anticipating that the Tomas Union might elect 
pdisal representatives, the Zeastro Union deliberately selected delegates 
of known moderate views : the Right ladet Lvov (Union President) and the 
Oktobrists lanoasky acid Naslov. As it turned out however, the moderate cause 
was not lost within the Tomas Union : the ladet Chelnokov joined the 
Progressists Astrov and Ryabssbiisky to represent the Towns union on tie 
depntation. 39 Overall the deputation membership of two Oktobrists, two 
Kadets and two Progressists gave the ladets a pivotal leadership. The 
attitude of the Congresses towards the deputation differed significantly. 
The prevalent feeling within the Towns Union was that the Congress should not 
disperse until the deputation was received as a guarantee against 'treachery' 
on the part of the government and faint-heartedness on the part of the 
deputation. But the majority of the Zenstro Vaion proposed the sdjourziig of 
e current Congresses until after the reception of the delegation. The final 
word lay with the delegation itself, which by a predictable four-to-fro vote 
favoured tie latter coarse. The Congresses closed oa 9 September despite 
33 POLICS, M, 27/46(Moasow), 1913,39. 
36 PO,,. 2,243,31+5-x, 1915,42. 
3? TaGA08, f . 62? (St1rur) , 14,4-3 ; XLTUZHEY, inü, 7 ; GRAVE 56.. 7. 
38 LqLA. OJt, f. 62? (Sttru*r)qi4O3 ; PALIOLOGUS, II, 83 ; also , 
D? AXW 122. 
39 Moscow P02109 report of 9 September 191,8 : TsGAOR, f . 6,343,2,2599; Voted iä GRAYS g3. k; XLTUZMIV, xvii, 6; Bari skkia, oiýa I*11s PAP. 
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disquietude on the part of a large proportion of the delegates. 
40 
The hope. 
of Duma society now rested on the Congresses' delegation. 
In presenting his report on the Congresses, the Director of the Police 
De, partaent recommended that all projected congresses and conferences be 
banned. 
41 
However the current occupant of the M09 Prince Shcherbatov, had 
every intention of securing for the delegation a fair hearing before the 
Tear : on 11 September the joint-chairmen of the delegation, Lvov and 
Ch*laokov, were informed that the Tsar would receive then shortly. 
42 
But 
witkin days the moderate cause suffered a substantial setback. Shaherbatov's 
report on tko events of the previous month delivered to Nicholas on 16 
September clearly revealed hin sympathy for the Progressive Bloc and the 
Coigre6eea. 
43 
At the cabinet showdown on the afternoon of the same darr, 
ßkcherbatov showed himself too hostile to Goremykin to be tolerated any 
loaer. Nicholas decided botk to purge his Council and reject the petition 
1 
of the Cosgressee. Oa 20 September as embarrassed Skoherbatov relayed 
Nickolas's decision that no delegation of a political nature could be 
received by the Ssperor. 
45 
The impact of this eoumuaication upon the dispersed Coagress delegates 
was hardly less ahatteriag thas that of the Dam prorogation on the Bloc 
nesbera acne three weeks previously. Again the effect was not to provoke the 
Opposition into direct action but to convince it of the uselessness of 
further agitation. 03L 27 September the Towns Union made a public stateasat : 
the collapse of the 8essian war effort was the fault of the government alone, 
for the army and nation had consistently done tkeir duty ; the only solution 
to tke political and military srisia was irks iaaediate transfer of Boxer 
40 Doeuiezt selections quoted is GRATZ $34-& 56v7- 
41 GROB 56. 
42 Report by L'nov, Kaasasky and Naslor quoted in GRAVE 58. 
43 Skcherbatov's Report :T QH, S. 627(8ttraor), 14,1. -6. 
44 ALM-gv*3.. 18tp. 136 GMN O 579-589. 
4.5 Report by L'vov, Kau aky a }Iaaº3, oY grtoted IN Grave 58 ; POL] CE, 27-1915, 60 PALEOLOGUE, II, 84 ; AU 919 248-9. 
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,& coalition government held responsible 
to a reconvened Satate Duaa. 
1 
document was a despairing apology for the political impotence of the 
public organisations. On 29 September the six members of the Congresses' 
4lelegation considered their position : the Congresses' members had long ago 
="tnrned to their war employment and could not be mustered to provide 
effective support for a campaign to force their attentions upon the Tsar. 
The delegation dispersed in silence after a formal vote against freak 
oo*gresses of the public organisations in the near intnre. 
47 
In the face of 
t*e intransigence of the Tsar, the leaders of the public organiaatioas 
r, sacted is precisely the same way as the Progressive Bloc. Like the Duna 
Bloc and like the Bloc sympathisers within the Council of Ministers, the 
p*biic organisations restricted their political campaign to confines of 
their own ckooeing. 
Probably the most sigaificaat feature of the post-prorogation crisis 
was the röle played by the Progressive Bloc. It had always been assessed that 
in the event of a political clash between the Tsar and the nation, the Dana 
would spearhead the national soveseat« This did not prove to be the aase in 
goptesber 1915" Since this represented their first tentative foray into the, 
political arena, the public orgaaisatioas looked to the Progressive Bloc for 
guidance and direction. Not only did the Duna Bloc fail to give, a lead to 
the public organisatioas, it positively discouraged their assumption of a 
strong political line. Far fro* welcoming tie arrival of a new and powerful 
political agent upon the seen, the Dusa leaders jealously discerned a 
potential challenger to their own monopoly of political action. To avert the 
dagger the Bloc leaders, with Milynkor, Guchkov and Boaoyalov at the fore- 
-front, exercised their authority to calm the proletariat whose response to 
tha Puma plight had proved so embarrassingly effusive, and to restrain the 
public organisations Which were tempted to take up the Opposition campaign 
46SLT ZBEY, xvii, 1O-11. 
Re,,,. ck',, 30 3eptea er `1913 ; 'also CBS TSK 592, 
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against the government. During September the impetus of the society campaign 
ras controlled less by the defensive repressive actions of the government 
than the insistent restraining influence of the Dana Bloc. For täe month 
after the prorogation of the Dunn, society was policed not by the MVD but 
hi the Progressive Bloc. 
When seeking explanations for the defeat (as distinct from the collapse) 
of the Progressive Bloc, the circumstances of the Emperor must figure 
prominently. With so many advantages working for the Bloc, only the aair 
himself was sufficiently powerful to upset the odds for success. Travelling 
to the Sttavrka from Petrograd on 23 Antguet, Nicholas felt the burdens of 
political leadership falling from his shoulders with immense relief. In 
undertaking the office of Commander-in-Chief in a sphere far removed from 
the desoralisizg defeatism of the capital and the claustrophobic domesticity 
of life with Alexandra, Nicholas experienced a feeling of elation which he 
himself co=pared to the eootioa following Holy Cou, unioi. 
48 
Refreshed by 
kis welcome remoteness from 'the poisoned air of Petrograd', Nicholas 
quickly absorbed from kin Chief-of-Staff llekseyov a soldier's healthy 
contempt for the antics of office-bound civiliaau. 
49 
-The spirit of cautious 
optimism which pervaded the Front contrasted starkly with the extravagant 
despair of those safe in the capital. As Nickolas remarked-to Pierre Gilliard, 
You have no idea how depressing it is to be away from the front., It 
seems as if everything here saps energy and enfeebles resolution. The 
most pessimistic armours and the most ridiculous stories are accepted 
and get about everywhere ... At the front there is only one thought - 
the determination to conquer. A133L else is forgotten and, in spite of our 
losses and reverses, everyone remains confident. (50) 
Into this fresh atmosphere of hope and determined action, all the more 
intoxicating because of its brief duration, burst Goreaykin with tales of 
rebellion within and outside the government. With hindsight, it is plain 
that the greatest mischance of the political crisis was that the two issues 
of the Bloc Programme and Nigho ms's sssroutption of military command coincided, 
48 Nicolas to al szandrx, 25 a+uegsw . 1915 < :. 
NICHOLAS 70. 
49 PLLEOLOGD8, II, 90 ; IIanmo*1Zn Utaeplevshikkhh. II, 36. 
50 Gilliard, Thirteea Years, p. 137 ; also MILIUKOV 333. 
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To Nicholas, remote from political erects at Baranovicki, it seemed hardly 
i *sideatal that the Dana should consort with the liberal wing of the 
46u. il of Hiaisters precisely at the time when he had received as illegal 
&tteapt to force his hasd from those sause mmiaisters. The ministerial letter 
"f, 21 August and the Bloc Programme of 22 August were expressions of the 
sam. coalition aimed at forcing fundamental reform in tke midst of war and 
preventing the Emperor continuing as Commander-ix-Chief. This impression of 
seaspiracf a4aiast the Autocracy was accentuated by the single biased 
&aeosat to which Nickolas had access - that of Goremykin - and the single 
biased izapiratioa to which he was mmb jested - that of Alexaadra. 
51 
Browbeaten by the correapoadeace of the Empress and exasperated by tie 
"port of Goreaykia, Nickolas allowed his irritation to manifest itself in 
a precipitate action wiick many considered contradicted the recent direction 
of bis thougkt. 
52 
But while tke personal circumstances of the Tsar palayed tke crucial 
fiele in the prorogation of the Dana, they provide no insight into the utter 
sollapse of the Bloc immediately on receipt of the imperial vkaze. In point 
"f fact many of the political factors which appeared to support the Bloc 
were either quite illusory or faded into insignificance when viewed in a 
wider context. Into the first category eaters the auch-vaunted support for 
the Bloc within the Council of Ministers. It has already been suggested that 
the timing of the ministerial letter to Nicholas could not have been more 
tsfortnsate for the Bloc. Under these circumstances, the open sympathy for 
the Bloc of the sane group of ministers at the Council meeting of 28 August 
proved more of a hindrance than a kelp in recommending the Bloc to the 
piaptror. Ever sensitive to any encroachment upon his autocratic prerogatives, 
1iskolas classed the Dana with the ýIxsbel' ministers-and meted out punish- 
. nest to both in equal measure. 
31 Be* tke barrage of appeals fro* Ale2a"ra to 0lose the Doma : ARA 
117(23 Angust), 127(28 Aiagst),,. 130(29 August) & 131(30 August)* 
S2 For example, ä8&EASEY 144. 
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Leaving aside the unfortunate coincidence of the Bloc campaign and the 
ministerial protest, sympathy for the Bloc on the part of even a number of 
ministers was no guarantee of victory. Nicholas insisted that matters 
r. lating to the Duna were the monopoly of the Chairman of the Council, to 
the official exclusion of even the Minister of Interior. Added to this was 
the fact that effective 'rebellion' by ministers against the Tsar was. 
impossible. In the event of the submission of individual or collective 
resignations, the Tsar could either accept or flatly refuse them. Kokovtsov 
in November 1913, Maklakov in March 1915 and later Trepov in December 1916 
f*rsish examples of ministers whom Nicholas would not allow to resign until 
a, time convenient to himself. Nauaov in October 1915, Aleksaadr Khvostov in 
Jane 1916 and Golitsyn in December 1916 are instances of individuals whose 
r luctaace to assume ministerial office was overridden by command of the 
Emperor. Ministers were totally dependent upon the Tsar for their appoint- 
.. meats, retention in offise and termination of service. Despite their 
ostensible power, the complete dependence of the ministers upon the whim of 
the Tsar meant that the sympathy or antipathy of even a cumber of ministers 
provided little concrete resource in approaching the Tsar. 
It has already been indicated that when the government demanded the 
convening of the Duaa Budget commission to consider the 1916 Budget, the 
Bloc leadership made no attempt to exploit the Doma*s financial prerogatives 
to extract political concessions. At first glance, this is stark evidence of 
the extent to which the Bloc's ability to fight back had disappeared. 
Bowerer while the crash in Dana self-confidence was an accomplished fact, 
the financial aspects of the Dana, dilemma were more complicated than appears 
at first sight. Goresykin had always taken pains to attempt to ensure that 
any wartime session granted the Dana would be harmless : his machinations 
bolore the Dana session of January 19,15 testify to his- determination is this 
respect. while txaable to proscribe the 1915 ßuaer Session of the Doma is 
q ite the sau way, Gereyºici* pr. p rei for the worst. Since the Duza's only 
`i:: ýi ZI4" 
smal power lay in its perusal of the State Budget, Goremykin reasoned that to 
r ove. or at least threaten to remove this privilege would reader the 
coapletely harmless. 
;;,, 0* 19 June, with the prospect of a Duaa session on the horizon, 
ao"xykia persuaded the Council of Ministers to consider the principle of 
oxation by decree in the future (reviving the notion of August 1914). 
53 If 
t3ps, government could raise taxes without recourse to the Doma, the Dumm 
womid survive merely as a government luxury which could be dispensed with 
e sever circumstances dictated. On, 27 June, encouraged by guarded Council 
agsement to his taxation scheme, Goremykin conceded the Drama session 
fcsaeaaiag on 19 July. 
54 ßoremykia secured the approval of the Emperor and 
the announcement was brazenly made a more five days before the Dania met. The 
p lgatioa baldly stated that under the terms of Clause 87 of the Fuadam- 
-. *tal Laws, taxation could be raised by decree for the next two-and-a-half 
yo, ars. 
55 At one stroke the finAial rights of the Doma were effectively bf- 
passed until January 1918. Only the Tsar's indulgent attitude towards the 
, Damn 
kept Goreaykin from saaaaxily dismissing the legislative assemblies. 
. moment 
that the Tsar's political opinion coincided with that of its 
tom*, f minister, the Dana coal& be safely prorogued. That moment came at the 
fIsAm 30 August. After prorogation Goremykia contemptuously offered the 
Dams, the tost menial form of financial collaboration : it was required to 
pow tke 1916 Budget is the oertaia ksewledge that refusal would mean the 
withdrawal of eirea this servile faactioa. with aorale lower than at almost 
alk-T jse is tip history of tie Duaa, the Bloc leaders were prepared to 
asspt this trareaty of its lia«eial prerogatives rather than attempt to 
affle the point. 
56 
Tke Bloc AM prove no iateh for tke eeiabli. ba. *t over tactics. At base 
*bore could be only two effective apptaaeies to the g+QTeruuest in Aaguat - 
3 PADENIE, iii, 313(Gores kiiz) 
TAXTIZI, War periad, 2©; MILIUKOP 31?. 
PADENIE, iii, 313(Goremykia). 
36 PoLICE, 307&-19159150. 
,ýY, ,; tý, < 
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clandestine pressure or the threat of open rebellion after the canner 
. 1945. The first sethod was infinitely sore suited to the Dnaa members, 
taanteed the widest measure of society support and Offended few patriotic 
pl. es as to the morality of extracting concessions under war duress. To 
e*ota a perceptive police reporter, the 8adets ideally wazted 'to effect a 
Useful revolution clandestinely [za. s is - original 
I with the , unction 
#*, Us govera&ent itself' . 
57 Unhappily, the clandestine nature of the Bloc 
Joell survived its inception : widening membership multiplied the chances 
ýf*-a. public contest with the goyernseat, Moscow initiated its own unsolicited 
easrpaign of support, the Bloc Programs leaked into the press and the whole 
ILI" campaign escaped from the confines of the Data into the streets. The 
, so"lstely public nature of the campaign by the time the Bloc approached the 
c. aseil of Ministers os 27 August sabotaged any hope of clandestine pressure 
a*4 stiffened the resistance of the Tsar and the Rightist establishaeat. 
The only real alternative now wad to abandon 'pressure' mad pass on to 
ads rebellion. However tie Bloc leaders =Hera frankly terrified to attempt 
Syr raising of the populace. The only precedent - the Vyborg Appeal - had 
proved an unmitigated disaster and &o-ans, with any experience of that 
tra*a&tic event ever motored the confidence, to repeat the experiment. she 
Bloc leaders were trapped bfr their own 1{ 4 tatioas. 'Clmdeetiae pressure' 
was thi oily weapon they were < prepared to eaploy is wertine and once this 
423Moack wau speit, Cite weaka""ea of tke Sloe, as& of the Fourtk Deana itself 
pree1aded the osly altersatüe means of political warfare. In its last stages 
the Bloc sampaiga scar oossciovll or sawittiagly as exersise is bluff ; who* 
that bluff was called, the realia*tio* of -their political impotence hit the 
p; aa soderates iard*r tiara er. r beforo. 
Täe pvorogatio* of tits Dma *sber. * is a poriod of growing goveraseat 
;. aetiox, A first soae aodsrates still seised upon, any faint indications of 
a aoatüuiag `'Li. ber Pltai #r Pk" 8aplºror proved as unpredictable as over, 
Pot" rad r. pcrrt of 23 ßt bsr 1913 PO t . xvi. 27157,19l5, " 
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srhaps now regrekting his earlier over-hasty decision. On 27 September the 
i Minister of Interior Alehsei gkvostoT Joined Gorenykin in proposing the 
cteasio8 of pro-issue censorship from the areas of 'Reinforced Protection' 
= o- the whole of the Russian Empire. The Council of 
Ministers agreed that the 
failure of the Bloc had prompted a collapse ix aorale suffisient to tolerate 
putting back the clock to the pre-1905 days of censorship byt Nicholas, as 
os so many occasions the despair of hin ministers and critics alike, termed 
tk* proposition down flat . 
58 Nickolas also mystified the Right by his 
cäoiae of new aiaietera. When in late October Krivoaheia was forced by ill- 
-1waltk to retire from the Chief Adaiaistration of Agriculture, Nicholas 
appointed in his stead not a reactionary but the moderate Right Natsmov. 
59 
#Dreover, as a gesture of gratitude to the departing Brivoshein, Nicholas 
foraally elevated the Chief Admiaistratioa of Agriculture to the statue of 
a Miaistry, thereby endowing Naaao" with greater official powers than his 
predecessors. 
6o 
The next day (27 October) the reactionary Minister of 
'ý 
Ej 
ýý; 
3 
Coa*uaieations Rukklov was brusquely di issed and replaced by the *oderate 
Bight £L. ksandr Trepev. 
61 
'Altus', the political com aentator of Utro Roasii, 
soafessed himself quite bewildered by the ohanges 
The Left did not want the retirement of Xrioosheia but the Right did - 
and they won. The Rights did not want the reaoval of Rakhloy but the 
heft did - and they won ... I would net be surprised if I read in 
tomorrow's papers that in the place of 8rivoshein and Rukhiof were 
appointed two ministers fron aaoag the Duaa deputies. (62) 
&Jokol, the most extrese Right of the daily aewapapers, could sake ao aore 
Brise of the changes than its Progressist rival : 
Is the last analysis, who Will Win ? Just what is the political direct- 
-ios these days ? Where is Russia heading : to the Right to the Left} 
forward or backward ? To% ask but you find no answers. 
(63) 
58 läarye, Nesriag the Ead, pp. 268 & 271. ° 
59 See Krivosheia's scrap-book of press-cuttiags : TaGIAL, f. 1571(Kritosheia0 
, I, delo 237 ; also 
PADERI$, i9330-1(Nauaov). 
60 Tkk* distiactios is Glaimae , 8os Erle 9 am Ki sterstto : tro Roo ii and Riss Me Fedoao,. oeetZ, 2 October 1915. 
61 8e_ c', 28 October 1915 ; "also DTALIN 134. - 
62 # Igo 8aß30 October 191$. 
63 Eo_, 
_lok0l, 
31 October 1915 cuttiag is Ts_, GLL, t. 1571, I, 237,15. 
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, 
t, is likely that the Emperor, now uncertain of the correctness of his 
vision to prorogue the Duma, was disposed to prevent a complete flooding 
the cabinet by reactionaries, which would sabotage all hope of reconcil- 
. -kation with the Duna. 
With the passage of time however the reactionary course gathered strength. 
The forces of the Right responded to the challenge of the Progressive Bloc 
, ti the organisation of their own 'Black Bloc'. After the 
Duma prorogation, 
^_ succession of provincial Rightist congresses combined to flaunt the victory 
of the Bight in the faces of the crushed moderates and kept the general 
, tblic well aware of 
the ascendancy of reaction. * 
64 
Within the newly- 
©astituted Council of Ministers, the driving force was the Minister of 
X terior, Aleksei Khvostov, recruited from the Right fraction of the Duma. 
Esthnsiastically taking up the banner of his earlier predecessor Maklakov, 
Eitvostov set out to undermine the Council Chairmanship, seize the initiative 
within the cabinet and expand the authority of the HVD within the structure 
of government. 
65 
Towards the country ähvoatov'e policies were unequivocally 
repressive. To give two examples, an attempt by the Union of Towns to foster 
a new public organization, a Co-operat . ve IIaiong xa+e cya c&lly and ruthlessly 
66 
MI-- eased ; and the ban on all congresses and conferences recoaseaded by 
the Police Director as early as 9 September eM rejected by Shcherbatof was 
J. Xplemeated by Khvostov from 6, Noveaber. 
67 
The priacipal target fror Khvostov's. aatsgoaiss was the Duaa. From the 
noatnt of his appoiataeat Khvostor iastracted the police to institute 
azxmau surveillance over the Dn*a fractions and desanded a detailed weekly 
64 ! oe Slvo, 12 Auvwt 1915 ;P , 
ni, 316(MiIJakov) ; Moscow Monarca- 
-ist Congress 20-3 Septeaber( ' i-1915,153), Niziai-Norgorod 
Congress of the United Nobility-204 Nove ber(ý, 307A-1915,17? ) and 
Petrograd Monarchist Congress 21-3 Noreaber(PADENIE, vi., 196 and wi, 319 s 
MaXkov Two a*d MilYWaºlr) -; T IKIt War period 37-8. 
65 TaGIAL, _. 1276(C, unail of Mi aistes , si, 1027,1-17 cited in DTAKIN 134-6 ; 1,331-2 & 337(Nanmov) ;. _ also 
LAQER! CHBV 179. 
66 , 27-1915,6 &307&-1915,, 201` 94 Novenber 1915. 
67 Police report of 9 Septeaber 1915 s, m's flý, i 6,3y3,25949 gaoted in GRAVE 56 ; Bas of 6 Noveaber 191.5 s Pýº_ LýSCE, 2? -1915,112. 
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report on Duma activities. However in the opinion of the MVD the political 
68 
crisis was over by mid November : from that date Khvostov discontinued the 
regular reports and reverted to the normal practice of leaving it to the 
judgement of the Director of Police to place the most important decisions 
before the Minister, 
69 
Given that calm was now restored, political 
initiative lay with the government. The rescript which prorogued the Duna had 
promised a new session 'not later than November 1915', oalahich the defeated 
Bloc placed what remained of its shattered hopes. 
7° Gorenykin and Khvostov 
judged that the political situation was now sufficiently quiescent to break 
that promise. On 23 November an imperial reseripjr baldly stated that 'duo to 
special circumstances' the November session of the Doma would not now take 
place. 
71 The next day Goreaykin informed the Duna Budget commission, the 
only official institution of tke recessed Duma, that a now session would be 
convened only when the commission had completed its examination, of the 1916 
Budget. 72 It seemed as if the future Doma, should it exist at all, would be 
limited to purely financial fuactions. 
Immediately on assuming the poet of Minister of Interior, Bhvostot set 
about preparations for elections to the Fifth DMa. 
73 If the Fourth Dunn 
ran its full constitutional course, its last session was scheduled to close 
in June 1917 but with the uncertainties of war and the recent activities of 
the Duna Opposition, Kivostov felt justified in initiating preliminary plans. 
Of eight million roubles set aside for government expenses in the Dum 
elections, Shvostov spent some 980,000 roubles in late 1915 and 320,000 in 
early 1916, the greater part going to the organisations of the Bight and for 
68 POOLLWCE, xvi, 27/57(Petrograd), 26 if. ; litre Rossii, 30 Se teaber 1913 ; 
PADENTE, fv, 276-9(A. N. Sirostor) ; T _, 
1T eÖ tober 1915(*/s),? e ; s]so 
DIAKIN 129.131- 
69 P=CE, xvi, 27/5? (Petrograd), 138. 
70 GD80, IY, 16,1207-8 (sittiag of 3 Septeaber 1915). 
71 POLICE, 307A-1915,173 ; fý, UO Ys o ost , 24 Novsaber 1915,. 
72 Ts GI4L, f. 12? 6(Couzcil of Ministers), z, 14,108 & 115 ; MILIUKOY 333 ; 
Tiiaaes, 7 D"ceabsr 1915(a/s), 6b ; PADF. 1ME, ti, 319(Millakar). z ».. 
73 ) 224 ; PADEMIE, tii, 26(Skj*g tr. y) . 
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tja subsidisation of the Right pros** A proportion went into preparing a 
detailed exasizatioi of the electoral patterns of 1912 With a view to 
, excluding all parties to the Left of the Zemstvo-Oktobrists in 1917. This 
report, known as the 'Khvostov Meaorasdu ', was the blue-print for the state- 
created Fifth Doma. 
?5 The future of the Duaa as a representative institution 
of any power seemed bleak : the government had secured financial independence 
from the Duna, the plans for its successor were already under way, and all 
that remained for the Fourth Duma was a pit, * Able röle as part-tine 
government auditor. 
As the autumn of 1915 saw the position of the recessed Duna growing 
ever weaker, the Bloc members proved that they could aot withstand the 
disappointment of defeat. The first aid arguably the only Doma fraction to 
recover fron the Bloc defeat was the ladet. The Badet Central Comtittee 
speit the greater part of the fortnight seer prorogation ca' Ong and 
restraining society. A Radei meeting on 3 September authorised the immediate 
circulation of instructions not to take hasty action but to work for the war 
effort as conscientiously as ever. The same meeting included a report from 
the sub-committee on the next Party Congress recommending its postponement 
until the new Duna session. 
6 
During late September and October, the äadets 
busied themselves in preparations for the Congress, where (it gras hoped) the 
party and fraction would receive a clear mandate in the light of the present 
troubled situation. A plenary session of the Wet Central Committee on 5 
October agreed to hold the Congress in the first week of the new Duna 
session, at that time anticipate' for late November. 
" 
Proviaeial Badet conferences held throughout October were intended not 
only to elect delegates to theforthcoaing Congress but to evaluate the 
74 MPI 224-5 ; 'Is vospoaisaai3 Brºlatsksex, I, oj, Y01.20(1922), p. 199. 
7.5 225 & 228-241. 
?6 ! loseow report : P©ý, sti 2`7/4$, 1915,22-3 ;s GAOR, f. 523(Kadet Party), 
iii, 10,13-14. 
7+' POLICH zti, 5 
ý 
ü27/46,1915,33 =,; , fý s'3 3 10911-12 " r.,,. _,.,. ý ", a3so Moscow Police report of 2 Osteber 1915 :` 'f. , 27,2814, quoted in GRAVE 63-4. 
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Kadet position. The opinions were very mixed, representing the whole Kadet 
spectrum from the crypto-Trudovik to the crypto-Oktobrist positions. The 
Saratty Conference of 10-11 October supported the Milyukov line and preferred 
steady persuasion of the government to any attempt at wider agitation. 
78 
The Samara Conference of 20-21 October condemned the Milyukov line, demanding 
the Kadet fraction abandon the compromising Progressive Bloc in favour of a 
close alliance with the Extreme Left parties and the workers' movement. 
79 
The Kiev Conference, also held 20-21 October, adopted a central position, 
rejecting the wild schemes of the Left Kadets in favour of concentration on 
the Progressive Bloc and its employment to exert pressure on the government8o 
It appeared there was no unequivocal mandate from provincial Kadetiam and 
whatever was decided by the forthcoming Congress would represent no more 
than one sector of Kadet opinion. In these circumstances it seemed legitimate] 
for the fraction and Central Committee to follow their own inclinations at 
least until the Congress met. 
Only gradually did the Kadet organs throw off the despair which had 
enveloped them in early September, a process most clearly demonstrated in 
their changing attitude to the government. On 22 September the Badet fraction 
resigned itself to a government hardened against the Progressive Bloc and 
limited its actions to the collection of documentary material which could be 
used against the government at a later date. 
81 
There were no plans at all 
for a further trial of strength with the government, oa. l the forlorn hope 
that events would turn the way of the Bloc sometime in the future. A plenary 
session of the Kadet Central Committee on 5 October confirmed this course : 
Badets everywhere were required to watch, record and document all instances 
of government abuse and maladministration for a future day of r. ckoniag. 
82 
78 PO_ CE, 27-1915,124-5 & 169 ; also POý, 69-b, 3. 
79 POLICE, xvi, 27/46,1915,40-1 ; also PO x, 27-1915,20-b, 33 & 68,10-11. 
80 P4LICE, xri, 27-1915,32-b, 8 and 27-1915,126 & 227. 
81 Report of 22 September 1915 : P0ý_, 3071-1915,152. 
82 Moscow report of 5 Ostober 1915 : POLICE, xvi, 27/46,1915,33 #º 
Ts_GAOR, f. 523(Xadet Party), iii, 10,11-2. - 
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This resolution was issued on 13 October as a Central Committee circular to 
the provincial organisation, with a sanguine footnote suggesting that good 
behaviour on the part of the general public might still win over the 
government. 
83 
The sterility of this exercise from the point of view of 
practical politics betrayed just how far Kadet confidence had fallen since 
late August. The eminent historian who headed the Kadet movement employed 
the months of political defeat to convert his party into an historical 
research team. With a hopeless political situation confronting his, Milynkov 
abandoned practical activities in favour of an academic exercise, presumably 
in the belief that any activity was better than none in preventing a further 
collapse of morale. 
However Milyukov was not the only source of initiative within the Kadet 
fraction and the month of October saw a number of attempts to break away 
from the sterile exercise prescribed by its leader. The Left wing in 
particular refused to be bound by the defeatist attitude of the Central 
Committee. The Left Kadets headed by Nekrasov interpreted the Bloc defeat an 
proving the need for closer association xitk the Extreme Left fractions and 
the workers' movement. 
84 
On 1 October they organised a giant meeting in 
Petrograd with the object of sounding the idea of a organisation of local 
residents' committees to sake the voice of the proletariat sore powerful and 
articulate. By parading as the sponsors of the schese the Left 8adets hoped 
to build bridges between the Kadet party and the re-emergiag workers' 
=ovement. 
85 
Unhappily a second meeting on 8 October resulted in a chaotic 
scrap between the various workers' groups, each claiming the monopoly of 
legitimate represeatatioa of the proletariat auf only united in scornfully 
rejecting the Ladet attempt to patronise thea. The Okkrana reports paint 
86 
a marry picture of ]Cadet failure : of the new local residents' coasittees 
83 Report of 13 October 1913 : POS LIC$, 27-1915,98. 
84 x927-1915,26-28 & 44-, 5 am svi, 2? /57,1915,59. 
85 Petrograd report : P0 LAIC :, xyi, 2? %57,1915,29-31 " 
z ,. 86 i id 38-41 ., 4 
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raised by the Left Kadets, a few were taken over by the workers themselves, 
sore were absorbed by the Extreme Left parties (especially, oddly enough, the 
Trudoviks), but the great majority simply withered away from lack of support. 
87 
A final effort to reach the Moscow workers on 15 November was indignantly 
boycotted ; the Left Kadets abandoned the workers' movement in disgust to 
the Trudoviks and S. D. s. 
88 
A simultaneous approach to the Extreme Left 
parties had a similar reception. The Srudovike of Kereasky were tuned to the 
workers' movement from aid September and enetered into close alliance with 
the Mensheviks soon after. 
89 
As the Left Kadets' closest neighbour, the 
Trudoviks were committed to a more away from the Kadets and three *operate 
meetings on 2,6 and 8 October revealed that no hope of coalition existed. 
90 
Neither the direct approach to the workers nor the indirect approach by way 
of the Extreme Left parties proved remotely encouraging to the dispirited 
Left Badete. While the Milyukov line seemed unnecessarily defeatist, the 
Left Kadets quickly learned that their radical schemes could provide nothing 
sore eonetructiye. 
The activists on the Badet Bight wing were hardly more successful. In 
seeking (like the Left Kadets) to broaden the base of tho"äadet asreneat in 
order to neuster greater resources for a future.; coatest, 'the ght 
K lets had 
in mind two potential areas of sopport. At the Central Coasittee plenary 
session of 5 October, the Right Kadets sponsored a resolution calling for 
closer relations bstwwou society. forces in Russia and Western Europe 
91 
Accepted by the meeting as Resolution Six, this scheme was not as chimeric 
on the grounds of practical politics as at first appears. The Right Kadets 
hoped to persuade Russia's Allies substantially to increase their pressure 
os the Tsar's goversaest for concessions to liberalism. But while the germ 
87 POLICIE. xvi+27/57,1915,66-73(report of 30 October) & 87-96(9 Noresber). 
88 Ibid, 126-8 ; also Bim hev y da2etY, 16 November 1915. 
89 P0LxOS, 243,345D-1915.49 ; also TýR, f. 623,14,6. 
90 Report of 8 Ootober 1915 : P0ý, 307A-1915,159" 
91 Moscow report : POLICZ, zvi, 27/46,1915,33 ; also TeGAOR, f. 523(Bmd. t Party) 
'üi, 1©, 11-12. 
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of the idea ras reborn in the autumn of 1915, attempts to put the scheme 
into practice did not mature until the spring of 1916 (see below). 
The most surprising direction in which the Right Kadets roved was 
towards the traditional bastion of reaction, the United Nobility. In the 
first days of October, a group of the nobility broke away from the main body 
and formed what came to be known as the 'Young Nobility$. 
92 On 10 October 
the Moscow Kadete debated the significance of the breakaway group and 
opted for a policy of contact : 
It is essential to exploit by all means the incipient movement within 
the camp of the nobility. Every Kadet with connections in that quarter 
met use all his influencce for its development and by the patronage of 
the growing movement ... to draw this movement un4er the ICadet flag. We must try to undermine the existing organisation of the mobility, that 
is to say, to paralyse the authority of the Strukov group and in its 
place substitute a group of progressive nobility. (93) 
To split the United Nobility with its congress only six weeks away,, to 
enhance the authority of the Progressive Bloc by claiming a sector of the 
nobility among its active adherents and immediately to increase both the 
prestige and the practical resource of their party were prizes which the 
Kadets could not let pass. Throughout October 'feelers' were extended, though jj 
is an atmosphere of mouatiag doubt. On 1 Noreabor the Roaco!. Kadsts decided 
to call a halt to the negot'ation. on the grounds that the move could well 
split the Bloc should dstai3e of the secret negotsiationa ge _out, and that 
approaches towards the Right .. were undesirable 
in this period , ot. a reviving 
workers' movement. 
94 The r a, which had been watching this development 
with aaezietyt reported on 8 November that the Kadeta appeared to have 
abandoned all ioyes in the direction! of the 'Togag Nobility'. A week later, 
a confirmative atatemeat closed the police dossier ox. this fascinating but 
95 
abort-lived ladet enterprise. 
As leader of th" ladet,, MllyukoV inadei only trio 01oeely-related poütieal 
92 1P4 CE, xvi, 2? /46,1915,58 an& 27 1915,? 5" 
93 PQ=CZ 24 " 
94 ; lLd 034-5. 
95 Lam, X12 (report of 8' ior b*r " 1915) & 34=6(report of 15 Novouber) . 
224. 
moves in the aftermath of prorogation. On 25 October he called a joint 
meeting of the leaders of the Progressive Bloc and the heads of the public 
organisations, hoping to revive the early spirit of the Duna Bloc. Unfortun- 
-ately the meeting only revealed conflicting and contradictory attitudes : 
Guchkov (for the War Industries Committees) demanded direct action ; 
Chelnokov (for the Right wing of the Towns Union) advocated a 'wait-and-see' 
policy ; Astrov (for the Left wing of the Towns Union) demanded direct 
attack on the government ; and Lvov (for the Zemstvo Union) attempted to 
play the 'trimmer' while making plain his sympathy for Che]. nokov'a opiniona: 
6, 
The meeting, a failure in that no real understanding between the Duna 
leaders and the public organisations emerged, yet provided the stimulus for 
a brief revival of Bloc activity. 
On 28 October Milyukov took the opportunity of calling the first 
meeting of the Bloc since 3 September, but ran into difficulties at once. 
97 
Seeing little chance of a long Doma session in the immediate future and 
worried lest the Bloc atrophy through lack of eaeecise, Milyokov took the 
view that the Bloc must learn to function independently of Duna sessions. 
The State Council representatives however considered that to extra- 
parliamentary activity must be left to the public organisations and the most 
the Bloc could legally do was to prepare for the next Duna session. 
98 It 
was tragically clear that its Council delegates were going to condemn the 
Bloc to virtual impotence. A meeting on 2 November repeated this stalemate, 
for the feeling that the promised Duma session was imminent encouraged the 
Council members in their obstinacy. 
99 On 5 November the Bloc drew up a 
Resolution comprising six points connected with the war effort and six 
political demaads (the latter carefully muted to avoid offending the 
96 EL, vol. 52, pp. 144-151 ; also IERIINsKY 142-5. 
97 KA, vol. 52, PB"151-7 ; also Mä2' 145.6. 
98 IIbid, PP. 151-2(Milyukov), 153(01'eufiey), 156(Stakhoyioh) & 156(Kovalovsky). 
99 ibia, pp. 161-3 ; tiaiveraal aatieipatioa of a DUea Session : reports of 
2& 10 November 1915(, 243,343D. 1915,57 & 61). 
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sensibilities of the Council representatives). 
100 On 12 November the two-way' 
split within the Bloc became three-way : the Council delegates accepted only 
the filet (non-political) points of the Resolution ; the Right Blocists were 
prepared to accept the political demands but stipulated that the Resolution 
be presented privately to the Emperor ; and the Left Blocieta (led by 
Yefremov) insisted upon the publication of the entire Resolution. All three 
groups threatened to quit the Bloc unless their views were respected. 
101 
Appalled at the fragile nature of the Bloc alliance, Milyukov delayed the 
convening of the next meeting to allow time for tempers to cool. 
On 23 November came the bombshell : the promised Dsma session was 
postponed indefinitely. 
102 A Bloc meeting on 26 November presented Milyukov 
with an appalling dilemma : if the Bloc stepped up its activities, it would 
lose its Council representation ; if it accepted the postponement-of the 
Derma without protest, it would lose the Progressists. 
103 On 28 November the 
Progressists showed they were not bluffing by publicly withdrawing their 
delegates from the Special Councils. 
104 1* alarm Shidlovsky (the Bloc 
President) and Milyukov privately agreed that. the Bloc mount some form of 
agitation, if only to keep the Progressists within the Bloc. The challenge 
to the Council delegates was implicit and on 9 December the Centre Group of 
the State Council formally quitted the Bloc. 
105 
All the painful concessions 
and compromises to accommodate the Council representatives had proved vain 
against the tide of events. And yet far from purging the Bloc of its less 
reliable elements and clearing the way for an energetic campaign, the 
defection of the Council Centre Group only impressed more deeply upon the 
Bloc's remaining adherents the fragility of the Bloc coalition and the I 
100 KA, vol. 52, p. 165. 
101 lbid, 170-6. 
102 POCE, 307A-1915,173 ; Rttankie Vedos ostZ, 24 November 1915. 
103 BA, vol. 52, pp. 181-3. 
104 Report of 30 November 1915 : POLICB9307A-1915,173-6 ; Ra e skie Ve d onosti, 29 November 1915 and Otre Bow iß, '1 December 1915. 
105 Rc h' ,2 December 1915 ; also ' 
JbYAXIX 143-4 and CHERMEASKY 625. 
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aecessity of most careful consideration before the ssallest action. The loss 
of the Council Centre Group shocked the Bloc back into son-activity and it 
was a full two aoaths before the Bloc members mustered the courage to call 
a fresh meeting. 
106 Thus even the schemes of the experienced Millukov came 
to naught : the public organisations were still too contradictory and 
independent-minded to forge a close alliance with the Bloc ; while in defeat 
the Bloc itself proved to be the sum of its members' weaknesses rather than 
the aggregate of component strengths. 
If the Kadets only with difficulty began a recovery from the prorogation, 
crisis, their fellow moderates fared even worse. The Oktobrists suffered the 
blows of the government with the fatalistic resignation of a party whose 
spirit was brikes and which had abandoned hopes of regaining political power. 
The attitude of the Oktobrists was best expressed in the famous 'Mad Ckauff- 
-enr' parable published by Vasilii Maklakov in late September. As the most 
Right-wing of the Kadets, Maklakov was very close to the Oktobrist position 
sed provided a striking apologia for the weakness of Oktobrist policy. The 
author, travelling by car over dangerous mountain roads, is appalled to 
discover that his chauffeur drives so badly that he threatens all the 
travellers inside with almost certain death. Maklakot describes the dilemma 
of the leading passenger at some length z 
W What must you do ? Force the chauffeur to vacate his seat ? That would 
be fine in a csrt, at usual tines, at slow speed, on the flat. At suck a 
tine it would save the situation, but can it be dose on a winding road 
in the mountains ? He still has the wheel and drives the car - if you 
are not strong and skilfsl, one false move or hasty arm movement will 
crash the car. You know this, and he knows it too and smiles at your fears 
and impotence s "Don't try to grab". 1e is right. You dare not try to 
grab the wheel. Perhape fear or exasperation might lead you to forget thel 
danger to yourself and salve a grab for the Wheel and risk a crash " but 
wait I It's not just yourself who is involved. Yosr mother is with you, 
and your action will kill her as well as yourself. 
The oily course to take is sash a situation is sot to distract the ob flour 
asd hope for the best, judicious],? ignoring the complaints of those whore 
judgement it interior to one's ow : 
106 84, vo1.52, p"184. next 8. oä nesting, 28 January 1916. 
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So you restrain yourself. You postpone the reckoning with the chauffeur 
until the danger decreases and you are on the flat again. You let the 
chauffeur keep the wheel. More than this, you try not to get in his way, 
even helping him with advice, directions and co-operation. You are quite 
right - this is necessary. But what will you experience at the thought 
that even your restraint will not carry you through, that even with your 
help the chauffeur cannot drive ! What will you suffer if your mother, 
seeing the danger, begs you for help and, not understanding your behaviour 
, accuses you of inaction and fear ? 
(107) 
Meklakov succinctly sketched the psychology of the Oktobrista (and to soso 
extent the entire moderate camp) in Aesopian language, stressing the 
apprehensive terror of a political group whose policies were reduced to 
kopiag for the beat and whose energies were debased to the level of kuaovtriagj 
a government which it ka*w to be incapable. Meanwhile tha organisational 
death agony of Oktobrisa continued : the official Oktobrief orb Goloc 
Xoakv7 closed down in duly 1915 and the Central Committee was hard put even 
to orgaaise a celebrative Oktobrist jubilee to coaaeaorate the teeth 
anniversary of the October Mazifesto. 
10$_ 
The Progressists found thomelves threatesed by eoapiets disint"gratioa. I 
The sub of the crisis was the profound dissatisfaction of of industrialist 
ca=p with the direction of Progresaiet fraction policy In view of . the 
competition for government contracts, the current high profit margin on war 
orders and the continuing threat of state nationalisation of war industry, 
the industrialists were anxious to secure t1e aaziaat possible influence 
over the goveraaent. However 2efr. aov at the haadrof the Progreesist fractionl 
rarely-syspathetie to the cause of the industrial combines, was moving the 
Progressists into open opposition to the government. The anti-industrialist 
Progressist deputies led by !. tenor and Titov had organised themselves to 
the extent . of founding a newspaper FizaasovaTa ftseta 
(financed by Titov'a 
banking contacts in Petrograd) to publicise their views : from June 1915, 
the Progressist amp wies aplit bittre" the $oweow-otientated industrialist 
107 &ficle Tae Polosheäie first pmblished in ke Pedomoýst , ? Septeader 191 9'2 and subsequently repeatedly republished e. g. VE 6 and LLTOV 178.9. Ts trsatlatioa quoted is m9fowa. 
108 R it Ved tr, 18 October 1915 ; also DIAKIN 151. 
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lobby (Utro Rossii) and, the Petrograd-orientated intelligentsia (Fiaua 
109 With an eye to its industrialist Gaeta). patrons, the more servile 
Progreesist Central Committee stipulated on 2 October that 'the Fraction 
paust under no circumstances depart from the path of parliamentary straggle 
and aunt remain within the Progressive Bloc'. 
110 The spirit of the directive 
ba lg survived the mouth : on 3 November the Duna Progressists initiated 
meetings with the Kadets to consider withdrawing representation from the 
Special Councils. ill To the Kadets, the discussions were intended to wring 
a Duna session from the government under threat ; to the Progressists, the 
negotiations were in deadly earnest. On the twelfth Yefremov threatened at 
a meeting of the Progressive Bloc to withdraw his fraction from the Bloc 
unless its full political Resolution was publiahed. 
112 
A police report of 17 November revealed the complicated stresses of the 
Progressist position. The industrialist backers were divided in their 
attitudes, the majority seriously considering withdrawing support from the 
Progressist fraction in favour of the more moderate and tractable Cadets : 
The indecision of the organisation of isdustrialista, osoillating over 
the question of whether to associate with the political platform of the 
Kadets or Progressista, is exciting the Kadets to the greatest extent 
possible, since the eagerky wish to attract the industrialists to 
their party. (113) 
The minority resolutely supported the Progressists despite Yefreaov1s 
policies : Koaovalov threatened to resign as President of the Council of 
Industrial Congresses unless support of the Progressists was maintained. 114 
The debate in the wings made no apparent impression upon Yefreaov. In 
response to the government postponement of the Dunn session, a move which 
Yefreawv insisted mast be net with direct actioi, the Progressist fraction 
109 DYARIN 146. 
110 R. port of 2 0etober 1915 : POLICZ, 307jL-19159157. 
111 Report of 3 November 1915: POLCE, 2? -1915,102. 
112 BA, vol. 52, PP"170-177. 
113 Pcý, x i, 27/57(P. trograd), 1915,124-5. 
114 Ibid, 122-6 iYYii. 
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withdrew its five representatives fron the Special Councils. 
115 A statement 
released on 30 November 
against the postponemen- 
-sent not Duna control, 
chance of outvoting the 
the Duma delegates into 
technical minutiae, and 
claimed that this action was more than a protest 
t of the Duma. The Special Councils were under govern- 
the Dumm representation was too small to have any 
governaeht, the government deliberately channelled 
sub-committees where they were out of their depth in 
in that they had no legislative or executive 
authority, the delegates were allowing the government to 'use' the Duaa to 
share responsibility for misdeeds over which it had no control. 
116 But 
while Yefremov, a majority of the Progressist fraction and a minority of 
industrialist support agreed with putting political considerations first, a 
leaderless fraction ai. nority, the mass of the party outside the Duma, and an 
articulate majority of the industrialists deeply regretted the decision. 
The last group shifted its attention towards the Kadet fraction. The 
Progreasista had been consistently defeated by the Kadets over the course of 
1915 : was it better to support the perennial challenger or the constant 
winner ? The Progressists certainly enjoyed closer liska with industry but 
by their recent actions had forfeited the confidence of the bulk of industry 
: would it be advantageous to transfer support to the more 'professional', 
more adroit Kadete, whose moves to effect compromise with the government 
seemed more realistic than the Progressists' ill-judged antagonism ? The 
doubts of the industrialists in the capitals was echoed by Progressist 
opinion in the provinces. The shock of the decision of 28 November smashed 
the already desperately weak Progressist provincial movement : the majority 
of local Progressists deserted is protest to the Kadets, and eves the-loyal 
minority showered the Progressist Central Committee with complaints about- 
the leadership of Tefremov, urging an immediate return to the Special 
Conacils. 117 To match the rift is the provincial organisation sa group of 
115 Poý, 3D7a1915,171 173 & 1? 6. 
116 I. bil d, 1? 3-6 ; Progreaeist atateaeat also in UUttr_o Ro_ ii, 1 Deceaber 191.5. 
117 For exaaple, froa the 
. 
Do* proviace : p0 
_, 
27-1915,20-b(Doa), 30. 
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Duma deputies led by E. Trubetskoy quitted the Progressist fraction in 
protest in early December. 
118 
With time the reasons for industry abandoning the Progressists appeared 
all the stronger : the Progressist fraction failed to protect the cause of 
big industry in two major crises. In early December the militant Congress of 
Middle Industry publicly attacked the War Industries Committees, claiming 
that as a creation of big industry run for the benefit of big industry, the 
Committees were allocationg the plus government contracts to their patrons. 
The Progressist fraction could understandably do little to resolve the 
conflict but its failure to act was sees by many industrialists as further 
proof of Progressist impotence. 
119 More dramatic was the contest over oil 
pricing. The scandalously excessive profits of the oil monopolists had 
prompted the Special Council on Fuel to recommend the compulsory fixing of 
oil prices on 21 November. In response, a meeting next day of the Council of 
the Congress of Representatives of Industry agreed to a system of price- 
fixing as long as there was no nationalisation of the oil industry. 
120 
However the indignation against the oil monopolists reached such a pitch 
that on 20 December the Oktobrist Klyushev advocated nationalisation of oil 
as the only answer to the abuse. On 229 Deaeaber a set-piece contest took 
place in the Duna Budget coaaission. For nationalisation stood Klynzhev : as 
the landed party, the Oktobrists had no vested. interests to lose and stood 
to gain the gratitude of the entire nation. For price-fixing stood Titov, 
secretary of the Progressist fraction, the embarrassed champion of free 
enterprise. In the vote that followed. the debate, Klyuzhev won a convincing 
victory and the assurance that oil nationalization would be put to the Duma 
the moment it opened. 
121 The Oktobvists won. some prestige but the Progress- 
-iota failed again as the sp©kesaas of industry. ©nee more the industrialists 
118 8e eh', 12 Deoeaber 1915. 
119 Petrograd Police report of 16" DecO*ber 1915 z Ts R, f. 6,343,3,36490-b 
quoted in GRAVE 15-18. 
120 KL! UZEEV,: ai, 33. 
121 I_bid, 45-. 6(20 December) & 4? (22 Deceaber). 
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coved closer to commitment to the Kadets. 
By the New Year 1916 the government had in most respects completely 
recovered its confiden96 after the crisis of August-September 1915. From 
the Dama the government now expected little trouble : the arbitrary postpone- 
-meat of the Duma session in November had proved that the Duma membership 
was in no position to launch a counter-offensive. The Progressive Bloc had 
sunk in the early days of September, to resurface in a grotesquely water- 
-logged condition for a brief period in November, only to disappear again. 
Within the Duna there appeared to be little to fear from the Doma fractions. 
The Right was content with a recessed Duna, the Left was powerless until 
the time when the workers' movement reached greater proportions, the 
Oktobrist fraction was silently decomposing, and the Frogreasists showed 
every sign of tearing themselves and their supporters to pieces. 
Only the Kadets represented a potential threat. Khiostov covered the 
Badete carefully throughout the revery period : on 30 October a police 
cirular demanded all available inf ornatios cm: the various Sauet projects - to 
expand their support ;a supplementary circular on 7 November requested 
detailed reports on the snrveillanee of the ladet provincial conferences. 
122 
Although Khvostov judged the, crfsis to be over by aid November, he maintained 
his close watch on the ladets. A final report on the political developments 
of 1915 submitted to Sivostov on 28 December ruled out all fractions as 
dangerous except the Kadets. 
123 The Kadeta were the only traction which 
could be said to have weathered the 3eptembsr erisin. The Badete seemed 
likely to secure the monopoly of organised opposition for the. internal 
dissensions of the P, rogressista made possible their elimination as a Duna 
farce and the trassierezcs. af their resöaraes to the meets. While aa-one 
could pr®tead to be aatiatfad w th the our' t political aituatioa, the 
Kadets hard salvaged -far.. agora frays t1w- meat of the B1oc than their noderate 
122 POLICE; 27-'1915,9k(38 October) & °r. (" ber). 
123 Report of Pollee °Birdtör' $ lötak , 28 December 1915 s Pp LICEE, xvi, 27/i6,1915,61. 
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rivals : the crisis had relatively enhanced the Badet position even while 
the fortunes of the Duma and Progressive Bloc suffered a profound slump. 
2. The Kadet Crisis (Januars-June 1916) 
Early 1916 brought significant changes to the positions of both the 
Badet party and the Duma as a whole. Having escaped the full force of the 
trend towards disintegration and internal collapse which had always afflict- 
ed the Oktobrists and was no* assailing the Progressists, the Kadets too 
were soon to be struck down by the prevailing political 'epidemic'. The 
position of the Duma however improved after its lowest ebb in late 1915 
though, given the desperate weakness of the moderate fractions, it is 
hardly surprising that its partial recovery over ea' .y 1916 owed nothing to 
the efforts of the Duna parties and was essentially a by-product of inter- 
ministerial politics within the government. 
Goremykin's excessively proscribed conception of the Dumm function was 
starting to cause unease at the highest level by late 1915. While Gorenrkin 
assumed that the prorogation of the Doma and the purging of the Council of 
Ministers gave him carte blanche in the pursuit of reactionary policies, the 
Emperor never wished to never contacts with the Duna irrevocably. Soon after 
the postponement of the promised Dnaa session, the Empress pointedly remarkedil 
how of late the attitude of Goremykin differed from that of Rasputin : 
Our Friend has been with the old mast [Goremykin - R. P. 
] who listened 
to his very attentively but was most obstinate . He intends asking you 
not to call the Dumas at all, (he loathes it) - and Gregory told him it 
was not right of hin to ask stich a thing of you - they must be shown 
a little confidence. (124) 
on 19 December Rodzyanko precipitated the immediate crisis by accusing 
Goremykin of inexcusable neglect of the deteriorating supply situation. 
Rodzyanko'a penultimate paragraph warned : 
124 Alexandra' a -letter of 29 Narre*bsr 1915 : ALW DRA 231 ; see also Vaasilyev, Tie Ochraaa, PP 153 " 
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If the Council of Ministers fails to take such steps as may yet save 
our country from disgrace and humiliation, the entire responsibility 
will rest upon you, Ivan Logginovitch. If you feel that you lack strength 
to bear this heavy burden and to use all available means to help the 
country to emerge onto the high road of victory - have the courage to 
own this and make way for younger and more energetic man. (125) 
Exasperated by this scathing and to some extent gratuitous attack, Goremyykin 
was confirmed in his determination to ignore the Dumas thereby bringing to 
a head the issue of relations with the Duna within the government. 
As the cabinet crisis materialised, two candidates emerged as possible 
successors to Goremykin. The first was Aleksei Khvostov. Accurately sensing 
the area of the Emperor's disssatisfaction with Goresykin, Khvostov set out 
to add the Council Chairmanship to the MVD by providing an alternative to 
the blind reaction of Goremykin. Like Shcheglovitov in October 1913, Khvostov 
planned to recommend himself to the Emperor by proving himself the only 
individual with the expertise to resolve the critical relationship between 
government and Duna. At a private meeting in early January, Khvostov promised 
Rodzyanko and Milyukov a standard Duma session - in effect raising the new 
'Ministerial Boycott' - in exchange for a guarantee of Duma 'good behaviour'. 
Rodzyanko eagerly gave the required assurance while even Milyukov was prepar- 
ed to express sympathy for the 'deal' (whilst hedging his agreement about 
with sufficient provisoes to make disavowal practicable should the deal turn 
sour). 
126 Khvostov could now report that his adroit management had secured 
in advance the calm Duna session originally envisaged by the Emperor. 
However unfortunately for Khvostov (sad apparently unknown to him), the 
crisis engendered a backstairs campaign for a rival replacement for 
Goremykin. On 20 December an anonymous document entitled 'What is to be 
Dane' was brought to the attention of the Empress, who was so favourably 
impressed that she passed it on to the Emperor. The paper called for a break 
with the brittle reaction of Goreaykin'which, by refusing a Duma session, 
only irritated the '301 5, the government and cast the Duna in a 
125 Original document located in 1aI, f. 1626(Goremykin), i, 1897,1-6 ; this translation by Bernard Pares': PARES 306 ; also RODZYANKo 143. 
126 Tsý, f. 155,4? 924 tvtOV 335 ; PAD NIE, vi, 323(Milyukw) 
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thoroughly undeserved heroic mould. The alternative was a new 'soft' line. 
The Dumm was to serve not as the spokesman of the people but as the safety- 
valve for society tensions. By feeding the Duma a meagre but savoury diet 
of small reforms, a tolerable simulacrum of rapport could be achieved between 
government and country. Neatly packaged and irresistibly simple, the plan 
was sold to the Imperial couple at precisely the right moment. Once the 
paper's acceptance was assured, its author was identi&ied an Boris Sttirmer127 
Two rival candidacies for the Chairmanship thus e*erged : Khvoatov 
challenged through his governmental position at the MVD while the machinery 
of backetairs influence promoted its creature Stßrmer. Of far greater 
interest to the Duma was the fact that the 'hard' line of Gorenykin was 
under strong pressure and both the rival replacements had committed 
themselves to a milder line towards the Duna and an early recmnvened session. 
For the first ten days of January 1916 the rival candidacies were 
debated by the Emperor and Empress in their private correspondence. 
128 With 
the private debate still cintinuing and Alexandra apparently wearing down 
the half-hearted opposition of her husband to Stürmer, the contest quickly 
assumed a more public aspect. In completing its examination of the 1916 
Budget by the lati days of December, the Duna Budget commission challenged 
Goremykin to fulfil his November pledge and can the i un&. 
129 On 11 
January 1916 a fundamental split in the Council of Minister, demonstrated 
the urgency of the problem of Goremykia's replacement. Together with three 
of his ministerial colleagues Goren tin opposed anything more than a 
'financial Dumm' and proposed that five days were ample for the Damaa to 
complete theme functions. Partly from a vestigial respect for the rights of 
the legislative assemblies, mostly from intuition that the time was ripe for 
the downfall of Goresykia, Sivoeto' sad the surviving 'liberal' ministers 
denied the feasability of recreating the Dam of January 1915 and pressed 
127 Report of 23 February 191ö a +34 A. ý1916,57-60. 
128 . AL R& 251 &256 ; NICHOLAS 128. 
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for a standard Duna sessioa. 
130 Goreaykia respoaded to the cabinet crisis 
La precixel. y the saue way as in late August 1915 : he appealed to the 
lkperor to support him and overrule the Council majority. On 17 January 
Goresykia demanded of Nickolas a Duma prorogation 'blank',, with spaces. for 
date. and conditions which would be iaaeeed by kiaaelf according to the 
exigencies of the aoaest. 
131 
It was now clear to Nicholas not only that Gorenykin was too set upon 
the ruin of the Doma to be suffered any longer but that he had departed from 
tine 'butler' r8le which had ensured his survival through earlier crises. The 
very next day Nickolas interviewed Stürmer and asked for his reaction to 
Goreaykin's contention that 'the Duma must be limited in its activities 
exclusively to the examination of the Budget and its duration must be 
limited to those activities'. Mindful of the moderate image projected by 
his promoters, Stirmer replied : 
I think that if the Duaa exceeds the peraitted limits of its work it 
can always be quickly prorogued but I see no reason for lack of faith 
is the Dana ... I consider that the Dams. can-and should function.;. I have never been one who would say that the Duma is impermissible 
because it is dangerous. (132) 
Nickolas was evidently satisfied with Stürser's attitude of hopeful 
pragmatisa and agreed with the Upreee's choice : on 20 Ja*uary Gorox kia 
we forna11y dismissed aid replaced as Coxacil Ghairsaa by.. Stßraer. 133 
In point of fact StUra*r, tke puppet of a backstairs clique whisk 
izaluded 8asgntin asd GurlyaRd (who 'ghosted' tle dosua nt 'What is to be 
I)eme' i, kad little sfapatif for tiu 
13k Shaer skowed early signs of 
üs natural reactionary brat : on häs; Very first day as premier be surprised 
Nicholas by deaudiag 
_ 
the dLsmissals of Sasonoy, Inat' er and xaes4)t. 
133 
But Stfirmer had been appointed Ito prgvide as aalternatiye to Goresykia-atrle 
130 PADENIE, i, 332(Sttlriet) . *d vi, 322 & 325-6(Miyukov). 
131 Taý, i. 1276(Conacil. ot, Misisters), =, 7,171. 
132 PADRE, i 222-3(St*sner). 
133 IbU922Z aM. ai, 321(Milyukov) ; DODZTANMO 146. 
134 CNSICY 6323. 
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reaction and had little chiice but to keep to the liberal pragmatic image 
so successfully projected by his backers. The circumstances of hin appoint- 
-meat bound him in particplar to the 'Duma ticket'. Denied a purge of the 
remaining moderate ministers within the Council and is keeping with the 
undertaking made to the Emperor at his initial interview, Stürmer was 
compelled to attempt a working relationship with the Duna and set a date 
for a new session. 
136 
With the prospect of the Duna opening on 9 February, the Duma membership 
prepared for its first public platform since early September 1915. However 
the activity which marked the fortnight before the new session bore only the 
most superficial resemblance to the 'campaign' of August 1915. When on 28 
January the Progressive Bloc net for the first time in two months, the 
participants contented themselves with chatter about the current political 
situation. 
137 On 30 January the Moscow Council of Society Leaders attempted 
to prompt the Bloc by publishing its own programme : Point 3. demanded a 
'Ministry of Confidence', Point 5. stressed the need for closer Dumm contacts 
with the public organisations, and Point 8. called for the extension of 
society authority into the vexed issues of transport and supply. 
138 The 
Bloc seemed anxious to observe Point 5. in particular for its meeting of 2 
February included invited representatives of the Zenstvo and Town Unions. 
139 
In truth the initiative within the Moscow Council stemmed from the Unions, 
who were now more anxious to establish links with the Dumm than evek before 
in fear of an 2¢ campaign of persecution. The weak co-operative movement 
had already largely succumbed to I regression and tine alone would ensure 
its complete exteraiaation. 
1 On 26 January an imperial edict stipulated 
136 A Duna session commencing on 9 February was announced on 25 January : 
TsGIAL, f . 1276, x, 7,178 ; also Tim s, 8 February 1916 (n/s) , 8c . 
137 BA, vol. 52, p. 184. 
138 TaGAýOR, f"579(1ýi coº), 2$27,1-2 ; also Moscow police report of 7 February 1916 TSGAOR9f"6,343,; 1,5677 quoted in GRAVE 84-5. 
139 BA, tol. 52, pp. 187-194. 
140 Report of 28 March 1916: CE, 3074J3/1916,201 ; also POLIe$, xvi, 1916, 46-b, 6 & 10 quoted in Lp 139. 
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that future orders for foreign products could oaly be placed through the 
government. 
141 The implications for the public organisations were far- 
reaching : if the Unions could not order independently of the government, 
the edict amounted to forcible incorporation of the public organisations 
into the state structure. Alarmed by this latest threat to their independence 
the Unions were very ready in February 1916 to latch on to the Duna. 
The familiar Bloc rows continuedt on 4 February the Progresaiste again 
found themselves in a minority supporting the 'Responsible Ministry' slogan 
in defiance of the Bloc majority and again Yefremov threatened to quit the 
Bloc rather than rest content with 'A Ministry of Confidence'. By 8 February 
the quarrels of November 1915 had been revived. A Bloc progamme of legislat- 
-ion proved to be impossible since the Right fractions within the Bloc would 
accept only war legislation while the Left fractions insisted upon extensive 
political reform. 
142 The day of the opening of the Duma dawned revealing a 
Bloc quite as divided and conflict-torn as at any point since September, 
On 9 February, the first day of the Doma session, Nicholas confirmed 
suspicions of his sympathy towards a reconvened Duna by unexpectedly 
attending the opening ceremonies. Rodzyanko was to claim that the Tsar's 
appearance was a triumph for his own influence but I4ilyukov insisted that 
Rodzyasko was as taken by surprise as anyone, only learning of the imminent 
arrival a bare hour in advance. 
143 Although the Duma deputies saw the visit 
as a last-minute gesture of goodwill, Nicholas had been considering the 
move for some months. As early as 15 November 1915, even the Empress was 
reminding him of the idea : 'one must call the Duma together even for a 
quite short time, especially if you, nsimowa to others, turn up there it 
will be splendid, as you had. thought before of doing'. 
14' By 4 February 
Nicholas had decided : 'I want to return in order to be present at the 
141 T. (_, f . 1274,1916,1'7,4. 
142 Bloc meetings of 4&8 February 1916 FOT, ICE, 307A/3/1916, pp. 1-3,9 & 12-14 ; for the original slogan dr ts, aºf "579, do 383. 
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opening of the State Duma and State Council ; please do not speak of this as 
yet". 
145 Of the success of the Tsar's visit there was no doubt. Nicholas's 
appearance in the Duna was greeted with an enthusiasm and facile optimism 
summed up in Ridzyanko's phrase, 'the Tear is in the Duna, Praise be to God, 
now everything will change for the better'. Perceiving that the Tear was 
quite as moved as the Duna members, Rodzyanko seized the opportunity to 
attempt a constitutional coup de theatre : 
Your Majesty, use this glorious momext to announce here and now that 
you are granting a responsible ministry. You cannot imagine the great- 
-noes of this act which would without question pacify the nation and 
favourably resolve the war. (146) 
However Nicholas was not co overwhelmed by emotion completely to forget 
himself and passed on with a non-commital 'I shall think about it'. 
147 
The Tear's visit to the Doma had the effect of taking the ground from 
under the proponents of a renewed offensive against the government. The 
spirit of elation and hope generated by the visit overlaid the poor impress- 
-ion made by StUrmer's first ineffectual appearance in the Dana and the 
disappointing government declaration that followed. 
148 Stanley Washburn 
echoed the opinions of the optimists in a report for the Times : 
For the first time in history, the Emperor attended the opening of the 
Duna ... A step of great resolution and tremendous significance, 
irrespective of party, which has instantly shed radiance on internal 
affairs and will effectively purge the poisoned currents of domestic 
policy. (149) 
It was in this atmosphere that the Doma sitting of 9 February reached the 
final item on its agenda, the Resolution of the Progressive Bloc. The 
document which had been desultorily bickered over within the Bloc since the 
previous November by now represented no more than the lowest common 
denominator of its varied participants. It offered no constructive political 
145 NICH07, AS 144 ; Nicho, . pus 
told; the St ya OR 7 February : Haabury-Williams, 
The Emperor Hicholas, p. 80. 
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programme, only an impotent appeal to the government to change ite ways. 
Rodzyanko described it as 'a declaration urging the government to give ear 
to the voice of the people'. 
150 Even if the Bloc had been able to mount an 
impressive Declaration, it is doubtful whether it could have overcome the 
artificially-elated atmosphere of the first sitting. From the government 
viewpoint, the Tsar's visit could hardly have been more successful : at no 
cost whatsoever to itself, the government had secured a moderate Duin 
session. The relief which attended the opening of the long-awaited Duna 
session blended with the optimism generated by the Tsar's visit. The attack- 
-ing line of the Progressists now evoked little sympathy and was tacitly 
dropped until the Bloc mood recovered from its exaggerated optimism. The 
Oktobrists again found hope in judicious inactivity and the endeavours of 
their party leader Rodzyanko. However the 8adets., by far the strongest 
fraction in the Bloc by early 1916, were confronted by perhaps their most 
dangerous crisis : the VI Kadet Party CongTea®. 
Party ooagresses were dangerous exeroiees for the Sadets and their 
Central Committee had gone to great pains to, avoid calling one for over 
eight yeare. 
151 The 'constitutional' right of the Congress tomandate the 
Central Committee and Fraction was a recurrent nightmare to these institut- 
-ions, which fully realised how out of touch they were with the general 
membership. Every conference . summoned 
by the Central. Committee since 1907 
had supplied alarming proof of how increasingly . rift in sympathy the 
provincial. organisation had become. Added to this was the undeniable fact 
that the ladet provincial organisation was now only a shadow of its former 
self. The fall-off In Badet membership since-1906 had been Judged alarming 
by the V Congress in October 1907, and the collapse in the subsequent eight 
years had been noticing less t din stroos.. 
152 While an attempt could be 
150 (DZ0, IV, 't247.125 
t)AI 
191 , Tii 
a., 2k Föbruary 1916(a/s),? f and 
151 8ibavA $assiatd h" ro az, pp. 'f56=$ ;` otrow, i l "IKil*akoý, p. 252. " 
152 ladet Central. Con . ttee report of 1907 s R, l. 523(K&det party) iii, 1491-4 s; Moscow Sadst' dºsý ot`" "l910 s T, - 7t3i i31TakoT) ,fü, 
ý1, 
1-4-j also iii pp. i & 197. 
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made to disguise the extent of Kadet provincial collapse by claiming that 
all meetings were 'hastily-convened unrepresentative conferences', a formal 
congress could betray the Badet disaster for all to see. 
It is hardly surprising to learn, in these circumstances, that the VI 
Congress was forced upon the Central Committee. In the earlý stages of the 
Leftward trend in the provinces, the relatively small area separating the 
views of the provinces from those of the Central Committee meant that the 
Committee could still conceal the fact of variance and retain provincial 
loyalties. But by mid 1915 the provincial organisation had moved so far Left 
that it approximated more closely to the line of the Progressists, Trudoviks 
and even Mensheviks than to official Kadet policy. The Kadet Conference of 
June 1915 had demonstrated the danger and thereafter police reportd provide 
ample evidence of the growing gap between provincial ladetism and its 
Central Committee. By late July 1915 the Kadeta in the Kaluga and Don 
provinces had opted for the 'Responsible Ministry' slogan rather than the 
official Badet 'Ministry of Confidence' ; by late October 1915 rebellions 
against the Milyukov line were well advanced in Moscow and Samara. 
153 In 
late Deeemefir 1915 the Kostroma Ladets were protesting about the limitation 
of future Duna sessions to budgetary functions ; and on 5 January 1916 the 
police noted that the Samara Badete had refused direction from the Central 
Committee and had formed a local bloc with the IMesahevika. 
154 Finally a 
police report submitted on the eve of the Congress stated that there existed 
a full-scale revolt agailst the Millet line : 
In the last few days, numerous protesting members of the provincial 
Badet groups have moved a declaration against the Kadet fraction, 
amounting to threats to defect to the Progressists in the event of the 
Kadet fraction's further disavowal of the basic points of the Badet 
Programme. (i55) 
The Ladet VI Coagrese was eeseatial to prevent tho remaining provincial 
organisation from throwing off all 14sgs with the central Hadet organs. 
153 PQISCS, xvi, 27-19'15,3Q-b (Kaluga) *3. sad 20-b (Don) , 17 sad 27/46,1915 fox}, 143-6 sad 40-1 (4anam) . 
154 POLICE a), 3 sad 68(Saa ra), 33. 
155 Report of 1? February 19't 27.916, . 
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The composition of the Congress as it convened on 18 February presented 
a very real threat to Milyukov. Of the total 127 delegates, there were fifty- 
eight provincial representatives as against thirty-six fraction deputies. 
156 
The provincial Kadets could be expected to oppose the Milyukov line while 
the presence of the Left Kadet rebels meant that not even MiIyakov's fraction 
colleagues could be relied upon to support the 'official policy'. The 
crucial debate followed Milyukov's 'Report on the Kadet Fraction and its 
Tactics', delivered on the morning of 19 February. The Congress minutes 
record the speeches of twenty provincial delegates in this debate, without 
exception antagonistic towards Milyukov. The provincial rebellion was headed 
by the Moscow spokesman Mandel'stan s Milyukov was mistakenly leading the 
party towards the Right when the correct course was to approach the growing 
workers' movement ; to effect a transfer of power to (at very least) a 
Ministry of Confidence, the Badet fraction must not halt before open conflict 
with the government even at the. risk of Dnaa dissolution ; and in order to 
avoid a perpetuation of the lamentable lack of communication between 
provinces and central organs, mutual congresses aast be institated. 
157 The 
Left Kadets of Nekrasov readily supported Mandel'stan and gllefully 
anticipated a massive rebuke to Milyukov which would transfer tactical 
initiative to the Left wing of the fraction. At this stage it did not seen 
beyond the bounds of possibility that the VI Congress would break Milyukov 
both as leader of the Kadet'Party and director of the Progressive Bloc. 
Incredibly, l4ilyuk©v iotonly survived but triumphed. His strategy and 
tactics in the situation forced upon hin were nothing less than masterly. 
Muck of the work was doge before the Congress even set. Milyukov took a 
lesson from the NO manual in arranging the preparatory provinci&l confer- 
-encee in October 1915. The syeteasf voting delegates to the Congress was 
indirect, through the provinai&l c©nterences, ei device corresponding 0103511 
156 TsA0R, f"523(Cadet Party), iii, 5,102 ;d lo 5 of the Kadet party road 
comprises the official'siautis of the VI Congress kept by the Secretary 
of the Central Coaaittee L4. Xormilotcoteriag 147 hand-written pages. 
157 Ts , f. 523, i i, 5, pp 3(iitýov); 3 -5$, 60-63,6-68,75-86,93,95-99 & 10ý provincial. Speakers. and 95-6(Mandel'staa). 
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to the curia system of Duma elections. Responsible centre-line representativ- 
-es were always despatched by the Central Committee to explain the official 
policy to the provincial hotheads : Vasilii Maklakov was the 'trouble- 
shooter' most commonly employed. 
158 In this manner there was a good chance 
of the most rabid critics being filtered off. The scheduling of the Congress 
only ten days from the start of the Duma session was exquisite. While 
claiming that this was the ideal time for taking tactical decisions, Milynkov 
could be sure that it was also the moment of maximum optimism and least 
grounds for criticism. Not only was the Duma too short-lived in its current 
session/ for fair judgement but the new Council Chairman had hardly settled 
in sufficiently to present a sure target. And although the threat of 
rebellion against the Badet executive organs was dangerous enough, Milyukov 
was well aware that the Progressists were currently too obsessed with their 
own problems to exploit the Kadet rebellion. In February 1916 the Progreso- 
-iota and Oktobrists presented no threat and relellion against the official 
Kadet line was tantamount to consigning oneself to political oblivion. To 
the delegates assembling at the VI Congress, there seemed no practical 
alternative to Kadetism and little chance for any varietg but the Kadetisa 
of Milynkov. 
Milyukov forestalled a certain a*ount of criticism by indicating a more 
activist course for the Badet fraction. By raising the Bloc banner on the' 
opening day of the Duma eeesion, Mi1Jukov sought to demonstrate the deter- 
-mination of the Badet leadership of the Bloe. 
159 Milyukov underlined the 
point the next darr, oa 10 February, when he i*pressed upon an audience of 
meta in Moscow the need for 'a mare ailitant Bloc policy towards the 
government in the future, a course wich he Idaitted to be dangerous but 
absolutely necessary. 
160 The tieng~ of -, then* faintly surprising opinions 
71 0,17, 
158 For Maklakov at the Saratoy conference in October 1915 : PO E, 27-1915, 
124-5 & 169. 
159 MILIUKov 337 ;. RODZTAJM0 151.. , 
160 Moscow report of 10 February 1916 : POLICE, zrii, 27-1916,46-b, 1 ; also 
quoted in GRAVE 71-2 fron !. 6,27,46,291267. 
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and the circumstances of their delivery lead one to the cynical conclusion 
that they were made largely for effect. The fact that Milyukov's soot radical 
opinions were expressed is Moscow, the centre of Left. Badet opposition to 
the official line, can hardly have been accidental. By shifting official 
fraction policy towards the position expected fron the Party Congress only 
a week away, Milyukov planned to steal the thunder of his critics. 
The Central Comittee had also prepared the composition of the Congress 
with meticulous care on the principle of divide and rule. It was certainly 
true that at first sight Milyukov's position appeared w*, Ak, but a more 
thorough analysis of attendance figures gives a very different picot. : 
of the total 127 delegates, seventeen were from the Badet Central Committee, 
thirty-six were fraction deputies, three State Council deputies, thirteen 
Kadets fron earlier Dumm and fifty-eight provincial representatives. 
161 
The central Badet organs in fast outnumbered the provinces sixty-atme to 
fifty-eight. Even no, the proviacial"representation was slanted : foutteea 
Petrograd delegates and eleven Moscow delegates gave the capitals a total 
of twehty-five of the total fifty-eight places, while the anticipated 
trouble-maker Kiev was allotted. only fiveplaces. 
162 Asa result the 
division into sides, which case over- moetvclearly in the policy debate of 
19 and 20 February, emerged as follows :: all the. 'trueI provincial delegates 
(thirty-three), most of. the Moscow. 3edets (seven. out of-eleven) and a Left 
Kadet minority within the fr ction(about five) , joined 
to form a Left- 
inclined opposition numbering about forty-five. The Central Committee 
(seventeen. ), the fraction majority (about thirty), the Council representat- 
-ives (three), the deputies fron peat Du as (thirteen), the Petrograd 1Gadsts 
(fourteen) and the Moscow. et M nortt r (four) rallied to . torn an 'officials 
bloc of about eighty. By o34se :s aeieý e of numbers of delegates,. 
Milyukov and the Cejttral-"Cdftl tt ºe rd+da bbäfOrtable majority for the. 
official line', 
161 TaGGAOR, f . 523, iii, 5,1-2. 
162 Ibid, 2. 
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Finally Milyukov took pains to ensure that no Kadet dirty linen was 
washed in public. Each day of the Congress the credentials of all delegates 
were carefully checked before admission. The press was excluded completely, 
and fobbed off with a brusque official statement only released on 22 
February, the day after the Congress ciosed. 
163 The Congress orgazaisers 
thereby imposed virtually newstigkt coaditiond to avoid public scandal 
should the party official line be successfully challeaged. 
The almost hysterical protests of the provincial delegates were 
countered by various stratagems. Grigorovich-Barsky, the spokesman for Kiev, 
complained that the ladet Party was ruled from Petrograd without reference 
to or knowledge of the provinces, and urged the ladet central organs to take 
steps to remedy the disastrous decline in provincial aombership which had 
resulted from their past neglect. The Central Committee response was to 
refer the issue to a party comission, to lie buried until it the February 
Revolution prompted a hurried . xkua*tioa. 
164 Mandel'staa for Moscow demand- 
ed annual congresses to ensure close ra r between the provinces and 
the central organs but so effective was the Central Committee 'whip' 
discipline that the question was never even put to the vote, 
165 The Left 
Kadets won an important victory by getting their resolution for approaches 
to the Left carried by forty-six votes to twenty-seven ; but Milyskov 
countered b5 winning overwhelming support for ladet allegiance to the 
Progressive Bloc (seventy-three votes to fourteen) and 'A Ministry of 
Confidence' as the Party slogan by a comfortable majority (fifty-one votes 
to thirty-two), 166 
The last hope of the Left Udetswas to force through an expansion of 
the membership of the Central Comisittee, the executive which ruled the party 
between songrsasea. 3ieldiag to°praviacia1 preaaure, the Central Coaaittee 
163 PO CE, 307. A/3/1916,67 ; Sa, 523, iii, 9,9-10. 
164 TsGAOR, f. 523, iii, 5,97-100(GrigoroKah-Baºrsl r) & 118(Comittee decision). 
165 Ibid, pp. 95-6 &: 11$. 
166 Voting figures were aa't., +sfttired: in., tie official ladet aunt.. ; thane figures are from the Olg, a a reporter : P0ý LICE, xyii, 27-1916,46-b, 5-6" 
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res©a aeided an increase in memberskip to forty-five (from forty), but 
Nekrasov won a further increase to fifty places. 
167 Nekrasov and the Left 
äadets held the belief that the larger the Central Committee, the greater 
the provincial representation. In, fact the reverse proved tie : the 
provincial delegates could not organise swiftly enough to secure unanimity 
behind their candidates, the central organs were longer prepared and better 
organised, the Milyvkov eatabliahaeat skilfully vistnised knows trouble- 
makers (Maadel'stan received only forty-two roten and failed to aake the 
Coaeittee), and the sheer distance and time involved precluded the regular 
attendance of all but a handful from the provinces. When the elections to 
the expanded Central Committee were oesplete, the Left $adets were dismayed 
to find that twenty-five were re-elected members of the previous body sind a 
nor* three places were taken by 'true' provincial delegates. 
168 ! he plan 
had rebounded upon the Left Kadets and left them, with three provincial 
delegates out of the fifty-strong Central Coaaittee, in a. weaker position 
than before. The expansion of the Central toaiittee turned ý out to the 
advantage not of the Left Cadets who sponsored the okmage but the establish- 
-od Milyxkov faction. 
Tis Coagrsss closed of 21 Fsbrnary wits only vague rssoaaeadatioas sad 
the seabership of the new Ceatral Coaiittee as its legacy. The Central 
Coaaittee eaerged fro. the Congress with enhanced authority and greater 
independence within the party. The Congress resolutions released to the 
Press the next day were agreed not by the Congress but by the Central 
Committee, which not iatiediately on the closure of the Congress on the after- 
-moon of 21 February. 
169 This nesting also selected the officers of the 
Central Coaaittee, asotkor exercise is which tit. Congress played no part, 
and narked a freak adveaoe is tko parier dictatorship of _Xilyakor. 
170 size* 
167 Taý, f. 523(Eadet Party), ii 5 "33. ' 
168 I_bid, pp. 74 -& 94" 
169 Ta_ R, f. 523, iii. 9 3.6. 
170 T. GAOR, f. 125(Idet 7ractioa), ii, 13. 
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1907 the President of the Central Committee had been Ivan Petrunkevich, an 
elder statesman whose undoubted prestige, declining health and endearing 
senility had served Milyukov's purpose admirably. His financial contacts 
also recommended hin for, to quote a single instance, it was only thanks to 
a gift of 5,000 roubles he made available in September 1912 that the ladet 
electoral campaign to the Fourth Dana had been completed. 
171 In early 1916 
however Petrunkevich was compelled to stand down through ill-health. On 21 
February the first election to the Presidency of the ladet Central Committee 
for almost tea years returned the following results : Milyukov 22 totes, 
Shakhovskoy 7 voted and Rodichef 1 vote. President of the ladet Fraction 
since 1907, Milyukor now added the Presidency of the Central Committee. The 
elections to the four vice-presidencies oharacterised Milyukov's stranglehold 
over the party organisation. Two centre-line cadets from Petrograd (Vinaver 
and Shakhovskoy) were joined by two centre-line Moscow Kadets (Kishkia and 
Dolgor kov), promoted by Milyukov in an attempt to mollify the provincial 
capital. The Left ladet Nekrasov received only one vote for his candidacy 
for rice-president. 
172 All in all, the VI Congress had not proved the 
nightmare feared by the Central Committee. Despite a considerable measure of 
dissatisfaction, the 'official line' had been confirmed. Perhaps even more 
significantly the Central Committee had emerged from the Congress with 
increased moral and organisational weight and Milyukov had extended his 
formidable authority from the Fraction to the Central Committee to institute 
a more monolithic centralised Kadet executive than had ever befire existed 
in the history of Kadetisa. 
Hover altkoRgk Mily*kov kad timed an anticipated disaster into a 
resounding personal victory, tk. re were a number of factors which each the 
triumph hollow Is the wider eoatezt. At the sea. Central Committee seating 
of 21 Fehrn*2y the Eadets gazed despairingly at the twin problems of ii*t=e 
and provincial seaberahip". The. Congress had mandated the Central Coasitte*ýto 
171 . 
aß. R, t. 523, ii: L 9 6. 
172 Ibid, pp. 1 (elections to Presidency) &2 (Vice-Presideacies). 
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develop the provincial party but there was no hope of its successful 
implementation. Skingarev warned that the funds available barely sufficed 
to sustain the central party administration ; the provinces could not expect 
recruitment campaigns financed by the Central Committee but must sponsor 
their own development. The Committee Secretary Korailov agreed : even when 
the party had numbered 100,000 at the height of the 1905 Revolution, its 
finances had been na sound ; with the arch reduced membership of 1916 the 
Central Committee could barely finance its own operations, making a recruit- 
-meat drive in the provinces impossible except at a purely local level. 
Predictably and inevitably, no decision was taken. The whole dilemma was to 
be placed before the provincial Xadete at as unspecified future date. 
?3 
While Milyukow was extending his power over the executive organs of Kadetien, 
broader developments in the country at large were corroding its provincial 
organisation. Milyokoir was assuming greater and greater authority over less 
and less : while his tactical expertise won a convincing victory at the VI 
Congress, he could offer no solution to the fundamental problems which were 
undermining its authority in the wider context. 
The political atmosphere of the 1916 Duma Winter Session recalled that 
of 1913 rather than. 1915. There was no attempt on the part of the moderates 
to return to the spirited Bloc campaign of August 1915. Both Duna and 
government had made their positions clear in the eoatreteaas of September 
1915 and now had little to say to one another. To repeat the conflict seemed 
superfluous, and the months of February and March 1916 were passed with both 
protagonists attempting to operate independently of the other so as to 
reduce tie occasions for painful contact. As Milynkov anticipated on the. eve 
of the session, the government and the. I to were now "is the position of 
111. fellow-travellers, seated is the same train compartment but avoiding 
acquaintance with one, another' . 
174 'Fhe government held aloof from wlev k` 
r-  
173 TRf. 523, iii 9,6-7 (Shiagarew and äorailov) &7 (Committee deei io* 
174 Milyukov ilk Reck, ' editorial, 8 February 1916 ; also ! lilycow's rpeeek 
of 10 February 1916 : 28091V91308-1323- 
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relations with the Duma : Stiirmer refused to reply to a Duma za ros against 
illegal war censorship ; he ignored a personal appeal by Rodzyanko for better 
relations ; he declined to meet Duma representatives to discuss the 
co-operative movement. 
175 The Progressive Bloc continued to devote itself 
to the misgivings of nits members at the expense of parliamentary action. On 
14 February, the Progressive Nationalists introduced a programme of 
procedural reforms to the Bloc : by greater organisation (cutting down on 
time allotted to wasteful open debates, increasing the number of sittings, 
stifling pointless and repeated za ros etc. ), the Duna might become more 
productive and rescue the prestige of the Bloc. The Bloc members agreed in 
principle, quarrelled over details and tacitly allowed the programme to 
lapse. 176 On 19 February the Bloc cravenly decided that the government's 
apparent sympathy for the volost' zemstvo made this reform of prime 
importance, which should assume first priority in the Dumm's endeavours. 
177 
Offered such a poor lead by the Progressive Bloc, it was hardly surprising 
that the Duna settled down to a plodding programme of petty legislation 
(according to Stgrmer's plan). On 21 Februarar, the Duna Agriculture and 
Army/Navy commissions agreed to meet in joint session to find a solution to 
the supply question ; on the twenty-second, the Duna Finance and Budget 
commissions net in joint session the better to examine the State Budget. 
178 
The Duna coathnued on its constitutional way, inexorably conscientious, as 
though the events of 1915 had never been. 
The only false note was struck on 25 February when, in accordance with 
his promise to Ihvostov the month before, Rodzgasko warned the Bloc members 
not to attack Rasputin or launch campaigns against the government on pain of 
early Dana prorogation. Although the asour pro re of the Bloc required its 
175 TBG OR, i. 4, i, 24,6 quoted in cEE sK! 648 ; POLICE, 307 3/1916.33-'k i Ti mee, 2 Diareh 1916(a/s), 7c ; also censorship debate is Dma s 22 O, IT, 
21,1673-1697. 
176 Ts GAOR, f . 5? 9, d, lo 1327. 
177 POLICE, 307A/3/1916,38. 
178 Ib 4, PP. 4k & 71. 
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leaders to protest at this attempt to silence opposition and each categoric- 
refused to gag his fraction, the ban was in practice fully operative179 . -ally 
A police report for 29 February confirmed that the Duma was still cowed after 
its defeat of September 1915 and noted that while the Duma Bloc opposed the 
government, under nd/circumstances could it be termed pro-German, and the 
Duma opposition was effectively emasculated by its own patriotic scruples. 
Even the Kadets, patently the chief trouble-makers amongst the Opposition, 
in practice held a remarkably Right position, cerittainly well Right of the 
Progressists and even some Oktobrisjrs, while their patriotism could not be 
doubted. 18o The report of 29 February lent the government hope that for th-e 
duration of the war at least, the moderate opposition presented no great 
threat and could be tolerated with an acceptable margin of safety. 
March saw a slight raising of the parliamentary temperature but not 
enough to #ustify serious government apprehension. The workers' movement 
which began a fresh offensive in January 1916 alarmed the government and 
Duma equally. When 100,000 workers demonstrated on 9 January, the police 
_ I. 
arrested the Petrograd ringleaders, conscripted them and in aid February 
despatched them to the front line. 181 When Milyukov came out in support of 
the police action in a speech to the Army/Navy commission on 23 February, 
the government felt encouraged to approach the Bloc with a view to formulat- 
-ing a common policy on the pressing issue of the militarisation of war 
industry. 182 The Special Council of Defence meeting of 28 February revealed 
a split between the Bloc Right, which supported ailitarisation, and the Bloc 
Left, with Milyakov and Konovalov profoundly dubious about the political 
wisdom of so drastic a measure. 
183 By 4 March the ladets had decided that, 
while supporting strong measures against the revived workers' movement, they 
179 ß9307A/3/1916,75 & 201 ; Tsý, f. 1278, x, 7,201 ; MILiü$OT 337" 
180 Moscow report of 29 February 1916 : TssGA0R, f. 6,27,6350 quoted im; 
GRAVE 75-81. 
101 MP 163 ; Shlyapnikov, Kant Seanadtaatogo t ooda, I, 142-3 ; LAPERYGBEY 1.33- 
182 T. ý, f. 1278(Council of Miaisters), 4357,37. 
183 TeGVIA, 'f. 3699174.12-13 quoted in C1 ENBKY 678-9 ; PADXI2`E, vi, 333" 
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opposed factory militarisation. The Progressists enthusiastically backed the 
Kadets and, against the wishes of Rodzyanko, insisted on debating the measure 
in closed Duma sitting on 7 March. 
184 The voting pattern of the Special 
Council was repeated : the Right wing led by the Oktobrists (who had now no 
industrial interests to obeerve) favoured militarisation ; the Duma remainder 
led by the Kadets and Progressists (who were competing for the backing of 
the powerful industrial lobby) opposed militarisation. 
185 
A may out of the immediate impasse proposed by the War Minister 
Polivanov received majority support. For the t4Aem being the government would 
try appeasement of the workers : the Special Council of Defence would raise 
the wages of workers in war industries, permit workers' organisations and 
set up an instrument of arbitration for labour disputes drawn from the Duma 
and State Council. 
186 However, mortified that Polivanov should contract 
such a 'bad' bargain with the Duma without even reference to himself, 
Stiirmer instructed his War Minister to sever links with the Duna. 
187 Polivan 
chose instead to flout Stiirmer's directive and introduced the militarisation 
issue at the next meeting of the Special Council of Defence on 9 March. 
Although the divided attitude of the Bloc leaders persisted, Polivanov 
identified himself still more closely with the Duma. 
188 Oa 13 March he gave 
permission for a shortened account of the Duma closed sitting of 7 March to 
be published, thereby siding defiantly with the Doma expressly against 
StUrmer's authority. 
189 This final act of insubordination crowned, a vicious 
and prolonged backstairs campaign against Polivanov headed by the Empress. 
1 
184 Badet Central Committee meeting of 4 March 1916 : TsO&, f. 523, iii, 9, 
11-19 ; Also MPK 119. 
185 (DSO, IV, 32,2837-2888 ; StUrmer's report to the Emperor, l4 March 1916 
164 ; PADEgl1I, vi, 333(Nilyakov). 
186 STaGi0R, f. 5? 9(Mi1yukov), 371 ; MPK 114 & 164 ; PADBRIE, vi, 333(Milyukov) ; 
, Iv, 32,2887-8. 
187 MPK 114 & 164 ; Alexandra's letter of 6 Marty 1916 :P RTINDR1 289-290. 
188 ! 120 ;T aGVIA, f "369,174.72 exited by - XCZ 661-670. 
189 MPK 120 ; MILIUEOV 339 PkD MIS ri, 334(Mi1YuIwT) . 
190 See Alexandra's letters of 9 Jaauary, 6 &. 12 March 1916 :. AlUb' 
290 & 297.2, 
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On 15 March Polivanov, whom Knox described as 'undoubtedly the ablest 
military organiser in Russia' and Paleologue as 'the last line of defence of 
the existing regime', was dismissed. 
191 The repercussions of the 
militarisatiob issue were broad indeed : the government lost its most able 
War Minister, the Council of Ministers one of its few remaining moderates, 
the Duma perhaps its last hope for a constructive relationship with the 
government, and the Bloc its precariously-maintained show of unity. 
The second major issue of the 1916 Winter Session confirmed the growing 
reactionary tone of the government. On 9 January the Police Department had 
issued a circular hinting that a few pogroms for the populace to let off 
efeam would not come amiss, a suggestion taken up with gusto in the western 
borderlands of the Empire. 
192 On 26 February the Duma Left introduced a 
zarros against anti-semitism timed to coincide with the start of the Dumm 
examination of the MVD Budget. 
193 On 8 March, debate in open Dumm sitting 
revealed a dangerous split between the Kadets, who being largely financed by 
Jewish sources not unnaturally waved the banner of racial equality 
vigorously, and the anti-semitic Zemstvo-Oktobrists and Right wing. Encourag- 
-ad by thin evidence that he was not alone in hin persuasions, the author of 
the original circular, the Police Vice-Director lafafov attended the Doma on 
10 March. His argument that the circular had been intended to be informative 
not directive deceived ao-one but with the Bloc Right wing cynically 
accepjciag Kafafov's explaaatioa, the 8adets were forced to agree in the 
interests of maiataisiig the Bloc. 
194 The March debate over anti-semitis= 
coafirmed the fragile nature of the Progressive Bloc, the elision of 
principle required to natntain suck a broad-based alliance, and provoked a 
191 Knox, With the Ruasi A, II, 4'12 ;° P&LEOLOGUB, II, 227 ; also Lukonsky, 
Mem s, p"33 and RODZYANKO 155-6. 
192 PADENIE, ii, 125 & 135(W afov) ;, 26 February and 11 March 1916 
(a/s), 5b & 5f respectively ; alto MIUMNSKY 661. 
193 tDSO, iV, 27,236©(26 February 1916) ; Tiaes, 11 March 1916(n/s), 5f. 
194 ßw-O, IV, 33.3O25-3o42(8 March 1916) & 34! 3137-31ý. 6(1o March 1916) ; L 08,3071/3/1916,114 & 165-7 ; L. Greenberg, e Jews is Russia : the S tela f ti ,2 vole, Tale U. F. 19 5, II, p. 120 ; M. F. Hua, ber _ Msd tip h sip Qsestion', RR, vol 31, ao. 2(April 1972), 165.8. 
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crisis amongst Jewish circles which was to threaten the integrity of the 
Badet fraction. 
The final development which gave the government cause for concern in 
early 1916 was the relationship between the Progressice Bloc and extra-Duma 
support. On 2 March Khvostov informed Stürmer that the Bloc had established 
a permanent bureau for co-operation with other society organisations, a 
development which he judged potentially dangerous. 
195 
On 4 March the Kadet 
Central Committee viewed the question of the public organisations with 
similar apprehension. It was feared thet the Town and Zemstvo Union 
congresses scheduled to meet 12-14 March would prove an embarrassment by 
their outspoken hostility to the government and insistence that the Bloc 
share their views. Vinaver believed that the two Unions were associating 
with the Duma only in fear of the government, and the answer to the problems 
of both Unions and Bloc was to push through the Duna. a bill for the 
legalisation of the public organisations. 
196 
As it happened, fears again proved unjustified for while the two 
Congresses were spirited in their criticism of the government, they did not. 
wish to provoke its wrath with the doubtful patronage of the Doma as their 
only protection. The Congresses' resolutions passed on 15 March demanded a 
network of society organs including unions of workers, peasants and 
co-operatives,, with the Drama Bloc as its political spearhead. Milyukov was 
quick to reciprocate : on the sixteenth he emphasised the necessity of 
meeting the government challenge with a Bloc-led society alliance . 
197 
However the Bloc in general and the Kadets in particular did little more to 
seal the 'society alliance'. While Shingare'v employed the closed Duna sitting 
of 25 March to declare that the war would hagre been lost but for the effotts 
195 fhvoatov note : TsQAOR, f. 62? (BtSrmer), delo 40. 
196 Tsß , f. 523(Kadet Party) iäi, 9, i9-2? (Viaayer p. 19) ; Moscow peke* 
report of 15 February 1916 : TSGAOR, f. 6,343,1.5382 quoted in GRAVE 86 ; 
also Empress's letter of 16 lG7 1916 :, ALS RA 30k. 
197 PADTNIE, vi, 334-5(Milyukov) ; Moscow Police reportd of 6& 13 I oh, 19I6 
TsGA©8, f . 6,343,1, $554. & 8041 quoted in GRAVE 88-92 & 94 ; also cHE sE! 654 and LA ERTCHEV 134.. 5, 
253. 
of the public organisations, appeals from local co-operatives being 
systematically picked off by the MVD were ignored by the Bloc. 
198 The Bloc 
bureau for co-operation never developed to any significant extent, the 
divisions between the public organisations persisted and the projected 
'society alliance' against tke government regained a chimera. 
The government had reasonable cause for satisfaction with the record of 
the Winter Session of 1916. Although the Drama Budget commission completed 
the State Budget in the last days of March and the Duna was no longer really 
necessary to the government, its patent harmlessness encouraged even the 
most reactionary elements to take a tolerant view. 
199 The fact that the 
militarisation debate was approaching its final stage encouraged StB ºer to 
entertain thoughts of a further session. In late March the Allied ambassadors, 
worried lest the current wave of strikes disrupt the war effort, prevailed 
upon Stürmer finally to introduce into the Duna a bill for the militarisatioa 
of war industry. 
200 The bill reached Duna open sitting on If April, where it 
was welcomed by the Right (led by the Oktobrist Sauich) and opposed by the 
Left (led by the Progressist gonosalov). Precisely at this dramatic juncture 
the debate had to be guillotined for the closure of the session, leaving 
both Duaa and government determined to take up the debate again at the 
earliest opportunity. 
201 The restrained nature of the Winter Session 
virtually guaranteed its successor. Even Sttrmer was forced to admit 'I was 
deeply content that the first session of the Duna, ended without any 
Misunderstandings and entirely agreeably ... the first session of 1916 
passed in the most desirable fashion'. 
202 
198 Report of 28 March 1916 : PO , 307A/3/1916,187.192(Shingarer) and 201(appeala fron co-operatives to the Bloc). 
199 MINN 339 ; PADENIE, v, 164(Stürmer) ; the exception was the Erpress : 
letter of 17 March 1916 (ALEXANDRA 305). 
200 Ts GIAL, f. 1278(Coueil of Miautera), I, 4357,161 ; Shlyapnikov, Bazu 
Seaaadtsatono Goda, T, 151. 
201 T&GIAL, f. 1278, I, 4357: 161 ; GDQ, IV, 47,4333-4340 ; Re k', 4 April 1916. 
202 PADEI1', Y, 164(StUraer); also conversation of Koaovalov with 0aehtov ft, 
April 1916 : tsQAM f. 555(Guch ov), i, 1436,1. 
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The following two months of Dun activity were profoundly affected by 
the temporary absence of Milyukov from the Russian scene. The Kadets had 
always been the party with the closest contacts with Western Europe and the 
Central Committee meeting of 5 October 1915 had reiterated the necessity for 
even closer links. 
203 
Through the British Ambassador Buchanan, Milyukov 
suggested to the Allies in January 1916 that a Russian parliamentary 
delegation visit Western Europe for the purpose of mutual information and 
encouragement. Suspicious of the role to be played by the delegation, Markov 
Two thought that the wartime emergency demanded that the delegation be above 
all a team of military experts ; Milyukov in reply pleaded that since the 
visit was also intended as a gesture of Allied solidarity on the tenth 
anniversary of the State Doma, the representation should be wider. Milyucov8e I 
argument won the day and on 17 February an Anglo-Russian banquet sealed the 
agreement that a delegation would be welcomed in Great Britain in April* 204 
However while the delegation seemed a good idea in February, by the 
time that April approached its wisdom was seriously in doubt in some quarters. I 
A minor crisis arose over the delegation at the ladet Central Committee 
meetings of 30 and 31 March. At the first meeting, the Central Committee 
argued energetically against Milfukoy leading the delegation : the two-way 
trip via Scandinavia was dangerous, Milyukov would miss the anticipated 
Spring Session of the Dnaa and the Progressive Bloc was at a critical stage 
of its developssat. The valü: of the delegation was admitted but could not a 
substitute for Milyukov be found to head it ? No other party was sending its 
president on the trip and the Kadets had more to lose from the loss of 
Milyukov than any other party. Milyukov argued in reply that the presence of 
the Kadet President as spiritual head of the delegation would guarantee their 
reputation in Western Europe as the champions of the Russian constitutional 
movement. So not was Milynkcv On leading the delegation that he agreed to 
203 POý, xvi, 27/46,1915,33 ", T$ AOR, f. 523(Kadet Party), iii, 10,11-12. 
204 MILIUKOY 340 ; Tizes, 9 February and 27 Marc# 1916(n/s), 7d and 7e ; also CRE (M 722 & 72". 7. 
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quit only if the overwhelming majority of the Central Committee opposed 
him. 205 On 31 March Milyukov repeated his determination to go. Shingarev, 
who was also committed to the delegation, stated that if forbidden by the 
Central Committee he would withdraw from the delegation but also resign from 
the chairmanship of the Duma Army/Navy commission in protest. The obduracy 
and scarcely veiled threats of Milyukov and Shingarev overcame the opposition 
of the Central Committee and they got their way. 
206 On 16 April the 
parliamentary delegation left Russian on its scheduled two-month trip ; by 
the time it returned to Petrograd, the repercussions of Milyukov's absence 
had been felt throughout the Dia. 
With every objection put up by the Central Committee amply justified, 
it is important to isolate the fundamental motive of Milyukov in insisting 
on participation in the delegation. Bngel'hardt, who was the sole military 
expert on the delegation, saw the invitation as a confidence-trick to keep 
Russia in the war. With rumours of Russia moving towards a Seperate Peace 
with Germany, the primary concern of Britain and France was to apply 
suitable pressure to prevent the onslaught of the German war machine from 
failing on the Western Front alone. 
207 Milyukov in his public statements 
attacked most importance to identifying the Kadets with the Russian 
constitutional movement in the eyes oif Western Europe 
For me personally this was an opportunity to reinforce the Russian 
Progressive tendencies through public European recognition and thereby 
to open a new door for our influence just at the moment when another 
door was being slammed in our faces. (208) 
As the only party leader on the delegation, Milyukov naturally dominated 
both the delegation itself and the attention of the Western leaders. And yet 
the fact that Milyakov -and the ladets were readily accepted by the West as 
the forces for progress in Russia, while lending then a pleasing 
205 Ta_ R, f"523(Kadet Party), iii, 9,37-41(Committes arguments 37 &39, 
Milyukov 38 & 40) . 
206 Ibid, 47-58 ; also L&TERTCHBV 121. 
207 EN(UM IR BDT, ix, 6ý6. 
208 Note that Milyakov devoted an entire chapter of his memoirs to 'The Duma Delegation Visits Our Allies' : MILIUKOV 340-360. 
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international aura, seemed to offer little beyond moral support for the 
improvement of the Kadets' position within Russia. 
It is possible that Milyukov had an ulterior political coup in prospect. 
At its most modest, it may have taken the form of instituting a regular 
channel of publicity about the Progressive Bloc doutside Russia :a police 
report of 9 May stated that Bloc circles had recently been debating the 
establishment of a Duma Information Bureau in London or Paris. 
209 The Xadets 
may have been more ambitious :a police report of 29 February described a 
Kadet scheme for persuading the Allied governments to lend money to the by- 
now impecunious Russian government with Duna auditing as a condition of the 
loan. 210 But while the direction of Kadet thought is clear, evidence is 
scanty about the precise steps taken to implement their schemes. The ladets 
were probably correct in believing that only by exploiting the Duma's 
financial prerogatives could permanent concessions be extracted from the 
tsarist government. These prerogatives were currently under fire : the ukase 
of 14 July 1915 had effectively transferred financial power to the government 
; the Duna perusal of the Budget since then was little more than a 
contemptuous gesture by a government which appreciated the value of project- 
-ing a liberal aura towards its-Western Allies. In such a situation the 
Kadets considered means to exert financial pressure on the government through 
the good offices of a sympathetic third party. 
But whether Milyukov over broached the subject in official Western 
European circles or not (and there are no records of such a conversation), 
such a project could have little hope of acceptance. 
211 While generally 
sympathetic to the aspirations of the Duda, the British, French and Italian 
governments were only prepared to take action to reinforce Russian 
obligations towards the Allies and ward off any thredt of a Seperate Peace. 
209 Ts , f. 6,20,46 quoted is GRAVE 11.9-124. 
210 TsGA0R, f. 6,27,6350 quoted it GRAVE 79-80 ; Open letter from Moscow 
industrialist Smirmor to albert Thoatus is ss]dº ed oat ,4! 1914 ; 8odzyanko' " guarded remarks in ' Gosudarstvensaya Duns' 9". 19-20,. 
... 
211 MILIU&OV ", -63520- 
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To promise Milyukov one atom of the ambitious Kadet sAme would justifiably 
irritate the Russian government and might well accelerate its pro-German 
trends and turn it irretrievably against its Western Allies. At the same time, 
if the Risssiam government were to move closer to a Separate Peace, a Duma 
committed to the Western Allies would prove a most valuable agency to oppose 
the trend ; in the event of the tsarist government going over to Germany, 
the Duma would be the only sympathetic and war-committed Russian force at 
Allied disposal. The Allied reception of the Russian depuatation was 
accordingly friendly and respectful but completely non-political. Through 
Britain, France and Italy Milyukov was feted and flattered but in his heart 
he must have recognised that the most ambitious of Badet 'Grand Designs' 
atlod no chance. 
212 
Even no, the European trip could be viewed less as a 
ladet defeat than a ladet failure to discover a convenient Deus ex maacchina. 
If Milyukov's performance on the international stage exposed his 
limitations, his absence from Russia highlighted his domestic indispensabil- 
-ity. The Duma as a wjhole, the ]Progressive Bloc, and the ladet party in 
particular were profoundly influenced for the worse by Milyukov's absence. 
Within the ladet party elements hostile to Milyukov's 'dictatorship' of the 
movement took the opportunity to attempt political coups which Milyukov 
would have no alternative but to accept on his return. The first rebellion 
came from Moscow, where the self-confidence of the local Kadets had increased 
pari passu with the growing self-assurance of tie second capital itself. As 
early an October 1915 police informants had been reporting serious 
arguments between the Moscow Kadets and the Central Committee : on 17 October 
Milyukov defended hie policies against the attacks of Mandel'stam, to reveal 
that the Moscow Kadets were equally divided between the two viewpoints. 213 
At the VI Party Congress Mandel'stam repeated his attack upon the official 
212 Milyukov'e diary of the trip : 
_U, 
Vol. 5k/55, pp. 14-ßt3 ; Engel'hardt's diary : DM#EL' HAIWT, iz, 632-660. 
213 Police report of 19 October 1915 t located by Grave in 1927: 1& T Gi48* 
r. 6,27,31334 (GRAVE 68-71) and by myself in 1967 in Ts_ ßA08, f . 102,29-1915, 103-6. Another example of the continuous reorganisation of the Soviet historiaal archives. 
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line but found Milyukov's position within the party too entrenched. Burning 
with frustration at the inefficacy of his rebellion, Mandel'etam ordered a 
Moscow post-mortenon the Congress for 28 February. Again he attacked 
Milyukov, accusing him of leading the party into crypto-Oktobrism and 
deliberately ignoring (and ignorant of) wider circles of Russian society. 
While Milyukov was obsessed with Petrogagd and the State Duna, the real 
answer to the problem lay in the organisation and leadership of society, 
especially the peasant and proletarian masses. 
214 
But despite the wide 
support for his views amongst the Moscow Kadets, Mandel'stam proved unable to 
translate this moral backing into political reality while Milyukov was 
personally in command. Once Milynkov departed the scene, however temporarily, 
the Moscow Kadets were prepared to take action. 
On 26 April, a bare tea days after the delegation left Petrograd, the 
Moscow Kadete attacked. Headed by Kishkin, tkey demanded the immediate 
adoption of the 'Responsible Ministry' slogan, insisted that the approaching 
Duna session be productive (especially with reference to legislation on 
co-operatives and peasant rights), and claimed full rights for Moscow within 
the Badet movement. The Moscow Kadet minority who supported the official 
line, headed by Kornilov, vainly attempted to stem the rising tide of. 
rebellion. 
215 Curtly informed by the Central Committee that it could not 
accommodate the demands of an unrepresentative cabal, the Moscow Kadeta 
arranged a two-day plenary meeting for 10 and 11 May. With the greater 
authority lent by the plenary title, the Moscow badete claimed equality for 
the Moscow Committee with the Petrograd Central Committee, insisted upon the 
immediate subsidised development of the provincial organisation and pressed 
for regular institutionalised channels of communication between the central 
organs and the proviaaes. 
216 These Moseew resolutions took pride of p3 . 
214 Report of 28 February 1916 : POLIC8, XYii, 27/46-b(oscow), 3-6 ; also Police report of 1 August 1916 : l-kkOR, f. 6,27,46,8 quoted is GRAVE 81-3, 
215 TsGAOR, 1.523(Sadet Party), iii, 9, pp. 6k, 67,68 & 71(Xisykia), 64-5,567 & 69 
Korailor)968(Vinayer) and-69(Iagoyev). 
216 I bid_, Pp"72-i8. 
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on the agenda of the Central Committee meeting in Petrograd on 19 May : 
firstly, regular information about not onl3 the Petrograd Committee but the 
Moscow Committee was to be circulated in the future ; secondly, the ICadets 
must join battle with the government for fundamental reform by all parliam-. 
-entary means ; thirdly, contacts with the public organisations aast be 
increased ; and fourthly, a party commission must be appointed to prepare 
for the Fifth Duma elections. 
217 The Moscow Kadets had chosen their moment 
well to make a bid for equality with Petrograd. Even so, they still had not 
the self-confidence to challenge Milynkov to his face ; the underhand and 
conspiratorial nature of the bid was in itself a tribute to Milyukor's 
supremacy and betrayed the fundamental timidness of the Moscow rebellion. 
Almost simultaneously with the Moscow rebellion came an allied yet 
seperate movement within the fraction. The Left Kadets had emerged as a 
political grouping earlier than the Moscow Kadets but until 1916 had fulfill- 
ed the role of a ginger group within the fraction rather than attempt 
political independence. The unsuccessful attempts of the Left Kadets to 
approach the workers' movement and the Extreme Left parties over October 
1915 had left then thoroughly chastened through the winter of 1915/1916. 
With the VI Party Congress, the fortunes of the Left Kadets rose sufficiently 
to foster a revival. Although failing to extend their authority within the 
party structure -a disappointment shared with the Moscow Kadets - Nekrasov 
and the Left Kadets gained minor tactical victories, including Congress 
support for their approaches to the Left, 
218 The Left $adets also preferred 
to bide their time rather than challenge Milyukov directly. On the very first 
day of the new Spring Session (16 Nay), nade bold by the knowledge that 
their party boas was at that aoaent is Paria, the Left Kadete rebelled 
against the Kadet official line and petitlantl9 voted with the Progreaafsts 
217 Paper 'A': 'Oa ladet Organisation', Paper 'B': 'On Tactics in the Du a 
and BLOc', Paper 'V': 'On Coitacts between the Bloc and associated 
organisations' and Paper 'G': 'tja the Elections to the Fifth Duna' : Tsý08, f. 523 Xadet Pax'ty), i , 9, ^9 ff. 
218 TsGAoRif. 523, iii, 5,1O & log ; tzrii, 27-1916,46-b(MoaeowI. s5 6+ i eee MILIUKOV 366 for the briefest possible mention of the Left laäeta. 
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in defiance of the Bloc Bureau. 
219 Thus two rebellions against Milyukov's 
authority were mounted almost at once : the Moscow Kadet challenge to the 
Central Committee and the Left Kadet defiance of the Fraction Bureau in aid 
May furnished solid grounds for believing that the Kadet movement, which had 
so far escaped serious split, would succumb at last to the prevailing 
political disease. 
To tkese more predieoble crises caused by Milynkov'e absence was added 
a third more unexpected development. The Jewish lobby had always exerted a 
disproportionately large influence over the Kadets through its financial 
services but up to 1916 had preferred to remain in the political background. 
It had been a great disappointment when, in deference to the prejudices of 
the Progressive Nationalists, Milyukov had struck the Xadet principle of 
'the immediate removal of all religious and national restrictions' from the 
Programme of the Progressive Bloc in favour of a formula of 'gradual advance 
along. the road to Jewish equality'. 
220 In early 1916 the Eadets were 
attacked for abandoning the Jews by their own Jewish deputy Friedman, 221 In 
desperation at continuing civil and military persecution and the inefficacy 
of Kadet patronage, the Jewish community in the capitals split into two 
camps. One group rejected the Hadets as Jewish champions, particularly in 
view of Milynkov's apparent condoning of police anti"semitism in theIafafov 
debate of 10 March, and turned to the Extreme LMft. 222 The more well- 
connected group sought to employ its influence over the ladet party to force 
through the reforms which had failed to come about through the Progressive 
Bloc. In early March 1916 the Jewish group within the ladet Central Committee 
(consisting of Vimaver, Gesseaaand Rodichev) attempted to secure Kadet 
219 GDSO, iv, 48,4446(16 may 1916) ; KLYUZHER, xTii9109 ; MILIUKOV 342. 
220 Police report of 9 S"pteaber 1910' sT 4®R"f 6,343,2 25949 goted iii. °' GRAVE 55 ; Grsenberg, Th . ex is , , 119. ; Hamm, ' Liberalins ., and the Jewish Question', pp. 1 5.. 
221 GDSO, IV, 52,4883-9(7 Jute 1916) ; . Nov Put', 1916, no. 19, p. 12 cited in Greenberg, The Jon, in Ressia, 1T, 1 0. 
222 Friednaa in OTA' 'Put ,, 1916, 
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sanction to the attaching of a Jewish rights' clause to the Volost' Zemstvo 
Bill. Milyukov, realising that the Right wing of the Bloc would never 
tolerate such an unwelcome graft, argued that the implementation of Jewish 
rights must be temporarily postponed to preserve the unity of the Bloc. 
223 
Milyukov put up the same explanation for refusing ladet support for the 
Duna interpellation against police anti-semitism in mid March. 
224 it 
became plain to the Jewish ladet group that the initial impediment to 
Jewish rights was Milyukov himself, who was perfectly ready to sacrifice 
then to the principle of the unity of the Progressive Bloc. As with the 
Moscow Kadets and Left gadets, the Jewish group lay low until the departure 
of Milyukov offered the opportunity for an internal coup. 
The Central Committee meeting following the VI Congress on 21 February 
had elected four vice-presidencies : the two Petrogad appointees were 
Vinaver, the Jewish leader, and Prince Shakhovskoy. On 31 March the Central 
Committee agreed that Shakhovskoy would be temporary President during 
Milyukov's absence. 
225 On 19 May, when the Moscow Kadets placed their 
resolutions before the Central Committee in Petrograd, Vinaver made his bid 
for power. He argued that since he and Shahhovskoy were of equal official 
status within the party, the nomination of Shakhovskoy as interim President 
had no real meaning. By offering his support to the J. wti Moscow Kadets, 
Vinaver got himself elected to chair the meeting of 19 May. Counting on 
Moscow's gratitude for his sympathetic chairmanship, Vinaver proposed that 
a Jewish rights' clause be inserted into the Bill on Peasant Rights currently 
taking shape in Dada commission. Without Milyukov to argue the wider politic- 
-al context, Vinaver's proposal passed the Central Committee by seventeen 
votes to thirteen. Simultaneously, Vinaver consolidated his forward position 
within the Badet power structure by getting himself elected chairmaa. of. the 
223 KLTUZZHEV, xvii, 102 ; also GESRMBNSKY 696. 
224 areenberg, The Jews in Rnssia, II, 1200 
225 TsßA08pf. 523%adet Party), iii, 9, pp. 1-2{election to vice-presidencies} 
and 63(Central Committee decision of 31 Diareh 1916). 
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party commission to prepare for the Fifth Duma elections. 
226 Within the 
confines of the Badet party, the Jewish group's coup had been conspicuously 
successful : the group leader occupied an entrenched position at the heart 
of the Kadet Central Committee and for the first time in the Fourth Duma the 
Kadets were committed to legislation for Jewish rights. 
Milyukov's absence had equally serious repercussions outside the Kadet 
party. The peasant deputies in the Duna had resented the proposed Peasant 
Rights' Bill since its inception, seeing it as a deceitful attempt by the 
Duma establishment to win support which it did not deserve. The new Badet 
proposal to tack a Jewish rights' clause onto the already meagre bill 
roused the peasant deputies to fury. 
227 Convinced that nothing in the 
interests of the peasant could come from the present fraction arrangement, 
a movement sprang up in late May for the creation of an independent peasant 
fraction. The instigators of the movement were the three Kadet peasant 
deputies led by Levanidov, who by their actions presented yet another threat 
to the unity of the ladet fraction. 
228 The existing fractions regarded this 
most recent development with the gravest concern. Peasants constituted 29% 
of the Right fraction and 27% of the Nationalists so the Duna Right wing had 
no cause to welcome this particular Kadet crisis : the peasant 'revolt' 
sparked off by the Jewish coup within the ladet party affected the Right. 
fractions far more seriously than the moderates and heft. 
Even no, the Dues Opposition had little cause for self-congratulation. 
In the absence of Milynkov, there existed no single authority recognised by 
all the constituent members of the Bloc. It was fortunate for the Bloc that 
the first month of Milyukov'a trip coincided with the Duna recess between 
Winter und Spring sessions for, true to the conscience of its Right members, 
226 Ts_, f. 523(ladet Party), iii, 9, PP"74(Viaayer'a proposal),? 3- (Viaaver'a 
election), 7k-9(debate grad yet* o* Jewisä clause) and 79(ViaaverIs 
election to party coaaissioa). 
227 Speeches of peasant deputies : GDSO, IY, 52, k797-8(Kilinin), 52,4889-4890 
(Chistov) and 53,4992-3(Tyvonckuk); also CSB SKY 697-8. 
228 The Badet peasant deputies : Levanidov, AtMaas' ev and -Durov 
-ATEL' 131,64 & 101) ; Rue skie Ao_ Z, 22 June 1916. 
263. 
the Bloc continued to function only during the Duma sessions. 
229 
But once 
the Spring Session opened on 16 May, the Bloc came under immediate strain. 
As described above, the Left badete joined the Progressists in flouting the 
voting instructions of the Bloc Bureau on the very first day of the session. 
In all 116 deputies from a total Bloc membership of some 300 were fined by 
the Bloc Bureau for disobedience, a large proportion for a combination 
claiming unity of aims and actions, 
230 The Jewish Rights' clause angered 
not only the peasants but the whole Right wing of the Bloc. The Centre, 
Zemstvo-Oktobrist* and Progressive Nationalist fractions refused to counten- 
-ance any Jewish concession, threatening (as Milyukov had anticipated in 
March) to withdraw from the Bloc rather than concede. 
231 Not a single Dama 
fraction benefited from the absence of Milyukov : the ladet, were rent by an 
internal power conflict, the fractions of the Right were menaced by the loss 
of large proportions of their membership, and the precariously-maintained 
Progressive Bloc was threatened by the polarisation of the Left and Right 
wings of the moderate camp. 
To cap the Bloc's problems, Sttraer sow felt sufficieatly confident to 
abandon his 'soft line', show his true colours and dispense-with the Dana. 
The liberal image created for Sttlrmer by his backers in January 1916 
deceived no-one b9 May. Stirmer now chose to revive the traditional defensive 
tactics of Goremykin : the day before the session opened, Stlirmer secured a 
prorogation 'blank' enabling him to close the Duna at a moment's notice 
without reference to the Emperor. 
232 Despite the fact that the Duaa was 
expending the greater part of its time and energy on internal problems, 
Stiiraer was not os prorogation at the earliest opportunity. Oa 9 June, a 
bare two weeks into the new session, Stäraer informed Nicholas that the 
229 Milyukov was away from Petrograd 16 April to 18 June 1916 ; the Duta Easter recess ras 4 April to 9 May 1916. 
230 XLYUZ$EV, x ii, 109. 
231 Ibid, 112. 
232 P S, ', 173-8(Stär*er). 
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necessary documentation for the summer recess was complete and needed only 
the Emperor's decision on a date. 
233 Even within the Duma a not inconsider- 
able body of opinion saw little reason to continue the session muck longer : 
at the Council of Elders' meeting on 5 June the Oktobrist Godnev opposed 
continuing after June on the grounds that war work and the deliberate 
234 
absenteeism of the Right would make a constitutional Duma quorum impossible. 
On 7 June Stx raer's weekly report to the Emperor proposed the immediate 
prorogation of the Dusa and Council on three grounds. Over the first weeks 
of the session (16 May-7 June), the Duna had held only four open sittings 
attended by an estimated 150-200 of the total 430 deputies. The low Duna 
morale indicated by these figures had been admitted by Rodzyanko whb openly 
advocated early prorogation. In the second place, the State Council was 
currently being stirred up by trouble-makers like the ex-premier Bokovtsov, 
who personally supported the closest possible Council links with the Duna 
Bloc. Sttrmer recommended the Council's early prorogation and aa purging of 
its opposition elements at the elections in autumn 1916. Finally, the 
reforms advanced by the Dana Bloc were unsuitable fvr implementation in time 
of war ; StUrmer argued that-prorogation would be the. kindest way o3. post- 
-poning government consideration of the reforms until after the war. 
235 
Persuaded by Sttrmer's logic, Nicholas agreed that the Duna be prorogued on 
the twentieth ; Rodsyanko was informed that the Dun had one week to 
conclude its affairs before the summer recess. 
236 
On the very eve of prorogation the parliamentary delegation returned 
from Western Europe but too late for Milyukov to do anything beyond voicing 
bland assurances that the European constitutional movement was firmly behind 
the Progressive Bloc. Oa 19 June the delegation members attended the Data 
Army/Navy commission to deliver their reports but found time only for the 
233 TsGIAL, f. 1276(Council of Minieters), z, 7,214 ; also MPZ 121. 
234 ]leck' 96 Jnze 1916 ;a , ýso C st7[ 703. 
235 Original report of 7 June 1916 : TsGAOR, f. 627(St er), delo 42,1-4 ; 
also published in I, 122see also PAD ir, v, 165-6(Stüraer). 
236 Rodzyanko wan informed on 12 June 1916 : wK 124-5. 
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detailed and comprehensive statement of Milyukov. The reports of Milyukov's 
colleagues were submitted the next day : Shingarev in particular received a 
rapturous response for his enthusiastic description of the success of the 
delegation in the last open sitting of the Duna session. 
237 After his 
'recharge' in constitutional Western Europe, Milyukov argued that it was 
time for the Bloc to act, for with the Allied victory in sight, the Russian 
parliament must sell itself to Europe to extract constitutional concessions 
from the tsarist government at the forthcoming Peace Conference. 
238 No-one 
appears to have been so tactless as to point out that for Millnkov to demand 
Bloc action on the day before the Duna closed for four monthd was quite 
grotesque. 
StUrmer could rest content with the thought that the Duna had closed 
calmly, the Duna delegation had returned too late to initiate an opposition 
campaign, and the Bloc and its fractions were currentlyAin internal problems 
which even Milyukov's tactical skill would be tested to resolve. Rodzyanko 
delivered the epitaph on the 1916 Spring Session in his memoirs 
The deputies were not conscientious in attending sittings and often 
there was no quorum. The Rights made sharp attacks in the hope of 
cutting short the Duma rand in general the atmosphere was so strained 
that it was hard to accomplish anything. The perpetual conflict seemed 
fruitless, the government did not wish to listen, disorder increased 
and the country went to the *ogs. Hopes were placed on the Doma but 
unfortunately it was powerless. (239) 
Even Rodzyanko's persoxnal position was far from secure and the Empress 
anticipated his downfall in a gleeful letter to the Emperor : 'there is a 
great chance that he 
(Rodzyanko 
- R. P. 
) 
won't be re-elected because his 
party is furious he did the thing clumsily and asked you to close the Duma 
because they were tired'. 
240 On 24 June Klimovich, the Director of the 
Police Department, submitted an eleven-page report on the State Duna which 
237 Zhurnal go ss i IV Sozyvat GosudGEstvennoy Dung cam II, PP"350-39k i 
also KA, vol. , PP"5-3© ; QDSO, IP, 0,5792-5799" 
238 Zhurnal 8omsiseii, pp. 91. -2. ; published in full in KA9vol. 58, PP"5-z3 -; also PADENIE, vi, 336(Milyukov). 
239 RODZYANKO 161-2- 
240 Letter of 23 June 1916 : AL A WRA 362. 
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reflected both the confidence which the government felt now in its relations 
with the Duma and the fragmented and chaotic state into which the Duma had 
fallen. Klimovich noted that the Bloc fractions had been divided from the 
start of the Winter Session, in part still shocked after the defeat of 
September 1915, and Milyukov's absence had exacerbated the trend towards 
parliamentary disintegration. The Z Jewish coup within the Kadet party had 
caused rep4cussions throughout the Duma, fragmenting the Kadets, disrupting 
the Bloc and even threatening the ostensibly remote Right wing. The moderate 
camp of the Duma had never been so divided and upset as in June 1916.241 
The Klimivich report would have made depressing reading for Milyukov. 
He had returned from a pleasant if limitedly successful visit to Western 
Europe to find his political house and neighbourhood in almost unbelievable 
disorder. His only solace was that the start of the summer recess allowed 
him up to four months out of the glare of publicity to put his house back in 
order. In that time he had to put down the rebellions within his party, 
re-establish his authority and attempt the thankless task of patching the 
Progressive Bloc for operation in the next Duma session. 
241 K1isovich Raporti24 Ju*e 1911: T*GAOR, f. 627(Stürmmer), delo 44, ppt1-1'1, 
esp. pp. 2-6(Duma divisions) &6 aMM 9(Jewiah coup). 
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CHAPTER SIX : THE DEVELOPING REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION 
1. The Bloc 'Storm-Sianal'(Ju].: r-November 1916) 
The Duma summer recess was equally welcome to the Bloc and the govern- 
-ment : both Milyukov and the Emperor needed the break from parliamentary 
confrontation to set their respective political organisations to rights. 
While Milyukov had to repair the Bloc and Kadet party of the divisions which 
had emerged in the course of his trip abroad, Nicholas planned a fundamental 
reorganisation of government to meet the increasing demands and strains of 
the wartime situation. Krivoshein had first advanced a scheme for a civil 
dictatorship in July 1915 but Nicholas's assumption of military command and 
decision to allow greater play to the Duma had effectively pushed the 
concept into the background. By late spring 1916 the plan was agAn 'under 
active discussion'. 
The reasons for the re-emergence of the 'civil dictator' scheme are not 
elusive. The deteriorating situation in the country seemed the product of 
poor organisation rather than shortages of manpower, raw materials and 
capable personnel. The Oktobrist Vice-President of the Duna Protopopov said 
of the situation in mid 1916 : 
Finances were in disorder, exchange of goods was disrupted, the 
productivity of the cod'try took a tremendous drop ... the communication 
routes were in total disorder ... the dual authority (Military Head- Zquarters and Government Ministry) on the railroads led to terrifying 
disorders ... The cities starved and trade, constantly in fear of 
requisitions, was stifled ... speculation resulted, not as a fundamental! 
sickness, but as a manifestation of insufficient production and 
exchange. (1) 
Another colleague of Milyukov who served on the Duma delegation stressed the 
dilemma of authority within the state : 
There was no-one to put things in order. The authorities were everywhere,; 
supposedly giving orders, and there were a lot of then, But there was ao directing will, no plan, no system ; and there could not be any, given 
1 Quoted in MILIUKOY 362 ; also Rodsyanko, 'Gooendarstrennaya Duna', p. 21. 
. 
the general discord among the executive authorities, and given the 
absence of legislative work and genuine control over the work of 
ministers. The supreme authority was imprisoned by harmful ftluences and 
forces. It provided no motivating force. (2) 
In the increasing chaos of authority, a greater centralisation of civil 
government seemed essential to the maintenance of the Russian war effort. 
The courage to attempt radical reorganisation was a by-product of the 
military successes of the Spring campaign. On 4 February Erzernm on the 
Turkish front had fallen, the first Russian feat of arms since 1914 itself. 
On 22 May was launched the Brusilov Offensive against Austria-Hungary, which 
by late June had claimed some 217,000 prisoners alone in the steady Russian 
advance to the Carpathians. 
3 With the apparent turn in the tide of Russia's 
military fortunes, the government experienced a brief resurgence of self- 
confidence and the Tear prepared to tackle problems Which he had hitherto 
been anxious to shelve. 
Nicholas's own circa. tance" were a vital component in the re-esergence 
of the civil dictatorship ecken. Nicholas had bravely assumed the command 
of the Russian army in August 1915 in the hope of resolving the critical 
relations between the ailitary and civil authorities but it had become 
abundantly clear that is practice no oae individual could sustain both 
commands. After some months of conscientious attendance at the S vka, as 
environment which he found infinitely preferable to the capital, Nicholas 
was forced to make a choice between his political röle as Tsar and his 
military role as Commander-in-Chief. The prospect of the opening of the 1916 
campaign season and the vision of a triumphal progress into Europe reminisc- 
-ent of Alexander I decided his to opt for military command. After April 1916 
he abandoned the practice of making regular visits to the St_ ka from 
Tsarskoe Selo in favour of making his permanent domicile at the 3tß ka, from 
which he made rare and reluctant trips back. to the capital. 
$ 
2 )1ILIvxov 362-3- 
3 PALEOLOGUE, I1,186,268 & 286 ; zukOuAkr, xea irs, PP"35-9 Fis 354468- 
4 After April 1916, Aicholaimade only two (linked) trips away from the 
St _vka before December x to Tssrakoo Selo (18.25 October) and Siel (26- 
irL. 
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On committing himself to his military role, Nicholas sought to fill the 
resulting vacuum in civil authority by the creation of a dictator. In early 
June the conditions for establishing a civil dictatorship were uniquely 
favourable. Recognising that the four-mouth summer recess offered him the 
opportunity to attempt a political experiment without a Duna audience, 
Nicholas argued in a letter to Alexandra that, 
it is imperative to act energetically and to take firm measures in 
order to settle these questions once and for all. As soon as the Duma 
is adjourned I shall call all the Ministers here for the discussion of 
these problems and shall decide upon everything here. (5) 
If, when the Duna reconvened, the experiment had proved successful, the Bloc 
would be compelled to condone the new system because of its efficient 
prosecution of the war effort ; if the experiment failed, the failure would 
owe nothing to the Duna and relations as they existed before June could be 
reinstituted without government embarrassment or lose of face. 
Encouraged by the Emperor, Zlekseyev the Chief of Staff (and a prime 
mover of the civil dictator scheme) produced a detailed report on 15 June 
outlining the weaknesses of the home front and recommending the creation of 
what he termed a 'Supreme Minister for State Defence' : 
Just as in the military theatre all power is concentrated upon the 
supreme commander, in the sane way throughout the internal provinces of 
the Empire ... power must be collected into the hands of a single all- 
powerful figure, who might well be called the Supreme Minister for 
State Defence. Such a person, enjoying the highest possible confidence 
of Your Majesty, would have the following responsibilities : to unite, 
lead and direct by his sole will the activities of all ministers, state 
and society institutions situated outside the limits of the theatre of 
war ... For his activities and prerogatives he would answer to Your 
Majesty alone. (6) 
Overwhelmed by the deceptive simplicity of the scheme, Nicholas immediately 
adopted Alekseyev's plan for his own. 
The Council of Ministers was summoned to the Stavka to discuss 
Alekseyev's memorandum on 28 Jute, a week after the prorogation of the Duaa. 
29 October) ; Alexandra however made six trips to the Stý (3-17 X7: 
6-12 Jaly, 27 July-3 Augast, 22 Augast-4 September, 2-12 0c ober and 14. 
November-2 December). Sources : It1 311-461 & NICHOLAS 163.. 312. 
5 Letter of 11 Jane 1916 : NICHOLAS 207 (see also 210). 
6 mPK 259-266 (quotation 264) ; also RODZZAZZ0 164. 
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The bulk of the ministers were in their own interests fundamentally opposed 
to the scheme but were understandably reluctant to condemn a project so 
evidently fostered by the Emperor. To avoid the basic direction of criticism 
and save embarrassment, the ministers reduced the issue to one of personal- 
sties and questioned the availability of suitable candidates for the new 
post. 
7 Nicholas's own candidate was Sturmar. Since early March (when Aleksei 
Khvostov was dismissed for plotting against Rasputin) StUrmrer had 
temporarily filled the offices of both Council Chairman and MVD, a combinat- 
ion which in Nicholas's eyes prepared Stürmer admirably for the role of 
civil dictator. 
8 
It was now clear that the Tsar was so captivated by the dictatorship 
scheme that it was bound to be implemented in some form. Attempts from both 
outside and within the government to dissuade Nicholas met with no success. 
Rodzyanko, commissioned by the Bloc to plead the rival cause of collaboration 
with society, made no headway at the Stavka with the Emperor who (not for 
the last time) remarked that 'Rodzyanko has talked a lot of nonsense'. 
9 
Downcast that this same collaboration which he too advocated had been so 
lightly rejected, Nauaov resigned from the Ministry of Agriculture. 
" Even 
Stgrmer protected at his candidacy for dictatorship, arguing that the joint 
offices of Council Chairman and MDD were onerous enough without the addition 
of the Able of dictator. 
11 let despite Sttirmer's objections, the antipathy 
of the recessed Duna and the carted but unmistakable opposition of the 
Council of Miniatera, thr will of the Emperor proved (as in September 1915) 
powerful enough to override all other factors combined. 
7 PADEHIE, i, 240-2(Stürner) aad' i, 344(l äumöj) ;1 ii1UZ0v 363 ;N cholas' o 
letter of 27 June 1916 : NICHOLAS 221 ; Sezennikov in 256. 
8 MILIUKOV 338 ; R. MOP-Miller, Ra atzet the Hobt Devil. Collins Reprint 
1967, PP. 239-250 ; RODZYAHXO 155 ; NICHOLAS 152 and ALEXANDRA 299. 
9 Rodzyanko's audience with Nichola., 25 June 1916: RODZYAnKo 166.7 and NICHOLAS 219. 
10 PADENIE, i, 224-5(Stilrmer) and i,, 337-3ký1(Naumov) ; Oeob_vi Zhurnal Bpreta 
Ministrov, 18 June 1916 : fi ßl , f. 1276, =i, 348,127-133 sited in D-TAXIN 185. 
11 PADENIr, i, 224-5(Sttrrer). 
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The dictatorship was hurried through without regard for either domestic 
or foreign sensibilities. On 1 July it was agreed that Stfrmer assume the 
role of civil dictator. His admittedly heavy load of responsibilities was 
to be lightened by a ministerial reshuffle : Stflrmer would drop the arduous 
MVD in favour of the 'lighter' Foreign Ministry, from which Sazonov (who was 
absent from this meeting) would be dismissed. 
12 The impact of Sazonov's 
dismissal upon Duma circles and Russia's Allies was prodigious, being 
universally interpreted as confirmation of the rumours concerning a Seperate 
Peace. Paleologue and Buchanan even pleaded with the Emperor for Sasonov's 
retention but wi*houtsusoess. 
13 However the most sinister interpretation of 
Nicholas's motives was false. The dismissal of Sazonov was only incidentally 
an international event ; although Nicholas must have appreciated the damaging 
effect of the change upon Russia's relations with her Allies, he was 
temporarily obssessed by the determination to subordinate all considerations 
to his civil dictatorship project. 
Unfortunately for Nicholas good timing was the only merit of the 
attempted dictatorship. It had been apparent from his earliest days that 
Sttlrmer had not the personality or stature to cammand respect from the Duma: 
still less obedience from his ministerial colleagues. 
14 Beyond the 
unsuitability of the candidate, the very first move in creating the 
dictatorship was demonstrably foolish : no natter how onerous the MVD might 
be, it was quite impossible to effect a 'dictatorship of the rear' without 
control of the 1VD. The decision of 1 July designed to ask* Stüraer's 
tenancy of the dictatorship feasible in practice doomed the operation from 
its inception. Even the transposition of the unambitious Aleksandr Khvostov 
12 PADENIB, i, 286 (StArmer) ; Sazonov Iateful Yews, p. 307 ; 1P'! C 258 ; Osob 
Zhurnal Soveta nistroy, 1 duly 1916 : TSa+AL, f. 1276, XX, 113,1-3 cited 
in D! ARI 219. 
13 PALEOLOGUE, II, 301-2 ; SUCHANAL, II, 16-17 ; also PADENIE, i, 244-5 & 282 
(St! lrmer) and vi, 343(Mil vkoy) ; MPK 12-14. 
14 Rodzyanko disaissed Stürser an 'as utter non-entity", Shnl'gin as 'absolutely unprincipled #Ad a coaplete aetllity' : RodzyamkoRWm: x of Reu , p. 178 and SHÜL' GIN 79" 
_.. 
to the MVD in place of Stürmer only offered 
operate without the traditional competition 
what he needed was the authority which only 
that authority even the delegated powers of 
to implement the concept of civil 'dictators: 
Stftrmer's attempts to expand his field 
272. 
the 'dictator' an opportunity to 
of the Minister of Interior; but 
the MVD could provide. 
15 
Without 
the Emperor proved insufficient 
hip'. 
of operations met with the 
stolid resistance of vested interests within the government, which had little 
choice but to raise their hats to the concept of Dictatorship but were not 
prepared to concede without a struggle when they felt their own positions 
were threatened. An attempt to transfer the Special Coulcil of Defence to 
his own jurisdiction encountered such opposition from the War Ministry and 
the Duma delegates that StUrmer was forced to drop the idea. 
16 Realising 
both the material and symbolic importance of the supply question, Stlirmer 
argued in his report to Nicholas on 21 August that the patent inc`pacity of 
the new Minister of Agriculture Bobrinaky necessitated the transfer of 
supply to his own office ; but the Fabian tactics of his bureaucratic 
opponents delayed the decision until Stürmer's failure in other fields proved 
to Nicholas the imprudence of adding to the Dictator's duties. 
17 
Badgered for decisions on subjects about which he understood little and 
overwhelmed by the sheer volume of work for which he was held responsible, 
Stä. rmer played more and more for effect. Making no headway at the expense of 
established ministries, he attempted to prove his energy by simply adding to 
the government structure. On 29 July he created the Cost of Living 
Commission, a pathetic institution on a shoe-string budget, whose sole 
raison d'etre appeared to be to serve as evidence of the Dictator's 
endeavours. 
18 In his report of 1 August he tentatively suggested thecreat- 
-ion of a Ministry of Health, a proposal welcomed by the Emperor but turned 
15 PADENIE, i, 268-9(Stflrmer) and v, 449(Aleksandr Khvostov). 
16 RODZYANKO 169. 
17 Report of 21 August 1916 and editorial comment : MPK 146-7- 
18 MPE 144-5 & 150-1 ; Ts GIAL, f. 1276, av, 14,3-4 cited in DYASIN 226-7" 
a73. 
down by the Council of Ministers. An appeal by Stttrmer was upheld by the 
Emperor in a written decision of 25 August, to which the Council of Ministers 
had reluctantly to submit. 
19 But although StUrmer had won his point, the 
contest only highlighted the three-fold nature of his weakness. Stürmer was 
only contriving new and relatively ino6fensive bureaucratic accessories 
because he was unable to make headway within the traditional government 
structure ; the new institutions he contrived served only to exacerbate the 
critical problem of divided authority ; and on major issues, StUr was 
able to defeat the vested interests within the government only by direct 
appeal to the authority of the Emperor, which defeated the whole point of 
the exercise. 
By late August the fundamental failure of the Dictatorship was univers- 
-ally acknowledged, and even StUrmer was prepared to abandon the notion of 
20 
Dictator and settle for the less demanding Ale of 'government co-ordinator'. 
The practical outcome of the Dictatorship experiment was the reverse of its 
intention, not the enhancement and centralisation of power but, in Milyukotse 
phrase, total 'paralysis of authority". 
21 The collapse of the Stürmer 
dictatorship however promoted its successor : as the dictatorship of Stßrmer 
faltered, it was challenged by the Empress's patronage of the No, 
After April 1916 political initiative within the government largely 
devolved upon the Empress for the Emperor was too remote at the Stavka at 
Baranovichi to exercise close control and too absorbed in the successes of 
the Brusilov offensive to check the arbitrary actions of his consort. 
Alexandra's appetite for power grew immeasurably over this period to the 
extent of totally conquering her former social awkwardness : 'I an no longer 
the slightest bit shy or afraid of the ministers and speak like a waterfall 
in Russian ... they see I am energetic and tell all to you and that I as 
22 
your wall in the rear'. By early September Alexandra was heading the 
19 MPK 139-140 & 133 ; ICA, vo1.56, P. 132. 
20 Sttrmer himself made the distinction between Diktator and Raspo ital_ 
: PADENIE, i, 242. 
21 MILIUKOY 361. 
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attack on Sttirmer's collapsing dictatorship, indicating the universal nature 
Of Sttirmer's uppopularity and lack of success and, by implication, her own 
political foresight in diagnosing the problem at an early stage. 
23 The 
object of the campaign was to convince Nicholas of his lack of touch with the 
political situation in the capital and persuade him to abandon politics 
to her. 
Alexandra now advanced her own protege, Probopopov. Nicholad had taken 
a liking to Protopopov at their first meeting in July and was disposed to 
believe that he would enhance government relations with Russian society by 
favouring the Vice-President of the Duma. Alexandra emphasised this point in 
her campaign to get Protopopov installed as Minister of Interior : 
Gregory begs you earnestly to name Protopopov. You know him and had 
such a good impression of him, happens to be of the Duma (is not Left) 
and so will know how to be with them ... I think you could not do better 
than name him ... he likes Our Friend since at least four years and 
that says much for a man. (24) 
Though worried by Stiirmer's performance as Dictator, Nicholas was still not 
so convinced of his failure as to welcome the intrusion of a potential rival. 
In his letter of 9 September he agreed that while, 
It seems to me that this Protopopov is a good man ... and Rodsianko has 
for a long time suggested him for the post of Minister of Trade, Our 
Friend's opinions of people are sometimes very strange, as you yaourself 
know - therefore one must be careful especially with appointments to 
high offices ... This must be thought out very carefully. All these 
changes make my head go round. In my opinion tke+re they are too frequent, 
In any case they are not good for the internal situation of the country 
as each man brings with him alterations in the administration. (25) 
However Nicholas had to concede that the movement against Sttiraer was not 
morel* a product of his wife's fertile imagination for a majority of the 
Council of Ministers led by Trepov was currently lobbying him for Stgrmer's 
22 Letter of 22 September 1916 : AT RA 409. 
23 Letters of 13,14 August sad 7& 20 September 1916 : ALEXANDRA 385,386, 
394 & 404 ; the beat expression of Nicholas's first doubts about Sttrmer 
iJ in his letter of 14 August 1916 : NICHOLAS 246. 
24 Letter of 7 September 1916 :, ALEXANDRA 394 ; for Nicholas's early 
attitude to Protopopov, letter of 20 July 1916 : NICHOLAS 233 ; also 
Milyukov, 'Fevral'skie Dni', p. 169. 
25 Letter of 9 September 1916 : NICHOLAS 256-7. 
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dismissal. 
26 On 10 September Nicholas agreed to Protopopov's appointment, 
although demonstrating his reluctance to declare the Dictatorship a failure 
prematurely by insisting that Protopopov serve a probationary term as 
acting Minister of Interior. 
27 
On the fourteenth, Nicholas summoned Sttirmer to render an account of 
his stewardship, an encounter as embarrassing for the former as it was 
humiliating for the latter. Although Stiirmer survived the double onslaught 
for the time being, Nicholas's faith in him was badly shaken : 
Old Stürmer cannot overcome these difficulties. I do not see any other 
way out, except by transferring the matter to the military authorities, 
and that also has its disadvantages. It is the most damnable problem 
I have ever come across 11: (28) 
The challenge of the Empress had been substantially successful : with the 
appointment of Alexandra's ambitious protege to the MVD, the failure of the 
dictatorship scheme was tacitly admitted. 
The final stage of Alexandra's plan was to expand the authority of the 
MVD into her own 'dictatorship of the rear'. The dictatorship projected by 
the Emperor was an artificial superimposition upon the traditional structure 
of government ; the Empress chose to back the fastest-developing movement 
within the government, the rise of the MVD to challenge the Chairmanship of 
the Council of Ministers for supreme executive power. Under Profopopov, the 
MND's recent but interrupted drive for power received the full backing of 
the Empress. By November 1916 Stttrmer had been effectively demoted to the 
function of traditional Council Chairman and authority within the government 
was flowing to Protopopov. The Emperor's candidate for the 'dictatorship of 
the rear' had been replaced by the Empress's. 
The coincidence of the prolonged Duna recess (as planned by the govern- 
-ment) without doubt muted the response of the Duma moderates to the 
26 PALEOLOGUE, III, 34 (entry for 14/27 September 1916) ; also Rodzyanko, 
'§osudarstvennaya Duma', p. 17. 
27 Letter of 10 September 1916 : NICHOLAS 2,58 ; also MPK 110 and Felix 
Yusupov, Rasputin, Loadon 19311, p. 89. 
28 Letter of 20 September 1916 : NICHOLAS 266 ; also KERENSKY 178 and 
MILIUKOV 368. 
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dictatorship 'trials'. Political activity by the Duma parties between the 
end of the Spring Session and late September 1916 seems to have been 
negligible, with a number of vital issues arising during the summer passing 
almost without comment. At first eight this must seem surprising. Surely the 
dictatorship scheme was sufficiently important to the Duma to warrant close 
attention and commentary by the leading parties ? Surely the fragile 
condition of the Progressive Bloc at the moment of prorogation could not 
remain unattended until the Autumn Session ? And yet there is strikingly 
little evidence of more than perfunctory salon conversation about the 
dictatorship, and even less record of any attempt to repair the rifts in 
the Duma Bloc. Indeed no record survives of any formal Bloc meeting between 
20 June and 3 October 1916.29 Clearly the policy formulated in autumn 1915 
that the Bloc would be operative only doting Duma session was still closely 
adhered to a year later. 
Similarly, although the Okhrana judged that the divisions within the 
Kadet party had never been so dangerous as in late June on Milyukov'e 
return from Western Europe, there is no concrete evidence of any attempt at 
'patching' for several mouths , 
30 
The Duna recess served as an arbitrary yet 
universally recognised guillotine on the discussion of politics at the 
national level, leaving the Duna deputies to turn their energies to the war 
effort or local politics. Petrograd was abandoned to the government and 
Moscow presented the only picture of any significant political activity. 
The importance of the imminent municipal duna elections roused the Moscow 
Kadets to a measure of action but even so a police report for 15 August 
suggested that while prepared to brand the government for the tribulations 
of Russia, the Moscow Kadete were at heart unwilling to precipitate further 
fragmentation of the party by joining battle over major issues, and were 
quite content to accept the enforced period of party recuperation which the 
29 KA, vol. 56, p. 82 ; PO_, 27/57(Petrograd), 6-7 cited in LAVERYCHET 143. 
30 Moscow report of 3 July 1916 : Pp`, xyii, 46-b, 6. 
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Duma summer recess offered. 
31 The tentative cd'clusions which may be drawn 
about the Kadet position over the summer of 1916 seem only negative. The 
party was so split that, like the Zemstvo-Oktobrists since late 1913, its 
members preferred to avoid major issues in fear of further disintegration. 
When the party indulged in political activity at all it was to secure local 
victories in which national politics were utilised only for limited 
propaganda purposes. 
As on a number of earlier occasions, Milyukov's actions as leader of 
the Kadets over summer 1916 haäe attracted a certain amount of adverse 
criticism. If the internal state of the party was so precarious, what 
impelled him to spend all August and early September on lecture tours in 
England and France ? Not only would his further absence prevent him from 
undertaking a repair job on his party, it could logically be expected to 
exacerbate the condition created by his previous expedition. Milyukov has 
been accused of gross deriliction of duty both to his party and the Progress- 
-ive Bloc by repeatedly deserting these organisations when they so demonstr- 
ably depended upon his presence and leadership. 32 It is possible that 
Milyukov the historian had still not completely succumbed to Milyukov the 
politician. Despite the parliamentary professionalism which so clearly 
marked him out from his Duma colleagues, Milyukov was not a complete { 
political animal, never abandoned the , pursuits of his academic profession 
and always retained some features of the political dilettante. It is also 
possible that as a 'Russian European' Milyukov was led both by his y politics 
and his scholarship to place excessive stress upon contacts with the West, 
to the regular neglect of Russian domestic developments. 
However it is more than likely that Milyukov judged that the party and 
Duma situation in aid summer 1916 was so stagnant that his presence or 
absence would have only marginal impact : 
31 POLICE, xvii, 27-1916,46-b(Moscow), 8-9 & 12-14. 
32 CHERMENSKY 735 ; also August-September 1912 (see Chapter One, 1) and 
mid 1903, when Piotrow calls his 'excessively casual' and 'strikingly 
absent' on important occasions : Piotrow, Paul Milvukov, pp. 54 & 63. 
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I spent all of August and part of September on this second trip. The 
first question upon my return, naturally enough, was whether or not I 
was late for what had been happening in Russia during this time ... With 
regard to Russia's internal situation as described above, I was not 
late. That situation had remained essentially unchanged. (33) 
He may well have reasoned that nothing could be done to tackle the problems 
of the Kadet fraction until the Duma reconvened. The Duma deputies were 
dispersed throughout the country and public organisations, the Bloc was non- 
operative out of Duma session, and the possibility of collecting more than a 
handful of Kadets for the discussion of fundamental issues remote. Milyukov 
recognised the impossibility of even attempting answers to the Kadet 
dilemma until a date for the new session was set. 
Mid September however saw a perceptible rise in political tempo despite 
the lack of any definite date for the Duma. The principal reason was the 
heightening atmosphere in the capitals caused by the growing economic and 
social repercussions of the war effort. Milyukov was inclined to blame the 
tension on the fact that top-level politics were escaping into the streets : 
Everything previously known only to the more or less tight circle of 
the devoted became during this time the property of the public at large, 
including the rank and file citizen. The barometer of the domestic 
mood rose accordingly. (34) 
A police report for October noted the heightening mood with disquiet but 
failed to discern any party political complexion to the change : 
By the beginning of the month of September of this year, an unusual rise 
in opposition and animosity was sharply noticeable among the widest 
and most diverse strata of the residents of the capitals. Again and 
again complaints agSHnst the administration and harsh and merciless 
condemnation of government policy were heard ... but the mood of the 
broad masses is "Oppositional" and not "Revolutionary", standing 
outside the strict limits of party platforms. (35) 
Aside from the anonymous social forces which threatened government and Dnma 
alike, a political clash of personalities was in evidence by late September :1 
MMilyukov returned from Cambridge to reassume the leadership of the recessed 
33 MILIUKOV 373- 
34 Ibid ; also Petrograd Police report Of 28 January 1917 quoted in GRAVE 
125. 
35 The diatiaction is between oppoaitsioaaost' and rei o t@ionnogt" : lA, 
vol. 17, pp. 6 & 25 ; also Petrograd report of 30 October 1916 : PONCE, 
167,19 quoted in GRAVE 138-9. 
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Duma Bloc and on 18 September the appointment of Protopopov as acting 
Minister of Interior provided the first major talking-point since the 
installation of StUrmer as Dictator. 
36 
Protopopov's elevation proviked speculation which polarised into two 
mutually exclusive interpretations. Optimists (including the Russian 
industrialists and Allied ambassadors) hailed the appointment as promise of 
extensive government recruitment in the Duma and a new era in relations 
between government and Duma. 
37 The Duma moderates were at first disposed to 
look kindly on Protopopov : in a guardedly optimistic editorial, Rech' 
agreed that 'while the appointment of Protopopov is isolated and by its 
isolation fortuitous,.. it must promote a favourable atmosphere for a more 
peaceable Duna attitude towards Stttrmer'. 
38 Yet even as the Russian 
moderates read these lines, Protopopov confitmed the pessimists' belief that 
the appointment was nothing more thaw a sop to the Duma and Protopopov 
himself either a dupe or a traitor. On 21 September Ptotopopov dashed 
liberal hopes by extending the ban on conferences instituted by Khvostov : 
henceforth all meetings whether open or closed were to have police represent- 
ation, which was empowered to terminate the proceedings without explanation 
or appeal. This precautionary measure, though directed far less against 
either 'society' or Duma circles than against the workers' movement, incited 
all sectors of the populace against the government. 
39 
In its party political manifestation, the revival of the opposition 
movement in the capitals may be dated from Protopopov's edict. The Kadets 
returned to national politics apprehensively. At an unofficial Moscow Badet 
meeting on 18 September, fear of the imminent dissolution of the present 
Duma concentrated discussion on the agenda item 'Party strength on the eve of 
36 PADENIE, vi, 342(Milyukov). 
37 Rusakkoe Slovo, 20 September 1916 ; CHERNOV 35. 
38 Rech_, 21 September 1916 ; also Vasilii Gurko, Mem mories, pp. 185-6. 
39 PADENIE, vi, 342(Milyukov) ; GRAVE 154 ; MILIUKOV 376. 
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the Fifth Duma Elections'. 
40 
Only days later on 23 September, at the first 
formal meeting of the Moscow Badet Committee since June, the principal 
complaint was that patriotisn disarmed any wartime opposition movement 
against the government. Kishkin anticipated a revolution only at the end of 
the war but Kizevetter believed that the government was relying on the 
traditional Russian lethargy which had in the past always been the decisive 
factor maintaining the existing government in power : 'I am very much afraid 
that this silent infinite patience is not an expression of conscientious 
patriotism but only that dull submissiveness and downtroddenness which has 
characterised our entire Russian history. ' 
41 
While the K. adets debated their fears, other groups pressed a more 
vigorous line. Rumours of a 'socialist plot' were circulating and Kerensky, 
Skobelev and Chkheidze were widely believed to be consolidating their 
position with the workers preparatory to revolution. 
42 
At a congress of 
presidents of regional War Industries Committees held secretly 26-27 
September in defiance of the police ban, its President Guchkov proposed 
outright war against the government. As described by Sttirmer, 
Guchkov announced that an agreement to take up arms in battle against 
the state power was essential to save Russia from the supply crisis - 
through the organisation of society forces ; the congress, under the 
chaitmanahip of ßuchkov, passed a resolution of struggle against 
authority. (43) 
Opinions differed as to the line of the Duna upon reassembly. Paleologue was 
convinced that no trouble need be expected from the Duma moderates : 
The liberal parties in the Duma have made up their minds not to take up 
any of the Government's challenges and to defer their claims. The 
danger will not come from them. A military defeat, a famine or palace 
revolution - that's what I'm particularly afraid of. (44) 
40 Moscow report of 18 September 1916 : POOLICE, xvii, 27-1916,46,11-12. 
41 Moscow report of 26 September 1916 : POý, xvii, 27-1916,46,19(Kishkin) 
& 20(Sizevetter) ; also Moscow report of 20 September 1916 : P0ý, 643, 
3,23734 quoted in GRAVE 139-140. 
42 PALEOL04UE, III, 50-1. 
43 Loyal report of 9 October 1916 : MPK 160 ; also P0ý, 1916,347,4,242 & 
246-7 cited in LAVERYCHEV 150. 
44 PALEOLOGUE, III, 55 (entry for 28 September/11 October 1916). 
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The Police Department however, apparently on the basis of the few Duma 
deputies whose opinions were readily available, reported that the Duma could 
be expected to be oppositional and anticipated a denunciation of government 
policy in Rodzyanko's opening speech. 
45 
The first three weeks of October saw the opposition movement accelerat- 
ing and broadening to a degree alarming to all moderates. The transport and 
supply crises were now so advanced that the living conditions of the twown 
populace were deteriorating dramatically : Washburn noted that 'nowadays the 
food problem comes first in public interest, with almost every other topic, 
the war included, nowhere in comparison'. 
46 
This economic collapse provided 
the major factor in promoting a revolutionary situation in the capitals. In 
conversation with Bernard Pares, Konovalov judged that 'it was in October 
that living conditions really became alarming, and it was from this time that 
the revolutionary mood must be dated'. 
47 
A police report for October 
quoted by Florinsky substantially agreed : 
In the opinion of the spokesmen of the Labour Group of the Central War 
Industries Committee, the industrial proletariat of the capital is do 
the verge of despair and it believes that the smallest outbreak due to 
any pretext will lead to uncontrollable riots, with thousands and tens 
of thousands of victims. Indeed the stage for such outbreaks is more 
than set ... groups of responsible workers find it difficult to prevent 
the masses from bursting into demonstrations growing out of the lack of 
necessities and the rise in the cost of living. (48) 
Another factor was that the military successes which had buoyed up 
government confidence over the past few months were over. The brilliant 
Brusilov offensive had been halted and replaced by the campaign to save 
Rumania, with whom Stfrmer had unwisely contracted military alliance in early 
August. 
49 The German army of Mackenson proved more than a match for the 
45 Report of 29 September 1916 : POLICE, xvii, 307A/3/1916,78-9. 
46 Washburn's article 'The Food Problem in Russia', Times(Russian Supplement) 
28 October 1916(n/a), 2a and 2b. 
47 PARES 384 ; also POOLLICE, 167,67 quoted in GRAVE 131. 
48 Florinsky, M. T, The End of the Raasian EmDire, Collier Paperback 1961,175-7. 
49 PARES 368 ; PALEOLOGUE, III, 50 ; Alekseyev had warned Nicholas of the 
dangers of alliance with Ruzania : NICHOLAS 274. 
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Rumanians : by late December the admance of the German army necessitated the 
transfer of one quarter of the Russian forces to defend the Rumanian front. 
The enormous lengbli of the Russian front by late 1916 stretched Russia's 
military resources to the extent that she became incapable of accomplishing 
anything more than a purely defensive 'holding the ring'. 
5° At the same 
time the military emergency increased the need for efficient organisation 
on the home front and rendered the problems of the civil government all the 
more critical. As in the previous year, pari Hsu with the change in 
military fortunes came the familiar ebbing of government self-confidence. 
A third factor in the acceleration of the opposition movement was the 
imminent Duma session promised for 1 November. The Duma deputies assembled 
exceptionally early, each with news to report of developments in the country 
at large, and immeasurably increased the gathering momentum of the opposition 
movement. The Moscow Badete rejected the advice of Milynkov (to concentrate 
fire upon the person of StUrmer alone) to come out boldly in favour of 
attack upon the government as a whole. 
51 The Kadets were anxious for their 
image as leaders of the Opposition for, in the words of Vasilii Makiakov, 
'the indignation of the country had risen td such heights that the Duna did 
not wish to be left behind'. 
52 Popular feeling against the Duna itself 
was running high : 
At the lower levels of society they accuse the Duma ... of deliberately 
refusing to come to the aid of the general masses. The most bitter 
accusations in this respect are addressed not only to the Oktobriets 
but to the Kadets too. (53) 
A joint meeting of S. R. e and S. D. s on 9 October also 'registered the undoubt- 
ed fall in the influence of the progressive-liberal political current led 
by the Kadets and remarked the complete bankruptcy of the Dum& and Progress- 
50 Lukomaky, Memoirs, pp. 40-45 ; Vasilii Gurko, Memories, pp. 145-6,158-162 
191-202 ; PALEOLOGUE, III, 52-3 . 
51 Meetings of 30 September and 1 October 1916 : POLICE, xvii, k6-b, 13-16 
also TsGAOR, f . 579(Milyukov) , 698,1-7. 
52 Maklakov, 'On the Fall of Tsard©a', SFER, vol. 18, no 52(1939), p. 90i 
53 Moscow report of 20 October 1916 : POLICE, 167,46-1916,75 quoted in 
cHE rrSKY 756 ; also Petrograd report of 30 October 1916 : PO LICE, 167, 
19 quoted in GRAVE 138. 
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-ive Bloc'. Perhaps even worse than dislike for the Duma moderates was 
indifference towards them. Another police repott for the month of October 
noted that 'outside traditional political allegiances, the broad mass of the 
people are little interestsed in the State Duma'. 
54 
Meetings of Moscow society were arranged by Konovalov to discuss the 
political situation (5 and 6 October) and the supply crisis (9 October). The 
principal feature of the meetings was their domination by party polemics, 
and the police reporter noted that Konovalov flagrantly exploited his 
position as organiser to hit out at his Kadet rivals : 'Konovalov hurled at 
the leaders of the Moscow Kadets charges of being inactive, doctrinaire, 
over-academic and, most important, estranged from democracy'. He readily 
bracketed the Kadets with the Oktobrists as conscious or unconscious 
stooges of the tsarist government : 
Afgr the Oktobrist-ministers, as if we have not suffered enough, will 
come the Kadet-ministers. Maybe in a few months we shall have a ministry 
of Milyukov and Shingarev. Everything depends on us : the imminent 
session of the State Duma must be the decisive onslaught on authority, 
the last charge at the bureaucracy. (55) 
The rising opposition movement persuaded even Rodzyanko to demand a Duma 
session earlier than that promised for 1 November but the request was 
peremptorily dismissed by the Emperor on 9 October, dashing Rodzyanko's 
hopes for repeating what he considered to be his personal success of 
summer 1915.56 
Moderate and conservative political forces were bj now acutely anxious. 
Milyukov confessed that a Kadet meeting which he attended in Moscow on 
I October 9fid proved a rude awakening : 
There has been a metamorphosis in the mood of Moscow. The most naturally 
inert and ignorant circles have begun to speak in the language of 
implacable revolutionaries. I would thick that the mood of Moscow out- 
-strips that of Russia as a whole ... Meanwhile it seems that it has 
54 KA, vol. 17, pp. 30(S. R. and S. D. meetings) and 26(lack of interest in Duaa). 
55 Moscow report of 12 October 1916 : POLICE, xvii, 46-b, 7-8. 
56 Teý, f. 1276(Coutncil of Ministers) x, 7,227 ; Stttrmer's loyal report 
of 9 October 1916 : MPK 161. 
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still to reach Petrograd and the provinces ... Moscow wishes to express her own feelings and she cannot and will not be silent. (57) 
To Milyukov's alarm, he realised that the London and Paris of mid 1916 were 
more familiar and comprehensible to his than the Moscow of 1916. The political 
effect of this discovery was to convince Milyukov of the necessity of 
controlling and channelling the opposition movement. He expressed this 
belief at the renewed Bloc meetings of early October but found the Bloc 
participants as far from unanimity as ever. At the meeting of 3 October, the 
first since June, a meandering debate closed with Shingarev's warning 'I 
don't know whether it is too late for us ; we are on the brink of a 
catastrophe'. A second meeting proved equally fruitless while a third (on 
13 October) vividly demonstrated the range and woolly-mindedness of the 
members' thought. Kapnist argued the necessity of 'breaking the government's 
neck' but Vasilii Maklakov insisted that 'this Duma is not a politically 
mature institution, the majority is volatile and rejects the principle of a 
responsible ministry ... more than a ministry of confidence is quite beyond 
us'. Yefremov uttered the last word in confusion of thought with the claim : 
'I am a defender of theocracy ,,, but having come so far, I find that a 
responsible ministry is the only remedy'. 
58 The problem of inducing the 
varied members of the Bloc to adhere to a single coherent policy seemed as 
insuperable as ever. 
While the Bloc dithered, social forces outside the Duma relentlessly 
pushed towards open conflict with the government. On 15 October Prince Lvov 
came out in support of an immediate congress on the supply crisis, a giant 
society congress in the Rear future and pledged the full support of the 
Union of Zemstvos to a Duna stand against the government. 
59 On the streets 
of Moscow and Petrograd the workers demonstrated, precipitating the first 
isolated incident in which troops aided with the workers against the police60 
57 POLICL, xvii, 27-1916,9 which also appears in abridged version in GRAVE 1 2-3 and further edited in Riha, A Russian Earopean, pp. 260-1. 
58 XA, vol. 56, pp. 82-3(3 October 1916) & 87(13 October). 
59 POLICE934394 quoted is GRAVE 144-5. 
60 PALE07AGDE, III, 73-5 ; ShlyapaikovKanm Semnadtsatoe Goda, I, 238. 
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The Duma moderates found themselves swept along in spite of themselves by 
the vigour of the opposition movement : on 18 October the Duma Budget 
commission went so far as formally to condemn the recent transfer of supply 
to the jurisdiction of the MVD. 
61 
The government became increasingly apprehensive. In his loyal report of 
9 October, Stlrmer confided his belief that the Duma membership would attack 
the government not only from persdnal conviction but in order to play to the 
electoral gallery on the eve of the Fourth Duma's dissolution : 
The imminent session of the State Duna, promises to be highly restless 
with criticism of all measures undettaken by the government. The whole 
membership of the Duma is preparing to speak, impelled by considerations 
of the new elections in 1917 and by the desire to distinguish themselves 
before their electorates in the interests of re-election. 
As in the past, the government was less concerned about the violence of 
Duma expression than the wide currency that it enjoyed. Stürmer toyed with 
the idea of calling the Duna but enforcing closed sessions which would 
effectively 'exclude the possibility of the publication of the stenographic 
records and their appearance in the press'. 
62 
The height of government 
alarm was reached with the police report of 20 October : 
This opposition mood has reached exceptional proportions which were 
not attained in the broad mass of the population even in the period 
1905-6 ... Russia is on the brink of revolution and Petrograd in more 
than close to an armed uprising. (63) 
By 31 October, Sttirmer noted in his report to the Emperor that the Duna 
majority was convinced of the necessity of adopting 'the path of systematic 
battle with the government ... and the publication from the height of the 
Duna rostrum of criminal propaganda throughout the country demanding a 
change in the existing structure of government'. 
64 
Desperate to avert suck 
a calamity, Stürmer resorted to open threats : 
I draw the attention of the members of the Duma to the fact that the 
immediate consequence of the dissolution of the Duna would be the 
61 Ts_, f. 1278(State Duma), v, 330,463. 
62 Both quotations : StUrmer's report of 9 October 1916 (1'B 161). 
63 KA, vol. 17, pp"5-6 ; also P©LICE, 167,67 quoted in GRAVE 129. 
64 Sttrmer's loyal report of 31 October 1916 : MPK131. 
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speedy despatch to the front line for military service of all members 
of the legislative chambers in the liable age group. (65) 
However the increasingly extreme utterances of both government and Duma 
were symptoms of a severe attack of nerves and there were attempts from 
both sides to cool the situation. The government acted first : in the hope 
of avoiding a collision course, Protopopov arranged a meeting with his ex- 
colleagues of the Duma Bloc for 19 October. The personal animosity of 
Milyukov and Protopopov almost aborted the meeting from the start and 
Protopopov was quick to protest at the total lack of cooperation from the 
Bloc past and present : 
I came here for your support but I am not finding it. If it must be 
done, I shall carry on alone. You have never once invited me to the 
Bloc, I have not attended a single meeting ... Why is it that you 
treated even Khvostov better than you treat me? 
After a semi-apology from the Bloc leaders for putting Protopopov in the 
dock, there was a serious attempt at political bargaining but the demands 
of Yefremov proved impossible for Protopopov to swallow. Nothing concrete 
vmwerged from the meeting. Protopopov parted in exasperation : 'Gentlemen, I 
have made the experiment of cooperation but unfortunately it has proved 
unsuccessful ; this is my last attempt ; what more can I do ? '. 
66 
The 
government's appeasing move had been rejected and, true to Protopopov's 
last words, the government retreated into itself and adopted a defensive 
stance. 
Asmong the Dumm moderates there was still considerable doubt as to the 
wisdom of attacking the government. The familiar dilemma of the Bloc in 
wartime reappeared. A majority of Kadets and Progressists proposed adding 
their weight to the opposition movement to avoid being overtaken as political 
leaders, and pressing the advantage against the government despite the risk 
of revolution or military collapse. Milyukov, a minority of Kadets and 
65 PADENIE, v, 72(St er - quotation) and vi, 347(Milyukov) ; also 
PALEOLOGUE, III, 88. 
66 See booklet published by the Progressive Bloc, copies of which may be found in the Rodzyanko fond (TsGAO , f. 605, d lS 73) and Millnkov fond (TzGAR, f. 579, deo 382) -; also, included in Shlyapnikov, Kanun Se nadt; atog 
Goda, II, 99-107 ; quotations pp. 3 &7 of Bloc booklet. 
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Progressists and the whole Oktobrist camp led by Rodzyanko, fearing revolut- 
ion more than the present government, proposed employing the Bloc to 
channel the energy of the opposifion movement into securing particular 
concessions from the government. 
A succession of Bloc meetings over the last ten days of October became 
the principal arena for the clash between the two viewpoints. At a meeting 
on 20 October debate centred on the degree of support which the Duma might 
expect in a political crisis : Krinsky for the Left Kadets argued that to 
attack the government 'would earn colossal popularity' but Shingarev for the 
Right Kadets feared that 'popularity' was an ephemeral political factor : 
The Vyborg Manifesto was a mistake ... The people did not rise and the 
Manifesto remained incomprehensible even to the intelligentsia. In the 
army they are now saying that a palace revolution is necessary but I 
am a great sceptic of revolution in general ... let us instead initiate 
a campaign of parliamentary moves. (67) 
At the meeting of 22 October argument centred over whether to attack the 
premier, the administration or the whole governmental structure. A tri- 
partite division emerged with Milyukov, the Right Kadets and the Oktobrists 
in the centre, and the Left Kadets and Progressists, and the Progressive 
Nationalists at the two extremes : Milyukov found his position under fire 
from both the Left (headed by Yefremov) and the Right (led by Shul*gin). 
68 
The subsequent meeting on 24 October however saw the triumph of the Milyukov 
viewpoint : Milyukov persuaded both Yefremov and Shnl'gin that his centre 
line was preferable to the ascendancy of the opposite wing and promised a 
firm stand against the government. Shingarev gamely attempted to define the 
common ground of the compromise but only succeeded in highlighting its 
political feebleness : 
The only hope is that the Drama is not estranged from the country. Our 
only strength in moral authority ... The issue must be faced right now 
and you must not fear to show your attitude to the government ... the issue must be presented point-blank : the government or the Duna. (69) 
67 20 October 1916 : KA, vol. 56, pp. 88-93(Srinsky and Shingarev pp. 90 & 92). 
68 22 October 1916 : BA, vol. 56, pp. 99-102. 
69 24 October 1916 : IG, vol. 36, pp. 1O2-6(Shimgarev p. 105). 
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Even so, while confessing sympathy for the anger of the Left, Milyukov had 
secured a tactical victory for his traditional policy of restraint. 
But while Milyukov had engineered a victory for his policies within the 
Bloc, he was less successful within his party. The Autumn conference of the 
Badet party held in Petrograd 22-24 October, the first since the internal 
coups of May, proved a complete upset for Milyukov's hopes for political 
restraint. Anticipating strong opposition, Milyukov adopted, his usual tactic 
of holding closed sessions and excluding the public and press. 
7° Milyukov 
rather desperately defended his position on tactical grounds : 
In its struggle with this upheaval the government will find itself in a 
vacuum - it will have no-one to lean on ... At the ultimate moment, 
frightened, it will grasp for us and it will then be our task not to 
destroy the government, which would only aid anarchy, but to instil a 
completely different content into it, that is to build a genuine 
constitutional order. That is why, in our struggle with the government, 
despite everything, we must retain a sense of proportion ... To support 
anarchy in the name of the struggle with the government would mean to 
risk all the political conquests which we have made since 1905. (71) 
The Left Kadets and provincial delegates hit out hard : Milyckov was person- 
-ally attacked for being out of touch with the mood of Russia and spending 
more time seeking foreign contacts than preserving the links in the ladet 
organisation. Prince Pavel Dolgorukov concluded a personal account of the 
Autumn conference with the observations : 
Milyukov sees the centre of attention as the parliamentary struggle with 
the government ; the "provincials" insist on shifting the centre of 
attention to the organisation of the masses, to a rapprochement with 
political groups to the Left ... Finally, as always, Milyukov succeeded in defeating his opponents and made them follow him. But this was 
accomplished only after a prolonged and heated struggle. The conference 
showed that the party's Left wing is growing constantly stronger. (72) 
Despite the device of holding the conference in camera, the strength of the 
Left ladet opposition to Milyukov quickly became known in Duma circles. 
Milyukov was now caught between the Party and the Bloc : his seriously- 
challenged authority within the party compelled him to shift his ground 
70 Birzhevie VedomostY, 27 October 1916. 
71 Report of 2 November 1916 : PO_, 27,26524 quoted in GRAVE 147-8- 
72 quoted in Moscow report of 2 November 1916 : POLICE, 27,26524 quoted in 
GRAVE 146 and in Ribs, A Russian gean, pp. 2 11-2 ; also Novo* Vrr 127 October 1916 and TsGAOR, f. 579(Mi`lyukov), 1106,1-4. 
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towards the Left in order to retain party leadership but this very move 
challenged the tactical victory which he had just secured over his Left 
Kadet and Progressist opponents within the Bloc. 
In the inoterests of party unity and his own leadership, Milyukov was 
forced to abandon his policy of resiraint. Once the decision was made, he 
could find arguments to sustain a policy of attack : the Duma must once 
again become the spokesman for the Russian people in order to regain the full 
confidence of a nation disappointed by the passivity of its past conduct. 
As Milyukov now remarked to Paleologue, 'certain things will have to be said 
from the tribune - otherwise we shall lose all authority over our constituents, 
and they will turn to the extreme parties'. 
73 The new move was greeted with 
enthusiasm by society forces outside the Duna. Rodzyanko received a message 
from the Union of Zemstvos on 29 October assuring him that, 
In the decisive battle of the State Duma for the institution of a 
government capable of uniting all the living forces of the country and 
carrying out nation to victory, "Zemstvo Russia" will stand at one with 
the people's representatives. 
A similar resolution from the Union of Towns on 31 October stressed that 
'the decisive hour has arrived - delay is intolerable and all efforts must be 
bent for the establishment of a government which in union with the people 
will lead the country to victorf'. 
74 Ostensibly, the identification of the 
Duma moderates with the larger opposition movement was was now complete. 
However the Bloc meetings of 30 and 31 October provided the venue for 
still further controversy over Duna action. Following its precedent of 
August 1915, the Bloc attempted to broaden the base of its campaign by 
alliance with the State Council but the majority of the Council delegates, 
while sympathetic to the general line of the Bloc, refused to countenance 
the accusation of treason prepared against Stier. Vladimir Gurko probably 
spoke for the Council majority in saying, 
73 PAmoLOGUE, III, 88-9. 
74 TsGAOR, f. 605(Rodzyanko), 74,2 ; both nessages are also quoted in tau in 
Rodzfaºnko, ' 4osndarstveaaaºya Doan', pp. 29-31 " 
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As a member of the upper chamber, I categorically state that as regards 
the declaration as a whole, the majority will go along with the Duma, 
but ae they will not suscribe to this clause. I would be the first to 
protest against the accusation of treason. 
Milyukov gladly seized on the principle of Bloc unity to rationalise a 
compromise entirely to his own liking and the projected appech was toned 
down to avoid alienating the Council delegates. 75 The cautiousness of the 
Council members combined with trepidation about the Duma session now only 
two days away to prompt a drazatic collapse of self-confidence on the part 
of the Right wing of the Bloc. At the meeting of 31 October Shul'gin roundly 
condemned the Milyukov line for inciting rather than expressing the 
opposition movement : 
Now the Kadets are introducing a proposal to base agreement on the 
principle of active struggle with the government ... but we are not prepared to go to the barricades on that basis. The Duma must be the 
safety-valve for letting off. steam, not for making steam. 
While the Bloc Right wing found the Badet line unduly provocative, the Left 
wing led by Yefremov deplored Milyakov's retreat overthe treason charge and 
consideredhe edited declaration too anaemic : 
The declaration is both weak and feeble. I cannot be silent any longer. 
There is an infinitely more crucial issue arising here than the question 
of editorial modifications. Are we agreed that we =at do more, 
appreciating the necessity for further struggle with the government and the "personal regime" ? We fear that the Zemstvo-Oktobrists do not 
accept even the necessity for attack ... Land) today I have seen the disagreement is deeper than I realised ... It is a fundamental split in the Bloc organisation. 
Despite the soothing reassurances of Milyukov and Shidlovsky, Yefremov 
delivered his bombshell : 'the decision of the Progressists is not to subscr- 
ibe to the declaration and consequently to quit the Progressive Bloc'. 
76 
The Progreasist decision rocked the self-confidence of the Bloc on the 
very eienoing prior to the opening of the Duna session. Although the decision 
announced by Yefremov was bg no means unanimous -a Progressist 'rump' led by 
Orlov-Davydov refused to quit the Bloc - the repercussions could hardly have 
75 Bloc meeting of 30 October 1916 : KA vol. 56, pp. 110-114(Gurko p. 113) ; 
also GUR$0 582-3 and SHÜL'GIN 80-5. 
76 Bloc meeting of 31 October 1916 : BA, vol. 56, pp. 114-7(Shul'gis 114, 
Yefremov 116-7. Milyukov and Bhid1OY. k 117) 1 also PADENIE, vi, 346 (Milyukov) and Rodzyanko, 'Gosudaretvennaya Duma', p. 33. 
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been more serious. 
77 The action of the Progressists persuaded the Left 
Kadets to give practical consideration to breaking away from the authority 
of Milyukov and forming a new fraction with the Yefremovist Progressists. 
78 
The double threat to the unity of the Progressive Bloc and his own Kadet 
fraction and party posed a terrifying dilemma for Milyukov. To refrain from 
attack (his own original policy) would keep the Right wing of the Bloc 
content at the expense of losing the Progressists, probably losing most of 
the Left Kadets and conceivably even his own party leadership, not to mention 
again disappointing the opposition movement in the country. To attack the 
government mercilessly (a line personally deplored by Milyu$ov) could possibly, 
lose the Bloc the allegiance of the moderate Right fractions but had the 
advantages of retaining Left ICadet and Progressist allegiances, reviving the 
prestige of the Duma as the national spokesman and saving his personal 
position as party leader. There was more than a risk of Bloc disintegration 
either way but Milyukov characteristically chose the course which offered 
the surest guarantee for his own national and party authority. Milyukov's 
decision to attack was not prompted by 'a momentary aberration' : while ), is 
commitment to a policy of assault upon the government was untypical, the 
action was for Milyukov the logical response to the predicament of the Duna 
in the country and his own position within the disintegrating Kadet party 
and Bloc in the exceptional circumstances of late 1916.79 
All who attended the first day of the new Duma session on 1 November 
eagerly anticipated a forthright attack on the government. The Council of 
Ministers, informed of developments within the Bloc by their police reporters 
and undercover ag t Krupensky, prudently departed immediately after 
Rodzyanko's opening speech. 
80 
After the wars-up in the form of Shidlovsky s 
77 Report of 8 November 1916 : PO , xvii, 307A/1/1916,89 ; also Utro 
Roa ii, 2 November 1916. 
78 Ibid ; also PADENIE, vi, 91-2 and Rech', 1 & 5-November 1916. 
79 The phrase is Katkov's : KATKOV 194 ; also Ri. ha, A Raaaian 8uropeaa, pp" 
263-4. 
80 PADENIE, vi, 91-2(Milyukov) ; PALEOLOGUE, III, 91 ; GURKO 547. 
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reading of the Bloc Declaration, Milyukov rose to speak. 
81 
His speech was 
not marked by great political insight, striking oratory or convincing 
argument but there was no doubt of the immediate impact of this succes de 
scandale. Milyukov used the knowledge that the presiding officer Varun- 
Sekret knew no German to read out passages from the Neue Freie Presse 
describing the baneful influence of the Empress upon Russian politics. He 
followed this with a catalogue o& accusations against Stiirmer, hesitating 
after each charge to enquire rhetorically 'Is this stupidity or is this 
treason? '. Finally he attempted to cover himself against futtre legal 
redress by remarking, 
Does it matter, practically speaking, whether we are dealing with 
stupidity or treason ? The government persists in claiming that 
organising the country means organising a revolution and deliberately 
prefers chaos and disorganisation. Is this stupidity or is this treason? 
Choose either, the consequences are the same. (82) 
The charge of treason directed explicitly at StUrmer (and implicitly at the 
Empress) lent Milyukov's speech enormous notoriety. Milyukov was to remark 
with pride some years later that, 
The impression it produced was as if a blister filled with pus had burst 
and the basic evil, which was known to everyone but had awaited public 
exposure, had now been pin-pointed ... My speech earned the reputation 
of a storm-signal for the revolution. Such was not my intention but the 
prevailing mood in the country served as a megaphone for my words. (83) 
Rodzyanko dared not authorise the publication of a complete stenographic 
record of the speech but pirated versions were typewritten by the thousand 
to satisfy a public eager to learn the worst. 
84 
The government was thrown onto the defensive by the shock of Milyukov's 
'storm-signal'. Stürmer asked his colleagues for authorisation to prosecute 
Milyukov as a political criminal but the other ministers, an 4ous for a 
return to calm, persuaded him to sue for slander instead. 
85 
The passivity 
81 GDSO, V, 1,10-13 (SkidlovskT). 
82 GSO, V, 1,35-48 (Milyakov) ; for the speaker's own copy, see T. GAOR, f. 555, 
delo 60 ; also PADERIE, vi, 346-7(Milyukov) and SHUL'GIN 85-6- 
83 Milyukov, Ietoria Vtoros Rueskov Revolsutsii, Sofia 1922-4, II, 277. 
84 P&LEOLOGUE, III, 93, ; dUL'GIN 56-7 ; Milyukov, 'Fevral'akie Dni', p. 170. 
85 PADENIE, i, 266(Stärmer) and vi, 347(Milukov). 
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of the ministers under fire only encouraged the Bloc onslaught. The Duma 
expected to hear philippics from the demagogues of the Extreme Left (and 
Kereneky and Chkheidze predictably attacked the X government on the first 
occasion) but what surprised the Duma and alarmed the government was the 
mobilisation of the moderate Right in the campaigm. 
86 
At the second sitting 
of the Duma on 3 November, the usually mild-mannered Shul'gin concentrated 
his wrath on the person of Sttirmer : 
A man without convictions, ready for anything ... who understands 
nothing about state affairs ... who does not attend here, offers no 
explanations, refutes no accusations but resorts to legal redress 
against Milyukov... We will fight this government until it goes. On the 
home front is the Duna. It watches , listene, finds out and when 
necessary, speaks out. (87) 
Even Vasilii Maklakov abandoned his self-chosen role as 'trimmer' of the 
Duma moderates to add his considerable talents to the denunciation of 
Sttirmer and his administration : 
This ministerial kaleidoscope, in which we fail even to get a glimpse of 
the faces of the ministers involved I This cabinet without a programme, 
ministers without opinions, without faith in one another, without 
mutual respect, without even tokens of solidarity. The sum of it all is 
the present government of Sttirmer ... which paralyses and enfeebles the 
strength of all Russia ... We have now parted company with the old 
regime in Russia and before each minister stands a dilemma : serve 
Russia or serve the regime. To serve both is as impossible as to serve 
God and Mammon. (88) 
Appalled at the broad spectrum of attack from the Extreme Left through to 
the Nationalists, Stürmer in his loyal report of 3 November held out no hope 
whatsoever for avoiding prompt Duma prorogation. 
89 
Yet despite Stürmer's misgivings, the Council of Ministers authorised 
the Ministers for War and the Navy, Shuvayev and Grigorovich, to approach 
the Duma in the interests of the war effort. 
90 The visit of the two ministe 
86 GDSO, ®, 1,13-22(Chkheidzs) and 28-33(Kerensky) ;a seperate transcript of the Chkheidze speech is in the Milyukov fond : TsGAOR, f. 579, d 1_ 451. 
87 GDSO, V, 2,67-71 ; seperate transcripts are in both the Milyukov fond 
TsGAOR, f. 579, delo 456) and Guchkov fond(TsGAOR, f. 555, delo 62) ; aee 
also the speaker's own account in SHDL'GIN 86-88. 
88 GDSO, V, 2,130-1 ;a seperate transcript is is the Milytikov fond : TS_, f. 579, deio 455- 
89 MS 132-3 ; also PAUENIE, i, 229(StVrmer). 
90 Ts_, f. 627(Stftrmer), 15,2-3 ; also PAS 393 and C SKy 776. 
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to the Duma on 4 November was greeted rapturously by the Bloc and both sides 
repledged their oaths of loyalty to the pursuit of victory in the war. 
Milyukov exultantly claimed the 'the Ministers for War and the Navy took 
their stand on the side of the Duma and the nation'. 
91 
The element of 
misunderstanding which converted a reconnaissance mission into an acclaimed 
Duma triumph demonstrated the relief with which the Bloc welcomed the 
slightest sign of concession from the government. Stflrmer was acutely 
embarrassed by the episode, which was interpreted by all as 'proof that 
these two ministers are not in solidarity with the remainder of the council 
of Ministers' and that the Duma had secured two converts from the government 
camp. 
92 Stürmer believed the Duma to be jeering at the 'DicaLtator' who 
could not impose even the most rudimentary discipline over his ministers. 
Personally distressed, without resource or hope for the future, Stttrmer was 
clearly at the and of his political usefulness. 
The Milyukov 'storm-signal' was destined to take pride of place in Duma 
and particularly Kadet hagiography. In later years the all-important 
exigencies of the moment were forgotten and the speech seen as a deliberate 
and conscious advance in the movement against tsardom. In the scramble for 
a place in the history of the Russian revolution, Kadet apologists were to 
claim the 1 November speech as 'the beginning of the revolution'. 
93 The 
immediate consequences of the speech seemed impressive enough. Stfirmer was 
discharged, the inevitable end of a protracted and painful process. Under 
fire from the Empress since aid August and from the Council of Ministers 
since mid September, the 'Dictator' had in practice been reduced to mere 
Council Chairman by October. The last justification for holding even thia 
post was his successful handling of the State Doma and Alexandra was quick 
91 GDso, V, 4,203-5 (Shuvayev) ; MPS 135 ; PALEOLOGUE, III, 94-5 ; Rech' 
editorial, 6 November 1916(quotation). 
92 Sttirmer's report of 7 November 1916 : MP 135 ; also ENGEL'HARDT, xii, 728. 
93 For example : Mandel'stan in Rech', 28 March 1917 ; Tyrkova-Williams in 
From Liberty to Brest-Litovek, London 1919, p. 3 ; Petrunkevich in Is Za_iavk 
Obahcheetvennorco Deyate sa. Voa_minania, Berlin 1931+, p"355 ; and Milyukov 
himself in Istoria VtorgiRuaakoy Revolyutsii, I, 34. 
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to furnish the Emperor with the fullest details of his glaring failure in 
this respect. 
94 On 8 November Nicholas agreed to his removal : 
I have been thinking of old Sttirmer. He, as you rightly say, acts as a 
red flag not only to the Duma but to the whole country alas. I hear this 
from all sides ; nobody believes in him and eiryone is angry because we 
stand up for him... I reproach him for his excessive prudence and his 
incapacity for taking upon himself the responsibility of making them 
all work as they should do ... He is coming here tomorrow and I will 
give him leave for the present. (95) 
As Milyukov was to relate, Sttirmer's downfall (announced on 10 November) was 
accounted a personal triumph by the delighted Duma Bloc : 
The first impression from the dismissal of Stürmer was that this was a 
complete victory for the Duma following its onslaught upon Stilrmer. It 
seemed as if in effect this was the first step towards ministerial 
responsibility in that an individual, having received a harsh judgement, 
was dismissed. (96) 
The second major consequence of the 'storm-signal' was ? ilyukov's 
triumphant return to political ascendancy. A police report for 8 November 
observed that 'the hero of the hour is Milyukov ; there is no doubt that his 
popularity in the Duma, Bloc and his own fraction has reached its zenith'. 
97 
In the country, type-written and mimeographed cppies of his speech brought 
the name of Milyukov to everyine with an interest im politics or a taste for 
'seditious' literature. 
9$ Mil yukov's authority within the Bloc was again 
impregnable. Although the Progressists were still sulking in isolation, there 
was every ground for hope that they could be enticed back into a Bloc which 
had survived possibly the greatest test to its unity so far. While the 
speech did not draw the Left 8adets unconditionally back into he, it did 
arrest the Leftward drift of the Badet minority and instilled into the 
majority a new breezy self-confidence : 
The Kadets are persuaded that the government cannot refuse the demands 
of the Progressive Bloc ... The Kadets have attained incredible 
political influence over the last weeks, their opinions are believed 
and they are aided by the restlessness in society ; Milyukov has become 
the regular hero of the day. (99) 
94 Alexandra's letters of ?, 8 &9 November 1916 : LIJMMRA 436-7. 
95 Letter of 8 November 1916 : NICHOLAS 296. 
96 PADEMIE, vi , 348 (Mii, "koy) . 
97 Po_, xvii, 307A/1/1916,89. 
98 MILIÜKOV 377-8 ; also HATXov 165 and Riha, A Russian Europeaa, p. 266. 
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Milyulov's last-minute switch in tactics on the eve of the Duma session had 
been amply vindicated and everything which he could reasonably have hoped 
for from the speech had come to pass. 
The immediate consequences of the 'storm-signal' suggested an authority 
which was in reality largely illusory. The Duma attack had provided only the 
final push in the fall of Stflrmer, not its deciding element. The Bloc 
uncertainty about tactics was by no means resolved by the success of early 
November and the moderate groups were far from unanimous about how to exploit 
their famous victory. At the Bloc meeting of 8 November, the first since 31 
October, Milyukov prudently attempted to place recent events in perspective : 
I would not call the substitution of Trepov and Protopopov for Sturmer 
a great event but ... an electric spark emitted here is running over 
the country. Under the influence of the feeling of mortal danger which 
we have pointed out here, the country is rousing itself. 
His colleagues, while quick to congratulate themselves on their recent 
success, preferred to postpone decisions about future policy until the 
formation of the new administration. 
100 In Moscow the local Kadets recovered 
from the intoxication of victory earlier than in Petrograd and experienced 
a full return to their old qualms about the relative strengths of Duma and 
government. A police reporter described the mood of the 9 November meeting 
of Moscow Kadets as, 
Clearly showing utter perplexity at finding solutions, complete 
recognition of their own impotence and awareness of the power of the 
government. None of the Kadets believe that the government will meet 
the demands of the Bloc in full and in the last analysis, the whole 
question for the Kadets is who should replace Sttirmer ... In their 
private conversations the Kadete demonstrate a strong inclination to 
compromise ... The Kadets talk of the possibility of a "Society Cabinet" 
only in their official statements, and in their private discussions are 
reconciling themselves to a partial renovation of the present 
cabinet. (101) 
The early collapse of confidence in Moscow Kadet circles was soon to 
communicate itself to Petrograd. 
99 Report of 19 November 1916 : POý, xvii, 307L/l/1916,157. 
100 KA, vol. 56, pp. 117-8. 
101 POý, xvii, 27-1916,46(Moscow), 28 (original underlining). 
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It also emerged that the promises of support given by the public 
organisations provided little real reinforcement in a duel with the government 
The point was proved when on 5 November the MVD adopted its now traditional 
device of slapping a ban on the congresses of the Zemstvo and Town Unions. 
While the Union of Towns was tempted to defy the ban, the more staid Inion 
of Zemstvos meeting on the sixth resolved 'under no circumstances to operate 
by illegal means, nor under any circumstances to assemble a congress by 
revolutionary means'. Not prepared to defy both the government and its 
senior partner, a meeting of the executiv*f the Union of Towns the next day 
reluctantly followed suit. 
102 The provocative action of the MVD was accepted 
by the public organisations with little more than statutory complaint, 
demonstrating that in November 1916 they were still not prepared to follow 
the Bloc into battle, even had the Bloc wished to lead, 
With the fall of Stttrmer came the task of reconstituting the Council of 
Ministers and, ever sensitive to appearances and the claims of the Duma upon 
his prerogatives, Nicholas insisted that 'while these changes are in progress 
the Duma will be prorogued for about eight days, otherwise they would say it 
was being done under pressure from them'. 
103 Despite Nicholas's transparent 
motive for instituting the Duma break of 10-19 November, all the changes 
made were deliberately calculated to w9 ken the resolve of the militants and 
offer hope to the moderates. The Council of Ministers was reconstituted with 
the clear purpose of appeasing the Duna. On 10 November, and despite the 
qualms of the Empress who saw her plans for Protopopov threatened, Sttirmer 
was replaced by the moderate Right Aleksandr Trepov. 
104 On the sixteenth 
the despised and incompetent Minister of Agriculture Bobrinsky was succeeded 
by Rittikh, whose training under Stolypin and Krivoshein guaranteed a seasure 
of efficiency and rendered him acceptable to moderates everywhere. 
105 Two 
102 POLICE, xvii, 27-1916,46,30 ; also CHEMMS Y 777-8. 
103 Letter of 10 November 1916 : NICHOLAS 298 ; Tsý, f. 1276, x, 7 243. 
104 Alexandra's opinion of Trepov : letters of 7& 10 November 1916 (ALEXANDRA 436 & 438) ; also P&LEOLOGUE, III, 34. 
105 PARES 393 ; Tir, mes, 25 November &1 December 1916(n/s), 8b and 7a. 
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of the most disliked ministers of the government had been removed to placate 
the Duma and their replacements specially selected to avoid giving offence. 
The Duma and Council of Ministers now cooperated in a campaign for the 
removal of the third Duma bete noire still remaining in the government. 
The campaign was only possible because of the Emperor's mounting 
doubts about Protopopov : 
I am sorry for Protopopov - he is a good honest man but he jumps from 
one idea to another and cannot make up his mind on anything. I noticed 
that from the beginning ... It is risky to leave the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the hands of such a man in these times. (106) 
Divining the political breeze, Trepov made the removal of Protopopov a 
condition of his tenure as Chairman of the Council at his interview with 
Nicholas on 10 November. 
107 Nicholas's agreement elicited a torrent of 
protest from Alexandra. Rightly judging that her husband's independence of 
mind ran in direct proportion to his distance from her aide, Alexandra 
packed for the Stavka at once. 
108 Her letters before departure show her 
insistence on Protopopov's retention : 
I entreat you don't go and change Protopopov now, he will be alright, 
give his the chance ... Don't change anybody until we meet, I entreat 
you, let's speak it over quietly together ... Protopopov venerates Our 
Friend and will be blessed, he is not mad ... Don't make any changes 
till I have come. 
and 
Put off Trepov until we have not ... I an but a woman fighting for her 
Master and Child, only don't pull away the sticks upon which I have 
found it possible to rest ... Only when you tell Trepov you won't 
change Protopopov, don't for goodness' sake mention my name - it must 
be your wise wish. (109) 
Alexandra arrived at the Stavka on 13 November and remained until 3 December; 
the evidence suggests that the stay was not a very pleasant one for Nicholas 
Yes, these days spent together were difficult but only thanks to you 
have I spent them more or lese calmly. You were so strong and steadfast 
-I admire you more than I can say. Forgive me if I was moody and 
unrestrained. (110) 
106 Letter of 9 November-1916: NICHOLAS 297. 
107 Yasilii (irko, ao ies, p. 1$0 ;. Gilliard, Thj Art eta Y s, pp. 1781"9. 
108 Vasilii Gurrko, Mem ories, p. 180 ; Yusupov, Rasý, p. 140. 
109 Letters of 11 & 12 November. 1916 ALKKAMRA'439-441* 
110 Nicholas's letter of 4 December 1916 NICHOLAS 299. 
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Alexandra naturally had her way and at Trepov's second audience with the 
Emperor on 16 November, both Protopopov's dismissal and Trepov's own 
subsequent offer of resignation were refused. 
ill In an unpAcedented attempt 
at joint action, Trepov and other ministers appealed to Rodzyanko to use his 
influence to oust Protopopov but Rodzyanko's visit to the Stavka was to prove 
no more fruitfdl than Trepov's. 
112 Trepov was eventually driven by 
desperation to the rash course of attempting to bribe Rasputin to get rid of 
Protopopov. 
113 Neither approach worked : the attempted bribe put Trepov in 
the wrong morally and earned his the hatred of the Empress, while the 
tentative collaboration of Duma and Council was never to detelop. Protopopov 
was retained in spite of his estrangement from the Duma, the Council of 
Ministers and the Emperor himself. 
Trepov took care to initiate good relations with the Duna fron the very 
start of his administration. On 11 November, only the second day of his 
appointment, Trepov held exploratory courtesy talks with Rodzyanko. titer 
asking Rodzyanko'e advice on a replacement for Protopopov, Trepov invited 
him (as described above) to join the Council of Ministers in a combined 
operation for his removal. Its complete lack of success in achieving its 
object did not disgrace the exercise in the eyes of Rodzyenko and the Duma. 
114 
On the first day of the reconvened session on 19 November, Trepov turned his 
seductive arts upon the more suecep$ible of the Dumm moderates : an 
assurance of a complete review of the question of agricultural price-pegging 
set out to woo the landowning Oktobrists, while his public disclosure of the 
Straits Agreement guaranteeing Russian acquisition of Constantinople at the 
end of the war was intended to"dispel rumours of a Seperate Peace and 
recommend the new administration in particular to the Kadets. In both 
111 PAIEOLOGUE, IIX, 105"-8 ; VabiUi Gurk4, Ms X e, PP. 180-2 Gilliard, 
Thirteen Teare, p. 179. 
112 BByloe, February 19189p. 1,51 ; B. j. Brow er and A. F. Xe The Rn.. ian 
Provisional Government 1220 vola, Staftford U. P. 1961 (cited heraattar 
as BROWNER 91,19-10. 
113 A. A. Noeaolov, At the Court of the Laust Taar, Loadon 1935, PP. 169-173 ; 
PADENIE, ii, 60-1 - Trepaar ENGEL RA T, xii, 728 ; Tusupov, Ras t, p. 118. 
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tactical ploys Trepov secured a considerable measure of success. 
115 
The Duma was faced with the familiar dilemma of what attitude to take 
to a new administration. Was it to treat the Trepov cabinet as a new 
government without responsibility for the misdeeds of its predecessor, and 
attempt rapprochement ? Or was the 'new' government merely 'a reseating of 
the musicians' in which nothing fundamental was altered, necessitating a 
continuation of the November assault 2116 The response to the dilemma 
varied widely, demonstrating once more the disunited nature of the Duma 
membership. The Duma Left decided to press the attack. On 8 November the 
Progressists, Trudoviks and Menshevike jointly announced their future 
boycott of the government. 
117 The Progressist attitude to the new Trepov 
cabinet was summed up by IItro Rossii on 11 November as 'plus rya change, plus 
c'est la memo chose'. police report of 19 November confirmed the existence 
of a 'Left alliance' which included some Left Kadets as well as Progressists: 
Considering the tactics of the Progressive Bloc mistaken and having 
lost faith in their leadmrs, the Left Badete and various Progressists, 
while not yet having decided to join the Social Democrats and Social 
Revolutionaries, are very close to their point of view. (118) 
On 16 November, a group of Petrograd Progressiete addressed a policy 
statement to Rodzyanko declaring that, 
The progressive-democratic group of municipal councillors and electors 
of Petrograd declare any collaboration by the State Duna, with the Trepov 
cabinet to be agnst the interests of the country and call upon the 
State Duma to continue in unison with the country the persistent 
struggle for power. (119) 
The same day, Yefremov released a nine-page defence of Progressist actions 
over the previous month which concluded : 
I do not expect large-scale changes. If the cabinet of Trepov is a 
little loss reactionary than the Sttrmer cabinet .., it is all the sane 
11$ See Rodzyanko's account in KA, rol. 56, pp. 118-9. 
115 GDSO, V, 6,251-9 ; Tsý, f. 1276, x, 7,252-274 ; Vasilii Gurko, Meor es, 
p. 189 ; Milynkov's Rea lt' editoria. 1., 20 November 1916. 
116 The phrase is Milyukov's : Rech' editorial, 11 November 1916 ; a**elso 
special article by J. Y. Simpson in Times, 29 December 1916(n/s), 5d. 
117 TsGIAL, f. 1278(State Duma), 4357,403 cited in C 'SKY 791. 
118 POL CE, xvii, 307/A/1/1916 156 
119 TssGGAOR, f. 579(Milyukov), 381,1. 
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to us. Doubtless it will be infinitely far from the cabinet that Russia 
needs ... For us Progressists, standing for battle with the regime, the 
position is clear - the fight with the government has only begun. (120) 
And yet on the opening day of the reconvened session, a fundamental rift in 
the 'Left alliance' between the 'suicidal' and the 'tactical' Left emerged 
at once. The Trudoviks and Mensheviks initiated a policy of obstruction, 
were forcibly expelled from the chamber and excluded from the next eight 
Duma sittings. The Left Kadets and Progressists, far from joining them, even 
voted for their exclusion, preferring the more supple and adroit strategy of 
Milyukov. 121 The 'Left alliance' had collapsed at its first test. 
On the Duma Right wing, 19 November was an equally distressing day, 
with the dogged loyalty of the Right rank-and-file to the government in power 
suffering a double shock. The Trepov Declaration revising agricultural 
price-pegging, whilst welcome to the landowning sector, incensed the peasant 
deputies for whom a price freeze was advantageous. The peasant deputies 
condemned the Declaration as a ploy by the new administration to ingratiate 
itself with the Progressive Bloc at the expense of its traditional loyal 
support. 
122 Anger at being taken for granted was topped by astonishment at 
the public defection of the most famous leader of the Right. In a speech 
which surpassed even that of Milyukov in impact, Purishkevich categorically 
condemned the government of StIrmer and Protopopov, and demanded the banish- 
-ment of Rasputin and all other 'dark forces' from Russian political life. 
123 
If the speech of the leader of the Duma Opposition met with approval, the 
degree of criticism expressed by the leader of the Right stunned educated 
society. The Duaaa Right hurriedly expelled Purisbkevich from the fraction to 
Which he had suddenly become a painful embarrassment, while the Okkrana was 
120 TsGAOR, f. 579(Milyukor), delo 453,1-9(quotation p. 9) ; also Utro Rosaii, 
15 November 1916. 
121 GDS0, Q, 6,240-251(19 November 1916) ; TsGAORjf. 5? 9(Milyukov), 2184,1-2 ; 
RODZTABM6 180 ; PADENIE, Ti, 348-9(Milyukoy-; KEMMSU 180 ;$ 
20 November 1916. 
122 Vaeilii GFurko, He r es, p. 189 ; also C88 SX? 798-800. 
123 ß, Y, 6,229-318 ; TsGI1 b, f. 1276(Council of Ministers), x, 7,290-32? ; 
V. M. Parishkevich, D euaik Parishkevicha, 8iga 1921, p. 6. 
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authorised to conduct a thorough investigation into the 'Purishkevich 
affair'. 
124 In a fury of desperation, the other Right leader Markov Two 
rounded on Rodzyanko, calling him a 'babbling blackguard' at the Duma sitting 
of 22 November and earning himself a richly-deserved exclusion from the Duma 
for fifteen sittings. Within a week the Right fraction split between the 
followers of Purishkevich and of Markov. 
125 The Duma Right disintegrated, 
leaving the new administration with few hopes for the traditional allegiance 
of the Right (and therefore even more disposed towards the moderates). 
In contrast to both wings of the Duma, the opposition drive against the 
government in the moderate camp began to falter. The Bloc meeting of 11 
November showed the delegates outwardly determined on government acceptance 
of the entire Bloc Declaration, but the Moscow Kadets were already pre- 
empting the issue by arguing the necessity of cooperation with the new 
administration. 
126 On the thirteenth both the Petrograd and Moscow ladet 
Committees passed resolutions supporting collaboration with Trepov, thereby 
demonstrating that the level of political self-assurance in Petrograd was 
dropping to that of Moscow. The police reporter noted of the Petrograd 
meeting, 'even the representative of the Left wing of the ! Cadet., Rodichev, 
supported businesslike cooperation ... in general yesterday's meeting of the 
Kadets has shown that their spirits are starting to fall. '127 The continuing 
decline in morale expressed itself in a debate at the next Bloc meeting on 
the efficacy of a Duma boycott should the government prove intransigent. 
128 
A police report of 19 November registered a further drop on the barometer of 
Kadet self-confidence : 
124 Report of 23 November 1916 : PO_ýLICE, xvii, 307A/1/1916,176-190 ; Tam, 
f. 1276(Council of Miniatera), x, 7,39k-408. 
125 ß"Y, 7,370-1(Markov on 22 November 1916) ; Police report of 28 
November 1916 : POMCE, 1916,307A, iii, 2,132 .; also 
Times, 12 December 1916, 
8c and Manch er _. i an,: 6 January 1917(botk n/s), 6g. 
126 Bloc meeting of 11 November 1916 : KA, vol. 56, pp. 118-120 ; Moscow t 
meeting of 11 November 1916 : POý, xvii, 27-1916,46,32-3. 
127 Report of 14 November 1916 t POLXCE, xvii, 27-1916,46,36-7. 
128 Bloc meeting of 18 November 1916 : KA, vol. 56, pp. 126-131. 
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Just no* the Kadets fear not only the dissolution of the Duma ... but 
that the war may finish without their decisive vote, and the supply and 
Polish questions may be decided without their participation. What will 
become of the "Party of the People's Freedom" if it has no influence on 
the affairs of the people ? With all the dexterity of a conjuror, 
Milyukov is throwing all the blame onto the government. (129) 
The nine-day Duma recess worked more to the advantage of the government than 
the Duma opposition movement. While the Trepov administration made its 
preparations, the early oppositional spirit of the Duma, although maintained 
by the Left and emerging dramatically on the Right, largely evaporated 
amongst the moderates. 
There was a variety of reasons for the declining commitment of the 
moderates to attack. Two of the three principal targets for Duma hostility 
had been toppled and the third seemed impregnable to Duma and cabinet 
campaign alike. With the worst features of the regime gone and the new Trepov 
administration making clear moves towards cooperation with the Duma, most 
Oktobrists and Bloc Right-wingers had little desire to advance further. With 
his authority within the Bloc and Badet party now unchallengeable and the 
threat of fraction disintegration reduced, Milyukov returned to the 'soft- 
sell' policy towards the government which he had always personally favoured. 
Most Kadets and Oktobrists also suffered a fundamental lack of self- 
confidence in dealings with authority, believing that an all-out assault 
could well prove more damaging to its authors than to the government. 
Memories of the Vyborg Appeal still haunted the gadets and the fear that the 
country would not support their actions never left the moderate parties. 
They may well have been right : on 10 November Protopopov issued an MVD 
circular to provincial governors requesting impressions of the impact of the 
Bloc 'storm-signal'. The answering reports suggested that nationwide interest 
was transient. 
130 The moderates preferred to keep uncompromising assault as 
an unknown and therefore overestimated 'ultimate weapon'. Partly out of.. 
lack of self-assurance, partly from tactical considerations, the moderates 
129 POOLICE, svii, 307A/1/1916,161. 
130 Ibia, 97. 
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consistently avoided a fight to the death, alw s preferring to keep room 
open for manoeuvre and negotiation. 
Internal divisions also sabotaged any hope of a sustained offensive 
against the government. Factional squabbles reappeared the moment that 
tension dipped. Reference has alread9 been made to the price-pegging issue 
wich united the Left with the peasant Right against the landowning interest 
as represented by the Oktobriste. At the puma sitting of 29 November, the 
land interest counter-attacked b9 accusing industry of exorbitant war profits 
: the Zemstvo-Oktobrist Stempkovsky claimed that the rise in the profits of 
the Progressist Konovalov's textile combine Prom 813,000 roubles in 1913 to 
7,101,000 roubles in 1915 could only be explained by war-profiteering. 
131 
The antipathy of landowner and peasant was again aroused, this time over the 
introduction of the volost' zemstvo. The peasants united in opposition to 
the Oktobrist bill, which they believed constituted a landed scheme desighed 
further to exploit the peasant. 
132 The effect of all these squabbles was 
two-fold : they tended to mark off the propertied moderaten from the extremes I 
of Left and Right on the basis of self-interest ; and they absorbed the 
greater part of the energies of the Bloc which were diverted from the larger 
conflict between Duma and government. 
A final factor in the decline of the moderates' opposition campaign was 
that fear dominated the psychology of the moderate parties. Fear of a 
Seperate Peace and the accompanying international humiliation of Russia was 
on the rise in autumn 1916, while the fear of government provocation was to 
dominate the Duna over the winter of 1916/1917.133 A more immediate fear 
was of the dissolution of the Fourth Duaa. The Bloc membership of late 1916 
almost without exception preferred the existing unsatisfactory and unrepres- 
entative arrangement to the prospect of elections to a Fifth Duna, with the 
131 GDSO, V, 10,558 ; for a discussion, see CBE NSBY 800. 
132 GDSO, V, 15,1051+1072(13 December 1916) ; also C SXI 802. 
133 For example, Rodayanko'sarticle *Provokatsiat In Sovremenaoe Bs< 
4 December 1916. , 
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likelihood of more extensive MVD gerrymandering and the exposure of their 
own complete isolation from the country. The Kadet fear of the dissolution 
of the Fourth Duma noted by the police on 19 November (see above) did not 
decrease with time ; indeed in early December the deputies were seriously 
concerned for their personal safety : 
At the present moment anxiety about the fate of the State Duma pervades 
the Progressive Bloc, and particularly the fate of individual deputies 
belonging to the Left wing. The prospect of dissolution is particularly 
menacing to the Bloc, for in the even of such an act of repression, the 
deputies would be deprived of their parliamentary immunity and the 
whole Left wing of the Bloc, including the Kadets, would be entirely in 
the power of the government. (134) 
Even more terrifying than the prospect of government repression was that of 
revolution. By late November 1916 the emergence of revolution as a univerea 
acknowledged threat had the Kadets, Progressists and Oktobrists, all with 
substantial stakes in the maintenance of public order, starting to tremble 
for their interests and investments. There was no doubt in the mind of the 
Okhranä that in the last resort the moderates would prefer to ally with the 
government on any terms to avert revolution : 
The Kadets quite literally contemplate an approaching revolution with 
feelings of horror and panic. This horror is so great that if there was 
only the tiniest possibility of agreement with the government, if the 
government offered the slightest concession, the Kadete would run to 
meet her with joy. (135) 
With the Duma fractions so dogged by fears and weaknesses, the parliamentary 
advantage could only lie with the government. 
The 'storm-signal' of early November 1916, a tactical response to 
urgent internal and external pressures rather than a deliberate decision be 
by the Bloc to declare war on the government, had entirely spent its force 
by the end of the month. Having secured its immediate objects in the fall 
of Stttrmer and the stilling of the disintegration of the moderate camp, the 
moderate Right returaed to the traditional Bloc policy of restraint. Haring 
134 Report of 7 December 1916 : PO CE, 307A/1/1916,21 
.; 
Oanobishin,.. 
Vooyaminania, p. 250. 
135 Report of 11 December 1916 : POLICE, 343,1916,106-7 ; also Moscow report 
of 2 November 1916 : p0_ s2-7-g2-95-24 quoted in GRAVE 148 and. Red"anko, 'Gosudaratvenna7a Daman''>p., 2$. 
, vv. 
given expression to the welling discontent of the nation, the moderate Left 
fell prey to its own doubts and fears. While other political groups both to 
the Left and Right courted disaster by their impetuous prosecution of a 
campaign of assault, the tactics and policies of the moderates became 
dominated by careful self-interest. 
2. 'The Word and the Vote'(Deceaber 1916-February 1917) 
From December 1916 the craven policy of the Duma moderates towards the 
government not only profoundly weakened extra-Duma support for the 'moderate' 
course but actually contributed towards the developing extremism in Russian 
politics. Encouraged by the weak line advanced by the moderates and confident 
that his position at the MVD was secure against both Duma and cabinet attack, 
Protopopov stepped up his policy of repression. A new Police Act was effected 
under Clause 87 extending the arbitrary powers of the police, first employed 
in the banning of the December congresses of the Zemstvo and Town Unions. 
136 
On 9 December the two congresses convened in secret to pass resolutions 
condemning the closures and exhorting the Duma to fight on their behalf. 
137 
Only two days later however the congresses were already beginning to despair 
of their traditional links with the Progressive Bloc and issued a joint 
appeal to the Duna and to the army for support. 
138 
The congresses' dou4ts proved justified : while prepared to do the 
minimum of introducing an official interpellation against the closures, the 
Bloc obligingly banned all public discussion of the subject at MVD requestj39 
Their faith in the Bloc severely shaken, the Unions turned to the Left as 
their mouthpiece in the Duna. In defiance of the MVD and Duma ban, Kereasky 
136 Report of 9 December 1916 : Poý, 307A/1/1916,37 ; also PO. LICF, 343 4 
& 347,29664 quoted in GRAVE 152 & 157 ; 1"ý MCO9 379. 
137 TsGAOR, f. 579(Milyukoy), 2857,1-2 ; PLLEOLOGUE, III, 130-1 ; MI, 2CE; 1916, ` 
xx, +6,116 cited in LAVERYCHEV 156 ; ShlyaplikoviKARun Semnadtsatoxo 
Goda, II, 107-113. 
13$ POLICE, 3439ZS91916,112 quoted in CHERI NSSY 808 ; Shlyapnikov, KARu4 
Seanadtsatogo Goda, II, 113.. 115. 
139 KERER'S$Y 180-1 ; MILIDXOV 379 ; x, 29 December 1916(n/a)15e" 
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read out the congress resolutions to the Duna on 13 December. The Town Union 
demanded prompt and vigorous action from the Duma : 
The State Duma must carry on the struggle with this shameful regime with 
unremitting energy and strength tt the bitter end. In this struggle the 
Duma will be backed by the entire nation. The Union of Towns calls upon 
the Duma to do its duty and remain in session until the principal task - 
the setting-up of a responsible ministry - is accomplished. 
Even the traditionally more conservative Union of Zemstvoa, whilst avoiding 
any suggestion of unconstitutional action, complained in the strongest 
terms. 140 Kerensky's protests were later joined by Konovalov's, who produced 
resolutions passed by the War Industries Committees which had held a secret 
congress on the fourteenth. The same exhortation to the Duma was reproduced 
An unresponsible government is leading the country to disaster ... Only 
a responsible government united with the people and with their aid can 
guide the country out of the cul-de-sac into which the old regime has 
led us ... the Congress of delegates of the provincial War Industries 
Committees calls upon the State Duma to carry through its struggle for 
the establishment of a responsible government to the end. (141) 
The position of the three public organisations was the same : in protest at 
police repression, appeals were launched to the Duna but the refusal of the 
moderates even to speak in their defence was forging a new political alliance 
with the Left. The events of mid December left little doubt that the public 
organisations were starting the process of passing from being a moderate 
political factor linked with the Duma Bloc to a militant force allied with 
the Duna Left. The public organisations' lack of confidence in the Duna 
found increasing expression in the utterances of the Doma heft, most 
patticularly in the words of Konovalov on 16 December : 'Let the battle be 
fought to the finish, let there be no concessions or compromises on the way 
the task of the country is to back the State Duna in its struggle ; there is 
no wavering in the country, let there be no reservations in the Duna. 
142 
The forces for political moderation in December 1916 were too few to 
140 GDSO, V, 15,1095-8 ; also extracts in TsGAOR, f. 579(Milyukov), delo 2850, 
SERENSSY 180-1, Tsw GIAL, f. 1276(Council of Miaiatera), x, 7,436& V39, and 
RODZYANKO 203- 
141 GDS0, V, 18,1192-1201(sitting of 16 December 1916) ; also TeGAOR, f. 555 
tGnchkov), 59,8-9. 
142 GDSO, V, 18,1200-1 ; for some details on the loss of moderate se*berskip 
to the Left, see Mansyrev, 'Moi Tospoainania', pp. 260-1. 
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afford the luxury of alienating powerful support. The Emperor was still 
resisting the reactionary course advocated by his wife but his collapse was 
expected daily. A police report for 28 November quoted Nationalist circles 
for the belief that there were two groups locked in power conflict at court : 
the Nicholas group 'advocating the immediate necessity of meeting the wishes 
recently expressed in both legislative chambers' and the Alexandra group 
which 'categorically opposes any change in the course of politics and stands 
by an earlier conception of government'. 
143 
T9it Nicholas appeared to favour 
a measure of trust in the Duna was indicated in his letter of 13 December : 
He [Trepov - R. P. 
] unfolded his plan concerning the Duma - tp prorogue 
it on December 17th and reassemble it on January 19th, so as to show 
them and the whole country that in spite of all they have said the 
Government wish to work together. 
However little faith could be placed upon the word of a monarch whose very 
next letter betrayed an ugly cynicism and brutal disregard for his ministers 
It is unpleasant to speak to a man one does not like and does not trust 
like Trepov. But first of all it is necessary to find a substitute for 
him and then kick him out - after he has done the dirty work. I mean to 
make him resign after he-has closed the Duna. Let-all the responsibility 
and all the difficulties fall on his shoulders. (144) 
Although Trepov was a force for moderation within the government, working 
both for the removal of Protopopov and the evolution of some working 
relationship with the Dumas it was only too clear that his days as premier 
were numbered. 
Outside the government but still within the bounds of 'official Russia', 
two new recruits for the moderate course emerged over the last weeks of 1916. 
The Bloc campaign of early November had not been without impact upon the 
State Council, whose growing 'unreliability' was best expressed in the debate 
of 24 November : resolutions were passed demanding 'the decisive removal 
from governmental affairs of hidden unresponsible forces' (105 votes to 23) 
and 'the formation of a truly working government, united by a well-defined 
.4- 
programme, relying on the confidence and good-will of the country and 
143 POLZCE, avii, 30? A/1/1916 252.. 
144 Letters of 13 &-14 Dessmber -1916 = JXIGROL ,, 306 :: 8k 307. 
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consequently capable of collaboration with the legislative institutions'(94 
votes to 34). 
145 Very similar motions weres passed at the Congress of the 
United Nobility convening in Petrograd 28 November-1 December. The Congress, 
comprising 126 delegates from 34 provinces, decided to submit a report on the 
political situation to the Emperor, the essence of which was an attack upon 
the 'dark powers' and a plea for a government 'enjoying popular confidence, 
capable of joint labour with the legislative institutions yet responsible 
only to the Monarch'. 
146 
Two institutions which had hitherto been traditional bastions of reaction 
now shifted Left to adopt policies extraordinarily close to those of the 
Progressive Bloc, a measure of the universal recognition of the emergency as 
well as the relative lack of response of the Bloc. Virtually all orgaknisat- 
-ions and institutions outside the goverhment were responding similarly to 
the developing revolutionary situation : while the Leftward shift of the 
State Council and United Nobility provided the Duna moderates with undreamed- 
of allies, traditional Bloc support was also shifting Left to leave the 
moderates behind. In December 1916 the moderates began to lose the allegiance 
of the public organisations to the Left parties, being accidentally 
recompensed by the defection of groups from the Right. 
The final force for the moderate line was of course the Progressive 
Bloc. The policy of restraint evolved after the 'storm-signal' of early 
November degenerated into abject servility in the course of December. Despite 
continuous MV_D 'provocation', the Duma moderates declined to respond except 
to wag an occasional minatory finger. The MVD banning of the Union congresses 
and their subsequent protests were blandy disregarded by the Bloc, which was 
not prepared to prejudice the chances of the Fourth Duma running its fkL3.1 
term. R, odzyenko and the Bloc submissively agreed to hold the Duma debate-©n 
internal policy on 13 December in closed sitting-to avoid offending the 
145 PADENIE, vi, 362-4(Tre. por"s loyal report of 26 November 1916) and f, 166- 
7(Stttrmer) ; PALEOLOGGM, III, 114 ; Russkoe Sloovo, 27 November 1916. 
146 Rueekoe Slloovoo, 29 November 1916 ; Shlyapnikov, Banna Semnadtoato go Goda, 
J198-9 ; Ti aes, 12,14 & 16 December 1916(n/a), c, 7e & 7e. 
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government. 
147 The furthest the Bloc was prepared to go was to warn the 
government of the risks it was running. Milyukov'e appech of 16 December 
was typical : 
The air is full of electricity and one feels the approach of a thu'äer- 
storm. No-one can tell where or when the first thunderclap will occur 
but in order that the storm should not break out in a form which we do 
not desire, we must, in conjunction with the nation at large, try to 
prevent the storm itself. (148) 
The tacit refusal of the moderates to press the opposition campaign to which 
they had given expression aliened much of their traditional support in the 
country and sent it over to the Left. The Menshevik Skobelev spoke for many 
when he accused the Progressive Bloc of listening only to the government, 
not to the people. 
149 
The end of the Duna session made little impact upon the listless 
activity of the moderates. The prorogation decree, published on 15 December 
to take effect the next day, was accepted so meekly by the Duma that 
Konovalov termed it a 'self-dissolution'. 
150 The instructions to Kadet 
depities for the Christmas recess wore to register the mood and spirit of 
the country, with any possibility of action reserved for the reconvened 
session. 
151 At the last Kadet meeting of the year, a combined Moscow and 
Petrograd Central Committee session on 21 Deceaber, Shingarev produced a 
familiar tired line of argument : 
Before everything, retain full self-control and restraint ... For the 
time being there is only one course before us - the path of parliament- 
-ary struggle within legal parliamentry limits. Only when this path is 
completely exhausted, then and only then will we adopt new and 
unparliamentary methods of combat. 
k 
Even the police reporter was affected by the depths to which Kadet morale 
had sunk : 'greater disillusionment, greater perplexity than that which 
presently permeates the Kadets would be hard to imagine ; of the exultant 
147 EERE)ISKT 180-1 ; Ti , 29 December 1916(n/s), 5e. 
148 G_, Q, 18,1179 ; also PADENIE, vi, 350(MilYukov). 
149 Quoted by Philips Price in Manchester tß, 20 January 1917(n/s), 7e0 
150 'Ssmorospusk' : TsIAL, f. 1276(Council of Minister0, x, 7,416-8 
151 Moscow report of 16 December 1916 : PoLICE,, xvii, 27-1916,46,5,3.. 
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spirit which precipitated the fall of Stürmer, there remains not a trace'. 
152 
Milyukov sought relief both from the gloom of the capitals and his downcast 
and disappointed party by spending his Christmas vacation in the Crimea. 
153 
By the last weeks of 1916 the Duma moderates had disillusioned their 
traditional support and, at one remove, promoted the paths of political 
extremism and extra-constitutional activity. The recognition of the collapse 
of the constitutional course engendered a rash of desperate measures from 
both the Left and the Right to exploit or save the situation. The most 
dramatic and foolhardy enterprise sprang from the Right : the dynastic duo 
Prince Yusupov and the Grand Duke Dmitrii Paviovich became 'haunted by one 
persistent idea, the idea of deliverinig Russia from her most dangerous 
internal enemy'. 
154 Purishkevich's speech of 19 November made a profound 
impression upon Yusupov : 'I am completely under the influence of yesterday's 
Duma sitting ... Purishkevich's speech made an enormous impression upon 
everyone, saying that if they could only open Uncle's [Nicholas - R. P. 
] 
eyes, 
they could save everything'. 
155 The political desperation which had induced 
Purishkevich to make his speech now impelled him to join forces with Yusupov 
156 to murder Rasputin. The grisly grand nQ ignol which eventually took place 
at the Yusupov Palace on the night of 16/17 December is too well known to 
need retelling. 
157 
Despite the open rejoicing which greeted the news of the mnrder, it 
6ýý 
soon became apparent that its effect would be far from salutory. Within 
days even Yusupov acknowledged that the successful plot had not achieved 
its prime object : 
152 Report of 25 December 1916 : POS, xvii, 27-1916,46, pp. 48-9(Shingarev) 
and 46(reporterfa opinion). 
153 PADENIE, vi, 357(Miiyukov). 
154 Yusupov, Raeutin, p. 73(and 41-3 & 70) ; a: so M. E. Soloviev, 'Kak i kern 
byl obit Rasputin V qVoproei Istori , 1963: 3, pp"211-218. 
155 Yusupov's letter of 20-November 1916 : KL, vol, 14, pp"233-4. 
156 Letter of 8 December 1916 : 8FAyvo1.14, p. 235 ; Yusupov, Raaa utiu, pp. 132-3 
SHÜL'GIN 119-121. 
157 Yusupov, Rue in, pp. 144-182 & 230 ; PALROLOG3E, III, 131-4 & 142-8. 
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With what youthful fervour we had believed that with one blow we could 
triumph over evil. To us it had seemed that Rasputin was merely a 
cancerous growth, and that with its removal the Russian Monarchy would 
be restored to health. We would not admit that this cancer had become 
so deeply rooted that its work of destruction would baffle even the 
most radical measures. (158) 
That the murder was a mistake was perceived at once by Sir George Buchanan : 
It madejthe Emperor more determined than ever to be firm ; it set a 
dangerous example, for mt prompted people to translate their thoughts 
into action ; and it rendered it more difficult for the Emperor to 
make concessions ... as he would have exposed himself to the suspicion 
of having yielded out of fear of assassination. (159) 
Nicholas returned from the Stavka on 19 December to console his distraught 
wife and whether he secretly welcomed the murder or not, Rasputin's death 
kept him at Alexandra's side and under her influence until 22 February, the 
very eve of revolution. 
160 The murder also provided an emotional rationale 
for reaction similar to that indulged by Alexander III after March 1881. 
Finally, although the murder took place during the Duma recess and there 
could therefore be no immediate repercussions upon a Duma session, the timing 
of the murder within hours of the prorogation threw suspicion upon the Duna. 
The Christmas recess was an ideal opportunity for the government both to 
effect a major cabinet reshuffle and determine the fate of the Fourth 
Duma in its absence. 
The overall political effect of the murder was an abrupt shift to total 
reaction. To assert, as does Kerensky, that the murder 'did not cause the 
slightest change in the policy of the court' is to obscure the fact that it 
accentuated and developed the prevailing mood in the government in dramatic 
fashion. 
161 The immediate aftermath was a hardening of government policy : 
preliminary censorship was quickly instituted in the capitals and the budget 
of the government 'Reptile Fund' to subsidise reactionary publications was 
increased. 
162 
An extensive government reshuffle, destined to be the last in 
158 Yusupov, Ras putin, p, 232 ; also SHUL'GIN 122. 
159 BIICHANAN, II938-9 ; also RODZYANXO 198 & Gilliard, Thirteeu Years, p. 187. 
160 Dnevnik Nikolaya SA, v©l. 20, pp. 124 & 135. 
161 KERENSKY 182 ; bothe Trotsky s*dßilliard considered the r8le of the 
murder 'colossal' : L. Trotxky, j&&jorX of IM Rassisa aeyolution, Londos 
1965(cited hereafter as TROTSKT , p. 9 and Gilliard, Thirteen Lta. "gp. 187 
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tsarist history, removed the few remaining non-reactionarieejwithin the 
Council of Ministers. On 20 December Nicholas confirmed Protopopov as 
permanent Minister of Interior, ending the probationary nature of the 
appointment under which he had laboured since September. This clear indicatii 
of the direction of future policy was confirmed the next tay when the 
apolitical Makarov was relieved as Minister of Justive and replaced by the 
Rasputin-creature Dobrovol'sky. 163 On the twenty-fifth Nicholas interviewed 
an unsuspecting Prince Golitsyn, President of the Committee for Aid to 
Russian Prisoners-of-War, at the instigation of the Empress, with a view to 
replacing Trepov as premier. On offering him the Chairmanship, Nicholas made 
it clear to his appalled victim that he would brook no refusal. Goliteyn 
desperately pleaded every disadvantage from ill health to crass ignorance to 
dissuade the Emperor, but to no avail: two days later, Golitsyn was formally 
appointed premier. 
164 Only two ministerial posts had now to be changed 
Ignat'ev, possibly the most enlightened Minister of Education under the 
tsars, was replaced by the non-entity Eul'chitsky and at the Ministry of War, 
Belyayev replaced the politically suspest Shuvayev. 165 The slightest 
suspicion of liberalism filtered off, the Council of Ministers was left to 
reactionaries and incompetents. 
At the same time there began a campaign to bridle the insubordination 
of the legislative chambers. The State Council was a comparatively easy 
target. As early as October 1916 Stflrmer had recommended to the Emperor 
adjusting the membership of the State Council to improve its 'reliability'166 
The resolutions passed on 24 November demonstrated the urgency of the 
operation and over the course of December the State Council was purged of its 
162 S. Hoare, The Fourth Seal, London 1930, p. 120 ; also CHERMENSKY 840. 
163 MILIJKOV 369 ; PADENIE, ii, k33-4(Shchsglovitov) and vi, 350(Milyukov) ; 
RoDZYANKO 202 ; Times, 6 January 191? (n/e), 7b. 
164 PADENIE, ii, 250-1,256 & 269-270(Golitayn) ; PALEOLOGUE, III, 159. 
165 L. Strakhoveky, 'Count P. N. Ignatiev i RöTörmer of Russian Education', 
SEER, vol. 36, no. 86(De. cesber 1957)'p. 22 ; Vaailii Gurko, Memoriee, pp. 227-9 Manchester Guardian, 11 & 19 January 1917(n/s), 5e & 5f. 
1 166 Stl rmer' a loyal report of 9 October 1916 : 1P8 162. 
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moderate elements. MVD pressure filtered off the most undesirable candidates 
to the elected curiae ; punctilious care was taken in the selection of 
reactionaries to the nominated half of the Council. 
167 The operatiom of 
disciplining the Council was completed according to the earlier promptings 
of Alexandra to 'put strong-minded Shcheglovitov there, he is the man who ... 
will allow no dmsorders and bad things to go on'. Shcheglovitov's appointment 
as President of the State Councinl was announced on 1 January 1917.168 With 
the State Council now sternly called to heel, the government had both elimin- 
ated an area of support for the Duma Bloc and reasserted its stranglehold 
on parliamentary legislation. 
Despite a cosy imperial ukaze of 7 January expressing the hope that the 
new premier would work welly with the Duma, there was every sign that the 
Duma would soom come under fire from the government16The constitutional 
threat alone was alarming enough : the Emperor enjoyed the rights of Dumm 
prorogation, legislation through Clause 87 in time of emergency and, most 
immediately, the dissolution of the Fourth Duma after the traditional five- 
year run. But dangers also threatened from outside the rubric of the 
constitution. Protopopov was setting his face more and more sternly against 
the Duma. He had made no headway with his ex-Duma colleagues, indeed his 
past connection with the Bloc only increased Duma animosity towards him and 
the government. A persuasive end-of-year report by his deputy Kurlov 
submitted on 30 December 1916 pressed for the complete abolition of the State 
Duma and the turning of the constitutional clock back to before 1905.170 To 
political expediency was added personal pique when Rodzyanko pointedly and 
publicly snubbed Protopopov at the Winter Palace reception on 1 January. 
171 
167 PADENIE, ii, 427(Shcheglovitov) ; PALEOLOGUE, III, 114 ; Hoare, The Fourth 
Seal, p. 123. 
168 Empress's letter of 15 December 1916 : ALEXANDRA 457 ; PADENIE, ii, 425-6 (Shcheglovitov) ; MPK 427 & 435-6 ; BTRENSKY 182. 
169 BUCHANAN, II, 51 ; R. Wilton, %givia' Agoay, London 1918, p. 74. 
170 P. G. Kurlov, Konets Tsarisma, PP. 285-6 Raeskoe Slovo, 3 January 1917. 
171 Rodzyanko, Thign of Ran in, p. 251 ; Prince V. N. Shakhovakoy, Sic Transit Gloria Mundi, Paris 195, p. 197. 
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At the Council of Ministers on 3 January, Protopopov moved the dissolution 
of the Fourth Duma but found himself overruled by Golitsyn who, more 
cautiously, preferred to postpone the Duma session and assess the results 
before taking a final decision 
. 72 Although he still did not possess 
sufficient authority to flout all opposition to his views, by early 1917 
Protopopov had been converted to the desirability of immediate Duma 
dissolution. 
Protopopov's plans for early 1917 remain somewhab of a mystery. The 
device of provoking society into a rash action which could then be exploited 
by the government had been discussed in political circles since early autumn 
but the precise motive was a matter for endless conjecture. MilyukoW believed 
that Protopopov intended to repeat Durnovo's Moscow stratagem of December 
1905 of inciting an insurrection in order to drown it in blood. the most 
common Duma fear was that the government was only seeking a pretext to 
dissolve the Fourth Duna early or, more seriously, to abolish the Duna 
altogether and return to the pre-1905 autocracy. Many observers, including 
the United States Ambassador David Francis, claimed to discerns wider 
significance, believing the government was 'attempting to bring about an 
uprising of the people in order to give Russia an excuse to negotiate a 
seperate peace'. 
173 
Whatever Protopopov'a precise objectives or degree of allegiance to a 
l 
policy of provocation, he was certainly taking extensive precautions against 
popular risings by very early in 1917. Kerensky recalled that, 
By the middle of January a special committee under the presidency of 
General Bhabalov, commander of the Petrograd Military District, had 
drafted a detailed plan for-the deployment of troops to be used in 
conjunction with the police in the event of riots in the capitals. (174) 
172 TsGIAL_, f. 1276, x, 7,451-7 ; also PADERIE, ii, 256-9(Golitsyn) and Petrograd 
Police report of 29 January 1917 quoted in GRAVE 169. 
173 PALEOLOGUE, III, 65-6 ; Rodsyaakv, 'Gosudarstvennaya Derma', pp. 33.3 I' 
Stinton Jonee, Russia in Revolution, London 1917, pp. 60-1 ; PADENIB, vi,, 351 (Milyukov) ; D. Francie, +a fr! e the American Zmb_ass?, P"35" 
174 SKY 182-3 ; also evidence of Protopopov, Beletaky, Klimovich and 
Milyukov : PADENIB, iv, 46 & 93 ; *'9264-3 ; i, 121-2 ; vi, 3O-2, tmal$o 
Times, 21 April 1917(n/s), 5a and Vaeilyev, Ti ana, pp. 215.4. z' , 
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At the same time as military plans were laid, the Emperor initiated prepar- 
-ations for the demise of the Fourth Duma : Nikolai Maklakov was commissioned i 
to produce a scheme of gerrymandering and election-fixing in anticipation of 
the Fifth Duma and by 9 February was reporting enthusiastically on the 
advanced state of his plans. 
175 In January Nicholas also entrusted Golitsyn 
with three signed but undated ukazes : one for prorogation sine die, another 
for prorogation until the end of the War and the last for dissolution. 
176 
With bthis armoury of paper power Golitsyn was invested with total formal 
authority over the future of the Duma. 
It seemed in early January 1917 that the Duna Bloc had everything to 
fear : the provocation policy of the MVD, the threatened dissolution of the 
Duma, a seperate peace with Germany, and of course revolution itself. The 
variety of response amongst the Duna moderates was considerable, cutting 
across traditional party alignments and confirming the trend to disintegrat- 
ion which afflicted every Duna fraction. The most spirited and adventurous 
remedy advanced was the palace revolution plot of Guchkov. The former leader 
of the Oktobrist fraction had abandoned the pusillanimous Zematvo-Oktobrists 
from as early as 1914, and by late 1916 had despaired both of the Duna as an 
instrument of political progress and the efficacy of constitutional aeththds. 
The exclusion of this 'liberal with spurs' from the Fourth Duna by MV» 
malpractice and the crash of Oktobrist fortunes a year later combined 
political frustration with his growing sense of hopelessness and extremism"? 
Guchkov's participation in a plot had a similar motive to Purishkevich's 
constitutional means were clearly impotent in the face of the political 
emergency, which must therefore be resolved by unconstitutional 'direct 
action'. But while Parishkevich's plot (though bloody) was strictly limited 
to removing a baneful influence on the Emperor, Guchkov came to the painfu]. 
conclusion that the monarchy could be saved only by the displacement of--the 
175 PADENIE, v, 287-9(Nikolai Maklakov) ; MPS 98 ; PARES 418-9. 
176 PAD ru , ii, 265(Golitayz) ; Rodzyenko, 'Gosudarstvennaya Duma' $'ps, +, 
177 PADENIE, vi, 277-8(Guchkov) ; the phrase is Trotsky's : TÄoT$X# 9l: 
4 
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present occupant of the throne. A conspiracy was mounted, based apparently 
on two sets of Guchkov's contacts, the military and the masonic. Probably 
in early October 1916, Guchkov sounded his opinion amongst his masonic 
colleagues, most particularly Kerensky, Nekrasov, Konovalov, Yefremov and 
Orlov-Ddydov. All seem to have been recruited to some degree, although the 
precise extent of individual involvement has been the subject of protracted 
and acrimonious debate. The leaders of the Left Kadets, Moscow Progressists 
and Trudoviks all however expressed significant approval for the scheme and 
attached their memberships to the extra-constitutional solution. 
178 
Unfortunately for Guchkov's plane, while many officers at the highest 
e 
level were sympathetic to a coup, very few were prepared to take action 
themselves. In the words of General Krymov to the Bloc in early January 
1917, the prevailing mood of the officer corps was that 'if you decide upon 
this extreme course, we will support you'. 
?9 Guchkov's plan on the ground 
came to depend on the dedication of a group of cavalry officers headed by 
Prince Vyazemsky and the possible support of the Army Chief of Staff 
Alekseyev. Medical misadventure too served to prolong and postpone commitment 
to a definite coup. At the moment that an embryonic plan to kidnap the Tsar 
from the royal train on the way from the Stavka to Petrograd was emerging, 
illness struck down its organisers. Guchkov spent 13 October to 20 December 
undergoing medical treatment at the remote Caucasian spa of Xialovodsk and 
was not at hand to inspire the plans to which he was clearly indispensable 180 
Alekseyev too was compelled by overwork to take extended sick-leave from the. 
Stavka from 11 November until 14 February, an occurrence which was taken as 
a pretext for postponing the COUP until March 1917.181 The plot hung firs 
until it was overtaken by the greater revolution. 
178 Poslednie Novost, y, 8,9 & 13 September 1936 ; S. P. Mol'gunov, R Put akh k Dvorteonu Perevorotu, Paris 1931, pp. 188-193 ; also LAVERYCHEV 130-160. 
179 RODZYANKO 205-7. 
180 DYAffiN 301. 
181 PADENIE, vi, 278-9((ttahtov) ; Lnkonskr, Xaoirs"pp"43 & 50-1 ; Vaeilii Gurko, Meaories, pp. 162-6 ; Denikin, '3'evral'skaya Revolyutsia i araia', 
p"193. 
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The Guchkov plot, though dogged by bad luck, betrayed every weakness of 
the moderate position in extremia. Despite the acknowledged emergency, there 
persisted a forlorn belief that somehow all would turn out well. Despite 
Alekseyev's extended absence from the Stavka, Guchkov was still confident 
enough to drop a broad hint to the Oktobrist Central Committee meeting of 
30 December 1916 : 
Guchkov's report was in the most gloomy strain, almost of complete 
despair of finding any solution with the present 6 fragmented state of 
society forces and parties. But through all his pessimism Guchkov 
stressed the possibility of an unexpected solution to the deadlock in 
the near future, outside the scope and efforts of society. (182) 
But although, in the words of the police report of 19 January, 'the majority 
of high society agreed with the legality of palace revolutions and murders', 
the Duma leaders followed all other society groups in declining to tale the 
responsibility and initiative for a bold unconstitutional stroke. 
183 As 
Vasilii Maklakov remarked on the possibility of a dynastic palace coup, 
The Grand Dukes are incapable of agreeing on a plan of campaign. Not 
one of them dares show the slightest initiative, and each of them claims 
to be working solely on his own behalf. They want the Duma to put the 
match to the powder. In other words, they are expecting of us what we 
are expecting of them. (184) 
The timorousness of the Bloc leaders was accompanied by the sanguine belief 
that even now the constitutional alternative was not exhausted ; whilst 
hedging their bets extensively, the Bloc members who subscribed to the 
Guchkov plot still clung to the constitutionalism of the Duna above all else. 
The same group which seriously considered the Guchkov coup - the Left 
Kadets and Progressiste - operated in other areas on the brink of illegality. 
On quitting the Bloc on 31 October, Yefremov had offered the following 
tactical explanation : 'we have not subordinated ourselves to the discipline 
or commands of a general who is over-cautious but instead have formed a 
partisan detachment and advanced to a forward position, hoping thereby to 
draw the entire army after ue'. 
185 With the decline of the Kadet-led Bloc 
182 Report of 8 January 1917 : POý, xvii, 27-1917,25. 
183 POLICE, 1917, xx, 57,10 quoted in LAVERYCHEV 166. 
184 PALEOLOGIIE, III, 167-8 ; also KA, vol. 14, p. 242. 
185 TsGAOR, f. 579(Milyakov). 453.3-4. 
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campaign after mid November, the Progressist course experienced a brief 
upsurge of self-confidence. The Progressist majority now had no artificial 
constraints on its actions of the kind imposed by membership of the Progress- 
-ive Bloc. The Duma members lost by withdrawal fron the Bloc (the Orlov- 
Davydov group) were amply compensated by the defection in all but name after 
mid November of the Adzhemov group of Left Badete into the Progressist 
camp. 
186 Late December 1916 and early January 1917 witnessed a succession 
of Progressist meetings at Ryabushinsky's and Konovalov's on their home 
ground of Moscow. Progressist 'direct action' was at its most articulate at 
a meeting on 3 January where it was resolved that in the event of the Duna 
being dissolved, its membership would reconvene in Moscow (at a villa placed 
at its disposal by Konovalo®) from where it would appeal to the country for 
support against the now-isolated government in Petrograd. 187 
This resolution marked the high-water point of Progressist independent 
development : the brief period over late 1916 when the Moscow and Duma 
Progressists were in unison was quickly succeeded by a return to the familiarI 
fundamental rift in the party. Alarmed by the prospect of another 'Vyborg'. 
the Progressist fraction soon agreed to rejoin forces with the Milyukov 
Kadets, inciting the more radical Moscow Progreseieta to a bitter attack 
upon the Kadeta. 
188 
At a meeting on 19 January, the Moscow group demanded 
the adoption of illegal means to bring down the government and the present- 
-ation of an ultimatum on the first day of the new Duma session. Sneering at 
Kadet 'tactics of restraint', Konovalov declared that tan impotent Doma is 
an object of mockery on the part of the government and in the eyes of the 
people is worse than no Duna at aii,. 
189 But despite Moscow's efforts, by 
mid January 1917 the Duma Progressists were drifting back into association 
186 Report of 19 November 1916 : POLICE, xvii, 307A/1/1916,156. 
187 Report of 6 January 1917 : POLICB, xvii, 27-1917,1-2 and report of 5 January 1917 ; PO LICE, 307,1917T6 quoted in GRAVE 165 ; also Rodzyanko, 'Gosudaratveanaya D t', p. 36. 
188 Report of 16 January 1917 : PO LICZ, zrii, 17,20-b, 1 ; alsp P0ý, 307/A, 1917 quoted in GRAVE 171. 
189 Moscow report of 19 January 1917 : PO_ CE, 27-1916,46,6o. 
320. 
with the Kadets and the Bloc. To most Progressist deputies, the act of 
withdrawing from the Bloc now appeared not as the loosening of intolerable 
restraints but ill-advised estrangement from the co-ordinating executive of 
the opposition movement. The Moscow Progressists could throw their weight 
behind the extra-constitutional schemes of Guchkov ; in disassociation from 
Moscow's extremism, the Duma Progressists could not long resist the 
companionship of the Bloc or the moral authority of the Kadets of Milyukov190 
The most proscribed response to the political emergency came from the 
moderates who relied upon constitutional pressure alone : the Zemstvo- 
Oktobrists. The morale of the Oktobrista remained very low, their political 
initiative was slight and indeed the grouping was only kept in existence 
through having its leader as President of the Duma. In so far as the Zemstvo- 
Oktobrists followed any coherent policy, it was still the hopeless 'Mad 
Chauffeur' parable of Vasilii Maklhkov. Fatalistically rejecting 'direct 
action' as a political weapon, the fraction rested all its hopes upon 
Rodzyanko's Duma office and its accompanying privilege of access to the 
Emperor. Rodzyanko tried to turn Nicholas from his newly-adopted reactionary 
line but found that his belief in constitutional methods alone frustrated all 
his efforts. He attempted to secure an extension to the life of the Fourth 
Duma : the present Duma had run only two normal-length sessions before the 
outbreak of war (making the peacetime five-year rule unrealistic), and it 
was the practice of Russia's Allies to postpone elections and maintain the 
existing parliament until after the war. Despite the Emperor's almost casual 
rejection of his case, Rodzyanko did not overstep his official functions. 
191 
When in early January General Krymov not Bloc leaders to assure them that 
$the mood in the army is such that everybody would greet the news of a 
revolution with joy ... if you decide upon this extreme course, we will 
support you', Rodzyanko indignantly refused : 
190 Moscow report of 19 January 1917 POLXCE, 27-1916, ßt6,60 ; also 
Mansyrev, 'Moi Vospominania', pp. 257-291. 
191 ABR9v0l. vi, 1922, P"335 ; also $ATIOV 219-223. 
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I will never support a revolution. I have sworn an oath of loyalty. I 
must ask you not to discuss such matters in my house ... Palcf&i 
revolutions are not the affair of the legislative chambers, and I have 
neither the desire nor the means to incite the populace ag`inst the 
Tear. (192) 
On being approached on a similar mission by the Grand Duchess Marie Pavlovna, 
Rodzyanko again took care to stress his strict constitutional limitations. 
193 
However he was sufficiently alarmed to pull no punches in his next report 
to the Emperor on 7 January : 
The nation realises that you have banished from the government all those 
i# whom the Duma and the people trusted, and replac§@ them btu unworthy 
and incompetent men ... It is an open secret that the Empress issues 
orders without your knowledge, that the Ministers report to her on 
matters of state, and that by her wish those whom she views with 
disfavour lose their posts and are replaced by incompetent and inexper- 
-ienced persons ... To save your family, Your Majesty should find some 
way of preventing the Empress from esersising any influence upon 
politics. 
Though apparently affected by this frank appeal at the time, the many 
warnings delivered on earlier occasions had persuaded Nicholas that Rodzyanko 
made a habit of 'crying wolf' to enhance his political position. Distrust of 
Rodzyanko's motives persuaded Nicholas to ignore his advice, 
194 
Increasingly aware of the limits which his constitutionalism afforded 
him, Rodzyanko tried a new approach. On I February he suggested to the 
Special Council of Defence a ceremonial meeting of all Special Councils 
under the chairmanship of the Emperor to co-ordinate the efforts of the 
government and society and to air urgent issues. At the subsequent meeting on 
4 February Rodzyanko's motion was carried by eighteen votes to nine (with 
five abstentions), only to be torpedoed by the refusal of the Council 
President, the new War Minister Belyayev, to-communicate the petition to_. the 
Emperor. 195 Rodzyanko's attempt at 'unofficial' constitutional appeal to 
the Emperor, with the object of forcing Nicholas face to face with the iae*. a 
192 RODZYA1KO 205-7 ; General P. Wrangel, Memoira, London 1929, p. 5. 
193 8odayanko, Reits of 2 asnutizi, pp. 246-7 ; also CKERNOV 49-50. 
194 RODZYANKO 211-3 ; Dnovnik Nikelaya s Yd, vol. 20, p. 127 ; Letter of 7- 
January 1917 from IrinaYuaipcva to GrandDuebees Zinaida : KA, 14,243-4. 
195 Ts A, f . 369, I, 180, pp+: 2o. 1(j Februsry) and 206(4 February) quoted in 
CHEI 1EN K! 863-5 ; also ENGEL' BARDT, xii, 727 and Lloyd George, 
Memoire, 2 vols, London 1938,1,965-8. 
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of the day, proved the extent to which the structure of government fostered 
the isolation of the Autocrat. 
What was to emerge as Rodzyanko's last chance was his audience on 10 
February. Despite Nicholas's reception, which Rodzyanko described as 'less 
indifferent than downright brusque', the Duma President presented a detailed 
report of the dangers of the current situation. Nicholas set his face 
against the report from the start, tetchily demanding to know 'since 
Protopopov was your Vice-President in the Duma, why he no longer pleases 
you 7' and coolly refusing to credit the state of emergency outlined by 
Rodzyanko : 'my information contradicts this completely ... if the Duma 
196 
allows itself unrestrained outbursts like last time, it will be dissolved'. 
Protopopov's ready supply of infdrmation suitable for the Emperor proved 
more than enough to withstand Rodzyanko's appeals. The last official means 
of access to the Emperor had failed like the others. 
There was undoubtedly in Rodzyanko's attitude a basic double-standard, 
a strong element of waiting for otherejto do the necessary dirty work. Both 
Rodzyanko and Vasilii Maklakov had known in advance of the Yusupov plot and 
had given it all the blessing that their constitutionalist principles would 
permit. 
197 The Duma Oktobrists must have known of the Guchkov plot and in 
their hearts prayed for the success of their former leader. Even no, 
Rodzyanko found himself trapped by his political morality : his advice 
rejected and his constitutional resources exhausted, he found himself at an 
impasse. With the failure of Rodzyanko's efforts, the Zemstvo-Oktobrists 
folded their hands and resigned themselves to the worst. Only two factors 
could work to their advantage now : whether a revolution broke or not, the 
two most powerful and prestigious society organs were still the Duma and the 
Progressive Bloc. In both of theme the Oktobrists comprised the largest 
single group and furnished the official leaders - Rodzyanko in the Dums and 
196 RODZYANKO 217-8 ; also xl, vol. 20, p. 133 and vol. 10, pp. 169-186. 
197 Yusupov, Raa iinn, pp+201-2 ; )1ILIUäOV 379 ; SHIIL'GIP 119-121. 
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Sergei Shidlovsky in the Bloc. The axis position and numerical weight of the 
Oktobrists could not be ignored even on the brink of revolution. 
The Milyukov Kadets were similaral. y inhibited by their constitutionalist 
scruples. Two Moscow meetings on 7 January portrayed the moods which 
differentiated the Left Kadets from the Milyukov Kadets. At the first, the 
Left Kadet Nekrasov optimistically (and not altogether realistically) told 
the leaders of the Zemstvo and Town Unions : 
In the storm and chaos we must create a new government which can quickly 
calm the country and get down to constructive work. As to what degree 
we are capable - witness the far-reaching organisations of the Zemstvo 
and Town Unions. These are now our practical schools - all that has 
been accomplished on/ smaller scale by the Unions must soon be carried 
out in Russia on a national scale. (198) 
At the second meeting the general feeling was summed up by Kizevetter : 
Behind the Town and Zemstvo Unions stands a well-known group of 
intelligentsia but there is still no effectual broad support for them 
in the midst of society. One cannot but be disturbed by the fact that 
there is a slackening of interest in the State Duma ... there is a very 
dangerous feeling of indifference towards the Duma ... no-ons at the 
present moment can. rely upon the mass support of society. (199) 
While the Left Kadets fought against their misgivings by allying with the 
Moscow Progressists, the Kadet majority surrendered to self-doubt. Many were 
convinced with Shingarev that the moment for compromise had been lost : 
I fear that even if our crazy government -is prepared. to. eoncede, even 
if it concedes a government composed of the most reliable men, it will 
not be enough. The mood has. already passed over our heads,:. and is to 
the Left of the Progressive Bloc. We already have to recognise that we 
cannot satisfy that mood, already we cannot restrain it. The country is 
listening to the Left and not to us. It in too late. (200) 
The fragmenting nature of the Kadet party and its resignation to forces 
outside its control was noted by a police reporter in his survey of 16 
January in that 'not withsonding a whole series of conferences, first in 
Moscow and nore recently in Petrograd, the Kadets not only cannot agree about 
tactics for the immediate future but demonstrate the very sharpest 
differences of opinion'. 
201 At a Bloc meeting on 19 January, the emphasis 
198 Meeting at Kishkin'8,7 January 1917 : POýCE, xvii, 27-1917,15. 
199 Meeting at Dolgorukov's, 7 January 1917 ibid, 3-5. 
200 Shingarev at a meeting on 8 January 191? : SHUL'GIN 123.4. 
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was on restraint and self-control, with no tactical programme fixed for the 
coming session. At a meeting of Moscow Kadets designed to explain official 
policy, the Central Committee spokesman Vasilii Maklkkov voiced 'official' 
Kadet reluctance to overstep constitutional bounds : 
The revolutionary path is inevitable. The only question is when to 
start this struggle ... As long as all parliamentary resources are not 
exhausted, the Badete consider this moment has still not arrived. 
Perhaps the moment is very, very near yet nevertheless there is no 
sense in forcing events. (202) 
Despite the policy failure which condemned them to political impotence, the 
Kadets refused to overstep constitutional forms. 
This is not to say that the Milyukov Kadets were not seeking a way out 
of their dilemma. One alternative was ti induce some other less fastidious 
political force to do the dirty work from which the Eadets would benefit. 
Milyukov may have had this in mind when he wrot* in a Rech' editorial of 12 
December 1916 that 'the public demands which have so far been directed 
exclusively at the Duma, should turn also to other factors which sight 
influence the course of political events', However to this scheme there was 
the objection that whosoever took the fatal step might well cull greater 
political advantage than those who waited. There was no point in getting 
Guchkov to pick the hot chestnuts out of the fire if he refused to share 
them afterwards. The other alternative was to discover a previously 
unexploited political lever which would leave the constitutional principles 
of the Kadets and Oktobrists unsullied, but rescue them from their political 
plight. The only salient external force which might serve was international 
intervention in the shape of the imminent Allied Military Conference. 
In retrospect the military significance of the Petrograd Conference of 
Jxanuary 1917, the first Allied conference on the Eastern Front since the 
outbreak of war, has become overshadowed by political factors. One Soviet 
commentator has taken the line that 'in reality the principal task of the 
Allied delegates was to ascertain the internal political situation in Russia 
202 Moscow report of 20 January 1917 : FORCE, xvii, 27-1917,46, pp. 60(Bloc 
meeting) & 61(Kadet meeting). 
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and take any measures necessary to keep Russia in the war'. There is little 
evidence to corroborate this judgement. 
203 If that had indeed been the 
brief of the Allied delegates, their failure would have been all the more 
glaring, as Sir Samuel Hoare remarked : 'the Allies were mistaken in sending 
such a mission at all ; the members of the mission were equally mistaken in 
almost al1Z the conclusions about the Russian front and the state of Russia'. 
204 In reality the delegates were bewildered that a conference intended to 
be almost entirely military in content had become a political issue within 
Russia. The government did its best to avoid mutual embarrassment by 
postponing the preparations against insurrection and putting back the Doma 
opening from 12 January to 14 February to avoid the conference coinciding 
with the session. 
205 Government determination to avoid exhibiting any 
political washing to its foreign guests was even pursued to the detriment 
of diplomatic courtesy : 
The Duma was to meet in a week after the close of the conference. The 
delegation asked permission to remain in Russia to witness the meeting. 
A government official intimated to them that if they stayed, the 
assembling of the Doma would be put off for another fortnight., (206) 
The menace in the government refusal to permit a Dama sitting while the 
Allied delegates were in Russia was not lost upon the Doma moderates. 
At first the Kadets at least were uncertain about how the Military 
Conference might be turned to their political advantage. Indeed the ICadet 
fraction meeting of 10 January unsolicitedly played into the hands of the 
government by resolving : 
In view of the fact that the Allied delegations will be visiting Russia, 
and that the duty of the Kadet Party is to support the continuation of 
the war to a successful conclusion, it is decided. to refrain from any 
provocative speeches even within the Budget commission. (207) 
203 CHERMENSKY 867 ; also A. V. Ignat Iev, Ruasko-analiiskie otnoshenia ns)vaaune 
Oktyabrsko' Revol_utsii, Moscow 1966, pp. 102-3 ; lack of evidea©s has-not 
prevented speculation e. g. Manch ster'Guardian allegations, 16 Marsh 
1917(n/8), 5d and 21 March 191 s, 5d. 
204 Soare, The Seventh Seal, p. 219 ; also Lloyd ßeorge, War Memoirs, I, 942. 
205 Ts GIAL, f. 1276, x, 7,451-7 ; PADENIE, ii, 256-9((litbyn). 
206 Lloyd Georg War Memoir®, I, 941. 
207 Fraction document of 10 Januarar 1917 intercepted by the Rostov police,, 
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However the ensuing restlessness of the Kadet membership and the realisation 
that the Conference was the only foreseeable answer to their dilemma forced 
the abandonment of this throwback to the discredited policy of 'Sacred 
Union'. By mid January a police reporter was already noting that, 
The Kadets are placing all their hopes to the most significant degree 
upon the Allies, and in particular upon the English who, defending the 
community of interests in the struggle against the enemy, will (while 
preferably not interfering in the internal affairs of Russia) maka 
representations to the Russian government concerning "a sofetening of 
the internal line of policy". (208) 
With all other avenues explored, the Kadets were compelled by desperation to 
revert to the stratagem which had let them down in April 1906. 
The Military Conference ran from 16-31 January (with a subsequent week 
for official functions). Over that period a succession of approaches were 
made to the delegates. Welcomed by a pessimistic briefing from Buchanan 
designed to acquaint him with the facts of Russian political life, Lord 
Milner, the head of the British delegation, was soon swamped with 
impressions. 209 Letters from Peter Struve were delivered stressing the 
dangers of the course set by the monarchy ; casual conversation with 
Rodzyanko elicited the intelligence that the majority of Duma deputies 
would refuse to disperse in the event of dissolution. 
210 
At a banquet for 
the distinguished visitors on 27 January, the mood of the Moscow Merchants' 
Club was expressed in the speech of its president, Pavel Ryabushinaky. After 
dwelling upon the sind of the government and its inability to conduct the 
war successfully, Ryabushinsky turned to the subject of Allied war loans 
to Russia : 
It would be expedient if the administrative direction of these sums 
were under the appointed central control of a commission of the State 
Duma and our public organisations, in which event purely English control 
over the sums would become unnecessary. (211) 
208 Ts GAOR, f. 111, v, 664,52 quoted in LAVERTCHMfl 169 ; for teardom's financial 
dependence upon Great Britain, see Ignat'ev, Russko-angliiskie otnoshenia 
p. 67- 
209 BUCHANAN, II, 52 & 54 ; Lloyd George, War Memoirs, I, 941. 
210 Hoare, The Seventh $eal, pp. 189-191 & 194-5 ; XLTKOV 223-5 ; Lloyd 
George, War Memoirs, l, 941. 
211 Speech text in Byabushinsky fond z Canis Library(Manuscript Department), 
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Two days later, Prince Lvov followed a prediction that threre would be a 
revolution within three weeks with a strikingly similar offer to Milner : 
The Allies should only grant their future supplies on condition that 
they were used, or some of them, b9 organisations in which the Allies 
had confidence, such as the Unions presided over by himself and 
Chelnokov respectively. (212) 
The two 'deals' differed slightly : the more ambitious envisaged a Duma-cum- 
public organisations commission to administer foreign loans, the more 
realistic was prepared to settle for a clause in future loans allocating a 
set proportion to the public organisations. L'vov's omission of the Duma 
was pointed and significant but the essential similarity of the suggestions 
- exploiting Russian society's good relations with the Allies to extract 
financial (and therefore constitutional) concessions from the Tsar - is 
even more striking. The affinity of the offers to the trend of Kadet thought 
since autumn 1915 is unmistakable. 
Milyukov too made personal approaches to Milner and his French counter- 
-part, Gaston Doumergue. To Milner, Milyukov insisted 'that the storm was 
approaching, that if at the last hour the dynasty wou)4 not consent to 
compromise, its fall was inevitable'. From Doumergue Milyukov received a 
homily on patience to which he retorted 'we have exhausted all our patience 
... if we do not act soon the masses will no longer listen to us'. 
213 
There 
is no record of Milyukov suggesting an arrangement as boldly as did Lvov 
and Ryabushinsky but his overall sympathy with the line of the latter in 
particular probably showed. On the basis of his visit to the Allies in spring 
1916 Milyukov could not be sanguine about the success of the variius society 
approaches to the Allied representatives in January 1917. It is highly 
probable that Milyukov regarded foreign 'intervention' as the longest of 
long shots by this time. He rested content with allowing others to-take the 
risks, in the knowledge that he could slain the authorship of the policy in 
f. 260, aa1, delo 26, quotation p. 2 
212 Lloyd George, War aoire, I, 945-6 ;. also conversation between Bloc 
leaders and General Caatelnau : Petrograd Police report of 28 January 
1917 quoted in GRAVE 121-2. 
213 Milyukov and Milner, : Miliukov, Ruaeia Today and Tomorrow, New York 
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the unlikely event of its proving successful. 
At all events the various approaches failed. The delegates had not 
expected to have politics thrust in their military faces and took the line 
that their delegated authority allowed then no competence outside military 
issues. Bemused but courtenus, they listened to the overtures of Russian 
society and prudently vouchsafed no reply. Towards the end of his satay in 
Russia, Milner presented the Epperor with an interim report of his findings 
which not only restricted itself to purely military matters but was quick to 
stress that 'there can be no question of interference in the affairs of the 
Russian military authorities'. 
214 
The Allied delegations finally left 
Russia on 8 February. To the huge relief of Nicholas and his government, 
their foreign visitors had from a mixture of diplomacy and ignorance refrain- 
ed from any attempts to influence Russian internal policy and had made no 
moves embarrassing to the host government. 
215 
What came as a relief to the government was the bitterest of disappoint- 
-ments to the moderates. The Allied factor on which the moderates' last 
hopes for constitutional action were banked had proved unforthcoming and left 
a stark alternative : either a constitutionalism rendered impotent by 
circumstances or an opportunism which necessitated breaking free from 
traditional constitutional limitations. The Duma moderates had little 
hesitation in choosing the former course. Fear proved stronger than hate and 
condemned the moderates to waiting apprehensively but fatalistically for a 
crisis against which they could mount no effective defence. The month of 
February 1917 was a time of waiting for the end : 
The basic characteristic of this period was that everybody, including 
the "street" was now waiting for something, and both sides, having 
embarked upon an open struggle, were preparing themselves for something. 
This "something" however remained somewhere behind the lowered curtain 
1922, p. 295 ; Milyukor and Doumergue : PALBOLOGUE, III, 188. 
214+ HPK 77-85 ; also Lord Milner, 'Before Russia Went Went'0 Natiq a Rey ear, 
vol. 105, December 1940, pp. 659 & 661 Lloyd George, War Menoirs, -, F; Lockhart, The Two Reyolutions, pp"69-70. 
215 PALEOLOGUE, III , 18k & 196 ; BUCH AN, II, 514. 
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of history, and neither side displayed sufficient organisation or will 
to be the first to raise the curtain. (216) 
While both the Duma moderates and the majority of the Council of 
Ministers hardly dared draw breath for fear of provoking a crisis, 
Protopopov blundered on with his plans : on 27 January he had the entire 
Workers' Group of the Central War Industries Committee arrested and imprison- 
-ed. The Petrogad workers, already at a hight pitch of tension, saw the 
arrests as the first direct move by the government against the proletariat 
of the capitals. 
217 Within the government, Golitsyn and his colleagues 
demanded to know of Protopopov why the arrests could not at least have been 
postponed until after the Allied delegates had left the country. Their 
representations had some effect upon the by-now half-insane Protopopov, who 
agreed to suspend operations for the duration of the Petrograd Conference* 
218 
However on the very day that the Allied delegates left, on 8 February, the 
Petrograd Military District was detached from the Northern Front and placed 
under the martial law of General Khabalov ; the next day Khabalov proceeded 
to impose a ban on all meetings, public and private, in Petrograd. 
219 
With 
the new Duma session scheduled for the fourteenth, it was difficult to 
interpret the government moves as anything but plans for the immediate 
suppression of the Duma and any popular movement which might seek to 
dtefend it. 
The Duma moderates in response were pitiable in their anxiety to avoid 
giving the governg&it offence. Their only hope for a Duma session rested on 
preventing the government finding any excuse for its dissolution, which 
meant the sedation of opposition forces however friendly and the imposition 
of a strong measure of restraint within the Duma. The Kadets and Oktobrists 
216 MILIU80Y 382 ; confirmed by Blair, Ruesian Hazard, p. 89 and Buryshkin, 
Moskva Kupeche skaa, p. 316. 
217 RODZYAKKo 216 ; MILIUK©V 384 ;I RENSKY 183 ; PADEMIE, vi, 28k4(Gn v) " 
218 MILIUKOV 385 ; PADENBE, vi, 288 (G 1cbkov ; 2122 , 304 February 1917(n/s) , 8b . 
219 KEI PSKY 183 ; PAL OLOGUE, III , 202 -; Rech' ,9 rebruary 1917 ; Va ai f Gurko, Mem! 
_oriee, p. 
264. 
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spent the first two weeks of February attempting the ignoble task of 
appealling to the proletariat not to demonstrate on their behalf. Two days 
after the arrest of the Workers' Group of the Central War Industries 
Committee, on 29 January, Konovalov and Guchkov held a protest meeting at 
which Milyukov was invited to speak. In a statement which astounded both 
orgainisers and audience, Milyukov not only refused to add his voice to the 
protests but condemned the interference of the workers in the political 
contest in which 'only the State Duma can dictate the conditions of the 
struggle with the governments. 
220 Fear of the government combined with 
acute jealousy for the Duma's political monopoly in Milyukov's demand that 
the workers mind their own business and refrain from political action. At 
a Moscow Kadet Committee meeting on 4 February, Milyukov's nerve showed 
signs of cracking : 
Milyukov wishes to rid himself of the responsibility for a possible 
false step and its possible repercussions ... The theme constantly 
recurring in all his conversations is the danger of taking a wrong 
decision "for which it will be necessary to answer before History and 
before the whole civilised world". Under "false step" Milyukov clearly 
means the tactic of further concession to the government and compromise 
agreements with it. (221) 
Faced with Left Kadet pressure for a Duma declaration against the government 
and a direct campaign against the Empress which plainly secured a large 
measure of support amongst the Moscow Kadets, Milyukov was forced to concede 
that 'the new session will be a direct continuation of the glorious 
November days'. 
222 
The Kadet policy of the next fortnight only too clearly contradicted 
Milyukov's assurance to Moscow. At the Petrogäd Central Committee meeting of 
6 February, the crypto-Oktobriem of the Kadet majority was typified in the 
sentiment of the former Left Kadet Rodichey : 'the absolute necessity is to 
liberate the Tsar and Tearistea from the "prison" of the clique which is 
220 Select quotations from the speech are in GRAVE 181-2 and CHERNOV 66-7 ; 
note Milyuskov's gloss on the while episode in MILIUKOV 384-5. 
221 Report of 4 February 1917 : Pt , xrii, 17,46-b, 1-6 (quotation p. 6). 
222 Testimony of A. Q. Peshekhonov cited in C tSKY 856-8 ; also PO, 
xvii, 17,46-b, p. 5(quotation). 
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concealing from them the menacing mood of the entire country and directing 
the government towards the abyss'. The Committee reiterated that nothing 
could be settled without the Duma, apparently in the hope that if this 
aphorism were repeated regularly, the workers, the government and the Kadets 
themselves might continue to believe it. 
223 
By 9 February Milyukov was so 
terrified of MVD provocation that together with Rodzyanko he authorised a 
statement in the press appealing for calm and opposing any demonstrations to 
greet the Duma opening. The unfortunate coincidence of this appeal appearing 
next to Khabalov's warnings against civil unrest in many newspapers did 
little to disabuse the workers and the Left of the conviction that the 
moderates were playing the government's game. 
224 On 10 February Milyukov's 
editorial in Rech' blamed the demonstrations of the foutteenth in advance on 
police provocation, arguing that it was still not too late to cheat the 
government of its design. 
225 A last emergency measure proposed by a hastily- 
convened Central Committee on 13 February was a direct appeal to the 
Emperot, a recourse rejected by Milyukoy (significantly ) on its 'unconstit- 
-utional' grounds. 
226 When 14 February dawned, a last appeal by Rodzyanko 
to stay away proved unnecessary : the giant demonstrations so feared by the 
Duma did not take place. The desperate braking, influence of the moderates 
upon the Petrograd workers' movement achieved its immediate object, but at 
the price of alienating what little political sympathy had previously 
existed between them. 
227 
The Duma session brought no change in the craven policy of the moderates, 
The unprecedentedly dispirited atmosphere was admitted by Rodzyanko : 
The mood in the Duna was languid - even Purishkevich made a dreary 
speech. The impotence of the Duna was felt everywhere ... The Duna 
maintained its traditional stance and did not precipitate an open break 
with the government. The Duma had only one weapon - the spoken word. (228) 
223 Tsý R, f. 63,47,511,16 quoted in LAVERYCHEV 165-6 ; also Rusakie 
Vedomosty, 6 February 1917. 
224 MILIUKOV 385 ; T*GGIAL, f. 1276, Zt%. 460 ;P SOGIIE, III9201-2 ; SHUL'GIN 
138 ; Times, 26 February 1917(n/a), 7d. 
225 PADENIE, vi, 351(Milyukov). 
226 TsGAOR, f. 155,878,1917,2 cited in CHEFMMST 865. 
227 Reh: , 14 February 1917 ; MILIUKOT 383 ; KEREMSKI 184 ; CBERNOV 65-9" 
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Kadet and Oktobrist spokesmen warned the government of the risks it was 
running but always took care to advertise their strictly constitutional 
position and activities. Milyukov greeted the new session with the statement 
'our only deeds are our words', a claim so dubious that he felt obliged to 
follow it up in the Duma sitting of 15 February with the less vulnerable 
alternative 'the word and the vote are for the time being our only weapons'. 
229 The Left was roused to fury before and during the session by what it 
regarded as the moral cowardice of the moderates. In a letter of 11 February 
to Lenin, the Bolshevik leader Shlyapnikov reported in disgust that 'the 
liberals and particularly Milyukov behave like scoundrels towards the 
revolutionary movement'. Kerensky had a field day. In a speech on the 
fifteenth he attacked the Empress savagely, going so far as to demand the 
immediate overthrow of the 'tyrants'. 
23° 
Only the determination of Golitsyn 
to avoid taking offence from the Duma wherever possible (braving the demand 
of the Empress that Kerensky be hanged for treason) saved the Duna from 
prompt dissolution as a seditious assembly. 
231 ICereneky also vented his 
spleen on the Duma majority in a political indictment that desert/®e to be 
quoted at some length : 
The historic task of the Russian people at the present time is the 
overthrow of this medieval regime but you wish to fight only "by legal 
means" ... You consider your duty done once you have concluded your 
diagnosis of the ills of the country ... I say to you that your speeches 
on the necessity of calm at all costs are either the naive sentiments 
of superficial thinkers or just an excuse to avoid the real fight, just 
an excuse to stay safely in your warm armchairs ... You not only have no 
desire, you are unable to break finally with the government because you 
have never been willing to subordinate your e*onomic class interests, 
the interests of just one sector of the population, to the interests of 
the whole ... You don't want to listen to anybody but yourselves but 
soon you will have to listen, for if you do not hear the warning voices, 
you will encounter the harsh facts. (232) 
228 RODZYANKO 219-220. 
229 GDSO, V, 20,13k4 ; also IMMERSKY 185. 
230 Shlyapaikov, Semnadtsatyi_God, Moscow 19234,65 ; Keren& is vords_. Kezp 
deleted from the Duma records at GDSO, V, 20,1358 ; LNSKY 186. 
231 TsGIAL, f. 1276, x, 7,464.5 ; PADENIE, ii, 261.20olitsya) ; KERENSKY 187. 
232 GDSO, V, 20,1353-6 ; full text also is Milyakov fond (TsýQB, z. 5? 9, d3 
i63) and edited text in X! 186-7. 
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Kerensky might have been administering the last rites to the Duma moderates 
and the Progressive Bloc. 
Even on the very brink of revolution, the weakness of the Duma moderates 
was matched by their disunity. The nature of their party dilemma since late 
1913 had resigned the Oktobrists to conceding the initiative within the 
Progressive Bloc to the Kadets. This subordinate role had always troubled 
Guchkov who, at the Oktobrist Central Committee on 30 December 1916, advised 
the fraction 'not to allow the Kadet party complete primacy in the current 
political struggle but be sure to attract to yourself the greatest attenttionf 
233 The old resentment of the ©ktobrists against what amounted to Kadet 
leadership was fired b9 this recommendation and manifested itself the moment 
that the Duma reconvened. A police report of 18 February gleefully noted 
Chelnokov's fears for the future of the Bloc : 'at the moment, in Chelnokov's 
opinion, the Oktobrists are expressing dissatisfaction about the over- 
dictatorial manner of Milyukov, who is leading the Bloc according to his own 
whims and forcing his decisions upon them'. The same report contained the 
gist of a telephone call from Shingarev to Ziehkin in Moscow on the sixteenth 
which had been tapped by the Okhrana : 'Sbingarev definitely confirmed the 
altogethe1'serious rifts in the Bloc and that heroic efforts will be needed to 
keep the Oktobriets from their wish to move to meet the governmestt. 
234 The 
Oktobrist revival was brought about partly by irritation with the 'dictator- 
-ship' of Milyukov and partly by whispers that Golitsyn was seeking allies 
in the Duna. The rumours that the Nationalist leader Balashev was being 
offered a ministerial post admitted the distinct possibility that the 
Oktobrists' traditional place would be usurped by the Nationalists, and all_ 
too easily detached the Oktobriets from the Duaa Bloc in a list bid for.,.. 
government favour. 
235 Memories of the privileged years of the early Third 
Duma never lebt the Duma Oktobrieta but conditioned their relationship with 
233 Report of 8 January 1917 s POLZM, xvii, 27_1917,26. 
234 P0 LICE, xvii, 27-1917,46,58 ; Re ch!, 20 February loll ; also DYAZIN 315-7.11 
235 NICHOLAS 311 ; 4, vo1.20 ' . 35 ; QDSO, Y 21,1499 (Shut' gin on 1'% `ebrnäi 1917) ; also CHE EKY 
88k. 
334. 
the government irrespective of the wider developments over the period of 
their decline. 
The Duma moderates made a sorry spectacle on the eve of the February 
Revolution. The very most the Progressive Bloc could contemplate behind its 
public policy of 'the word and the vote' were contingency plans for 
operation in the event of revolution : 
It was clear to everyone that it was not the business of the Duma to 
arrange the coup. It was extremely important however to define the role 
of the Duma once the coup would be arranged. The bloc started with the 
assumption that, given the coup, Nicholas II would be removed from the 
throne one way or the other. The bloc agreed on transferring the authorit: 
of the monarch to the legal heir Alexei, under the regency of the Grand 
Duke Mikhail Alexandrovitch until Alexei reached maturity. The Grand 
Duke's gentle character and the young age of the heir seemed to be the 
best guarantee of a transition to a constitutional system. (236) 
This agreement represented the consensus of the Left-orientated groups, 
desperately but unconvincingly demanding 'direct action', and the Right- 
orientated groups, fatalistically settling for 'constitutional struggle alone. 
All groups waited for other political forces to make the first move, avoiding 
the initiative and responsibility for the imminent crisis. Outside the Duma, 
the prospect of repression or revolution seemed equally likely if not 
equally horrifying. Within the Duma, the Left and Right paused in their 
assault on the government only to hurl abuse at the moderates whom they 
accused of having lost the powers of both movement and speech. The external 
dangers to the Bloc seemed matched by internal threats. 237 Though the 
moderates desperately tried to hold ranks, a Leftward drain of membership 
threatened the Bloc with a lingering death by anaemia and an unexpected 
eleventh-hour defection by the ©ktobrists threatened the complete dieintegr- 
-ation of the moderate camp. More than at any other time in the career of the 
Dumas only a Deus ex machine could save the moderate parties and the moderate 
course from annihilation. 
236 MILIUKOV 383-4 ; also Vaeilii Maklakov, 'On the Fall of Tsardom', pp. 
78-9 and Deaikia, 'Fevral'akaya Bavolyutsia i armia', p. 194. 
237 SRUL'GIN 141-2 ; Police report of 29 January 1917 quoted in GUYS 175-6. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN : THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION 
1. The decision to assume power (23-38 February 1917) 
Economic and social factors seem to have been paramount in the sudden 
upsurge of the workers' movement afeer 21 February. The alleged bread and 
flour shortages in the capital led to food riots from 19 February, while the 
lock-out of their 40,000 employees by the Putilov management on the twenty- 
second sparked off the general strike which within days brought Petrograd to 
a complete standstill. 
1 Although early Soviet commentators dutifully 
asserted B t6shevik direction of the movement, a broad spectrum of historians 
from Leon Trotsky to George Katkov are agreed that far from being sponsored 
by political parties, the workers' movement developed in spite of the 
pessimism and alarm of even the Extreme Left groups. 
2 The Social-Revolution- I 
-ary leader Zenzinov might have been speaking for the entire Left when he 
admitted : 
The Revolution struck like thunder out of a clear sky, and caught 
napping not only the government and Dunta but the public organisations 
too. Let us be frank - it came as a great and wonderful surprise for us 
too, we revolutionaries who had worked for it for long years and had 
always waited for it. (3) 
For the government, the Police Director Klimovich insisted that the February 
Revolution was 'a purely spontaneous phenomenon and not at all the product 
of party agitation'. Even the committed partisanship of Trotsky could not 
entirely smother his historian's respect for the facts ; the furthest he 
would go was 'to lay it down as a general rule for those days that the higher 
the leaders, the further they lagged behind'. 
4 
Trotsky's judgement was particularly deserved concerning the Dumm 
moderates. On Thursday 23 February, some 87,000 workers from fifty industrial 
1I ENBNY 187-8 ; P. ALEOLOGUE, III, 213 ; Vaailyev, The Ochrana, pp. 220-1. 
2 CHEMMSKY 888 ; TlibTMM 121. ýý . tLTWV 2.52-3. 
3 quoted by Chernov(c V 139)-, lyukoy(P E, vi 351) , Trotakq%ÖT ! 
162) 
4 Klimovich : PADENIE, i, 98 ; TWTSXY 139. 
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enterprises on strike in sympathy with the Putilovtsy thronged the city 
centre to celebrate International Women's Day. 
5 The government reacted 
promptly, choosing to interpret what was still a fairly good-humoured 
demonstration as a direct thteat. Whether the authorities' jittery nerves 
made them over-react to the situation or the demonstration was taken as a 
convenient pretext for implementing Protopopov's scheme of 'provocation and 
suppression', there was no doubt of the seriousness with which the demonstr- 
-ations were viewed. At 2 p. m. the adminetration of Petrograd was transferred 
from the civil City Administrator Balk to the military commander of the 
Petrograd District General Khabalov. The menace implicit in this transfer of 
power seemed unequivocal when Khabalov ordered the immediate closing of 
shops and offices, a night curfew, the halting of the city transport services 
and the introduction of cavalry units to reinforce the police. 
6 
The scene 
seemed cleared for a decisive confrontation between the city proletariat 
and the forces of the. government. 
The reaction of the Drina was distinctly muted. The Progreseist Man yrev 
was to claim that on the twenty-third 'neither amongst the broad Duma groups 
nor amongst society in general was any special significance attached ' to 
the social crisis. While casual conversation inevitably touched upon the 
situation in the capital, the talk of deputies attending the Duma sitting 
that day gave no indication that the subject would be tabled for formal 
discussion. The attention of the Duma moderates was fixed upon the general 
supply crisis and, at this particylar juncture, upon the attempted 
collaboration between the Minister of Agriculture Rittikh and Shingarev over 
the fixing of bread prices. 
7 The furthest the Bloc was prepared to go even 
in acknowledging the crisis was expressed in a motion put up by Milyukov : 
(a) The government should take immediate steps to provide food for the 
population of the capital and other cities and towns ; 
5 TROTSKY 121-2 ; MILIUKOV 386. 
6 KERENSSY 189 ; Stinton Jones, Rassi& in Revolution, pp. 60-84. 
7 Mansyrev, 'Moi Vosponinania', p. 262 ; _, V, 23,1593-7 & 1653-7(. itti t, 
of 
23 February) ; Sh]. yapnikov, E! sua Seanadtsatoao Goda I1,76-80. ' 
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(b) The workers employed in factories of the defence industry should 
be supplied with food immediately ; and 
(c) Town administrators and public bodies should be enlisted straight 
away in the distribution of food, and food committees should be 
set up. 
It was left to Kerensky to broach the subject of the local crisis and to 
introduce the amendment 'that the jobless workers from the Putilov works 
should be taken back and the factory resume operations immediately'. Although 
the Progressive Bloc was prepared to back this amendment, it was confirmed 
in its policy of avoiding offeiaing the government any pretext for reprisals 
against the Duma and declined to exploit the current threatening situation 
against the government. While the Duma membership privately debated the social 
and political crisis, the official actions and utterances of the Duma 
artificially suggested an exclusive preoccupation with practical economic 
affairs. 
8 
On the next day, 24 February, the social situation worsened. Assurances 
of the adequacy of flour and bread supplies posted overnight throughout 
Petrograd by Khabalov had no success in calming the atmosphere of emergency. 
As a result Khabalov proceeded to the next stage of the suppression, plan by 
adding infantry detachments to the Cossack cavalry which . 
had reinforced the 
police the previous day. The cavalry and infantry regiments were employed to 
patrol the streets as a show of overwhelming force while the police took 
action. But although Znamenskaya Square, the principal congregating point, 
was forcibly cleared by mounted police, the attitude of the attendant troops 
was by no means certain. The infantry regiments stationed to divide the city 
with picket lines were newly conscripted and made little effort to conceal 
their sympathy with the crowds ; the cavalty regiments whose loyalty in the 
barracks had been unquestioned wavered in the face of confrontation with 
the common people. 
9 
The mood of the Duma on 24 February heralded not an alliance of modleiatee 
8 KERE4Sg1 188-9 ; GDSO, V, 23,1657 ; TeGIAL, (. 1276 (Council of Miniähre), 
x, 7,468 ; also CiSKT 889. 
9 See various sources e. g. TROTSIT 123-79 Jones, Ruslia in Reyo1ttt3611, p1 
8o-84, BROW 27-31 and r iUKov 386. 
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and proletariat against the government but an attempt at constructive 
collaboration between Duma and government to tackle what the leaders of both 
camps declared to be the basic problem. The principal obstacle to cooperation 
remained Protopopov. The Duma published a challenge by passing an emergency 
bill to transfer the entire administration of supply from the MVD to the 
Zemstvo and Town Unions ; Protopopov, acutely aware of both the practical 
and symbolic significamce of the supply issue, responded by a flat refusal 
to surrender any jurisdiction. 
10 
The apparent impasse in relations was broken at the initiative of 
Rodzyanko. Departing from the discipline of the Progressive Bloc, Rodzjanko 
attempted to give expression to the traditional and recently-revived 
Oktobrist policy of expedient alliance with the government. The move was 
only possible because of the fundamental cleavage in the cabinet between the 
reactionary Protopopov group and the more moderate Golitsyä group. Golitsyn 
had long ago become convinced of the necessity of removing Protopopov from 
the MVD but his petitions to both Nicholas and Alexandra over the course of 
8anuary had been rejected. 
11 When Rodzyanko approached Golitsyn with a 
request to effect the transfer of supply forcibly, Golitsyh was prepared to 
negotiate in order both to tackle the supply crisis effectively and to secure 
the dismissal of Protopopov. At the noon meeting of the Duma Council of 
Elders on 24 A February, Rodzyanko exultantly announced that a joint confer- 
ence of government and Duma leaders had been arranged for that evening. 
12 
The composition and balance of the emergency conference, initiated by 
Rodzyanko though chaired by Golitsyn, suggested a fair measure of goodwill 
on both sides : for the government, Goliteyn himself, Rittikh(Minister of 
Agriculture), Belyayev(War Minister), Grigorovich(Navy Minister), Shakhovskoy 
(Minister of Trade and Industry) and Kriger-Voinovsky(Minister of Communicat- 
10 GDS0, V, 24,1733(24 February 1917) and SERENSKT 189. 
11 PADENIE, ii, 253-4(Golitsyn) ; Dnevnik Nikolaya KA, vol. 20, p. 131 Vasilyev, The Ochrana, p. 218. 
12 TsG 4 , f. 1276(Coancil of Ministers), x, 7,466-7 ; RRech', 25 February 1917 
quoted in BROWKER 28-9 ; GDSO, V, 14,1734. 
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-ions) ; for the Duma, Rodzyanko, Nekrasov(Vice-President) and Dmitryukov 
(Secretary) ; for the State Council, Shcheglovitov(President) and Dietrich 
(Vice-President) ; and for Petrograd, the Mayor and the Chairman of the 
Petrograd Province Zemstvo Board. 
13 The balance of representation, which 
was generous to the non-government instütutions, did not however represent 
the unanimous vote of the Council of Ministers. There was a fatal 
schizophrenia betweeb the Golitsyn group favouring collaboration wroth the 
Duma (all of whom took care to attend the conference) and the Protopopov 
group proposing the suppression of the Duma along with the Petrograd 
disturbances. The chief opponent of the transfer of supply, Protopopov 
himself, declared he was too busy to attend the meeting, which not 
surprisingly want against him in his absence : the Duma, Council and 
ministerial delegates 'unanimously voted to transfer the food supply in 
Petrograd immediately to the jurisdiction of the Petrograd Municipal 
Administration'. 
14 At the onset of a revolutionary situation, the Duma 
moderates (led by the Oktobrists) sponsored cooperation with the government 
for a return to normal rather than leading the workers to the barricades. 
Yet eve, at this juncture neither government nor Duma appreciated 
either the full extent of the danger or the speed at which events were 
moving. The joint decision over the transfer was accompanied by an almost 
leisurely optimism that once the matter was decided, the danger was past : 
At the same time it was noted that the Petrograd Municipal Administration 
did not have a suitable organisation at its disposal for this purpose ... 
As soon as the Petrograd Municipal Administration, in conjunction with 
the Duma municipal affairs commission, is able to set up a suitable 
organisation, the whole matter of supplying food to Petrograd will be 
placed under its jurisdiction. (15) 
:ý 
At a moment when time was at a premium, supply was transferred to an 
organisation still to be created and the formalities of the transfer 
entrusted to the notoriously slow Duma bureaucracy. Moreover, the government 
13 Rech'125 February 1917 ; Rodzyanko mistakenly dates this meeting on 25 
February : 'Gosudaratvennaya Dnma', pp. 37-8. 
14 Rech', 25 February 1910 ; also PALEOIDGUE, III, 215(entry for 24 February/ 
9 March 1917) and Rodzyanko, 'Gostudaretvennaya Duma', P. 37. 
15 Rech', 25 February 1917 quoted in BROTAR 28-9. 
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and Duma alike failed to recognise that an important political concession 
which satisfied them neither answered the immediate practical needs of the 
hungry citizen nor made any impact upon the developing crisis in the capital. 
At this möemt of closer company, government and Duma moderates revealed 
identical estrangement from the mass of the people. 
The ad hoc alliance between the Golitsijn group and the moderate-dominatedi 
Duma quickly came under intolerable strains from both the government and the 
workers' movement. Despite Kadet assurances that ample stocks of bread and 
flour existed and in defiance of punitive raids in the industrial suburbs, 
the morning of 25 February again saw the anonymous almost instinctive march 
of the workers to the city centre. By late morning the centre of Petrograd 
was again occupied by the workers, who were encouraged to suffer the 
increasingly vicious actions of the police by the growing sympathy of the 
cavalry units. At 3 p. m. came the first clear evidence that the obedience of 
the army could not be automatically assumed : on Znamenskaya Square a police 
officer was shot down by a'stray' Cossack bullet while leading a charge on 
the crowd. 
16 Alarmed by the incident, Khabalov threatened the strikers (by 
now numbering 240,000) with conscription to the front line unless they 
reported back to work by the twenty-eighth. This three-day ultimatum had the 
opposite effect to that intended, even encouraging the workers to greater 
excesses during the time remaining. 
17 
The impact of these developments upon the Duma moderates was still 
relatively slight : the Duma met at 11 a. m. to pans a motion demanding the 
expediting of the transfer of supply and rested content with that limited 
initiative. Rodzyanko proposed that the next sitting be not for 11 a. m. on 
the twenty-eighth, thereby arousing the shrill complaints of the Extreme Left 
who argued that events were moving so quickly that a three-day break was 
criminal neglect of the Duma's duty. 
18 At this point the Kadets demonstrated 
16 TROTSKY 127-130 ; Re=, 25 February 1917 quoted in BROWKER 30 ; Zenzin©v 
quoted in BROW ER 32 ; SEBENSKY 189-190. 
17 MILIUKOV 386 ; BUCHANAN, II, 59 ; TROTSKY 127-9. 
18 KERENSKY 190. 
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their influence : after a fraction meeting which opted for bringing the next 
Duma sitting forward one day to the twenty-seventh, the Kadet vote proved 
sufficient to secuere a majority for its view within the Council of Elders 
that afternoon. 
19 Irritated that his proposal be rejected and the recent 
understanding with Golitsyn which he had engineered be jeopardised, Rodzyanko 
insisted that the next meeting be closed to avoid offending the sensitivities 
of the government. 
20 A difference between Badet and Oktobrist$ tactics had 
emerged : while the Oktobrists were committing the'iielves to the government, 
the Kadets were hedging their political bets and waiting on events. 
But despite the Duma's careful restraint and well-advertised constitut- 
-ionalism, its support within the government was under increasing pressure. 
Even the apparently trivial bargaining within the Duma membership over the 
date and form of the next Duma sitting suggested to many ministers that at 
worst the Duma might be shifting towards the side of the insurgents and at 
best was insisting on close supervision of government actions. At a meeting 
of the Council of Ministers on the evening of 25 February Protopopov, angry 
that the Duma should even demand the transfer of supply, vented his spleen on 
the Golitsýn group which had acquiesced to the move at the extraordinary 
conference the previous evening. His antagonism towards Golitsyn at the 
personal and political level came across clearly with his threat 'to arrest 
your Rodzyanko and dissolve the Duma'. Despite universal distaste for 
Protopopov's ravings, more and more ministers were coming to agree that the 
Golitsyn policy of rapprochement was not the solution to the current crisis. 
However Golitsyn did secure agreement to defer the decision on the future of 
the Duma for twenty-four hours, employing the time to commission Rittikh and 
Pokrovsky to confer with the Duma leaders. 
21 Golitsyn's policy of moving to 
meet Hodzyanko was coming under very heavy fire. 
In the meantime a firmer line against the insurgents was initiated. At 
19 Ru ke Vedomosty, 27 February 1917 quoted in BROWSER 39-40. 
20 TsGIAL, f. 1276, x, 7,476 ; also KERENSSY 190. 
21 PADENIE, ii, 263 & 265(Golitsyn) ; PARES 442 ; EATKOV 286. 
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the end of the Council meeting Khabalov was called to the telegraph to 
receive the curt response of the Tsar (since 22 February at the Stavka) to 
his account of the troubles : 'I order that the disorders in the capital be 
stopped tomorrow ; such disorders are impermissible during this difficult 
time of war with Germany and Austria'. After informing the Council, ghabalov 
issued instructions that in future the sabre and nagaika were to be abandoned 
in favour of the rifle and machine-gun. 
22 In the course of the night of 
25/26 February the Okhrana effected a series of raids in the Petrograd 
suburbs which netted some one hundred revolutionaries and, by most accounts, 
was completely successful in decapitating the Extreme Left parties and 
organisations. 
23 
The precise effect of these actions upon the events of 26 
February was difficult to assess. Both Belyayev and the Empress were to send 
relieved 'All Clear' telegrams to the Emperor at about 11 a. m* but the 
twenty-sixth was a Sunday, with the industrial workers an if by common 
consent sleepin# late before setting off for the city centre. By early 
afternoon the crowds matched those of the previous day. Despite Rodzyanko'e 
pleas to use fire-hoses rather than bullets against the insurgents, the 
troops received orders to shoot wherever necessary. 
24 
The principal confrontation of the day was again at Znamenekaya Square 
but on the order to fire on the crowd, the Volynaky regiment put down its 
arms, forcing the police to take sole responsibility for the ensuing 
fusillade which claimed forty lives. 
25 Although the immediate object was 
achieved and the crowd forcibly dispersed, the insubordination of the 
Volynsky regiment augured badly for the government. This development was 
taken a stage further when part of the Paviovsky regiment mutinied in the 
late afternoon, not only refusing to fire on the crowd but turning their 
rifles on the police instead. The trend was clear : the sympathy of the 
22 PADENIE, i, 190-220(Shabalov) ; also MIZwXOV 386 and PARES 442. 
23 TROTSKY 130 ; MILIUKOV 386 ; also KATKOV 288. 
24 TROTSKY 99 & 132-3 ; Jones, Russia in Rerolution, p. 90 ; M. Ferro, La 
Revolution de 1917, Aubier-Paria 1967, p. 68. 
25 PADENIE, i, 291 ff. (Burtsev) ; also MILIUKOV 387. 
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soldiers for the insurgent workers was expressing itself in increasing 
commitment to their side. 
26 
When the Council of Ministers reconvened at 9 p. m. on the twenty-sixth 
to determine the fate of the Duma, the situation required most delicate 
judgement. Some signs pointed to the weakness of the government position. 
The insubordination of the Volynsky and Paviovsky regiments brought home to 
the ministers the gegree to which they were dependent on army loyalty, which 
could not at present be relied upon for offensive operations against the 
insurgents. An Okhrana report of the afternoon of 26 February painted a 
desperate picture for the government : 
The government is without support from anybody ... The bourgeois circles insist upon a change of government and stress the view of continuing the 
war to a successful conclusion, but the workers advance the slogan 
"Bread, Down with the Government and Down with the War" ... At present 
everything depends on the line taken by the armed forces. (27) 
However at the finely-balanced state of affairs on the evening of 26 February, 
it was still possible to interpret events as moving in the direction the 
government desired. The lapses of companies of two regiments did not 
necessarily imply the disloyalty of the remainder, and indeed the mutiny of 
the Pavlovsky company had been dealt with very ably by the Preobrazheneky 
regiment. The actions of the proletariat on Sunday, their normal free day, 
could not be taken as typical and the demands of their families could well 
send the workers back to their jobs early in the coming week. Most telling of 
all, there was solid ground for belief that the workers' movement had reached 
its peak and would now subside. The most important cogs in the revolutionary 
organisations had been removed by the Okhrana sweep and the workers' movement 
could not be expected to coatinue leaderless. Even Trotsky was to admit that 
the evening of the twenty-sixth was the turning-point and that all the 
revolutionary parties (Bolsheviks included) were for abandoning the struggle 
for the time being. 
28 The campaign to restore law and order over the course 
26 'Fevral'skaya Revolyutsia i Okhrannoe Otdelenie', Byloe, I(29), January 
1918, p. 170 ; also TROTSKY 136 and N. N. Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution 
11 , Ed. J. Carmichael, London 1955, pp"28-9. 
27 Report of Oki agent 'Limonin' :B loe, I(29), January 1918, pp. 174-5. 
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of the twenty-sixth encountered such little resistance that Sukhanov conceded 
that 'towards five o'clock it might well have seemed that Tsarism had again 
won the throw and that the movement was going to be suppressed'. 
29 It was 
still possible to agärue on the crucial night that it was necessary only to 
weather the storm which was already receding and moderating. 
With the social and political balance so delicate, the government's 
relations with the Duma proved of vital impoertance. The negotiations between 
Rittikh and Pokrovsky and the Duma are still shrouded in mystery. Precisely 
who the ministers contacted and what were the nature of the discussions have 
never been statisfactorily described, with none of the participants caring 
to divulge any details. Milyukov offhandedly mentions that he was contacted 
(along with Vasilii Maklakov and the Oktobrist Savich) but 'I do not remember 
at all what they actually spoke about with me'. 
30 
Shul'gin has revealed 
that there was a Bloc meeting on 26 February (presumably connected with the 
Goremykin initiative), which he condemned for its failure to take a firm 
line against the government ; Shul'gin may also have had this occasion in 
mind when he remarked that 'the feeling of the closeness of revolution was 
so terrifying that through the eleventh hour the ICadets became even softert31 
Maklakov may have reinforced this impression of Bloc complaisance by 
suggesting that the Duma be prorogued to allow time for the formation of a 
Ministry of Confidence headed by Alekseyev. But whatever the details of the 
mysterious discussions, Rittikh and Pokrovsky apparently returned to the 
Council of Ministers with impressions which favoured a firm line. 
32 
The Council of Ministers debated the situation from 9 p. m. until 
shortly after midnight. Protopopovts argument that this was no time for 
concession as the crisis was already subsiding won the grudging agreement of 
28 TROTSKY 134-7 ; also Ferro, La Revolution do 1917, pp. 70-74. 
29 Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution 1917, p. 25. 
30 )IILIUKOV 387-8. 
31 SHUL'GIN 144-6(Bloc meeting) & 140(quotation). 
32 SHUL'GIN 143-6 ; PADENIE, ii, 263-4(Golitsyn) ; Shakhovsky, Sic Transit, 
p. 199 ; Utro Rossii, 5 April 1917. 
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a majority within the Council. 
33 The news of the weak line of the Duma Bloc 
convinced all that no danger could spring from an early prorogation. Finally, 
to Protopopov personally, prorogation of the Duma automatically suspended 
the transfer of supply away from the MVD ; to this extent, Protopopov may 
have seen the prorogation of the Duma less as an assault on the national 
assembly than as a defence of his own position. Acceding reluctantly to the 
prevailing opinion but exercising his prerogative as Chairman by opting not 
for dissolution but for prorogation, Golitsyn employed a blank (which he 
pre-dated to the twenty-fifth) shortly after midnight. 
34 
At 1.58 a. m. on 
the twenty-seventh Golitsyn sent a telegram to the Emperor telling him of 
the action, and shortly afterwards despatched the formal decree of prorogation 
to the Senate from where it would pass to the Duma President. 
35 The deed was 
done : the triumph of Protopopov's optimistic view over Golitsyn's pessimistic; 
convereted a minor cabinet reverse into the issue which was to draw the 
Duma however unwillingly into the revolution against the government. 
The news of the prorogation spread quickly and by 9 a. m. many deputies 
were already at the Tauride Palace discussing what the Duma response must be* i 
A hastily-convened meeting of the Bureau of the Progressive Bloc predictably 
oscillated between despair and ambition, for as Shul'gin remarked, 
Not everybody understood their impotence. Some believed that now was the 
moment when we could do something, now that the masses had crossed into 
"action". And what did they propose ? Sitting at their cosy green velvet- 
covered tables, they thought that the Bureau of the Progressive Bloc 
could manage insurgent Russia as ii had managed the fractions of 
the Duma. (36) 
When the Council of Elders met in mid morning of the twenty-seventh it was 
still difficult to assess the political situation with any degree of 
certainty. The Council of Ministers had been forced to make its most crucial 
decision at what appeared to be the turning-point of the disturbances ; 
33 TROTSKY 173-4 ; MILIUKOV 387-8 ; Vasilyev, The Ochrana, p. 223. 
34 Sobranie Ukazenii i RasDorsazhenii Pravitel_ stva, I, i, 328 quoted in 
BROWIER 41-2 ; also KERENSKY 190. 
35 KERSEY 193 ; Rodzyanko, tGosudaretvennaya Dima'"PP"38-9" 
36 KERENSKY 193 ; SHUL'GIN 150 & 155(quotation). 
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within twelve hours the Duma leaders were confronted with a comparable 
decision with little more information upon which to base the most far-reach- 
-ing judgement in the history of the Duma. 
There were two rival attitudes to the prorogation decree within the 
Council of Elders. The inclination of the Right and moderate Right was to 
accept prorogation if it was accompanied by the establishment of an ministry 
of confidence. Maklakov's plan as reported to the Council of Ministers was 
the most concrete version of this, though in retrospect it is hard to dispel 
the image of the moderate Right attempting to pass off moral cowardice as an 
act of political self-sacrifice. 
37 By comparison, the retaliatory proposal 
of the Extreme Left for an official Duma sitting in defiance of the prorogat- 
ion decree combined a semblance of self-respect with a high degree of 
theatricality. 
38 Once again the Kadete proved to hold the balance and came 
up with a formula of compromise. It was decided neither to disperse nor to 
defy the prorogation decree but instead the official but closed sitting 
scheduled for that afternoon should become a meeting of deputies in their 
private capacities. 
39 Kerensky was later to condemn this compromise as 
disastrous for the future authority of the Duma : 
The Council [of Elders - R. P. 
) overruled our proposal, deciding that the 
Duma convene in "unofficial session" ... Politically and psychologically 
this meant there was to be a private meeting of a group of private 
individuals ... The meeting was not one of a state institution and it 
had no formal authority ... This refusal to continue in session formally 
was perhaps the greatest mistake of the Duma. It meant committing 
suicide at the very moment when its authority was supreme in the country 
and it might have played a decisive and fruitful part had it acted 
officially ... The Imperial Duma wrote its own death warrant at the 
moment of the revolutionary renaissance of the people. (40) 
But on that morning of 27 February the concern of the Duma moderates who 
largely determined the decision lay as ever less with their relationship 
with the people as their relationship with the government. The direction in 
37 ENGEL'HARDT, xii, 730 ; IItro Rossii, 5 April 1917 ; also CHERMENSKY 902-3" 
38 KERENSKY 195-6 ; Milyukov, 'Fevral'akie Dni', p. 175. 
39 SHUL'GIN 157 ; A. Bublikov, Russkapa Revolyutsia, New York 1918, p. 17- 
40 KERENSKY, The Catastrophe, pp. 12-13 ; also MILIU OY 391. 
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which the balance of power was tipping was still a matter for conjecture 
rather than informed judgement and the Duma moderates were not prepared to 
gamble away the future by adding their names to a movement which might be 
crushed the next day. In the belief that the Duma had too much to lose to put 
itself at risk, the moderates were only prepared to gamble on a certainty. 
By noon there was much clearer evidence that the position of the 
government was becoming intenable within the capital. Despite the arrests of 
the revolutionary leaders and the extreme caution of the remainder, the 
workers' movement continued under its own impetus ; only two ministers 
attended their desks this day ; at noon the Okhrana Headquarters ceased to 
function and was soon occupied by the mob ; shortly afterwards the Law 
Courts were set on fire. 
41 
Most significantly, army regiments started to 
commit themselves unreservedly to the insurgents : in the course of the 
night of 26/27 February the Volynsky regiment voted to mutiny against the 
government ; its example was followed over the morning of the twenty-seventh 
by the Litdvsky, Preobrazhensky and finally the Pavlovsky regiments. 
42 
When the 'unofficial sitting' began at 2.30 P. M. there could be no 
doubt that the stocks of the government in Petrograd were plummeting. The 
Duma itself was secure against any attempt to enforce the prorogation decree 
by military action : the selection of the Tauride Palace as the seat of the 
State Duma had been largely governed by the fact that the site was entirely 
surrounded by regimental barracks, a location designed to facilitate a 
military coup in 1906 which now worked to the Duma's advantage. 
43 
Just 
before the start of the sitting a company of the Preobrazhensky regiment 
arrived at the Tauride Palace to defend the Duma against the government, the 
first to offer their services to the Duma in the course of the Revolution* 
44 
The response of the Duma deputies to this development was distinctly dubious 
41 TROTSKY 138 & 143 ;B loe, I(29), January 1918, p. 175 ; Jones, Rus s in 
Revolution, pp. 107-11 & 124-5 ; PARES 444. 
42 KERENSKY 193 ; TROTSKY 143-4 ; MILIUKOV 390 ; PARES 442. 
43 TROTSKY 149. 
44 KERENSKY 196-7 ; Jones, Russia in Revolution, pp. 141-2. 
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few except the Extreme Left welcomed the self-appointment of a guard committ- 
-ed to Revolution and which expected the same of the leaders it came to 
defend. 
Following the Preobrazhensky regiment came a horde of insurgents whom 
the Duma dared not refuse and who rapidly occupied all but a few rooms of 
the Tauride Palace. 
45 
Chernov was later to note with satisfaction that the 
failure of the Duma to go to the Revolution had brought the Revolution to 
the Duma. 
46 
The close presence of their revolutionary guard and their 
equally revolutionary and uninvited guests assaulted the drawing-room 
sensitivities of the deputies almost beyond endurance. Shul'gin recalled 
the experienece with a shudder : 
I remember the moment when the blackish-grey sediment, pressing at the 
doors like a never-ceasing flood, drowned the Duma ... From the first 
moment of that inundation, repulsion filled my soul ... I felt helpless. Something dangerous, terrifying and abominable had been unleashed which 
threatened all of us alike. Even the old fighters in our midst shared in 
the common wave of fear then sweeping over us, as we sat huddled togethe 
in a vain attempt to draw courage and support from each other. (47) 
The invasion of the Duma quite literally brought home to the Dumadeputies 
the difficulty of maintaining a moderate line in a revolutionary context. 
However despite the growing revolutionary pressure, the Duma moderates 
still steered a cautious and legalistic course. Rodzyanko continued to fulfil I 
his constitutional role by informing the Emperor of developments and propoe- 
-ing political solutions. On the evening of the twenty-sixth, he sent a 
warning telegram : 
It is necessary that some person who enjoys the confidence of the 
country be entrusted at once with the formation of a new government. 
There must be no delay. Any procrastination is tantamount to death. I 
pray to God that at this hour the responsibility may not fall upon 
the monarch. (48) 
Just prior to the convening of the 'unofficial session' Rodzyanko again 
45 Izvestia, no. 1,27 February 1917 quoted in BROWIER 44-5 ; MILIUKOV 393 ; 
CHERMOV 77 ; SHUL'GIN 162-4. 
46 CHERNOV 78 ; Sukhanov made exactly the same remark : The Russian" 
Revolution 1917, P. 37" 
47 SHUL'(SIN 162-4 ; also CHERNOV 78 and TROTSKY 176. 
48 Izvestia, no. 1,27 Febraury 1917 quoted in BROWSER 40 ; Rodzyanko, 
TGosudarstvennaya Duma', pp. 40-1. 
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appealed to the Emperor 
The session of the State Duma has been suspended until April by Your 
Majesty's TJkaze. The last bulwark of order has been eliminated ... Order 
the immediate calling of a new government according to the principles 
reported by me to Your Majesty in my telegram of yesterday. Cancel 
Your Imperial Ukaze and oreder the reconvening of the legislative 
chambers. Make these measures known without delay through an Imperial 
manifesto. Sire, do not delay ... the hour which will decide the fate 
of Yourself and of the homeland has come. Tomorrow it may already be 
too late. (49) 
Unfortunately Rodzyanko's telegram arrived in the wake of two unduly 
optimistic ones from Alexandra and Belyayev, eliciting from Nicholas the now 
legendary remark that 'fat Rodzyanko has sent me some nonsense which I won't 
even bother to answer'. 
5° Notwithstanding the Emperor's scorn, it cannot be 
doubted either that Rodzyanko had a realistic grip on the crisis or that he 
performed his constitutional duty as Duma President as long as this was 
practicable. 
The balance of the 'unofficial sitting' on the afternoon of 27 February 
reflected the loyalist constitutional stand of Rodzyanko. Shul'gin noted 
that the 'invasion' of the Duma had the teffect of uniting the Duiwma groups : 
'even enemies of many years standing suddenly felt that there was something 
equally dangerous, ominous and repulsive to them all - the street mob'. 
Mansyrev witnessed the complete unpreparedness of the Duna membership for 
anything resembling 'revolutionary action' : 
There was complete confusion amongst the Duma deputies. Almost everybody 
had expected revolution but now that it had actually erupted, no-one 
was prepared for it, not even our Duma socialists ... Everyone felt 
complete unreadiness for any action and the total absence of any plan-51 
For just over an hour the future actions of the Duma were debated by almost 
all fractions. The Extreme Left reiterated its demand for the overthrow of 
tsarist government and declared itself prepared to accept an interim 
Constituent Assembly formed of the deputies from all four Dumas (in the 
calculation that the radical majorities of the first two Dumas were likely 
49 'Fevral'skaya Revolyutsia 1917 goda', HA, vo1.21, pp. 6-7 ; &RR. vi 1922,59 
; Jonea, Russia in Revolution, p. 130. 
50 PADENIE, v, 38(Frederiks) ; PAGES 443 ; TROTSKY 100. 
51 SHUL'GIN 158 ; Mansyrev, 'Moi Voaponinania', p. 264. 
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to cancel out the conservative majorities of the last two). 
52 
The most 
Right solution was oddly enough that submitted by the Left Kadet Nekrasov : 
power should be entrusted to a popular and firm commander like General 
Polivanov. This 'dictator scheme' not only angered the Left but found little 
support even amongst the moderate Right, who were hoping for a compromise 
plan which, while leaving all the political options open for the future, 
protected the Duma against possible government reprisals. 
53 Milyukov judged 
the feeling of the meeting accurately by proposing a course which combined 
ci3ýumspection and opportunism : 
I proposed to wait awhile until the character of the disturbances 
became clearer and in the meantime to create a temporary committee of 
Duma members "for restoring order and maintaining contact with various 
persons and organisations". This awkward formula had the advantage of 
meeting the problem of the moment without determining anything for the 
future. Limiting ikself to the minimum, it created a working body but 
did not lead the Duma members into criminal action. 
Despite the protests of the Extreme Left, Milyukov's'foranla was the only 
scheme with a sufficiently low common denominator of content to permit a 
clear majority. : the Council of Elders was instructed to elect the 
'Temporary Committee' at once. 
54 
By 4 p. m. the Council of Elders had come up with a full momberehip list 
for the Temporary Committee. There were no surprises : as Shul"gin remarked, 
, in essence it was the bureau of the Progressive Bloc with the addition of 
Kerensky and Chkheidze ; it was a broadening of the Bloc towards the Left'. 
55 
The party balance of the Committee was significamt : four Oktobriets 
(Rodzyanko, Dmitryukov, Shidlovsky and Engel'hardt), two Kadets (Milyukov and 
Nekrasov), two Progressists (Konovalov and Rzhevsky), one Progressive 
Nationalist (Shul'gin), one Centre (Vladimir L'vov), one Trudovik (Kerensky) 
52 SHUL'GIN 158 ; PARES 448-9 ; Volya R sia (Prague), 15 March 1921 quoted 
in BROWKER 45-7. 
53 Vol a Rossia, 15 March 1921 quoted in BROWKER 45 ; Mansyrev, 'Moi 
Vospominania', p. 266 ; Shidlovsky, 'Voapominania', p. 283. 
54 MILIUKOV 391 ; also CBERNOV 77 ; SHUL'GIN 158-9 ; Mansyrev, 'Moi 
Vospominania', pp. 266.7. 
55 SHUL'GIN 162. 
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and one Menshevik (Chkheidze). 
56 The essential non-revolutionary nature of 
the Committee was symbolised by the Oktobrist hegemony ; while the Committee 
invited representation from further Left than the strict Bloc confines, the 
weight of the Committee was at least as far Right as that of the Bloc. 
Moreover the Committee, headed in practice by Rodzyanko (as Oktobrist leader), 
took great care to deny the Committee any official Duma status. The moderate 
leaders were still living in the shadow of their defeat in autumn 1915 : too 
close identification between Bloc and Duma had on that occasion led to the 
Tsar's displeasure falling upon both. Such a double reprisal must be avoided 
in 1917 : should the worse come to the worst, the Temporary Committee would 
be represented as merely the unofficial executive of a private conference ; 
the Duma itself had to be protected, with the moral authority to disavow 
any actions of the Committee. 
57 
The careful circumspection of the Duma leaders on the morning and 
afternoon of 27 February disappointed and even angered many of the 
insurgents. Sukhanov expressed the misgivings of most of the revolutionary 
leaders about the r8le of the Duma moderates : 
Power had to go to the bourgeoisie, but was there any chance that they 
would take it ? What was the position of the propertied elements on this 
question ? Could they or would they march in step with the popular 
movement ? Would they, after calculating all the difficulties of their 
position, accept power from the hands of the revolution ? Or would they 
prefer to disassociate themselves from the revolution which had just 
begun and destroy the movement in alliance with the Tearist faction - 
Or would they finally decide to destroy the movement by their 
"neutrality" - by abandoning it to its own devices and mass impulses 
that would lead to anarchy ? (58) 
In the late afternoon of 27 February, it seemed that the latter course of 
'neutrality' was being favoured : the name of the Committee was of the most 
unexceptionable kind, suggestinb at most an information and liaison bureau ; 
both the Committee and the unofficial sitting which fathered it were 
meticulously distinguished from the Duma and Council of Elders in all. 
56 Izvestia, no. 2,28 February 1917 quoted in BROWSER 47 ; Milyukov, 'Fevral'ek 
-ie Dni', p. 175 ; Times, 16 March 1917(n/e), 7f ; PARES 449. 
57 CHERNOV 77 ; Bublikov, Ruea Revojyuteia. p. 18. 
58 Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution ý1917, p. 9. 
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offecial bulletins ; and the details of the Committee and its composition 
were deliberately withheld until almost midnight (by which time further 
events made mock of any vestigial cautiousness). 
59 
Yet even these superficially unremarkable developments needed the 
atmosphere of revolution which pervaded the Tauride Palace and, most 
particularly, the emergence of a rival authority - the Soviet. The decision 
to follow the pattern of 1905 and call a Petrograd Soviet had been taken at 
a meeting of Extreme Left leaders chaired by Chkheidze on the morning of 
25 February. 
6o 
The industrial proletariat of the Vyborg and Petrograd 
districts responded enthusiastically to the call to elect delegates, 
invading the Duma on the afternoon of the twenty-seventh to demand accommod- 
ation for the Soviet. At 3 p. m. the Duma reluctantly allocated Room 13 to 
the leaders of the insurgents, permitting the most unwelcome house-guest so 
far into the Tauride Palace. 
61 
The very existence of a clear rival for 
authority over the revolution operating inside the same building undoubtedly 
spurred the Temporary Committee on to greater activity and responsibility 
over the next twelve hours. Even as the Council of Elders elected the 
Temporary Committee they knew that the provisional Executive Committee-of 
the Soviet was conducting its founding session only just out of earshot. 
62 
The evening of 27 February saw the moderates painfully coming round to 
accepting the necessity of taking power. The most reluctant of all to take 
the crucial step, irritating even Shul'gin, was Rodzyanko, who spent the 
remaining hours of the day desperately searching for means of stabilising 
the worsening situation. 
63 
Rodzyanko relied heavily upon his alliance with 
Golitsyn to retain an element of order and legality. Both despatched 
telegrams to the Tsar describing the emergency and proposing almost identical 
solutions. It is unclear whether there was definite collusion but both were 
59 Izveat , no. 2,28 February 1917 quoted in BROWKER 47. 
60 KATKOV 359 ; Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution1917, pp. 15 & 39. 
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certainly motivated by very similar tactical convictions, Early in the 
evening of the twenty-seventh Rodzyanko again appealXed to the Tsar 
immediately to call upon a person in whom the whole country can have 
confidence and who would be charged to form a government having the confid- 
-ence of the whole population'. Almost simultaneously a telegram composed 
jointly by Golitsyn, Bark and Pokrovsky was despatched to the Empror asking 
him 'to dismiss us at once and nominate a person enjoying the confidence of 
the sovereign who will not arouse the mistrust of wide sectors of society'. 
64 
Rodzyanko and Golitsyn attempted without success to prevent an 
irrevocable break between the government and Duma. At about four in the 
afternoon of the twenty-seventh, Shcheglovitov was brought to the Tauride 
Palace by a group of insurgents, thereby posing Rodzyanko and the moderates 
a delicate political dilemma. Most were acutely embarrassed by the problem 
with which the revolution had confronted them. As Kerensky testified, 
constitutionalism still dominated the Duma moderates : 
The deputies were greatly distressed, and the moderates urged Rodzyanko 
to have him [Shcheglovitov - R. P. 
] released since, as the president of 
a legislative body, he enjoyed personal immunity ... I saw Rodzyanko 
greet him amiably and invite him into his office as a "guest". 
Kerensky seized the initiative and arrested Shcheglovitov in the name of the 
revolution, daring Rodzyanko to contradict him before the thronged hall, but 
'everyone fell back and Rodzianko and his friends, somewhat embarrassed, 
returned to their rooms'. 
65 
At a meeting of the Council of Ministers the same evening, Golitsyn 
made a last (and strictly an illegal) attempt to improve the image of the 
administration. Despite his msisgivings in usurping the prerogative of the 
Emperor to recruit and dismiss ministers, Golitsyn decided with Belyayev 
that the situation was so desperate that the only hope lay in political 
compromise and in particular the removal of Protopopov. Goliteyn confronted 
Protopopov with a demand for his resignation and the pathetic individual, 
64 ARR, iii, 1922,247 ; PAIXENIE, ii, 267(Golitsyn). 
65 KERENBKY 197-8 ; also SHIIL'GIN 170-1 ; Rodzyanko, 'Gosudarstvennaya Duma', 
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thoroughly cowed by the unanimity of hatred and distrust, acceded at once 
muttering 'now there is nothing left for me to do but shoot myself'. 
66 
Golitsyn assettPed that this 'sacrifice' must be followed by the collective 
resignation of the entire Council of Ministers and an appeal to the Empsror 
to create a Ministry of Confidence. 
67 
In so doing, Golitsyn was going far 
beyond his powers as Chairman of the Council. In acceding to outside 
pressure, preferring his own counsel to that of the Emperor, urging a 
renovated cabinet and then promoting the collective resignation of the 
present ministers, Golitsyn was himself making a revolutionary departure by 
invading the imperial prerogative. The fact of revolution drew a revolutionary, 
response even from the Tsar's own government. Golitsyn attempted to cover 
himself in part against accusations of lese-maiestä by persuading Rodzyanko 
to arrange for the attendance of the Grand Duke Mikhail at the meeting. 
Rodzyanko had asked the Grand Duke to come to Petrograd from Gatchina as 
early as the afternoon of 25 February in order that at least one representat- 
-ive of the ruling dynasty be on hand to act as a rallying-point for loyalist t! 
forces. 
68 
On arriving in Petrograd late on the afternoon of the twenty- 
seventh, the Grand Duke was conducted almost at once to the Mariineky Palace 
in order to lend Golitsyn greater courage and stature by his presence. It is 
doubtful whether Golitsyn would have gone so far in his actions had it not 
been for the attendance of one who was regarded in many eyes as the future 
Regent of the Empire. 
69 
Immediately following the Council of Ministers an equally historic 
meeting took place. The leaders of the government and the presidium of the 
Duma met together to appeal to the Grand Duke Mikhail to take the political 
and military initiative in the capital. In the words of Rodzyanko, 
The situation in the capital was reported in`detail to the Grand Duke, 
and it was suggested that the situation could still be saved - he should 
66 PADENIE, ii, 267-8(Golitsyn) ; MILIUKOV 388 ; PALEaLOGUE, III, 223-4. 
67 MILIUKOV 388. 
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assume on his own initiative the dictatorship of the city of Petr®grad, 
compel the personnel of the government to tender their resignations, 
and demand by telegraph, by direct wire from His Majesty the Emperor a 
manifesto regarding the formation of a responsible ministry. (70) 
By the time that Rodzyanko produced this account (1922), the embarrassment 
of admitting any cooperation or collusion between the 'forces of the 
Revolution' and the 'forces of Tsardom' had induced Rodzyanko deliberately 
to play down the combined nature of the meeting and the willingness of the 
ministers to accept dismissal. The rival testimony of Golitsyn before the 
Investigatory Commission of the Provisional Government in April 1917 was 
that 'both Rodzyanko and I beseeched Mikhail Aleksandovich to take the 
regency and immediately release us, that is the ministers'. 
71 Whatever the 
revisionism of subsequent accounts, it is clear that Rodzyanko and Golitsyn 
cooperated fully at the two crucial meetings of early evening of 27 February 
in a last minute attempt to save the situation. However this joint effort to 
pull a dynastic coup and channel the swelling revolutionary mood into defined 
political and constitutional ehannele concessions broke down over the 
indecision of the Grand Duke. Rearing to assume the enormous responsibility 
of usurping the authority of the Tsar, however locally and temporarily, 
Mikhail postponed his decision until he had contacted the Emperor over the 
telegraph. Following the account of Rodzyanko, 
The irresoluteness of the Grand Duke Mikhail Aleksandrovich contributed 
to a favdrable moment being lost. Instead of taking active measures and 
gathering around himself the units of the Petrograd garrison whose 
discipline was not yet shattered, the Grand Duke Mikhail started to 
negotiate by direct wire with the Emperor Nicholas II ; all his 
suggestions were completely rejected and thus, in this instance, the 
attempt of the State Duma failed. (72) 
While the other Duma moderates were screwing up their courage to make the 
crucial decision to seize power, Rodzyanko and Golitsyn intrigued to apply 
the brakes to the accelerating revolutionary movement by forcing political, 
concessions from the Emperor and instituting the local regency of the-Grand 
70 PADENIE, ii, 266(Golitayn) ; EERENSKY 214(Note) ; Rodzyanko, 'Goaudm atvenn- 
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Duke Mikhail. Even if the Tsar could not appreciate the political exigencies 
of the moment, the leaders of both government and Duma were prepared to 
compromise their oaths of loyalty to save the dynasty in spite of itself. 
Throughout the evening of the twenty-seventh effective power drained 
away from the government and militäy authorities, increasing the pressure on 
the Temporary Committee to take power. By 5 p. m. the symbol of Tsardom, the 
Winter Palace, had been occupied by the Pavlovsky regiment, leaving only two 
regiments - the Semyonovsky and Izmailovsky - still loyal to the government. 
At 7.35 p. m. Belyayev admitted the impotence of the local military authorit- 
ies by requesting immediate external reinforcements from the Emperor. 
73 By 
mid evening the remaining loyal troops commanded by Khabalov and Zankevich 
were be ged in the Admiralty building with numbers so small and morale so 
uncertain as to preclude any possibility of government regrouping and counter- 
attack. At about midnight Khabalov despatched a telegram to the Emperor 
belatedly confessing that he could not restore order. 
74 Its authority 
intimately linked with that of the military, the government was by late 
evening defeated and inoperative. Readily accepting the force of the military 
situation, Golitsyn and his cabinet resigned at about 11.30 p. m., dispersing 
within the hour without waiting to hear the Empror's response. 
75 As the 
Council of Ministers surrendered power and the Emperor refused to accept 
its resignation, local authority in Petrograd fell to whomsoever was willing 
to take it. The power vacuum could not be expected to last very long and, as 
Kerensky recalled, the insurgents naturally turned to the Duma for direction s 
From every direction people approached us for instructions and advice. 
The Provisional Committee which had only just been formed was compelled 
to act as an executive power. We were like the general staff of an army 
during war operations ... Hundreds of people wanted attention, gave 
advice and asked for work ... We had to keep our heads, for it would 
have been disastrous to waste precious time or to show any lack of self- 
confidence. We had to decide on the spot what answers to give, what 
orders to issue, when to encourage and when to discourage... (76) 
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From the moment that the insurgents invaded and occupied the Tauride Palace, 
the Duma leaders found themselves borne along by the pressure of events and 
gradually forced to adopt a strong and radical line in order to retain the 
allegiance of a revolution which threatened to sweep past and over them. 
Three factors finally compelled the Temporary Committee to take power. 
A joint meeting of the leaders of the Zemstvo and Town Unions, War Industry 
Committees and the Petrograd Municipal Duma in the early evening of the 
twenty-seventh unanimously 'welcomed the resolution of the State Duma not to 
disperse and its decision to take power into its own hands'. 
77 In fact, 
neither of these statements was true at that time. It is possible that the 
meeting of the public organisations was genuinely misinformed of the exact 
state of Duma affairs. It is true for example that the only news publication 
in the period was Izvestia, a hastily-improvised broadsheet run off by the 
enterprising Committee of Petrograd Journalists ; it is also true that the 
scrupulous distinction between the Duma and the new 'unofficial' bodies made 
by Rodzyanko in official communiques was blandly disregarded by both Izvestia 
and the vast majority of insurgents. 
78 But it is also likely that the 
leaders of the public organisations were convinced of the necessity for 
adding their weight to the revolutionary movement and deliberately issued a 
misleading and premature statement to stampede the Temporary Committee into 
assuming power. Whatever the intricacies of the meeting however, the commit- 
-went of the public organisations to revolution must have weighed heavily 
in the deliberations of the Temporary Committee. 
At the Stavka meanwhile, Nicholas was still uncertain of the gravity of 
the events in Petrograd. Whether the accusation that the Emperor's aide 
Voyeikov withheld Rodzyanko's warning telegrams is true or not, Nicholas had 
received reassuring telegrams from both Alexandra and Belyayev as late as 
noon on the twenty-seventh. 
79 The Emperor's unawareness of the extent of 
77 Izvestia, no. 3,1 March 1917 quoted in BROWKER 49. 
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the crisis had the effect of postponing a response until events had progress- 
ed too far for an 'unrevolutionary' solution. At a discussion between the 
Emperor and his advisers in the early evening of the twenty-seventh, 
Alekseyev counselled concession but Voyeikov countered that the disorders 
were being exaggerated by Rodzyanko for his own political ends and could be 
met by military action alone. Nicholas had been as influenced by the events 
of auf u'n 1915 as the moderate leaders, drawing the lesson that only firm 
action was required to dissolve a political crisis. By shortly afotet 9 p. m. 
Nicholas had decided to reject any notion of concession and to despatch 
General Ivanov to restore order in the capital. 
80 
By the time that the 
Grand Duke Mikhail contacted the Emperor at 10.30 p. m., the decision for 
repression was made and the Grand Duke was told none too courteously to keep 
out of high politics. Golitsyn's submission of the resignation of the 
Council of Ministers at 11.30 p. m. was answered at I a. m. the following day 
by a testy insistence on the rdtoration of order and the curt judgement that 
'changes in the composition of the ministers are inadmissible in these 
circumstances'. 
81 
The recalcitrance of the Emperor brought the schemes of 
Golitsyn and Rodzyanko to a impasse and confronted the Duma with the stark 
choice : either the people or the Tsar. 
As the Temporary Committee temporised in an agony of indecision, its 
patent rival was fast developing in stature. As Kerensky recalled, 
The formatiom of the Soviet earlier in the day was regarded as a 
critical event since there was now a danger that unless we formed a 
provisional government at once, the Soviet would declare itself the 
supreme authority of the Revolution. (82) 
From 9 p. m. ran the first plenary session of the Petrograd Soviet, a meeting 
which though both chaotic and unproductive thoroughly alarmed the Duma. Just 
as the simultaneous meeting of the Soviet Executive Committee and the Council 
79 Tyrkova-Williams, From Liberty+pp. 6-7 ; PADENIE, v, 38(Frederika) ; P4RES443. 
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of Elders spurred on the creation of the Temporary Committee, so the session 
pf the plenary Soviet in the evening forced the Committee through its next 
majov decision. To attempt to determine which factor was crucial in bringing 
the Committee to its decision may well be to miss the most funadamental 
point. Whether the pressure from the mob, the demands of the public organis- 
-ations, the recalcitrance of the Emperor or the rival authority of the 
Soviet finally triggered the crucial decision, the overall rationale for the 
action was cumulative. Different leaders ascribed varying degrees of 
importance to these factors. While Kerensky undoubtedly put the demands of 
the insurgents as of primary importance, Milyukov may well have seen the 
collapse of the existing government as sufficient justification for taking 
power. Shul'gin too persistently urged Rodzyanko 'Take power, the position 
is plain t If we don't, others will'. As the most cautious and conservative 
of the moderate leaders, Rodzyanko openly lamented : 
I do not wish to rebel. I am no insurgent. I did not make and do not 
wish to make a revolution. If it has been made, it is because people did 
not heed us. I am no revolutionary. I don't want to go against the 
Supreme Authority ... What shall I do ? Step aside ? Wash my hands of 
it 2 What shall I do ? (83) 
Rodzyanko waited for the result of the Grand Duke Mikhail's appeal before 
committing himself irrevocably. This failure crowned his other unsuccessful 
attempts to 'de-fuse' the crisis. With all constitutional and practical 
alternatives eliminated, Rodzyanko was compelled to follow his colleagues. 
Shortly before midnight Rodzyanko gave his assent to the Temporary 
Committee assuming power and the formation of a provisional government. In 
an attempt both to keep in check the flow of the revolution and retain power 
for himself and the Oktobrists, Rodzyanko priced his agreement as a promise 
that 'all members of the Committee unconditionally and blindly subordinate 
themselves to my command'. 8odzyanko's authority was still sufficient to gain 
the acquiescence of his colleagues (except Eerensky) to this stiff deaaud 
84 
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The newly-elected Soviet Executive Committee was now summoned. Just after 
midnight on 27/28 February, the rival executives produced a working agreement 
by which the Soviet agreed to subordinate itself to the leadership of the 
Temporary Committee : rather than provoke an early split in the forces of 
revolution, the Soviet administrator elected to run Petrograd, Mstislavsky 
agreed to concede to his Duma opposite nnber, Engel'hardt. 
85 
The Temporary 
Committee's decision to take power had come early enough to catch the Soviet 
before it realised its full authority and potential. Before the Committee 
broke up to allow its members some sleep at 2 a. m., it published the first 
carefully-worded announcement of its momentous decision : 
Under the difficult conditions of internal chaos brought on by the 
measures of the old regime, the Temporary Committtee of the State Duma 
has found itself compelled to take the responsibility for restoring 
national and public order. Conscious of the vast responsibility it has 
assumed by this decision, the Committee expresses its assurance that the 
population and the army will assist it in the difficult task of forming 
a new government that will correspond with the desires of the population 
and will be capable of commanding its confidence. (86) 
The Soviet followed the Committee's example and recessed in exhaustion 
some two hours later. 
Over the twenty-four hours following the decision to take power, the 
remaining vestiges of tsarist government disappeared entirely. From the early 
morning onwards, Engelhardt successfully masterminded the complex operation 
of establishing Committee authority throughout the capital. The tsarist 
government ceased operating, the Mariinsky Palace (thx seat of the govern- 
ment) was occupied, and the tsarist ministers either hid out or, anticipating 
a worse fate at the hands of the mob, surrendered to the Duma. 
87 
Milyukov, 
Rodzyanko and Kerensky formally greeted the suscessive regiments which 
trooped to the Duma to demonstrate their allegiance to the Revolution. 
88 
By 
2.30 p"m. General Zankevich, trapped with his dwindling body of loyal troops 
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in the Admiralty, recognised the impossibility of his position and telegraph- 
ed the Tsar that he was evacuating the Admiralty to return to barracks. 
With the withdrawal of the Izmailovsky (the last loyal regiment) at 4 p. m., 
the last redoubt of Tsardom in revolutionary Arograd was abandoned. 
89 
AS 
the authority of the government evaporated, that of the Duma and Soviet 
rushed to take its place ; by the evening of 28 February, the authority of 
the Temporary Committee in collaboration with the Soviet had entirely 
replaced that of the tsarist government. 
2. The formation of the Provisional Government (1-3 March 1917) 
28 February also witnessed the first attempts of the Tsar and the Duma 
moderates to come to terms. Having indignantly refused the collective 
resignation of a cabinet which (unknown to him) no longer existed, Nicholas 
was confirmed in his belief that strong action was necessary : in the early 
hours of the twenty-eighth, the Ivanov expedition was despatched. Nicholas 
too left the Stavka, though apparently motivated as much by anxiety about 
his children (all of whom were down with the measles) as by political 
considerations. At 5 a. m. the imperial train left Mogilev for Tearskoe Selo, 
thereby exposing its passenger to infinitely greater stress and danger than 
at the Stavka. 
9° 
A full thirty-eight hours were to elapse before the diverted 
train eventually came to rest at Pskov, a period throughout which the Tsar 
was almost completely incommunicado. At a time when crucial decisions had to 
be made, the Emperor was out of touch with developments in the capital and 
could neither learn of events nor effectively respond to them. He was 
dependent for news on what one tsarist apologist has termed Aleksepev's 
'deluge of tendacious [Biel and distotted information'. Nicholas saw little 
reason to hurry his decisions, unaware that while he 'was still reckoning in 
89 Izv estia, no. 3,1 March 1917 quoted in BROWKER 52 ; TROTSKY 156. 
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days and weeks, the revolution was keeping its count in minutes'. 
91 It was 
under these disorientating circumstances that the Emperor was called upon 
to make the most critical decision of his reign. 
By the evening of the twenty-eighth the Temporary Committee had digested 
the fact of the success of revolution within Petrograd and started to turn 
its attention to the country at lace and especially to the Emperor. Rodzyank 
was most eager to contact the Tsar in order to stabilise the situation before 
the revolution threatened the dyn"sty itself. Late that evening Rodzyanko 
telegraphed the Emperor to request a meeting at Bologoe or Dno the next 
day. 
92 
However Rodzyanko never kept his appointment. The Soviet both 
realised the large element of duress involved in the moderates' decision to 
take power and anticipated attempts at a 'deal' between the Temporary 
Committee and the Tsar. The 2 March editorial of the Bolshevik Izvestia 
clearly expressed this fear : 
The bourgeois parties that have currently joined the Temporary Committee 
of the State Duma are by no means burning with desire to consummate the 
revolution and to realise the complete triumph of democracy. The most 
attractive outcome for them would be a compromise with the old regime, 
the return to power of Nicholas II in the röle of "constitutional 
monarch". However the vitality and solidarity of revolutionary democracy 
have already compelled the bourgeoisie to take some steps beyond the 
limits of the position that the ruling class was unwilling to abandon. 
The Temporary Committee had to ... sanction the arrests of ministers 
and other agents of the old regime, and to establish a new power by 
revolutionary means. (93) 
The Left leade Chernov and Sukhanov claimed that Rodzyanko was prevented 
from travelling to meet the Tsar by the Soviet Executive Coa ittee : 
Rodzianko must not be allowed to see the Tsar. We still don't know the 
intentions of the leading groups of the bourgeoisie, the Progressive Bloc 
and the Duma Comaittee, and no-one can vouch for them ... If the Tsar hau 
any power on his side - which again we don't know - then the "revolution 
-ary" Duma which "stands for the people" will certainly side with the 
Tsar against the revolution... We must not create this possibility of the 
formation of a strong counter-revolutionary force - what the Tear would 
not be strong enough to do alone, he will easily be able to do with the 
help of the Duma and Rodzianko. (94) 
L 
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Shul'gin recalled a conversation with Rodzyanko which took place the evening 
of the same day (1 March) when the Duma President complained : 
This morning I was to have left for the Stavka to meet the Emperor to 
submit to His Majesty the only possible solution - abdication. But those 
scoundrels found out about it and just as I was about to set off told 
me the train would not be allowed to leave ... They said they would not 
let me go alone birt I must take Chkheidze ... who was to be accompanied 
by a battalion of "revolutionary soldiers". Who knows what outrages 
they would have committed there. (95) 
Thus at least three contemporary accounts indicate either that Rodzyanko was 
forcibly prevented from keeping his appointment or only permitted under 
circumstances which he considered unacceptable. 
Other commentators, notably George Katkov, contend that the restraint 
imposed by the Soviet was minimal and that Rodzyanko employed the Soviet as a 
convenient bugaboo to cover his reluctance to leave Petrograd. 
96 Certainly 
in his telegraph conversation with General Rusky in the small hours of 2 
March Rodzyanko advanced very different reasons for his non-appearance at 
Pskov 
I very much regret that I cannot come. I will tell you in all sincerity 
my two reasons for not coming : in the first place, the troops which 
you are sending to Petrograd have mutinied ... Secondly, I am told that 
my journey might have undesirable consequences. The unbridled passions 
of the popular masses must not be left without my personal control, 
because I am still the only one who is trusted and whose orders are 
carried out. (97) 
Katkov suggests that Rodzyanko was anxious that Rusky continued to believe in 
his authority over the Revolution, and not only were both reasons bogus but 
Rodzyanko knew them to be so. He does not however produce any evidence to 
refute the claim that the Soviet would have prevented Rodzyanko meeting the 
Emperor. Even so, Sukhanov admitted that the Soviet's decision against 
Rodzyanko's mission had been reversed by the intervention of Kerensky by 
midday ; although Rodzyanko might have been prevented leaving on the morning 
of 1 March, he was free to go by the afternoon. 
98 
It is probably fair to 
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suggest that while Rodzyanko did encounter resistance to his journey from 
the Soviet, his principal reason for not going was his concern for his 
authority over the revolutionary movement. If Rodzyanko had set out for Pskov 
on the morning of 1 March he would have missed the arrival of Prince Lvov 
(the projected new candidate for premier) the same afternoon and the meeting 
of the Temporary Committee to finalise the manifesto and composition of the 
Provisional Government scheduled for that evening. Rodzyanko must have been 
aware that his self-appointed role as 'dictator of the revolution' was 
universally resented and nowhere more than amongst his Duma colleagues. 
49 To 
abandon the capital at such a time, on no matter how important a mission, was 
to invite a coup in his absence. Rodzyanko, always acutely sensitive to his 
prestige and authority, simply did not dare to turn his back on political 
developments to spend days chasing the Emperor over the disorgaosed 
railways of north-western Russia. Nicholas had put himself at an enormous 
disadvantage by consigning his throne to a railway carriage ; Rodzyanko had 
no intention of making the same mistake. 
Unable to penetrate the Soviet control of the rail route to Petrograd, 
Nicholas decided not to return to Mogilev but to travel across country to the 
headquarters of the Northern Front at Pskov, which would serve as a convenient 
vantage-point from which to tackle the revolutionary capital. Nicholas 
finally reached Pskov and the welcome of the commander of the Northern Front 
General Rusky at about 7.30 p. m. on 1 March. Rusky knew more of the events 
in the capital than Nicholas : Rodzyanko had informed all army commanders 
through Alekseyev of the Duma take-over of power on the morning of the 
twenty-eighth and convinced the army High Command of the success of the 
revolution. 
100 Because of. the 'unavailability' of Rodzyanko, it now fell to 
the embarrassed Rusky to negotiate between the Revolution and the Tsar. 
Rusky was assured by both Alekse9ev and Rodzyanko that political concessions 
99 MILIÜKOV 394-6 ; also KATKOV 319-320,. 
100 SERENSKT 201-2 ; Lukomeky, Mem_ oirs pp"5"%--8 ; Ferro, La Revolution de 191?, 
Pp " 110 & 114-5 ; PARW 4,59 
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were essential in order to calm the revolutionary excesses which threatened 
the Russian war effort. He appears to have spent the better part of the 
evening of 1 March attempting to persuade Nicholas to make fundamental 
concessions, but without success. The turning-point in his campaign was the 
arrival at 10.20 p. m. of an urgent telegram from Alekseyev : 
The ever-increasing danger of anarchy spreading all over the country, 
of the further disintegration of the army, and the impossibility of 
continuing the war under present conditions urgently demand the 
immediate publication of an imperial act which could still have a 
calming effect, and this is possible only by calling a responsible 
ministry and by charging the President of the State Duma to form it. 
The news which reaches us gives us reason to hope that members of 
the Duma under the leadership of Rodzyanko are still in a position to 
stop the general disintegration and that it would be possible to wotk 
with them, but the loss of every hour reduces our last chance to 
preserve or restore order. (101) 
The message prompted an hour-lon9discussion with Rusky from which the pressed 
soldier-negotiator eventually emerged victorious. Nicholas was at first only 
prepared to concede a ministry of confidence but by stressing Alekseyev's 
initial remarks about the collapse of the war effort, Rusky was able to 
persuade Nicholas to grant a responsible ministry. 
102 
Shortly before 
midnight the Russian Autocrat agreed to surrender his authority over the 
executive of government in favour of a national assembly. At twenty minutes 
past midnight Nicholas indicated his surrender by telegraphing to Ivanov at 
Tearskoe Selo 'requesting you not to take any measures before my arrival and 
your report'. Neither arrival nor report was ever to materialise and the 
Ivanov expedition (which had arrived at Tsarskoe some three hours previously) 
was effectively called off from the moment that the telegram was received. 
At about. 2 a. m. on 2 March the Emperor signed the formal document granting 
Russia a legally-responsible constitution. 
103 
However the concession intended by Alekseyev and Rusky to satisfy the 
political needs of the moment conspicud'sly failed in its object. Rodzyanko 
101 ARR, iii, 253-4 ; also KERENSKY 212 and KATKOV 322-4. 
102 ARR, iii, 255-8 ; PADENI$, vi, 268(Guchkov) ; CHERNOQ 84 ; KERENSXT 2113. - 
103 KA, vol. 21, p. 153 ; XERENSKY 213 ; Ruses Vo a, no. 2,7 March 1917 quoted in BROWIER 102 ; Buihoeveden, The Life and Tragedy, p. 259. 
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had exploited his monopoly of communication to present a political impression 
to the army commandzrs which flattered his own importance but failed to 
reflect the true state of affairs. Alekseyev and Rusky believed that 
Rodzyanko could control the situation if armed with the necessary political 
weapons which they alone could secure. In faci the situation in Petrograd 
was fast outdistancing the cautious constitutionalism of Rodzyanko. The 
abdication of Nicholas had already secured almost universal agreement and the 
princip2ä issue was becoming the future of the monarchy as an institution. 
As the Emperor reached Pskov in the early evening of 1 March, the 
Temporary Committee was in session to complete its 'Manifesto of the 
Provisional Government'. However while the majority within the Temporary 
Committee proposed the removal of Nicholas as Emperor, it 'still took for 
granted that Grand Duke Michael would be Regent until the heir Alexis came 
of age'. 
104 The real argument started when, at about midnight, the Temporary 
Committee met the Soviet Executive Committee to discuss joint signature of 
the Manifesto. Controversy centred on the question of the form of future 
government. The Soviet was overwhelmingly republican in sentiment, the 
Temporary Committee largely monarchist. The furthest the Soviet was prepared 
to go to oblige the Duna was the formula 'the Provisional Government must not 
take any steps to predetermine the future form of government', but Milyukov 
stoutly defended 'the Romanov monarchy and dynasty, with Alexis as Tsar and 
Michael as Regent'. Exhausted from lack of sleep, Milyukov only succeeded in 
damaging his case in the eyes of the Soviet : 
He [Milyukov - R. P. 
] made some "liberal advances" to us, pointing out 
that the Romanove could no longer be dangerous now and that Nicholas was 
unacceptable to him too and must be removed. He naively tried to convince 
us of the acceptability to the democracy of his arrangement, saying of 
his candidates that "one was a sick child, the other a thoroughly 
stupid man". 
Long hours of desultory debate eventually produced an interim formula which 
was only tolerated because it was by now 4 a. m. and the wording was equally 
104 KERENSKY 206. 
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disagreeable to both sides. The first major confrontation over the future of 
the monarchy produced a tired stalemate. 
105 
Although arriving too late for the meeting, Guchkov was acutely disturb- 
ed by colleagues'accounts of the argument and the accelerating trend towards 
republicanism which prompted it. After conferring with Rodzyanko, Milyukov 
and Shul'gin about ways of saving the situation, Guchkov concluded that only 
swift and decisive action could forestall disaster : 
In this chaos we must above all think of saving the monarchy. Without 
the monarchy Russia cannot live. But evidently the present Emperor must 
not reign any longer ... If that is so, how can we calmly and indiffer- 
-ently await the moment when the revolutionary rabble destroys the 
monarchy ? This will inevitably happen if we let the initiative slip 
from our hands ... Therefore we must act swiftly and secretly, without 
asking, without taking advice ... we must confront them with an 
accomplished fact. We must give Russia a new monarch. (106) 
Since Rodzyanko had failed to make the journey to Pskov, Guchkov judged his 
own mission as the only way of preventing a complete slide into revolutionary 
chaos. Indeed if Guchkov had his way, the revolutionary aspect of recent 
events could be effectively camouflaged : 
I knew that if he abdicated into our hands, there would be, so to speak, 
no revolution. The Emperor would abdicate of his own free will, power 
would pass to a Regent, who would appoint a new government. The Imperial 
Duma, which had submitted to the ukaze of dissolution and had taken 
power only because the old ministers had fled, would transfer power to 
the new government. Juridically-speaking, there would be no revolution. 
Aside from general political considerations, the personal side of Guchkov's 
action cannot be ignored. An element of personal vindictiveness was probably 
present, for of all political leaders Guchkov had suffered most at the hands 
of the Emperor and Empress. There may also have been a personal need for a 
dramatic röle in the history of these events : Guchkov had played the lead in 
the forestalled palace revolution ; was he now to be relegated to spear- 
carrying in the actual revolution ? Guchkov could also leave the capital 
secure in the knowledge that the composition of the Provisional Government 
105 Quotation : Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution 11 , pp. 121-2 (for the whole meeting pp. 116-126) ; also MILIIIK09 2-4 and SHUIL'GIN 228-236. 
106 Quotation : SHULºGIN 239-240 (whole meeting pp. 237-210) ; also PADENIE, 
vi, 262-3(Guchkov), MILIUKOV 405 and CBERN09 83- 
107 Curiously, Chernov claims these words for Guchkov (CHERN09 83) and Shul'gin claims them for himself (SRULIGIN 241). 
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was finalised and, come what may, he would be Minister of War. He had every- 
-thing to gain by his dramatic mission to Pskov and, unlike Rodzyanko the 
previous day, nothing to lose. With Shul'gin (who volunteered to accompany 
him), Guchkov slipped secretly away from Petrograd - so secretly indeed that 
there are the widest discrepancies about the time of his departure, 
1o8 
Neither knew that very early that morning the Emperor had signed a constitut- 
-ion and rendered a revolution inevitable even in law. 
On that same morning of 2 March, shortly tiefere after Nicholas signed 
the manifesto, a telegraph conversation took place between Rusky and Rodzyanko 
After expressing the surprise of both the Emperor and himself that Rodzyanko 
had been unable to come to Pskov, Rusky reported his recent success : 
From the conversations which His Majesty had with me today, I found out 
that His Majesty the Emperor wanted at first to suggest that you should 
form a cabinet responsible to His Majesty, but later on, when I took 
leave of him, His Majesty, meeting the general desire of the legislative 
bodies and of the people, expressed his final decision, and has 
authorised me to inform you that he has decided to grant a Ministry 
responsible before the legislative bodies, charging you with the 
formation of the cabinet. 
Though welcoming the Emperor8s conciliatory attitude, Rodzyanko realised that 
events in Petrograd had passed the point at which such a concession could 
stem the revolution. Having come straight from witnessing the fierce 
republicanism of the Soviet Executive Committee, Rodzyanko replied 'with 
an aching heart' : 
The hatred towards the dynasty has reached extreme limits, but all the 
people ... have firmly decided to continue the war until its victorious 
end ... Everywhere the troops have passed to the side of the Duma and of 
the people, and the threatening demands for abdication in favour of the 
son, under the regency of Michael Alexandrovitch, have become a very 
definite demand ... Unfortunately the manifesto has come too late. It 
should have been published immediately after my first telegram, as Is 
as]sed His Majesty the Emperor to do. Time has been lost and there is no, 
return to the past. (109) 
Although Rodzyanko went no further than indicating the demand for abdication, 
this conversation triggered off the calinaign to secure abdication by the 
Army High Command. 
108 A selection of departure times :5a. m. (SHUL'GIN 240-3 and PARES 464), 2.57 p. m. (XATKDv 336-7), 3. p. a. (MIV 408), 4 p. 2. ( N5xY 209). 
log ARR, iii, 255-8 ; also CSSENOV 81-2 & 84-5 ; u2Kav 327-330. 
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By mid morning Alekseyev had received details of the conversation from 
Rusky and decided to effect the abdication. Alekseyev's Quartermaster-General 
Danilov telegraphed to Luhomsky, Chief of Stalf to Rusky, the sentiments of 
his superior : 'I ask you to report on my behalf to General Rusky my deep 
conviction that there is no choice and that abdication should take place ... 
it is very painful for me to say but there is no other solution'. At 10.15 
a. m. Alekseyev issued a circularr to all front commanders : 
Now the dynastic question has been put point-blank, the war may be 
continued until its victorious end only provided the demands regarding 
the abdication from the throne in favour of the son and under the 
regency of th Michael Alexandrovitch are satisfied. Apparently the 
situation does not permit another solution and each minute of further 
hesitation would only increase the claims ... It is necessary to save 
the active army from disintegration, to continue to fight against the 
external enemy until the end, to save the independence of Russia and the 
fate of the dynasty. It is necessary to put this in the foreground even 
at the price of expensive concessions. If you share my views, then 
kindly telegraph through the Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Front 
your petition as faithful subjects to His Majesty, advising me of it. (11 
Most of the replies had reached Alekseyev by shortly after noon. Apart from 
General Sakharov, who only supported abdication once he saw that his 
colleagues had done so, the appeal of 'war necessity' brought an immediate 
and favourable response from all commanders (including the Grand Duke 
Nikolai). At 2.30 p. m. Alekseyev concluded the collection of telegrams to 
Pskov with his own personal appeal to the Emperor : 
I implore you to immediately make the decision which the Almighty will 
dictate to you ;a delay threatens Russia with disaster ... Participation] 
by the army in matters of internal policy would mean the inevitable and 
of the war, Russia's shame and her disintegration. Your Imperial Majesty,, 
loves Russia dearly and for the sake of her integrity, of her independ- 
ence and for the sake of victory you must deign to make a decinion. (111), 
The campaign for abdication brought an unexpectedly easy victory : 
within half an hour of receiving the Alekseyev telegram Nicholas had agreed 
to abdicate. 
112 The reasons for the Emperor'rs ready acquiescence were 
overwhelmingly personal. Alone in Pskov after a nightmare two-day train 
journey, he felt - and to a lesser extent actually was - isolated from his 
110 ARR, iii, pp. 258-9(Danilov telegram) & 239-262(Alekeeyev circular). -- 
111 ibid, pp. 261-4(quotation pp. 261-2) ; also quoted in BROW ER 95-7- 
112 Rusak"a Ilya, no. 2,7 March 1917 quoted in BROWKER 103 ; also KERENSU 213, SHUL'GIN 281-2 and KATKOV 333" 
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resoüces, including his autocratic inspiration the Empress. Nicholas's 
fortuitous visit to Pskov impressed upon him the overwhelming importance of 
the military both to the Russian war effort and his own immediate future. 
His over-reliance on Alekseyev had become proverbial and proved a most 
significant factor in both the granting of responsible government and the 
abdication itself. Explanations for the abdication stressing external 
pressures fail to satisfy. The Soviet histor . 
`m Ganelin claims that 'the 
principal reason for the decison of the Tsar to abdicate was the complete 
collapse of the punitive expedition of General Ivanov' yet Nicholsa himself 
called off the expedition at a time when its failure of morale was still 
unknown to him. Chernov believed that Nicholas abdicated because he was 
'hustled' into it by the concerted campaign of his generals and 'was unable 
to withstand this cross-fire' but while this interpretation must have some 
weight it ignores the personaiity of Nicholas. 
113 Nicholas seemed to find 
abdication infinitely easier than granting a constitution ; shortly before 
the arrival of the generals' telegrams, he confided to Rusky that on mature 
consideration he was now inclined to abdicate rather than surrender the 
principle of autocracy. By abdicating Nicholas may have hoped to wipe out the 
constitutional concessions of his reign and bequeath an uncompromised 
autocracy to the next-in-line of the Romanov dynasty. Personal self-sacrifice 
was always attractive to Nicholas, a man of limited gifts drawn to the idea 
of martyrdom for a cause. Although his strict sense of conscience and duty 
prevented him ever seeking abdication, Nicholas could concede that abdication 
provided a political and personal escape. Politically, it favoured the 
dynasty, the monarchy and possible even a return to autocracy ; at the 
personal level, Nicholas could rid himself of the burden of supreme office 
with a light heart and devote himself to the placid uncomplicated existence 
that he had always craved. 
114 
113 R. Sh. Ganelin, Okt abrsk e Voo zhenno Vosat e: Semnadtsat God v 
Petrograde, heningrad 1967,2 vols, I, 9 ; CHERNOY 86. 
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When the generals' telegrams arrived, Nicholas had already made up his 
mind. In the absence of Rodzyanko or other Duma envoy, Nicholas authorised 
Rusky to transmit telegrams of abdication to the Stavka and the capital ; 
but precisely at this moment Rusky heard from Rodzyanko that Guchkov and 
Shul'gin were on their way to Pskov. 
115 During the seven-hout wait for the 
" delegates' train to arrive, Nicholas considered not so much the inevitability 
or otherwise of abdication as the future of the dynasty. At 3 p. m. he 
consulted the imperial physician Dr Fedorov about the health of the Tearevich 
and brooded on his pessimistic diagnosis for the rest of the day. By the 
time that Guchkov and Shul'gin arrived at 10 p. m., Nicholas had decided to 
abdicate in favour of the Grand Duke Mikhail rather than inflict the crown 
upon his twelve-year old invalid son. 
116 
Guchkov had come prepared for a long and acrimonious debate and launched 
into his set speech despite the embarrassment of his audience and (unknown to 
him) the willingness of the Tsar to agree to abdication. Shul'gin in 
retrospect claimed to detect in the Tsar's manner the sentiment thet 'this 
long speech is quite superfluous'. Determined to play his part to the full 
and unaware that he was breaking down an open door, Guchkov tentatively 
approached the subject of abdication just as Rusky, arriving late at the 
meeting, told Shul'gin that the matter had already been decided. After 
listening to Guchkov's unnecessary peroration with only minor signs of 
impatience, Nicholas delivered his bombshell : 'I have made the decision to 
abdicate from the throne ; until three o'clock today I had thought to 
abdicate in favour of my son Aleksei but now I have changed my mind in favour 
of my bother Mikhail'. 
117 The Duma emissaries' amazement on discovering the 
Emperor's compliant attitude reflected the speed at which events were moving. 
When they left Petrograd not only had the Tsar not been approached over 
115 Russk5Za Volva, no. 2,7 March 1917 quoted in BROWKER 103 ; PADENIE, vi, 263 (Guchkov) ; SHUL'GIN 282 ; Sukkanov, The Russian Revolution, pp"158-9" 
116 Russkaya Volya, no. 2,7 March 1917 quoted in BROWSER 103 ; Gilliard, Thirteen Years, pp"195-6 ; PA, AENIE, v3,275(Guchkov) ; SHUL'GIN 282. 
117 SHUL'GIN 266-9(quotations 268 & 269) ; also PADENIE, vi, 263-3(Gnchkov). 
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abdication but even the news of his granting a constitution had barely 
reached the capital. 
Taken aback by the amenability of the Tsar, Guchkov and Shul'gin 
overlooked various implications of the decision, most notable that Nicholas's 
abdicating for his son clearly contravened the Succession Law of 1797.118 
However, hardly able to believe their good fortune, they set out to secure 
the best possible terms for both parties. The 'deal' which the Soviet feared 
that Rodzyanko would make with the Tear was effected by Guchkov and Shul'gin. 
Lenin was to declare that, 
The handful of landowners and capitalists, with Guchkov and Milyukov at 
their head, wanted to deceive the will and ambitions of the vast majority' 
and to conclude a bargain with the declining monarchy in order to 
support and save it. (119) 
Although Lenin may have pitched his conspiracy theory a little high, it is 
clear that the Emperor and the leaders of the Right moderates negotiated in 
order to preserve, or at least lend the advantage to, a traditional system 
of government which both sides supported in the face of revolution. 
An abdication document was formally signed by the Tsar ; this satisfied 
the delegates, who were opposed only to Nicholas's tenancy of the throne and 
vigorously supported both monarchy and Romanov dynasty. 
120 
The constitution- 
-al terms in the abdication document were deliberately ambiguous, with no 
explicit reference to the establishment of government responsible to a 
national assembly. The nearest the document came to determining the future 
government of Russia was the sentence : 
We bequeath it to our brother to direct the forces of the state in full 
and inviolable union with the representatives of the people in the 
legislative institutions on the basis of principles which will be 
established by them. (121) 
Guchkov and Shul'gin were concerned now, with characteristic meticulousness, 
to concoct an unchallengable juridical link between the government of 
118 J. D. Bergamini, The Tragic Dynasty a history of the Romanofe, London 1970, p"i49 ; Bublikor, Rusakava Bevoiyutsia p. 27. 
119 Lenin, CollecteflWorke, vol. 23, P. 310. 
120 SHÜL'GIN 269-276 ; also PADEdIE, vi, 265(Quahk©v). 
121 SHIIL'GIN 214 ; Sobranie Ukazeni , X, i 344 !,,, quoted 
in BROWKER 144. 
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Nicholas II and the new Provisional Givernment. As agreed just prior to their 
departure from Petrograd, Lvov was to be the premier of the Provisional 
Goverhment, a rather welcome surprise to Nicholas who (like his generals) had 
always thought in terms of Rodzyanko ; the Grand Duke Nikolai was to be 
restored as Commander-in-Chief. At the behest of Guchkov and Shul'gin, 
Nicholoas signed documents to this effect, thereby bolstering the legal fict- 
ion that the Provisional Government was the direct heir and sole beneficiary 
of the Tsarist government. The documents were back-dated to 3 p. m. the same 
day, well before the arrival of the Duma delegates, to forestall aný 
accusation of duress. 
122 
About 2 a. m. on 3 March Guchkov and Shul'fin began the 160-mile rail 
trip back to Petrograd, leaving the Emperor alone in his despair to return 
to the Stavka later the same day. 
123 Flushed by self-congratulation after 
their easy victory, they were confident that the document they read and waved 
at every stopping-place en route was the political blueprint for the future 
124 
They were not to know that events in Petrograd had moved so fast in their 
absence that the carefully-worded moderate docent with which they returned 
already stood no chance of acceptance. On the previous afternoon (2 March), 
Milyukov had typically and perhaps unnecessarily decided to announce the as- 
yet unpublished Manifesto of the Provisional Government to the crowds still 
thronging the Tauride Palace. His remarks on the collapse of teardom, though 
less than trythful about the Duma role, were greeted rapturously : 
This happened because no other government in history has been known to 
equal this one in its stupidity, dishonesty, cowardice or treachery. 
The presently overthrown government, having disgraced itself, deprived 
itself of the roots of sympathy and respect which are the ties of any 
reasonably strong government with its people. We overthrew this govern- 
-ment quickly and with ease. (125) 
Even the details of the composition of an overwhelmingly moderate Provisional 
Government (which will be considered below) received a fair measure of 
122 SHUL'GIN 276-7 ; PADENIE, vi, 265,270-1 & 275-7(Guchkov) ; Rodzyanko, 
'Gosudarstvennaya Duma', p. 48 ; CHERNOV 96. 
123 SHUL'GIN 282-3 ; ICA, vol. 20, p. 137 (Dnevnik Nikolaya II). 
124 SHUL'GIN 279 & 283-4 ; also CHLRNOV 88-9. 
125 Izve tia, no. 6,2 March 1917 quoted in BROWKER 129. 
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of approval. Milyukov attempted to leave the matter there but was prevented 
from withdrawing by loud challenges on the future of the Romanov dynasty, 
the issue which by now dominated the discussions of both Provisional 
Government and Soviet. M]gi'yukov had no alternative but to broach this most 
explosive of issues : 
You ask about the dynasty. I know beforehand that my answer will not 
satisfy all of you, but I will tell it to you. The old despot who brought 
Russia to the brink of ruin will either voluntarily renounce the throne 
or be deposed. (Applause) The power will be transferred to the regent, 
the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovitch. (Prolonged bursts of indignation, 
exclamations of "Long live the republic" and "Down with the Dynasty" ; 
weak applause, drowned by fresh bursts of indignation) The heir will be 
Alexei. (Cries of "This is the old dynasty") Yes, ladies and gentlemen, 
this is the old dynasty, which perhaps you don't like and which perhaps I 
don't like either. But who we like is beside the point right now. We 
cannot leave unanswered and undecided the question concerning the form 
of government. We can visualise it as a parliamentary, constitutional 
monarchy. (126) 
Popular antagonism towards the monarchy was rendering the policy of the 
moderates more and more difficult, not to mention dangerous to their leader- 
-ship. The furore of criticism aroused by Milyukov's speech dominated the 
remainder of 2 March. 
127 
Milyukov was caught in a dilemma : either to defend the Romanov monarchy 
and risk the revolution turning against its moderate 'leadership' or to 
follow the prevalent trend by condemning the monarchy and risk the dangers 
of a country without formal or legal authority. Milyukov was relying upon 
Guchkov to secure a detente with the Tsar which could be presented to the 
Revolution as an acceptable fait accompli. The announcement of Guchkov as 
Minister of War that afternoon provoked noisy complaint from the mob but 
elicited a most interesting defence from Milyukov : 
A. I. Guchkov was my political enemy throughout the life of the Duma but 
now we are political friends. I am an old professor accustomed to 
reading lectures but Guchkov is a man of action. At this moment, while I speak to you in this hall, Guchkov is on the streets of the capital 
organising our victory. (128) 
Guchkov was indeed taking action though, as Milyukov knew, in Pskov not 
126 Izvest a, no. 6,2 March 1917 quoted in BROWKER 132 ; also Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution, pp. 144-7, CHERNOY 89-90 and MILIIXOV 407. 
127 Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution, pp. 147-8. 
128 Ibid, p. 145 ; Izvestia, no. 6,2 March 1917 quoted in BROWKER 131. 
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Petrograd. The exigencies of the revolutionary situation forced Milyukon and 
Guchkov into the same camp, with Guchkov negotiating in the field while 
Milyukov covered for him in the capital. 
For the remainder of 2 March Milyukov hedged his principles as he waited 
for news from Pskov. At a joint meeting of the Temporary Committee and Soviet 
Executive Committee that evening Sukhanov pointed out that, 
Nothing would come of Miliukov's stubbornness and his attempts to thrust 
the Romanovs upon us ... would not help the monarchist cause but at best 
destroy the prestige of his own cabinet ... We pointed out that it was 
the position that he Miliukov occupied as 1. der of the whole right wing 
that exacerbated not only the question itself but the general situation. 
Milyukov weaky put up little resistance to the Soviet : 
Miliukov listened and seemed to acknowledge that we were right. He too 
had experienced the day's events ... but however risky this gamble on 
the monarchy may have been, it was still indispensable to Miliukov and 
Guchkov :a gamble on the monarchy was still less risky than a gamble 
on bourgeois statesmanship without the monarchy. 
In the face of a Soviet argument that the Constituent Assembly would in any 
case abolish the monarchy, Milyukov could only stoically argue that 'the 
Constituent Assembly may decide as it pleases ; if it pronounces against the 
monarchy, then I shall be able to go, but at the moment I cannot'. 
129 Later 
in the evening, Milyukov experienced a more distasteful encounter with the 
anti-monarchism of the insurgents : 
I saw Rodzianko trotting towards me accompanied by a handful of officers 
smelling of liquor. In a halting voice he repeated their words, that after 
my statements about the dynasty they could not return to their soldiers. 
They demanded that I take back my words. Of course I could not take them 
back, but seeing the behaviour of Rodzianko, who knew very well that I had 
spoken not only in my own name but in the name of the bloc, I agreed to 
announce that I was expressing my own personal opinion. (130) 
The mood was moving so irrevocably against the retention of the Romanovs that 
, in the words of 
Chernov, 'the majority of the Progressive Bloc felt that 
the only thing left was to beat an orderly retreat'. 
131 
The early hours of 3 March were spent awaiting word from Pskov, with all 
129 Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution, p. 153(all three quotations). 
130 MilIU10V 407-8 ; also Izventia, ao. 7,3 March 1917 quoted in BROWRER 133, 
CHERNOV 90 and Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution, p. 146. 
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leaders suspending political discussion until definite news became known. 
At about 2.20 a. m. a telegram from Guchkov and Shul'gin reached the Tauride 
Palace. 132 The Duma leaders hurriedly met to discuss the implications of 
the abdication terms over the next two hours. All but Milyukov accepted, 
however reluctantly, that the revolution had passed by the Grand Duke Mikhail. 
Even Rodzyanko was convinced that Mikhail could not become Tsar. With this 
rather surprising defection and the temporary absence of the leaders of the 
Bloc Right, Milyukov found himself having to plead the cause of monarchy 
alone. 
133 With all his dislike of Rodzyanko, Milyukov had evidently not 
expected him to desert the royalist banner. He had now to uphold the monarchy 
alone and as best he could until his Right moderate colleagues arrived back 
later in the morning. At about 5 a. m. as the discussion drew to an exhausted 
close, Rodzyanko contacted General Rusky to ask him to hold the publication 
of the abdication manifesto until the political situation became clearer : 
It is with great difficulty that we managed to retain the revolutionary 
movement within more or less tolerable limits, but the situation is as 
yet far from settled and a civil war is quite possible. Perhaps they 
would reconcile themselves to the regency of the Grand Duke and the 
accession of the heir Tsarevitch, but his accession as Emperor would be 
completely unacceptable ... We would lose from our hands all authority 
and no-one would remain to appease the popular unrest. 
Although Rodzyanko insisted that 'the return of the dynasty in not excluded', 
the decisions of the next few hours were in fact to determine the future of 
the Russian monarchy. 
134 
The most expedient way for the moderates to solve the problem was to 
induce the man at the centre of the controversy, Grand Duke Mikhail, to 
decide not in their favour but in their interests. If Mikhail were to accept 
the crown, the moderate*ould be compelled either to follow him into political 
oblivion or to abandon their proclaimed principles in the interests of self- 
preservation. If however Mikhail refused the crown, the moderates could 
convince their consciences that they had been ready to back their principles 
132 SA vo1.22, pp. 15-16 ; MtLTUSAV. 409. 
133 KERENSSY 211 & 214 ; M3lyukov, e qr- La Vtoroy Rayol3ruteü, PP-'45-6. 
134 ARR, iii, pp. 266-8 ; also CHERNOV 92-4. 
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but were let down by their candidate. Everything depended on the attitude of 
the Grand Duke. At 6 a. m. Kerensky phoned 4e Mikhail to arrange a meeting 
for eleven o'clock the same morning. 
135 All the moderates except Milyukov 
agreed to press for the refusal of the Grand Duke and elected Rodzyanko and 
Prince Lvov as spokesmen for the meeting. This transparent attempt to 
muzzle Milyukov and present the majority viewpoint'as unanimous was caustic- 
-ally challenged by Milyukov, a past master at just such tactics. The device 
of electing two majority spokemen was rejected in favour of allowing the 
spokesmen for the two extremes to debate before the Grand Duke ; 'having 
made it clear that none of us would keep silent, we agreed that only two 
opinions would be expressed at the meeting, Kerensky's and mine - and then 
we would leave the choice up to the Grand Duke. 9136 
The members of the future Provisional Government began to assemble at 
the temporary residence of the Grand Duke Mikhail an the Millionaya at about 
10 o'clock. The first to arrive were those advocating Mikhail's refusal of 
the crown, Kerensky, Lvov and Rodzyanko, who may have hoped to steal a 
march on Milyukov by forcing the crucial decision from the Grand Duke before 
Milyukov's reinforcements arrived. 
137 Guchkov and Shul'gin in fact arrived 
back in Petrograd at just this time, blissfully unaware of the radical 
change in attitude towards the monarchy in their absence. Although Milyukov 
managed to warn Shul'gin by telephone of the mood of the revolution, Guchkov 
grandly announced the accession of Tsar Mikhail to the station workers and 
was only rescued from the angry mob with difficulty. 
138 Milyukov's policy 
at the meeting with the Grand Duke was therefore to ensure that the proceed- 
-ings lasted long enough for Guchkov and Shul'gin to cross twown from the 
Warsaw station to support his proposals. 
135 KERENSKY 215. 
136 MILIUKOV 410(quotation) ; KERENSKY 215 ; Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution 
p. 175 ; also Piotrow, Pau l Milyukoy, p. 351. 
137 Vozrozhdenie, vol. 24(1952), pp. 141-5. 
138 MILIUKOV 410 ; CHERN©V 89 ; SHUL'GIN 284-293 ; Bublikov, Russkgya 
Revolyutsia, pp. 27-8. 
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As arranged, Kerensky initiated the debate. Milyukov rose to counter 
the majority view, winning his protagonist's reluctant admiration : 
Speaking at great length and with all the force of personal convicfion, 
he tried to prove to the Grand Duke that he should accept the throne. 
Miliukov was stalling for time - to the obvious embarrassment of the 
Grand Duke - in the hope that Guchkov and Shul'gin who held similar 
views would return from Pskov in time to support him. (139) 
While the accusation of stalling for time was of course justified, Milyukov 
was in all likelihood genuinely carried away by the dread that the Grand 
Duke would be forced into a tragic error : 
I showed that in order to strengthen the new order, a strong governmental 
authority was needed and that it can be strong only when it relies on 
the symbol of authority to which the masses are accustomed. The monarchy 
serves as just such a symbol. The Provisional Government by itself, 
without the support of this symbol, will simply not survive until the 
opening of the Constituent Assembly. It will turn out to be a fragile 
boat which will sink in the ocean of mass disturbances. The country 
will be threatened by the loss of all sense of state organisation and 
by complete anarchy. (140) 
It was with enormous relief that Milyukov greeted the arrival of Guchkov and 
Shul'gin at the very end of his speech. The presence of equal support for and 
against Mikhail's acceptance of the crown now threw the meeting completely 
open and 'in spite of our agreement, a whole torrent of speeches poured 
forth'. 
141 
However Milyukov's relief at the arrival of his reinforcements was to 
prove misplaced. Guchkov and Shul'gin had been profoundly shocked by the 
abrupt change in the atmosphere of Petrograd and though their political 
philosophies bound them to the chariot-wheels of monarchy, they were starting 
to feel that the monarchy, however desirable, simply could not survive in 
the present revolutionary climate. Although they did not go so far as 
Rodzyanko in denying the feasibility of Romanov monarchy, Guchkov and Shul'gir 
were suffering a profound crisis of confidence. When he finally brought 
himself to express an opinion, Guchkov conceded the impossibility of Mikhail 
as Tsar (though suggesting that his Regency, as originally envisaged, might 
139 LERExsKY 215-6. 
140 MILIuxOV 411 ; also Milyukov, 'Fevral'skis Dni', p. 187. 
141 MILIiJSOV 411 ; KERENSKY 216 ; sBUL'GIN 296 ; PADENIE, vi, 266-7(Guchkov). 
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still be feasible). 
1f2 Milyukov's bearing switched from guarded confidence 
to near-despair as he realised that the support for which he had waited was 
proving unexpectedly feeble. Startled that Shul'gin should remain silent and 
Guchkov lend his support so 'weakly and lifelessly', Milyukov insisted on 
answering the arguments of his opponents in detail. 
143 Shul'gin wrote of him: 
Milyukov seemed unwilling or unable or afraid to stop talking. This man, 
usually so polite and self-restrained, would not let anybody else speak, 
interrupted thise who tried to answer him, cut off Rodzyanko, Kerensky, 
everyone ... Whiie as a sheet, his face bluish-grey from lack of sleep, 
completely hoarse from making speeches in barracks and at street 
meetings, he croaked and wheezed. (144) 
After some two hours of debate, during which the Grand Duke made no 
comment, the speeches stuttered to a halt. Mikhail begged leave to think 
alone for a few minutes but then asked permission for Rodzyanko to accompany 
him. It was natural that Mikhail should turn to Rodzyanko 0 his political 
adviser for this combination had been seeking a dynastic solution to the 
crisis since the first days of revolution. Scenting victory, the majority 
assented to this departure from the already-shattered collective approach. 
l 5 
As throughout the Third and Fourth Dumas, it was the Oktobrist vote which 
proved crucial to the political balance. Ironically it was the voice of 
Rodzyanko, a monarchist who could not envisage Tsardom in the context of 
1917, which proved decisive over the issue of monarchy : 
It was quite clear to us that the Grand Duke would have reigned only a 
few hours ; this would have led to colossal bloodshed in the capital, 
which would have degenerated into general civil war ... The Grand Duke 
asked me outright whether I could guarantee his life if he acceded to 
the throne, and I had to answer in the negative. (146) 
To the unconcealed delight of the Left and the utter despair of Milyukov and 
Guchkov, the Grand Duke returned to announce his decision to refuse the 
crown offered by his brother. 
147 
142 PADENIE, vi, 267(Guchkov). 
143 KERENSKY 216 ; also SHUL'GIN 296-301. 
144 SHUL'GIN 297-8 ; also quoted in CRERNOP 91 and even MILIÜKOV 411. 
145 SHUL'GIN 301-2 ; PADENIE, vi, 267.8(ßuchkov) ; Rodzyanko, 'Gosudarstvennaya 
Duma', p. 44 ; KERrNSKY 216. 
146 Rodzyanko, ' Gaeuda? etvennaya Duta' , p. 
44. 
147 SHUL'GIN 302-3 ; PADENIE, vi, 267-8(Guchkov) ; SERENSKY 216. 
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The details of the decision were concluded with almost indecent haste. 
Nekrasov had even come to the meeting with a craft refusal and the afternoon 
was spent with Nolde and Nabokov drawing up the definitive legal document148 
The message of the act of renunciation signed by the Grand Duke at 5 p. m. 
the same day was clear and to the point : 
I have taken a firm decision to assume the Supreme Power only in the 
event that such is the will of our great people, upon whom it devolves 
by a general vote through their representatives in the Constituent 
Assembly ;I ask all citizens of the Russian state to pay allegiance to 
the Provisional Government, which has come into being at the initiative 
of the State Duma, and which is endowed with full power until such time 
as the Constituent Assembly ... by its decision on the form of govern- 
ment expresses the will of the people. (149) 
On 3 March 1917 the initial process of revolution was complete : both dynasty 
and monarchy had abdicated, ostensibly to await the judgement of the people 
but implicitly for all time, and their authority and power were transferred 
in practice and at least legalistically to the Provisional Government. 
On the same morning the Provisional Government finally published its 
composition and programme. 
150 The developing revolutionary situation which 
had compelled the formation of the Temporary Committee and its subsequent 
transformation into the Provisional Government had also determined a shift 
from the Oktobrist hegemony of the former to a Kadet hegemony of the latter. 
Ipso facto the shift meant the declining authority of Rodzyanko and the 
rising power of Milyukov. Despite his defeats, most notably over the issue of 
the dynasty, Milyukov was the only moderate leader to keep his nerve through 
the hectic and exhausting days of the February Revolution. The Progressist 
leaders Yefremov and Konovalov had no independent initiative over the period 
and shamelessly indicated Milyukov when asked their opinion of any action to 
be taken. The Social Revolutionary leader Sukhanov was in no doubt of the 
identity of the rising authority : 
148 MILIUKOV 413 ; 1KihYukov, 'Fevra1'ekie Dni'"p. 188 ; SHUL'GIN 303-7 
149 Sobranie üka zenii, I, 1,345 quoted in BROWRER 116. 
150 Ratified by the Soviet Executive Committee, 2 March : Sukhanov, The 
Russian Revolution, pp. 116-157 and MILIUKOV 402-4 ; Published 3 March : 
Izv esti, no. 7,3 March 1917 quoted in BROWKER 135" 
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Miliukov was at this time the central figure, the spirit and backbone 
of all bourgeois political circles ... Without him all bourgeois and 
Duma circles would at that moment have constituted a chaotic mass and 
without him there would have been no bourgeois policy at all in the first 
period of the revolution. This was how his role was evaluated by every- 
-one, independently of party, and how he himself evaluated it ... I 
always considered this fateful man to be head and shoulders above all 
his colleagues in the Progressive Bloc. (151) 
From the instant of the Temporary Committee's decision to take power (at 
midnight on 27/28 February) until the formal publication of the composition 
of the Provisional Government (on the morning of 3 March), there waged a 
power struggle between Rodzyanko and Milyukov. 
Rodzyanko's authority declined partly through the anonymous developments 
of the revolutionary crisis and partly through his personal failings. As a 
Zemstvo-Ok*obrist, he was well to the Right in the Bloc and Temporary 
Committee and for him to lead the Provisional Government would have been both 
undiplomatic and unrepresentative. At various points in the croisis, Rodzyanko 
had alarmed his colleagues by his determination to claim total authority over 
the revolution. On agreeing to put his name to the seizure of power in the 
late evening of 27 February, Rodzyanko had laid down the single but 
uncompromising condition 'that all the members of the committee uncondition- 
-ally and blindly subordinate themselves to my command', leaving his hearers 
'dumbfounded' at his 'ultimatum'. 
152 
His imperious tones and the subsequent 
revelation that his actual authority was out of all proportion to his 
exaggerated claims particularly annoyed the Army High Command. The irritation 
comes through in the Rusky/Rodzyanko telegraPgh conversation of 5 a. m. on 
3 March and the Alekseyev/Rodzyanko conversation an hour later. 
153 In a 
circular to all army commanders at 7 a. m. on the third, Alekseyev expressed 
the opinion that'very strong pressure is being brought to bear on the 
President of the Doma and Temporary Committee, Rodzyanko, by the parties of 
the Left and the workers' deputies, and there is no frankness or sincerity 
151 Sukhanov, The Russian Revo1ution, p. 53 ; also MAKIN 3k6-?. 
152 MILIUKOV 396(quotation) and CHERNOV 85. 
153 ARR, iii, 266-8 ; KA, vol. 22, pp"25-7. 
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in the communications of Rodzyanko'. Alekseyev was later to believe that he 
had been duped by Rodzyanko for his own ends : 'I can never forgive myself 
for believing in the sincerity of pertain persons and for following their 
advice by sending the Army-Group Commanders the telegram concerning the 
Emperor's abdication'. 
154 In varying degrees, politicians, soldiers and 
insurgents alike resented the magisterial tones of the self-appointed 
'dictator of the Russian Revolution'. 
But for all his bombast, Rodzyanko demonstrated clear incapacity to 
live up to his claims. Transparently irresolute for most of the time, 
Rodzyanko made many more enemies than he made decisions. Milyukov was to 
accuse him of 'cowardice' in the face of difficult circumstances, notably 
in the incident with the drunken officers on the eveniný of 2 March. 
155 
When he forced himself to a decision it was invariably either wrong or too 
late to satisfy the original demand. The patent incapacity of Rodzyanko and 
his despised delusions of grandeur fostered a spirit of antagonism well 
exploited by Milyukov in his campaign to exclude Rodzyanko from real power. 
Milyukov first intrigued to exclude Rodzyanko from the Provisional 
Government. When the membership list was finally published it was Prince 
L'vov who headed the government as President. 
156 L'vov'e leadership had 
certain symbolic advantages : representing 'society Russia' and the patriotic 
war effort, his Presidency was calculated to reassure Russia's war Allies and 
dispose them towards early diplomatic recognition of the Provisional 
Government ;a Right Kadet by persuasion, his position in the party spectrum 
made him more representative than most of the range of the coalition 
government ; and although enjoying an enviable reputation as an administrator, 
his distaste for party politics both suggested a departure from the sordid 
politickings of the pre-revolutionary period and intimated to Milyukov that 
he would represent no threat to his own predominance within the governmeAt15? 
154 ARR, iii, 268-9. 
155 MILIUKOV 407-8. 
156 Izvestia, no. 7,3 March 1917 quoted in BROWIER 135. 
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L'vov's campaign for the presidency was conducted almost despite the 
candidate by Milyukov and the Kadets ; Lvov made no efforts to press his 
candidacy and indeed only turned up at the Tauride Palace on the afternoon 
of 1 March. 
158 However in his concern to exclude Rodzyanko, Milyukov may 
have been too quick to settle on the first rival candidate who seemed 
malleable. L'vov was to prove a broken reed and the source of perpetual 
regret to Milyukov in subsequent months. Although Milyukov was never to admit 
outright that the Presidency of Rodzyanko might have been preferable, his 
victory over Rodzyanko over the composition of the Provisional Government 
soon proved hollow. 
159 
Milyukov also made sure that Rodzyanko was unable to make political 
capital out of his leadership of the Fourth Duma and Temporary Committee. 
At first Rodzyanko was jejune enough to believe that his non-inclusion in the 
Provisional Government was recognition of his superior status. Chernov 
mockingly detailed Rodzyanko's conception of his future röle : 
The fact that the Government preferred to do wi*hout him was to him an 
added excuse for imagining that he had been placed above the Government. 
After Grand Duke Michael mentioned in his manifesto ... that the power 
of the Provisional Government was derived from the Provisional Committee 
of members of the Duma, Rodzianko became confirmed in his pose and 
psychology of "progenitor". He assumed that the Provisional Committee 
had not exhausted its role in creating the Provisional Government ... 
This Government was merely a ministry which might resign ; then power 
would revert to its original source, to the Provisional Committee, and 
to its President Rodzianko. According to this idea, the members of the 
Provisional Committee were actually kinds of "sovereign rulers". (160) 
If Rodzyanko believed this in early March, he was soon disabused of his 
claims to authority. The Kadets attacked with all the formidable legalism 
they could muster. At a Kadet Central Committee meeting late on 3 March it 
was resolved 'that the Temporary Committee of the Duma should be kept in its 
157 Tyrkova-Williams, From Libertyr, pp. 26-7 ; Shidloveky, 'Vospominania', p. 287. 
158 CHERN©V 175-6 ; MILIUXOV 396-7 ; also KATKOV 379- 
159 MILIÜKOV 375-6,396-7 & 399-400 ; CHERNOV 85 & 175-6 ; Rodzyanko, 
'Gosudarstvennaya Duma', p. 48 ; Bublikov, Rusakaya Revolyutsia, pp. 33-8 
also KATKOV 292 & 379. 
160 CHERNOV 177(original underlining) ; also 5HUL'(SIN 305 and Sukhanov, 
The Russian Revolution, p. 156. 
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inactive statel. 
161 Rodzyanko rather forlornly described his defeat in his 
later memoirs : 
The project of the President of the State Duma was that the Duma would 
be the bearer of supreme authority and the body to which the Provisional 
Government would be responsible. This plan was resolutely opposed 
primarily by the leaders of the Kadet party ... firstly, they argued, 
the convening of the Duma made the convening of the State Council a 
juridical necessity ... secondly, the leaders of the Kadet party consid- 
ered that the convening of the Duma would be pointless since its 
composition was so bourgeois that it would attract attacks from the 
extreme elements bent om its overthrow ... thirdly, it was pointed out 
that given the current state of the country, the government needed to 
command absolute plenitude of power including the right of legislation. 
Rodzyanko was all too easily brow-beaten by the Kadet arguments : 
The leaders of the Kadet party simply did not want an operative Duma so 
they could enjoy complete power themselves. Under these conditions the 
President of the State Duma could not take upon himself the responsibil- 
-ify for convening the Duma and considered it more correct to await the 
time when ... the Provisional Government would need to turn to the 
Duma to find a bastion against the extraordinary development of 
revolutionary excesses. (162) 
That time never came. As Chernov remarked, 'unfortuRnately for Rodzianko, 
Prince Lvov, Kerensky and others immediately turned their backs on the 
institution which had created their government, or rather tossed it aside 
like a ladder - once useful but now in the way'. 
163 As ever, Rodzyanko was 
trapped by constitutional forms. The President of the Duma proved unable to 
prolong his political authority either over or through the Revolution, having 
been manoeuvred out of the Provisional Government into prestigious but 
impotent obscurity. 
In tracing what can only be called Milyukov's triumph in the formation 
of the Provisional Government, one encounters a fundamantal inconsistency 
which can only be explained by ambition. When appealling so desperately and 
(one must assume) sincerely for the retention of the dynasty on 3 March, 
Milyukov emphasised the absolute necessity of a 'symbol' or 'axis' of 
traditional authority to stabilise the revolutionary situation. After Mikhail 
refused the crown, there remained only one euch 'axis' of authority acceptablel 
161 Vestnik Partii Narodnoy Svobod , 11 March 1917, no. 1, p. 13 quoted in aanelin, Oktsab ekoe Voorush n oe Voestanie, I, 100. 
162 Rodzyanko, 'Gosudaretvenna7a Desna', pp. 56-7(firet quotation) & 57(second). 
163 CHERNOV 177 ; also Vaailii Gurko ft o iea, p. 301. 
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to the broad spectrum of society - the State Duma. Yet Milyukov and the 
Kadets spearheaded the campaign to abandon the Duma and Temporary Committee ; 
in recounting Rodzyanko's attacks on the Kadet party in his memoirs, Milyukov 
was even prepared to admit that 'Rodzianko of course had the "leader" of the 
Kadet party in mind'. 
164 The only consistent explanation must lie with 
Milyukov's ambition, which involved liquidating his principal rival for 
authority over the Revolution. However the results of Milyukov's early 
victory were to benefit no moderate party. By excluding Rodzyanko and assert- 
-ing the complete independence of the Provisional Government from external 
control or jurisdiction, Milyukov created a government even more unresponsib: 
than that of the deposed Tsar and contributed to the seepage of political 
ballast which was to allow the new ship of state to drift into the power of 
the Extreme Left. Milyukov had coined the phrase 'fragile boat' but rejected 
the only means of increasing its sea-worthiness in order to retain command. 
The decision was to prove not only selfish but short-sighted : when the 
'fragile boat' foundered, a significant proportion of the responsibility and 
blame was directly Milyukov's. 
For the moment however the power was Milyukov's. The complexion of the 
Provisional Government was above all his creation. The leaders of the three 
moderate parties received cabinet office as of right. Milyukov became 
Foreign Minister, a post which he admitted 'had long been intended for me 
both by the public and by my comrades'. 
165 The new leader of the Progressiv 
Konovalov was the inevitable choice for Minister of Trade and Industry but 
even if he had not been so well-qualified for the post, party political 
considerations would have elevated him to ministerial status. 
166 
Guchkov was 
Minister of War and, when no suitable candidate could be found, Minister of 
the Navy too. 
167 However Guchkov emerged from the February Revolution with 
164 MILIUKOV 400 ; also Rodzyanko, 'Gosudarstvennaya Duma', pp. 48 & 56-7 ; 
SHUL'GIN 184 ; also Piotrow, Paul Milyukov, p. 353. 
165 MILIUKOV 427 ; also SHUL'GIN 225. 
166 MILIUKOV 424 ; Izves tia, no. 7,3 March 1917 quoted in BROWKEB 135. 
167 Izvestia, no. 7,3 March 1917 quoted in BROWSER 135 ; also SHUL'GIN 225. 
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greatly diminished hopes and authority. His position among the most Right- 
wing of the ministers of the Provisional Government offered him little chance 
of effectively opposing the hegemony of Milyukov, while the likelihood of the 
revolution shifting still further towards the Left augured the forcible 
removal of Guchkov from the government in the not too distant future. His 
self-confidence had been badly shaken and his listless defeatist attitude 
after February was in marked contrast to the 'Young Turk' of earlier years. 
Like Milyukov he seriously considered resigning from the Provisional Govern- 
ment after Mikhail's refusal of the crown but could not w¬ther the moral 
shock of the February Revolution with the same cynical ease as Milyukov. 
168 
Milyukov professed great disappointment in Guchkov : 
In the Provisional Government, Guchkov did not live up to his former 
reputation. I had hoped to find an ally in him but ... he kept to the 
sidelines, did not often participate in the cabinet sessions ... This is 
partially explained by his ill-health ... the weakening of his will 
however must be explained mainly by his pessimism with regard to what 
had happened ... I considered that it was still possible to fight but 
he did not support me in the struggle. (160) 
Vladimir Nabokov corroborated this judgement : 
From the very beginning Guchkov felt in the bottom of his soul that the 
cause was lost, and he remained in the government only "par acquit de 
conscience" ... no-one sounded a note of deep disappointment and 
scepticism with such intensity as Guchkov. When he began to speak ... I was horror-struck by the sense of something like complete and utter 
hopelessness. (170) 
There could be no doubt that on the basis of party leaders, the Provisional 
Government was Kadet-dominated. 
The remaining ministers were selected from the Bloc membership with just 
one exception. The need to mihllify the Soviet by at least the appearance of 
concessions to the Extreme Left became apparent at a very early staff and 
Shul'gin had been the first to propose the inclusion of Left elements on 
tactical grounds : 
168 MILIUKOV 412 ; CHEBNOV 92 ; PADENIE, vi, 267-8(Guchkov) ; KATKOV 384-6. 
169 MILIÜKOV 422. 
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When a yacht is on its left tack, before tacking to the right, you must 
bear further to the left to gain momentum ... If power is thrust upon 
us, we must seek support by enlarging the Progressive Bloc to the Left. 
I would invite Kerensky, as Minister of Justice, let us say ... Right 
now this post has no importance but we must snatch its leaders from the 
revolution. Among them Kerensky is really the only one ... It is much 
better to have him with us than against us. (171) 
In the event, both Kerensky and Chkheidze were offered ministerial posts and 
while Chkheidze refused the Labour Ministry on principle, Kerensky decided on 
the morning of 2 March to accept the Ministry of Justice (being careful to I 
172 
elicit the approval by acclamation of the plenary Soviet later the same day). 
'WThe 
composition and complexion of the Provisional Government were a 
tribute to the ingenuity and expertise of a politicia! h who was adept at 
leading from behind. The range of the Provisional Government ran from 
Trudoviks to Centrists, with the Right Kadet position constituting the 
political axis. Of the eleven ministers in the cabinet, four were to the heft 
of the Milyukov Kadets (Kerensky Minister of Justice, Nekrasov Minister of 
Transport, Konovalov Minister of Trade and Industry, and Tereshchenko Ministerl 
of Finance) and three were to the Right (Guchkov Minister of War and Navy, 
Vladmir Lvov Procurator of the Synod, and Godnev State Controller). Milyukov 
had successfully engineered a cabinet of which he himself was the pivot. 
173 
Moreover the Right Kadets occupied a commanding role through numerical 
strength : the Right Kadets commanded four votes (Milyukov, Lvov, Shingarev 
and Manuilov), the Progressists two (Konovalov and Tereshchenko), the 
Oktobrists two (Guchkov and Godnev), the Centre one (Vladimir L'vov), the 
Trudoxiks one (Kerensky) and the Left Kadets one (Nekraaov). 
17k 
The Manifesto which accompanied the publication of the membership of 
the Provisional Government was again an expression of Kadet predominance. 
The first four 'principles' proclaimed : 
171 Conversation with Shingarev : SHUL'GIN 124. 
172 KERENSKY 205-8 ; also MILIUKOV 406 ; Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution, 
pp-140-3 ; CHERNOV 124-5 ; also KATXOV 391-3- 
173 Izvýeno"7,3 March 1917 quoted in BROWKER 135 ; Ganelin, Oktyabxskoe 
Vooruzhennoe Vossý, I, 100 & 116. 
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1. An immediate and complete amnesty in all cases of a political and 
religious nature, including terrorist acts, military revolts and 
agrarian offences etc. 
2. Freedom of speech, press and assembly, and the right to unionise and 
strike with the extension of political freedom to persons serving in 
the armed forces as limited by the exigencies of military and 
technical circumstances. 
3. The abolition of all restrictions based on class, religion and 
nationality. 
4. The immediate preparation for the convocation of the Constitutent 
Assembly on the basis of universal, equal, direct suffrage and secret 
ballot, which will determine the form of government and the 
constitution of the country. (175) 
The Manifesto harked back to the time when the Kadets presented a revolution- 
-ary face, back to the unfulfilled promises of the October Manifesto and the 
high hopes of late 1905. In the space of a single breathless week, from 
Friday 24 February to Friday 3 March, more had been achieved politically and 
constitutionally than during the entire Duna period. The arid intervening 
years between 1905 and 1917 when principles were held in abeyance and 
compromise for survival had been the hallmark of the Duma moderates were 
over. Hopes for the future of Russia ran high as the Provisional Government, 
the moderates in power, faced the challenge of Revolution. 
175 Izvvestia, no. 7,3 March 1917 quoted in BMW= 135 ; also KE, RENSKT 210. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT : THE DUMA MODERATES IN PEACE, WAR MID REVOLUTION 
The historiücal treatment of the Duma moderates by later scholarship has 
been dominated by the availability of primary sources. The Kadets have always 
received at very least their full share of historical publicity, whether 
adulatory or censorious, Well before 1917 the Kadets went to great lengths to 
express their admiration for constitutionalism and to cultivate contacts 
with the West, thereby attracting the attention and very often the support 
of foreign statesmen and scholars. With the Bolshevik Revolution, the 
extensive emigration of Kadet leaders to Western Europe and America made 
readily available a substantial corpus of personal testimony. The high 
educational and cultural level of the party soon bore fruit with a steady 
output of memoirs, apologia and even polemics throughout the lifetime of the 
Kadet leaders. The voluminous publications of Milyukov and the running battle 
between Milyukov and Maklakov over Kadet policy in the Duma period were just 
the highlights of the literary activities of Badet leaders with the time to 
ponder their past mistakes. Whether condemned for precipitating the Revolution 
or commiserated with over the failure of Russian constitutionalism, the 
Kadets were unanimously accorded the leading r&le amongst the parties of 
the Fourth State Duma. 
I 
While in no way contesting the greater importance of the Kadete, it in 
undeniable that the concentration of both Western and Soviet interest on the 
Kadet party has long delayed a proper consideration of the other moderate 
parties. Only comparatively recently have the ©kfobriets been subjected to 
serious historical study. This is partly owing to the reticence of the 
Oktobrist leaders : while Rodzyanko published a series of apologia for his 
performance as Duma President (not as leader of the Zemstvo-Oktobrists), the 
1 An example of condemnation : Goulevitch, Czar sm and Revolution, pp. 258 & 
253-5 ; an example of commiseration : Riha, A Russian Enrol an, pp, 333-347" 
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party leader Guchkov wrote very little to defend or explain his actions. 
2 
This may also be attributable to the background of the membership of the 
Oktobrist Union. In an article on Guchkov, Louis Manashe made the point that, 
None of the major business figures active in the politics of the day 
left writings in the form of memoirs or histories of the period 
comparable to the Maklakov sort. Russian memoir writing seems to have 
been a preserve, originally staked out by Herzen, of the more literate 
gentry. (3) 
Even recent studies which have avoided dismissing the Oktobrists in a trite 
phrase have tended to concentrate (probably rightly) on the Third Duma 
period, thereby neglecting the period after 1912 and prematurely consigning 
the Duma Oktobrists to political impotence and obscurity. 
4 
The Progreseists have been the very last to 'surface'. Until almost the 
last five years the Progressists were readily dismissed as a minor 
parliamentary group in close attendance on the Kadets. Ariadne, Tyrkova- 
Williams for example fostered this impression : 
Mischievous tongues said that the Progressiste were distinguished from 
the Kadets simply by their refusal to submit to Milyukoff. But their 
main distinction lay in their greater readiness to submit to the 
insinuations and solicitations of the Socialists ... The Progressiets 
were of no real importance in the country. (5) 
The Progressists made few efforts to correct this interpretation : neither 
Yefremov nor Konovalov wrote memoirs to compare with those of other moderate 
leaders ; the Moscow industrialists led by Ryabushinsky apparently rested 
content that their patronage of the Progressists be forgotten. Menashe's 
comment on 1905 could well cover the period of the Fourth Duma too : 
The appearance of Russian entrepreneurial groups in the arena of politics: i 
represented an historic breakthrough for a class traditionally impotent 
in the political sphere. Curiously, this is also one of the most 
neglected aspects of the Revolution of 1905. The role of business groups 
2 Rodzyanko : Gosudarstvenna a Duma i Fevral'sk a. Revol tsia (1922), 
Krushenie Imperii (1926) and The Reign of Rasputin (1927); Guchkov : 
fragmented memoirs in Poslednie dnie Noroosty, August and September 1936. 
3 L. Menashe, 'A Liberal with Spurs : Alexander Guchkov, a Russian Bourgeois 
in Politics', RR, no. 1t1967, pp. 41-2. 
4 For example, J. F. Hutchinson, The4ctobriats in Russian Politics 1905-1917, 
unpublished London Ph. D thesis and G A. Hoeking, Goverament and Dua in 
Russia 1907-1914, unpublished Cambridge Ph. D thesis 1970. 
5 A. Tyrkova-Williame, From Liberty, p. 39. 
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in the united front of liberal opposition is generally overlooked in 
Western analysis for perhaps the simplest of historiographical reasons : 
practically all of our immediately available sources on the subject are 
in the form of memoir literature composed either by members of the 
bureaucracy (Witte, Gurko, Kokovtsov) or by gentry and intelligentsia 
figures associated with the zemstvo movement (Shipov, Miliukov, Maklakov 
et al. ). One is tempted to conclude that if Guchkov and Konovalov had 
written as much as Miliukov or Maklakov our whole understanding of 
Russian liberalism might be entirely different. (. 6) 
As if in answer to this mute appeal, later the same year (1967) the Soviet 
historians Dyakin and particularly Laverychev published works throwing new 
light on the industrialist patronage of the Progressist party in the Fourth 
Duma period.? Although it would appear that such remains in order to place 
the Progressists in their proper place among the Duma moderates, the past 
neglect has been tacitly acknowledged and is already in the process of 
being rectified. 
Surrounding all three moderate parties is an aura of sensitivity on the 
part of the Soviet historical establishment which finds expression not only 
in Soviet publications. but in the selection of materials made available in 
ýý 
i 
the archives and academic libraries of the Soviet Union. Despite the excellentjj, 
document collections of the 1920's and the more relaxed academic atmosphere 
of the 1960's, - the subject of the Duma moderates still suffers from a 
shortage of primary documentation. 
8 
However definite progress in the study 
of the Duma period is being achieved : though generally being made available 
only to privileged scholars rather La than in published form, more original 
material (notably minutes of party meetings and police reports of party 
activities) is happily being released. 
not 
This new primary material haaA(ae yet) revolutionised traditional 
conceptions or interpretations of the Dun& moderates. It is however providing 
6 Menashe, 'A Liberal with Spurs', p. 46 (note 13). 
7 V. S. Dyakin, Russkava Burzhuazia 
Leningrad 1967 and V. Ya. Lavery 
8 Notable document collections : 
Moscow 1926 ; Burzhuazia nakar 
Moscow 1927 ; Monarkhia Pered 
and of course Kraenyi Arkhiv a 
41 and 1922-6 respectively. 
hev, Po Tu Storonu Barrikad, Mosco w 1967. 
Feyral'skasa Pevolyºu tsia, Ed. S. A. Alekneyev, 
ae Fevral'skosº Revolvutsii, Ed. B. B. Grare, 
: rusheniem, Ed. V. P. Semennikov, Moecow1927 ; 
d Arkhiv Rueskoy Revolvutsii, Moscow 1922- 
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a corrective to the long-standing Kadet determinist approach dictated by 
the near-monopoly of Kadet testimony. As in the more well-publicised instance 
of Soviet historical revisionism, the period of the Fourth Duma is a classic 
case of published history being the propaganda of the victors. The Kadet 
appearance in 1917 as the paramount moderate party was the product of a 
prolonged, fequently vicious and subsequently alamoet-forgotten power 
struggle within the Fourth Duma. Whilst not impugning the greater importance I 
of the Kadets overall, it is becoming clear that the Western and Soviet 
'obsession' with the Kadets has wrongly and artificially depressed the 
very considerable significance of the Oktobrists and Progreseists. 
One of the most striking aspects of the Fourth Duma was the unprecedent- 
-edly high level of inter-action and inter-dependence of the moderate 
fractions, which found expression in bitter and obsessive party politics. 
A fundamental cause was the grouping of the moderate fractions arou"d the 
Duma axis in approximately equal strengths. The effect of the 1912 elections 
was to reduce the Oktobriat hegemony to within striking distance of the 
Kadet and Progressist fractions ; the effect of the Oktobrist crash of late 
1913 was to put all the moderate fractions on a numerical footing. In the 
spring of 1914, the Zemstvo-Oktobrists numbered 66, the Kadeta 55 and the 
Progressists 40 (though with the active support of a further 20 Left 
Oktobrists). 
9 The earner of the Fourth Duma after the Oktobrist crash was 
dominated by the rivalry of the three moderate fractions for contra]. of 
the Duma fulcrum. 
Partly as a result of party rivalries, political principles compromised 
in the life of the Third Duma were debased altogether in the Fourth Duma. 
The advent of war introduced patriotism and the concept of the 'Sacred Union' 
as justification for eroded principles. The wide membership of the Progressiv 
Bloc necessitated holding party principles in abeyance for the sake of 
opposition unity. With the coming of revolution, even the most fundamental 
g Index to Fourth Duma, Second Session(October 1913-June 1914) 
UKAZ__, ATEL' 21-3. 
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moderate principles took a tumble. Milyukov, downcast by Mikhail's refusal 
of the crown, declared himself on 6 March a life-long supporter of the Grand 
Duke's succession. 
1° But only four days later, a plenary session of the 
Kadet Central Committee and Fraction agreed to modify the Party Programme of 
i1 
11 
January 1906 to favour a republic rather than a constitutional monarchy. 
Philipps Price of the Manchester Guardian made the withering comment ! the 
Kadets, now unanimously supporting a republic ... are essentially 
opportunists so their conversion in evidence of the strength of republican 
sentiment'. 
12 Even moreastonishing, the Oktobrists, the classic monarchist 
party, turned their sails to the republican wind. Stanley Washburn of the 
'KAI 
Times reported in May that Guchkov had announced, and the Oktobrist Central ¢? 
Committee had ratified, the transformation of the Oktobrists into 'a new 
party uniting the bourgeois and democratic elements' and advocating 'republic-'' 
-an and liberal principles'. 
13 The expedient jettisoning of their basic 
monarchist principles was only the culmination of a process featured by 
the moderates since 1907. 
Three crucüal relationships governed the fortunes of the Duma moderates 
between 1912 and 1917, each contributing to the decline of political 
principle and the sharpening of party politics. The relationship with the 
country, already strained since the 3rd June electoral laws quarantined the 
Duma from the nation, deteriorated further during the Fourth Duma. The 
workers' movement of 1912-1914 revealed the gulf seperating the privileged 
deputies from the urban prolatariat. The national organisations and member- 
-ships of the moderate parties varied from almost non-existent (Progressist) 
through dying (Kadet) to inoperative (Oktobrist). Every party congress, 
whether Badet, Oktobrist or Progressist, revealed the consistent and 
10 KA, vol. 5"p"114. 
11 Manchester Guardian, 26 March 1917(n/s), 5d and Times, 26 March 1917(n/s), 7b 
the recommendation was ratified by the VII Kadet Congress, 25-17 March 
1917 : Reo h', 26 March 1917 quoted in BROWSER 1200-1. 
12 Manchester Guardi March1917(n/s), 4b (also 5e). 
13 Times, 31 May 1917(n/a), 8a ; also letter dated 12 June 1917 from one P. K. 
Fomenkov supporting the new party : T$GAOR, f. 555(Guchkov), deelo 536. 
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and politically debilitating decline of the provincial party organisation. 
To a large extent this national collapse was not the fault of the Duma 
moderates. As Bublikov remarked, political concern on the part of broad 
sectors of the populace had evaporated long before the Fourth Duma : 
The interest, such that was still retained in politics, carried a 
purely sporting character. The public observed with complete political 
impassiveness, though not without curiousity ... The State Duma 
definitely enjoyed no support in the country. The government could 
dissolve it whenevzr it wished and in the country not even the 
suggestion of protest was heard ... Every party life declined - and not 
because it was being killed off by police persecution but because 
interest in them had fallen off. (14) 
Russian society, and especially provincial society, was insufficiently 
developed and politically-orientated to sustain a constitutional order under 
extreme pressure from traditional autocracy. 
However although the moderate parties were to a considerable degree 
trapped by their political circumstances (which they could do little enough 
to improve), the Duma moderates did not help themselves. The Oktobriste 
prematurely settled for political defeat, the Progressists quickly abandoned 
their early ambitions to become a national party and not just an industrialist 
pressure group, and the various Kadet 'reconnaissances' to the Left were 
never sustained, even by the party's Left wing. In the case of each party, j 
there emerged an internal conflict between the established Petersburg 
Petrograd group concentrating on the Duma and the more vigorous socially- 
aware group in rival Mosvow. Within both the Oktobrists and Kadets, the 
Moscow group made strenuous but in the last anafysis unsuccessful attempts 
to shake their Duma representatives from their 'ivory tower' attitude and 
identify with the sweeping Leftward movement of the nation. Finally, Duma 
jealousy of its prerogatives annoyed and finally estranged the wartime public 
organisations , who 
(not without some justification) suspected that the Dunaj 1 
having secured a position of privilege, wished to slam the political door 
behind itself to exclude the remainder of Russian society. Though deserving 
14 Bublikov, Rusakazya, Reyolyuteia, p. 11. 
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sympathy for their political predicament after 1906, the Duma moderates made 
an undeniable contribution to their estrangement from the Russian nation. 
The unmitigated failure of their relationship with the country compelled 
the moderates to place all their political capital on the only alternative, 
their relationship with the government. While moderate party memberships 
outside the Duma. agitated for opposition to the government, the moderates 
within the Duma supported a policy of rapprochement. The subsequently well- 
publicised actions of the Duma moderates against the government were never 
dictated by acceptance of a mandate from the country. The campaign of early 
1914 was the product of a combination of playing to the electoral gallery, 
defending the constitutional status quo and competition between the 
moderates for the prestige of 'Champion of the Dumal. The Bloc campaign of 
August 1915 was initiated by ministerial intrigue, again fostered by Duma. 
concern for the parliamentary status quo and produced a Programme which pre- 
dated the October Manifesto in the modesty of its demands. The 'Storm-Signal' 
of November 1916 resulted from exasperation at the Stttrmer 'dictatorship'. 
desperation at the developing revolutionary situation and the exigencies of 
party politics. At no point in the Fourth Duma was the moderates' relation- 
-ship with the country the deciding factor in a parliamentary campaign ; at 
no point did the Duma moderates approach a full scale onslaught on the 
institution of tsardom - even during the February Revolution. 
By the Fourth Duma, the moderates were fighting not for the country, no+ 
even for reform, but for the maintenance of the status duo. No matter how 
strained the situation of the Fourth Duma, it was preferable to the 
alternatives. Revolution was a recurrent nightmare to the moderates and as 
early as August 1915 Saaonov could remark, 
If everything is arranged decently and an opening offered, the Cadets 
will be the first to come to an agreement. Miliukov is a thorough-going 
bourgeois and dreads a social revolution worst of all. The majority of 
the Cadets are trembling for their capital. (15) 
15 Cherniavsky, Proly e, p. 199 and ARR, vol. 18, p. 114 ; also Report of 11 December 1916 : POLICE, 343,1916,106-7 and - EN 'HARDT, xii, 729. 
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At a less apocalyptic level, the moderates relied upon the government to 
protect their positions in the Duma. Government manipulation of the elections 
to the Third Duma had falsified the political complexion of the Duma to the 
disadvantage of the moderate camp ; ten years later, public opinion had moved 
so far Left that a fair vote would have deprived the moderates of both their 
numerical strength and pivotal position in the Duma. 
16 By 1917 the govern- 
-ment was the sole protection for the Duma moderates against political ruin. 
In pursuit of their security the moderates unanimously backed Rodzyanko's 
plea to the Tsar in January 1917 (with the prospect of elections to the 
Fifth Duma in the autumn) to extend the life of the present Duma by reason 
of war emergency and the disruption of normal sessions. 
17 The moderates' 
only hope for survival in the increasingly oppositional and eventually 
revolutionary situation was to persuade the government to turn the Fourth 
Duma into a Russian 'Long Parliament'. 
The moderates' only card was that, given the trend of public opinion 
(which even Nikolai Maklkkov's ingenuity would be tested to pervert), the 
Fourth Duma was still the most amenable national assembly that the government 
was likely to get. However the government skilfully took advantage of the 
fact that both Oktobrists and Kadets were victims of their past triumphs and 
return to 
tragedies. Oktobrist policy af9tr 1912 was dominated by the desire toothe 
golden age of privilege in the early Third Duma ; Zadet policy after 1906 
was dominated by the determination at all costs to avoid another Vyborg 
fiasco. As a result the government adopted a 'stick and carrot' policy 
towards the Duma moderates : whenever crisis loomed, the government offered 
the 'carrot' of alliance to the Oktobrists and . brandished the 'stick' of 
dissolution at the Kadets. Whether employed diplomatically or blatantly, 
the government's ploy proved an almost foolproof means of bringing the 
Fourth Duma to heel. 
16 For example, the t aua be f- ed the Kadete were too far Right to retain 
any of their four seats in Moscow in the Fifth Dumm elections : Moscow 
police report of 12 October 1916 quoted in GRAVE 142. 
17 ARR, vol. 6, p. 335 ; also KATIOV 220-3. 4 
i 
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Unfortunately for the moderates, it was tragically plain that they 
} t: ' 
needed the government far more than the government needed them. In wartime 
the government could and did operate with minimal recourse to the Duma. 
Clause 87 of the Fundamental Laws gave the government virtual legislative 
independence. The threat of financial indepentdence which was moved in mid 
1915 proved sufficient to cow the Duma. The bureaucracy shunned the Duma as 
a recruiting-ground for government personnel : at the ministerial level, of 
the forty-three incumbents between 1912 and 1917 onlý two were taken from 
the Duma. 18 The unofficial contacts between the government and the Duma 
that did emerge were invariably at ministerial initiative and designed to 
benefit the government alone. Individual ministers attempted to 'use' the 
Duma to improve their own positions within the government, for example 
Shcheglovitov in October 1913, Kokovtsov in November 19139 Krivoshein in 
August 1915t Aleksei Khvostov in January 1916 and Aleksandr Trepov in 
November 1916. Certain ministers regarded as more liberal than most cultivated 
funderstandingst with the Dumas most notably Sasonov, Ignat*evg Krivoshein, 
Polivanov, Naumov and Rittikh. On exceptional occasions the Duna was even 
invited to reinforce ministerial attempts to influence the Tsars for example 
in Xguat 1915 in a campaign to dissuade him from becoming Commander-in-chiof, 
in November 1916 in a bid for the dismissal of PrAtopopov, and in February 
1917 in an attempt to bring him to make political concessions* But each 
incident of contact stressed ministerial initiative and benefit ; once the 
immediate advantage of the association was secured, the government was quick 
to terminate the arrangement. Milyukov's hopes for reform by association, 
the Duma's transformation of the establishment by political osmosist were 
further from realisation in the Fourth Duma than ever before, 19 The 
relationship between the moderates and the government was of stark necessity 
on the moderates' side but expedience, convenience or even charity on the 
18 Aleksei Khvostov (MVD September 1915 to March 1916) and Protopopov (14 
September 1916 to February 1917) ; for a diagram of ministerial changes 
1914-17, see Yeroshkin, Istoria Gosudarstvennikh üchrezhdenii, p. 310. 
19 ENGEL'HARDT, iv, 323. 
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part of the government. 
The third crucial relationship, so obsessive to participants but 
relativelg neglected by later historians, was the Duma moderates' relation- 
-ship with each other. The emergence of the Kadets as the dominant moderate 
party over the course of the Fourth Duma was by no means as inevitable a 
process as Kadet apologists would have one believe. The Progressists' 
contribution to Kadet actions was very considerable. The Progressist fraction 
itself never fulfulled its early promisr-, embarrassed by a very narrow basis 
of support outside the Duma and at Pfst disconcerted and then divided by the 
ambitions of its industrialist patrons. But the Progressists made a decisive 
impact upon Duma politics by so closely pacing the Kadet fraction that their 
rivalry stampeded the Kadets through a number of vital decisions. The defence 
of the Duma in early 1914, the agitation for a Duma session in aid 1915 and 
the 'Storm-Signal' of November 1916 were all instances of Kadet action taken 
under severe pressure from the Progressists. 'The Kadets' most famous 
victories were Progressist-induced. What reputation the Kadet party earned as 
a more radical oppositional movement during the Fourth Duma owed as Much to 
Progressist competition as to Kadet integrity. 
Even so, Kadet attention was concentrated less on the Progressista than 
on the Oktobrists. The Kadets were fortunate that the 1912 elections and the 
Oktobrist crash of late 1913, neither owing anything to the Kadetal quite 
fortuitously offered the opportunity (though not the certainty) of realising 
their ambitions. Without the Oktobrist crash, the Kadets could not have 
hoped to secure the Duma hegemony they enjoyed by late 1916. Even so, it is 
too convenient to write off Jrhe Oktobrists after late 1913 : the period 
1914-1917 saw the Duma Oktobrists 'frozen' by their unity problem but only 
slowly atrpphying as a political force. If the Frogressists constituted the 
'ginger group' within the moderate camp, the Oktobrists still constituted 
the greater part of the parliamentary 'weight'$ now lethargic to act111bxkt 
potentially still formidable. 
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Milyukov's Grand Design was for the Kadets to take over the Oktobrist 
r ke of Duma fulcrum by stealth, an ambition eventually realised in two 6 
distinct stages. The axis of the Fourth Duma, ran just to the Right of the 
central Oktobrist position, leaving the Kadets apparently remote well to the 
Left. Milyukov had to draw the axis to the Kadets or take the Kadets to the 
is ; in practice both were effected. The first stage proved to be the 
Progressive Bloc. Although the resounding failure of the Bloc in September 
1915 seemed to remove any grounja for its continued survivalg the Bloc must 
be seen not only as an important episode to in Duma-givernment relations but 
as a turning-point in the Kadet drive for power. The large number of varied 
participants in the Bloc blurred party principles and policies at a time 
when Milyukovq edging the Kadets towards the Rightj was attempting to cover 
himself against the criticism of the Progressists and his own Left wing. By 
excluding the Nationalist and Right fractions, the Bloc also constituted a 
more Left-orientated body than the complete Duma : the axis of the Bloc was 
the Left ©ktobrist position. 
20 Milyukov was the. champion of the Progressive 
Bloc even more in defeat than in August 1915 ; after September 1915 the Bloc 
was kept alive to be exploited an a Badet device to offset the natural 
Okfobrist fulcrum of power. 
The retention of the Bloc was not without its. price. At the Duma level, 
action was readily sacrificed to unanimity, reducing the official utterances 
and policies of the Bloc to an abyssmally low level. At a time when the 
moderates might have spoken out, most notably during the 1916 Spring Session 
of the Dpma, they were gagged by the Bloc, to the disappointment and later 
exasperation of public opinion. To the Kadeta, the Bloc offered a political 
advantage which had to be paid for by adoption of a quasi-Oktobriat position 
the Duma Oktobrists subordinated themselves to Bloc authority only on the 
understanding that the Bloc made. significant concessions to the Oktobriot 
20 The exclusion of the Rights (64 deputies) and the BalashevNationalists 
(about 68 deputies) brought the axis of, the Bloc some 66 places to the 
Left of the Duma axis i. e. to the Left Oktobrist position. 
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viewpoint. The cost of the Bloc was high : to gain authority for the Kadet 
fraction within the Duma, Milyukov moved the Kadets to the Right (in the face 
of the complaints of his Left wing) and emasculated the moderate opposition 
movement. 
The second stage was the formation of the Provisional Government. 
Rodzyanko attempted a last counter-attack against Kadet authority in February 
1917, an Oktobrist swan-song interrupted by the outbreak of revolution but 
incorporated in Rodzyanko's ambition to become 'dictator of the Revolution'. 
Rodzyanko's bid ended with his exclusion from power and the emergence of a 
Provisional Government whose balance represented the culmination of Milyukov'a 
{ efforts of the previous five years. The axis of the Provisional Government 
was the Right Kadet position - Milyukov's own. Never for a moment losing 
sight of the priority of the interests of the Cadet fraction, Milyukov 
iY 
exercised his political skills to secure the shifting of the power-axis from 
the Right Oktobrist through the Left Oktobrist to the Right Badet Position. 
The composition and balance of the Provisional Government were Milyukov's 
crowning achievement as a Duma politician, attracting (as Sukhanov conceded) 
all moderate opinion to the ladet banner : 
Amongst the bourgeoisie itself the Cadets swallowed up all the others. 
The more Right groups already seemed unseasonable and vanished like 
smoke ... The Cadets, "The People's Freedom Party", became the firm 
stronghold of the entire plutocracy, stolidly flying the banner of 
statesmanship and order ... From the very first thunderclap of revolution 
the entire bourgeoisie was consolidated in the "Left" party of the 
Cadets. (21) 
In company which was by no means remarkable for its ability and talent, 
Milyukov was the outstanding politician of the Duma period. Even his politic 
adversary Chernov was not grudging in his tribute : 
A man of many-sided education, a superior scholar in his special field, 
with a fine and flexible mind, well-balanced and calm, more the lecturer 
than the apostle of a political creed, Milyukov also had a decided taste 
for political life, the will to power and the discipline of a well- trained professional fighter ; he was not discouraged by failure, he 
accepted defeat philosophically, and like a true sportsman he bore from 
21 Sukhanov, The Ruseiaa ReTOl*tion, pP. 213-4 & 252. 
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each defeat unshaken faith in the possibility of revanche and zest in 
preparing for it. He had many qualities which go to make a really great 
political leader. (22) 
Milyukov's indispensability to the Kadet party was never in doubt. Adding the 
Presidency of the Central Committee to his Presidency of the Fraction in 
February 1916, his executive control of the party came close to dictatorship. 
The threat of his resignation caused the disappearance of the most determined 
and well-supported opposition within the party. 
23 Aa Chernov testified, his 
parliamentary expertise put all other moderate leaders in the shade : 
The studious side of his nature had been moderated by the long schooling 
of parliamentary life and struggle, which had taught him to swim with 
ease in the whirlpool of parliamentary combinational to manage the back- 
stage manipulation of the changing feelings and tendencies of the Duma 
semi-circle... A typical parliamentariang he was a splendid mediator 
between disputing partiest a creator of compromises, of elastic formulae 
which rubbed out contradictiong smoothed away sharp corners, made verbal 
concessions that did not prevent him from putting through his own 
program. He possessed a high degree of cautions of nicety in choosing 
the moment to act, of ability to wait patiently for a favourable 
situation, economising his strength and not over-exerting it in struggl- 
-ing against the current ... He elevated into a dogma in itself the art 
of tacking, of discovering flank attacks and the line of least 
resistance. (24) 
Political principle almost disappeared, to be replaced by a flexibility which 
came very close to bare expediency, Milyukov was a tough political realist 
with no finesse or lightness of touch : the references to his 'tactlessness# 
in the memoirs of contemporaries are legion. 
25 Milyukov avoided foolhardy 
stands on principles thereby escaping the succession of painful humiliations 
and ignominious backdowns experienced by the Progressists. He preferred not 
to face vital issues squarelys thereby avoiding a party crash like that 
suffered by the Oktobrists. Milyukov qualified for no awards for political 
gallantry or generosity : the Progressiste were unscrupulously *used' in 
1912 and mercilessly harassed when they became a threat to the Kadets ; the 
Oktobrists were exploited and deceived to reduce their initiative and power. 
22 CHERNOV 172. 
23 Piotrow, Paul Milyukov, pp. 246-9 & 424-5. 
24 CHERNOV 172-3- 
25 For . aaniple, ENGEL! BARDT, xi3, '323 and Oznobishin 
& 261. , 
Voa omiaaaia, pp. 5,238 
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Kadet supremacy involved the squashing of rivals and Milyupkov showed no 
squeazishness in his pursuit of that over-riding aim. 
Within the Kadet party, Milyukov had no peers : no Left Kadet effectively 
challenged his authority, and even Vasilii Maklakov, who was probably 
Milyukov's equal in intellect, never made the transition from political 
dilettante to party politician. For the Progressists, Yefremov and Konovalov 
were overawed and outclassed. For the Duma Oktobrists, Rodzyankols ambition 
proved out of all proportion to either his tactics or talents. Guchkov was 
the only party leader of sufficient stature and expertise to have given, 
Milyukov trouble - had he succeeded at the Moscow polls in 1912. Unlike 
Milyukov, wh& in the period of his forcible exclusion from the First and 
Second Duman successfully IruleA the Duma from the buffet-roon't ftchkov was 
nev er able to overcome the handicap of exclusion from the Fourth Duma. 
26 
The Duma Oktobrists were left with the inferior (albeit more sympathatic) 
leadership of Rodzyankol and Guchkov fretted in holpless frustrathon outside 
the Duma. By the time that revolution brought Guchkov back into the political 
limelight, the future for a leader of his monarchist persuasions was already 
lost. It was by a combination of good fortune and good management that 
Milyukov secured for the Kadets a position in early 1917 which would have 
been unthinkable in 1912. 
In emphasising the importance Of Party Politics in the Fourth Duma, the 
concept of the Kadetq Oktobrist and Progressist fractions belonging to a 
single parliamentary 'camp' in not lost. The Process of coming together by 
the Kadets and Oktobrists over the Third Duna, which in its turn made a vital 
contribution to the emergence of the Progressists, continued through the 
Fourth Duma. Far from pointing their unlikeness, the growing emphasis on 
party politics only demonstrated the close similarities of the moderate 
fractions. There was little to distinguish the fractions in their response to 
26 S. Ye. KryzhanovskytVoa_p naiatBerlix 19384-86 aleo, Piotrow, a, 
Milyuko -150, pp. 149. 
403. 
the major issues of the day : constitutional monarchy, opposition to revolut- 
-ion, the promotion of Russia as a Great Power, observance of international 
agreements and commitment to the War were tenets of all three parties. 
Politicallýqthe fractions were positioned between the extremes of the party 
spectrum, advocating a middle course between the brittle Reaction urged by 
the Right and the merciless Revolution preached by the Left. The quarrels of 
the later Fourth Duma centred on tacticsp not aims or principles, Once Kadet 
dominance had been finally established in the Provisional Government, the 
other moderate fraction memberships were quick to abandon their Fourth Duma 
party allegiances and join the expanded Kadet party. In the Third Dumas the 
power and privilege of the Oktobrist fraction had been a magnet to the Right 
wing of the moderate camp ; after March 19179 the hegemony of the Kadet 
party disrupted the fragile and artificial divisions of the Fourth Duma to 
constitute the centre of the moderate revolutionary camp., 
27 
The moderate fractions were positioned not only between the extremes of 
Left and Right but the extremes of country and government. By 1913 the Duma 
had lost all credibility as a 'Third Force' in Russian political life, 
Caught between the two fundamental forces of Russia, by comparison with 
which their own authority could only be tactical, the Duma moderates follojý$, d 
a policy of 'trimming' against the greater danger. When the government was- 
on the offensive, the moderates headed the defensive movement, as for example 
over parliamentary privilege in early 1914, the threatened Duma prorogation 
in August 1915 and the StUrmer 'dictatorship' in November 1916. But when the 
country's mood was threatening and the government appeared hard-pressed, the 
moderates exerted their weight against the popular movement, notably in 
September 1915 and the period December 1916 to February 1917. The Itrimmin I 9 
policy fostered the growing conviction of the unprincipled nature of Duma 
politics and the lunreliabilityl of the Duma, moderatest and at various tim*& 
thwarted both the government and the country. The mounting irritati(m. af-the 
27 Sukhanov, The Russian RIvOlutioA9PP-213-4s252 & 345-6. 
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government and nation became directed at the moderate-ruled Duma, which seemed 
to promote the postponement of the inevitable denouement only in the interests 
of upholding its own prestige and authority. By February 1917 both had lost 
confidence in the Duma and its moderates, and their value to either side was 
being seriously questioned. 'Moderates' in their principles and position in 
the Duma spectrum, the Kadets, Oktobrists and Progressists pursued a policy 
of attempting to 'moderate' the increasingly stark relationship between the 
rulers and the ruled. In so doing, they drew the fire of both sides. 
The qualities of political leadership which brought Milyukov success 
over the Fourth Duma period were as typical of the Duma moderates as were his 
failings. One of Milyukov's most serious shortcomings, cruelly spotlighted by 
the revolutionary situation, was his estrangement from the common people. As 
Chernov again remarked : 'his chief weakness was a complete lack of feeling 
for popular, mass psychology ; he was too much a man of the study, hence a 
doctrinaire ... he never spoke the language of the people ; for him it was 
a tremendous and alien force'. 
28 Milyukov's characteristic of regarding the 
people as either malleable ignoramuses of an inhuman mob was now typical not 
only of the Kadet party but of the moderate camp as a whole. In 1907 Milyukov 
had quoted Gladstone in describing 'liberalism' as 'confidence in the people' 
and 'conservatism' as 'lack of confidence in the people'. 
29 Over the period 
1903 - 1917, commencing with the drama of the Vyborg Appeal, the Kadeta had 
shifted from a 'liberal' to a 'conservative' psychology. The estrangement 
from the mass of the people which made such a powerful contribution to the 
collapse of tsardom was hardly less a feature of the moderates who constituted 
the first Provisional Government. 
A related feature of Milyukov's leadership also typical of the moderates 
was his lack of orientation outside the parliamentary milieu. In the course 
of the Dims Period the moderate deputies became seduced by the Privilege', 
28 CHERNOV 172- 
29 MilyukovsVtorgla DumalSt Petersburg 1907*'P. 28 quoted in Tyutyukin, 
t6ppositsia Yego VelichestvaltP-217- 
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prestige and protection offered by the Duma. Chernov called the Duma 'that 
peculiar little world which in Russia more than anywhere was isolated, 
protected against the pressure of the street'. 
30 It was in this envir6nm*nt, 
artificially maintained and increasingly out of touch with and unr*Prosentat- 
-ive of the main stream of Russian life, that the moderates played out their 
politics and intrigues. The moderates (and espeoially)Milyukov) were 
essentially suited to an established constitutional system, not to the 
revolutionary chaos with which they were confronted in 1917. Like Nicholas 
II himself, the moderates seemed designed by nature to function within the 
framework of a constitutional monarchy. Chernov made #ust this observation 
on Milyukov : 
He was meant for quiet normal times, when life follows deep, well- 
trodden paths, not breaking virgin soil recklessly, not for times when, 
irrational popular passions rages when the entire situation changes 
constantly, when mighty subterranean shocks overthrow the most magnific- 
-ent constructions like a house of cards. (31) 
In conversation with Vinaver in mid 1917, the Kadet Kokoshkin admitted 'you 
and I were born to be parliamentarians but fate always places us in 
circilm tances where the struggle must be waged along different paths ; thus 
it was in 1905-6 and so it is again now,. 
32 
Milyukov may have hoped in March 
1917 that his Duma career would serve as a political apprenticeship for the 
greater world of ministerial office, that 'having practised his diplomatic 
talents in the Duma corridors and in party conflicte, Milyukov felt himself 
called to transfer them from the microcosm of parliamentary politics to the 
macrocosm of international policy. 
33 In fact Milyukov proved unable to make 
the transition from an established parliamentary regime to the volatile 
world of revolution. Again typifying the moderate campt Milyukov's later 
career proved that the Duma period, far from being a preparation for higher 
things, represented the ideal milieu for his style of expertise and the 
30 CHEMOV 172 ; aleo JRihat 1 ConstItutional Devolop»ate in Runsial #P-9-7-- 
31 CEFMOV 173. 
32 m. Vinaver, Nedav_nee : KharWer: LMtIM i' vo Mjj"M"-. Parie 19269p. 135. 
33 CEF2N0V 17-5- 
L. 
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practical limit of his considerable but specialised talents. 
The position of the Duma moderates declined with each shift awat from 
the peacetime establishment. Powerless to control and often even to influence 
the major issues and developments of the period 1912-1917, the moderates 
betrayed their lack of resource with increasing clarity. Each new emergency 
drove the moderates into closer association with the government. The Duma 
had never been a trainingpground for a Government, only for an Opposition, 
and an 'Opposition of His Majestyt at that. The moderates were with rare 
exceptions still 'men of little deeds' and woefully ignorant of the practical 
demands and responsibilities of central government. In 1909 the Kadet 
Izgoyev admitted in Vekhil: 
We must at last have the courage to admit that the vast majority of 
members of our State Dumas, with the exception of thirty or forty Cadets 
and Octobrists, have not shown themselves to possess the knowledge 
required to undertake the job of governing and reconstructing Russia. (34) 
By late 1915 lasilii Maklakov, far from detecting an improvement, denied 
that even the more able Kadete were equal to the task of government : 'we do 
not understand this business, we do not know the technique, and there is 
now no time to learn'. 
35 Despite occasional sanguine claims, the Duma 
moderates (although the best of the Duma membership) were at no time a 
viable substitute for tsarist government, only potentially a powerful 
corrective. Fashioned by years in the political wilderness and with all the 
worst features of an 'Opposition mentality'$ the moderates made their worst 
showing of all in the Provisional Government. 
Well before the collapse of tsardom, the Duma had been incorporated into 
the traditional structure of government. rrom being the ambitioua national 
assembly of 1906 with its arrogant slogan #Let the Executive bow to the 
Legislature', the Duma had been reduced to something resembling a tearist 
P, R. O. for its Western Allies*36 Cowed by the recovery of the government 
34 Vekhi, p-123 ; also quoted in L*Aia*COllected W'Orks, svol-17, P. 209, 
35 Quoted in SHULIGIN 147 ; also Oznobishin9yo*P9mln=iAtPP-35-6* 
36 ENGELORARDTgi, 279, 
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after 1905, the Duma membership settled for an increasingly servile role, a 
process in which the moderates played the leading part. As Milyukov confessed 
in 1912,1to acquire the sole righ*f existence this 
[Third 
- R. P. 
3 Duma had 
to become one of the wheels of the bureaucratic machine'. 
37 By the middle 
of the Fourth Duma, the moderates were reliant upon the government for their 
political futures in every sense. When tsardom collapsed, supported to the 
very last by the moderates, the Duma leaders took power in the pursuit of 
their own party ambitions and the hope of retaining as much of the tsarist 
establishment as possible. Predictably the demands of government proved too 
burdensome for individuals without the talent, training or mass support for 
this unaccustomed exercise of power. Long deprived of wide support in the 
countryg the moderates could not long survive without the comfort and 
protection of traditional tsarist authority* In late 191,5 Sazonov described 
the tsarist government as 'dangling in mid-air, without support from below 
or above' ;a mere four months after the February Revolutionj Sukhanov made 
exactly the same comment upon the Provisional Government. 
38 The Provisional 
Government inherited all the weaknesses of tsardom with none of its strengths. 
The character, conduct and career of the moderates over the late Duma period 
predetermined the fate of the Provisional Government. The constitutional 
'Third Course' hailed with such optimism in the wake of the October Manifesto 
in 1905 declined irremediably over the career of the four Dumas to collapse 
completely in the revolutionary year 1917. 
37 Yezhexodnik "Rech"', 1912, P-77- 
38 Cherniavsky, ProloiMesp. 89 and ARRovol. 18, p. 60 Sukhanov, Zapiski o 
Revolyutsii97 volumesqBerlin 19229v, 146, 
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